--- Log opened Thu Mar 19 00:00:26 2015
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00:23 < bramc> There are two ways of doing it, and I'm not sure which is better. An individual contributor can say 'this output needs to be part of the transaction' or it can say 'this other input needs to be part of the transaction' thus deferring its judgement to that other thing.
00:24 < bramc> or both
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00:28 < bramc> I think the currently supported thing is to specify the output, and it can't specify a partial of the output, the only option is to require the output be just the one thing
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00:33 < fluffypony> bramc: I don't agree with your eBay analogy
00:33 < fluffypony> s/analogy/conclusion
00:33 < fluffypony> I think the OTC WoT *does* work, but there are two problems with it:
00:33 < bramc> fluffypony, Not sure what you mean, a bunch of what I said was cracking jokes
00:34 < fluffypony> oh about the highly centralised authority :)
00:34 < bramc> also, not sure what 'otc' and 'wot' are acronyms for
00:34 < fluffypony> OTC = Over The Counter (ie. #bitcoin-otc)
00:34 < fluffypony> WoT = Web of Trust
00:34 < fluffypony> here, for instance: http://bitcoin-otc.com/viewratingdetail.php?nick=fluffypony
00:34 < bramc> I'm not sure what the deal is with #bitcoin-otc, there was discussion earlier which seemed to imply that it's a failed thing where somebody made off with the goods
00:35 < fluffypony> no, the failed thing was Evolution, a darknet market
00:35 < fluffypony> the discussion is more around reputation systems in general
00:35 < fluffypony> you're right in saying that eBay's system works
00:36 < fluffypony> but (imho) wrong in concluding that you need a centralised authority
00:36 < fluffypony> the centralised authority in that model takes action on behalf of the users
00:36 < fluffypony> but that's because users aren't empowered to take much action themselves
00:36 < fluffypony> what I have noticed is that any seller with a rating <99% has a sales drop-off
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00:37 < fluffypony> people view it as "possibly untrustworthy"
00:37 < bramc> I didn't exactly say that you need centralized authority, just that all the examples of it working seem to involve centralized authority
00:37 < fluffypony> which goes back to gmaxwell's point about reputation hits being amplified
00:37 < fluffypony> so what I was going to say about the OTC WoT is that it's great *in principle*
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00:37 < fluffypony> buuuut the two problems I've identified are:
00:38 < bramc> The problem with a decentralized thing is that it's hard to iterate on when there are problems, which tends to be a cat and mouse game whenever there's a reason for having a reputation system in the first place
00:38 < fluffypony> 1. everyone takes "total ratings" as some measure of trustworthiness, forgetting about *who* rated the person and *when* they were rated
00:38 < bramc> Yes, it's a lot easier to flood positive reviews than negative
00:38 < fluffypony> 2. ratings are generally expressed in terms of "X gave Y a rating of N" instead of an expression of a "path" of trust
00:39 < fluffypony> which I suppose is a problem systemic to the fact that ratings are given as X gave Y a rating of N
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00:39 < fluffypony> ;;gettrust gmaxwell
00:39 < gribble> WARNING: Currently not authenticated. Trust relationship from user fluffypony to user gmaxwell: Level 1: 0, Level 2: 2 via 7 connections. Graph: http://b-otc.com/stg?source=fluffypony&dest=gmaxwell | WoT data: http://b-otc.com/vrd?nick=gmaxwell | Rated since: Mon Jul 25 13:49:45 2011
00:40 < fluffypony> people used to use ;;getratings all the time
00:40 < fluffypony> until it was removed
00:40 < bramc> That was experimented with on advogato, predating friendster
00:40 < fluffypony> bramc: so sort of like Facebook's social graph stuff?
00:40 < bramc> In the end you want a general rating based on the system as a whole, which tends to be fairly consistent
00:41 < bramc> Not sure what you mean about facebook's social graph stuff
00:41 < fluffypony> Facebook has this social graph thing in the back
00:41 < bramc> These things were literally worked on in 2002
00:41 < fluffypony> where they can tell that Alice is friends with Bob who is friends with Sue
00:41 < bramc> And you can see what became of them - everything is on facebook
00:41 < fluffypony> and they can build up a graph of friendships and relationships
00:42 < fluffypony> so they know who is connected to whom...because everyone is telling them
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00:42 < bramc> the usability of a simple 'friend' relationship beats everything, and a centralized system can be tweaked and despammed in a resaonable way
00:42 < fluffypony> yeah
00:42 < fluffypony> the great thing about trust "paths" is that it virtually eliminates most Sybil attacks
00:42 < fluffypony> because sock-puppet accounts are just circle-jerk rating each other
00:43 < bramc> If you assume that sock-puppets are less than half of the total accounts you don't really need to find paths
00:43 < bramc> or rather, you can look at the median rating of someone across everybody else and that gives you a pretty good idea of what's going on.
00:44 < fluffypony> I still like the idea of paths being a natural extension of the way we interact IRL
00:45 < fluffypony> like I introduce you to Bob at a party, and because you and I are friends there's already an implied trust between you and Bob
00:45 < bramc> If you use facebook you quickly realize that there's essentially no utility to a foafoaf relationship
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00:45 < fluffypony> if later on I go up to you and say that Bob is a douchebag, then your opinion of Bob changes because you don't really know him, so you're basing your view of him off what I say
00:45 < bramc> but on facebook you can quickly see a complete list of all the friends in common you have with someone, which tells you a surprising amount about them and makes it easy to ask for references
00:46 < fluffypony> yep, Facebook has got it down to a pay wrt to the way they display this stuff
00:46 < bramc> Well, I can tell you that peter is an asshole, but you knew that already
00:46 < fluffypony> I'm convinced that the general failure of the OTC WoT is down to the way the tooling expresses things
00:47 < fluffypony> the failure of the PGP WoT, on the other hand, is because people were signing PGP keys at parties for no real reason and no real purpose other than to say "yeah! I signed someone's key!"
00:47 < fluffypony> RIP PGP WoT
00:48 < bramc> the pgp web of trust didn't solve a problem anybody actually had, in a way which was usable to anybody
00:48 < bramc> I hated pgp from the beginning
00:49 < fluffypony> it's incredibly chunky
00:53 < bramc> We're happily conversing in this channel with effectively no authentication.
00:54 < bramc> If an FBI agent came to me tomorrow and asked for information about Mr. Pony I would hardly be able to tell them anything about your identity, but we still have some useful communication
00:54 < go1111111> random idea: is it possible to create a worthwhile reputation system where people try to predict the trustworthyness of other people, and benefit/lose accordingly as in a prediction market?
00:54 < bramc> I wish people would use slightly more identifying handles in here so I could keep everybody straight
00:54 < bramc> go1111111, no it isn't
00:55 < bramc> it's too many layers of abstraction removed from the eventual effect
00:55  * fluffypony wonders how that conversation would go down
00:55 < fluffypony> "so then Mr. Pony spoke to you on IRC, correct?"
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00:56 < bramc> And making it distributed would make it collapse under its own weight
00:56 < go1111111> bramc: and that is bad because it's just too complex? how confident are you that such a system wouldn't work?
00:57 < bramc> go1111111, Nobody's gotten even much simpler systems to 'work' in the sense of being useful for anything
00:58 < bramc> The whole point of bitcoin is that it *doesn't* require a reputation system
00:59 < bramc> And simultaneous transfer doesn't either
00:59 < fluffypony> Bitcoin doesn't, but dealing with people on the Internet really does
01:00 < fluffypony> especially as their transparency or anonymity should be their prerogative
01:01 < go1111111> simultaneous transfer of cryptocurrenies doesn't, but if I hire you to draw me a picture of a giraffe for 1 BTC, some reputation system would be useful
01:03 < bramc> Yes reputation systems are useful, but my advice for anyone wanting to have a reputation system is to set it up centralized and be prepared to change the rules on the fly as people try to game it any way they can
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01:09 < bramc> Related to that, the dread pirate roberts choosing that name seems to indicate that he actually thought people would buy his bizarre defense that he'd long since sold off the dread pirate roberts identity to someone else.
01:09 < bramc> reputation can be non-fungible in both the good and the bad directions
01:10 < fluffypony> yeah you can't really prevent reputation/identity theft or selling
01:11 < fluffypony> (in a decentralised system I mean)
01:13 < sl01> bramc: what about a marketplace for reputation ledgers?
01:17 < bramc> sl01, I can't tell if you're joking
01:18 < sl01> bramc: i mean like... have people subscribe (paid?) to services which track reputation, and let reputation services compete, so the one who tracks reputations as closely to reality as possible profits most?
01:18 < bramc> Still can't tell if you're joking
01:18 < sl01> not joking :(
01:19 < justanotheruser> I think it's a reasonable idea, don't see a reason for a ledger though
01:20 < sl01> sorry by ledger i just meant database basically
01:20 < sl01> and maybe you have to pay per query
01:20 < justanotheruser> it's not quite a decentralized solution though
01:21 < sl01> there could be some standard protocol so users could use different rep. services interchangeably wherever they are needed
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01:22 < bramc> Needs a paid vendor of analytics for whether peoples's reputation monitoring accurately reflects later behaviors
01:23 < wumpus> reputation management for reputation management vendors?
01:23 < wumpus> s/management/monitoring/
01:24 < bramc> I give up. Parody is dead.
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01:24 < fluffypony> Google Reputation, Powered by Google Blockchain (tm)
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01:25 < wumpus> turtles all the way down
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06:21 < kanzure> "The dude invented BitTorrent." "No, he extended the ideas of MojoNation and called it BitTorrent." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MojoNation
06:22 < kanzure> "Mojo was a digital cash currency that aimed to provide attack resistance and load balancing in a fully distributed and incentive-compatible way (see Agoric computing). Every pair of MojoNation nodes maintained a relative credit balance, with every EGTP request transferring some Mojo credit from the sender to the receiver. In early versions of MojoNation, users were required to set prices for any services their node provided. Most ...
06:22 < kanzure> ... users had no idea how to choose prices, so the Mojo layer was rewritten to use a second-price rolling auction." cool
06:24 < kanzure> how well did that work and what network size was reached?
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06:39 < amiller> paging zooko...
06:40 < zooko> http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CB8QFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.cs.rice.edu%2FConferences%2FIPTPS02%2F188.pdf&ei=p9EKVaL7I5LgoATw8oGAAw&usg=AFQjCNEoZlWFZGZPGZvAAgWgwJbdozUKxw
06:40 < zooko> http://www.cs.kent.edu/~javed/class-FP2P10S/papers-2006/mojonation.pdf
06:40 < zooko> I wrote that under a pseudonym.
06:41 < zooko> No, he unextended the ideas of Mojo Nation. :_)
06:42 < kanzure> that second link is an embarrassingly precise answer, i should have looked before asking :)
06:42 < zooko> Heh heh heh.
06:42 < zooko> I'm really glad for things that I published.
06:42 < zooko> Because I've forgotten everything else from that era except the things I can refresh my memory by reading. :-)
06:43 < zooko> And I've lost everything that I wrote down but didn't publish.
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09:20 < bramc> Oh look at that, channel logs made reddit
09:20 < fluffypony> you're famous!
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09:21 < andytoshi> influx of "what is this channel? why is it so quiet?" in 3 ... 2 ...
09:22 < binaryatrocity> What is this channel? Why is it so quiet?
09:25 < kanzure> bramc: pretty amazing how people are incapable of reading. your statement didn't even say "i am not going to give petertodd the benefit of the doubt" (rather, just on stupid-sounding ideas).
09:28 < gavinandresen> quiet… too quiet… people must be busy getting actual work done.
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09:33 < Anduck> hopefully we wont run out of btc devs
09:33 < instagibbs> you can tell that the accounts posting these irc "scoops" are simply rabble-rousers.
09:34 < instagibbs> they tire of banging on Luke-Jr  and move on to new folks :P
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09:35 < instagibbs> I think more people were shocked that bramc was hanging around -wizards
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09:42 < fluffypony> Reddit thrives on drama, instagibbs
09:44 < Luke-Jr> gavin +1 quiet is often good ☺
09:48 < nubbins`> dull, tho ;D
09:50 < zooko> gavinandresen: haha!
09:50 < Luke-Jr> nubbins`: only dull for the ones not writing code.
09:51 < nubbins`> only dull for the ones staring at the screen waiting for smth to happen 8)
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10:05 < tillikum> howdy
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10:07 < tillikum> anyone is austin this week for sxsw and keeping up with the bitcoin talks?
10:08 < kanzure> i am in austin but not at sxsw. i am offering food and access to andytoshi.
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10:08 < tillikum> whats andytoshi?
10:08 < kanzure> nevermind
10:08 < Anduck> a person..
10:09 < fluffypony> it's like a drug
10:09 < fluffypony> but with more mathematics
10:09 < Taek> you don't get access to it... it gets access to you!
10:10 < Taek> oh wait
10:10 < tillikum> haha thanks for the explanation... i think
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10:15 < Luke-Jr> lol
10:18 < tillikum> Hey kanzure - where are you offering the food and access?
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10:25 < kanzure> see pm
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10:28 < andytoshi> tillikum: hi, i'm in austin, but not keeping up with bitcoin talks; i'll also pm you
10:32 < bramc> andytoshi, Would like to talk to you about PoS stuff, I'm not in austin though
10:33 < andytoshi> bramc: i would too, not sure when i'll have some spare brain cycles tho
10:33 < andytoshi> bramc: is "proof of time" like a spow?
10:33 < bramc> andytoshi, Yeah different term for the same thing
10:35 < andytoshi> bramc: ok, cool. so one thing i was thinking is that you can do a weak sort of grinding by doing many PoT's in parallel
10:35 < bramc> andytoshi, That's why it's critical that the PoTs be canonical
10:36 < andytoshi> well, if they depend on the transaction set then you can grind them by fiddling with the transactions ... if not i don't see that they can commit to the transactions
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10:37 < bramc> That's why you have parallel PoTs for the challenges and the transaction set, with the transaction set shadowing the challenges, which are much more canonical
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10:38 < bramc> Not the most elegant solution, but it's all I've been able to come up with and it does seem to work
10:38 < andytoshi> do you have a writeup for this? i know you've been through it in the -wizards logs many times, but there is a ton of real-time iteration there
10:39 < bramc> No writeup yet, still iterating
10:39 < andytoshi> kk
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10:39 < andytoshi> like, what do you mean "shadowing" do the challenges depend on the tx set or not? it seems to me you either have a "grinding channel" through the transactions or you can't commit to them
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10:42 < bramc> There's a 'main trunk' which consists of alternating PoS and PoT and doesn't make any reference to transactions. It's what determines the challenges to the PoS
10:43 < bramc> There's a shadowing leaf branch which consists of alternating txroots and PoTs. The txroots are signed by the keys found in the PoS in the corresponding position of the main trunk
10:43 < bramc> a PoS in this case is just a public key whose hash is very close to the hash of the last PoT
10:43 < bramc> txroots also reference the leaf PoT of course
10:45 < bramc> All this complexity is necessitated by grinding attacks. Avoiding those is hard!
10:47 < andytoshi> how is stake distribution determined?
10:47 < andytoshi> oh i see
10:47 < bramc> andytoshi, There is no stake, it's just mining
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10:50 < andytoshi> so you're sorta "spacing out" a hashcash-like PoW by hashcashing keypairs which are then used to sign (a) a PoT, whose purpose is to push the characteristic time of the network longer than the synchronization time (for convergence) and (b) transaction sets?
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10:52 < bramc> I'm not familiar enough with hashcash to know exactly what that means, but it's spacing out PoS to avoid grinding on them, with a PoS being a public key which is used to sign a txroot and the previous leaf PoT. The spacing is done by doing a parallel PoT on both just the PoS and separately on the txroot. The PoT in the main trunk is used for the challenge in the next generation
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10:52 < bramc> The PoTs are fairly dumb. They're just repeated hashing with checkpoints.
10:55 < andytoshi> ok, i think i understand. i'll have to think about this a bit more
10:55 < andytoshi> tho i'm afraid this is perfectly compatible with what's in my paper :)
10:55 < andytoshi> because the stake keys have a cost which can be measured outside the system
10:56 < bramc> They definitely have a cost, it just happens to be depreciation on storage which was already sitting around anyway
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10:56 < bramc> I don't think of it as being stake, it's just mining with a different resource
10:57 < andytoshi> right. i think "stake" is a misleading term because people are used to being some sort of cryptographically-defined bond which is super cheap to compute
10:58 < bramc> By PoS here I mean proof of storage, not proof of stake
10:58 < andytoshi> and the problem with using that for consensus is that you can't cryptographically bond anything until you've got some sort of "cryptographic value store" which requires a pre-existing consensus system (this is my unproven claim)
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10:59 < andytoshi> oh ok, i thought PoS meant proof-of-stake. i think you will need to get a new acronym, that one's pretty settled :)
10:59 < bramc> hmm, probably
10:59 < tromp> PoD? proof of diskspace ?
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11:00 < fluffypony> Proof of Byte
11:00 < andytoshi> and it also means point-of-sale which causes confusion every so often ... and piece-of-shit, but that's less confusing because there is no non-shitty implementation of either "proof of stake" or "point of sale"
11:00 < Adlai> proof of old petabytes
11:00 < Taek> in the altcoin space, there's an existing concept of 'Proof of Capacity'
11:01 < nubbins`> capacity is the maximum amount something can hold
11:01 < bramc> I'm not sure if proof of stake systems can be made to work. My ideas can probably be used to fix some of their issues but not others. They are at the highest layer of abstraction much more complicated than what I'm doing, which is basically a technical fix, and I don't find trying to fix them a terribly interesting problem.
11:02 < bramc> Proof of Disk seems to be the least misleading
11:02 < nubbins`> ^
11:03 < tromp> capacity is somewhat less specific. eg. there is also computing capacity
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11:04 < tromp> the technically most correct term might be proof of  persistent storage, or proof of non-volatile storage
11:04 < Taek> PoPS
11:05 < tromp> not as succint as proof of diskspace  though:(
11:05 < fluffypony> PoNS
11:05 < bramc> PoD gets the message across much more clearly
11:05 < fluffypony> plus you have a band named after it
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11:06 < tromp> plus you can implement PoD on an iPoD :(
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11:08 < fluffypony> lol tromp
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11:17 < Anduck> what if k-value were calculated from private key (each priv key has one corresponding k-value) so every transaction re-using address would reveal the private key
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11:17 < Anduck> wouldn't this stop double spending? miners could just move the funds from doublespend-tryers to their own pockets
11:19 < Adlai> what if nobody used the new k-value calculation, and kept reusing old code and addresses?
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11:23 < Anduck> maybe it could be determined from pubkey that what the k hashed is
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11:24 < Anduck> privkey-pubkey-k all linked together like privkey and pubkey are currently
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11:34 < bramc> Anduck, That's probably a good idea. It doesn't completely fix everything because once a transaction is buried it can't be redone, but it should cut down on chicanery
11:35 < bramc> I need to do a blog post about how to get that effect for Lamport signatures. The more interesting question is whether it can be done for schnorr.
11:36 < Anduck> someone mining a block could double-spend though - but that can be done in current system too
11:37 < Taek> Would that enforce that you can't reuse addresses?
11:37 < Anduck> yes
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11:37 < Taek> that's a very sharp edge
11:37 < andytoshi> Anduck: there is no publically verifiable way to define k from the key such that a single sig doesn't reveal the secret key, at least that i know of, and at least that doesn't involve pairing
11:37 < Anduck> it's how bitcoin should work but reusing-possibility is a bonus
11:38 < andytoshi> Anduck: afaik you can only enforce linear relationships between k and the secret key, and if there is a known linear relationship between them you can solve for the key with one sig
11:39 < Anduck> isn't the k a random value normally?
11:39 < Apocalyptic> depends
11:40 < Anduck> depends?
11:40 < andytoshi> oh, actually i'm wrong, i see how to do it where k = x^2 with a NIZK, and this still hides the key, but it makes the sigs twice as big
11:40 < Apocalyptic> some implementations derive k deterministically afaik
11:40 < Anduck> Apocalyptic: ahh
11:41 < Anduck> Apocalyptic: it's a good way to ensure k will not be reused when reusing addresses
11:43 < Anduck> well, if this works it would solve at least two things: nonminer doublespending and address reuse
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14:39 < andytoshi> lol, gross ... if you do a pure pos system, this reduces to a centrally-signed (by whomever first starts grinding to maintain signership indefinitely) consensus, but it's still a consensus
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14:40 < andytoshi> well, you also have to do something to prevent the central signer from signing multiple histories, e.g. forcing ecdsa nonces, but this is easy
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14:41 < andytoshi> if you assume you've actually prevented this, then pos is a well-defined DMMS which is using commitments to a scarce resource :P
14:42 < moa> andytoshi: what's the resource?
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14:43 < andytoshi> moa: uhh it's not public yet ;)
14:43 < phantomcircuit> andytoshi, i suspect you'd find that preventing grinding is harder than it sounds
14:43 < moa> private scarcity
14:43 < andytoshi> moa: oh, the scarce resource is bonded pos-coin
14:44 < andytoshi> phantomcircuit: i'm not preventing grinding, i'm just observing that it leads to a centralized consensus, not a failed consensus
14:44 < kanzure> i thought there was no debate as to whether centralized consensus was consensus?
14:44 < phantomcircuit> oh
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14:44 < kanzure> i'm actually quite confused about what you are claiming
14:44 < phantomcircuit> andytoshi, for all practical purposes those are the same thing
14:44 < phantomcircuit> :P
14:45 < kanzure> what properties does a centralized consensus have that you thought that centralized ledger updating doesn't possess?
14:45 < andytoshi> kanzure: there isn't any confusion on what consensus is, but in the sidechains wp there's this "DMMS" definition and this claim "satoshi invented a DMMS which is how we get distributed consensus"
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14:45 < andytoshi> kanzure: but to actually get this you need a pretty heavy definition of DMMS (i think) which includes a bunch of crap from asic-faq.pdf
14:46 < andytoshi> with a "natural" definition of DMMS security you can describe things with heavy centralization pressure, and even apparently pos
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14:47 < andytoshi> well, this isn't quite true, i can define DMMS to be identical to amiller's scratch-off puzzles, but the name would be a bit misleading then
14:49 < moa> so it all hinges on the definition of DMMS?
14:49 < andytoshi> moa: yeah, i'm quietly working on a paper to give it a real definition
14:50 < moa> but that doesn't seem that surprising does it?
14:51 < andytoshi> moa: i'm a little surprised that i can't exclude pos outright with a really widely applicable definition
14:51 < moa> agreed
14:51 < andytoshi> but i stupidly didn't realize that even pure pos can lead to a stable consensus (in the sense that once someone hijacks it, nobody can "re-hijack it" to cause forks)
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15:04 < maaku> andytoshi: it isn't a dynamic membership set if no one can later join
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15:09 < andytoshi> maaku: oh, yeah, thx, that might force me into the scratch-off puzzle definition in a reasonably elegant way
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15:09 < andytoshi> i have an idea that all parties need to have equal footing (any differences will be amplified into total centralization) and this requires you have a poisson process of some sort
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15:10 < andytoshi> which is a SOP
15:10 < Taek> It doesn't seem natural to me that a DMMS would reduce to a SOP
15:10 < Taek> or at least, it would be surprising result
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15:12 < andytoshi> Taek: well, a DMMS is a signature, and it needs some sort of security property to differentiate it from any other function you might imagine ... so you think, what would a "forgery" of a DMMS be? roughly, producing one that claims to be produced with x amount of computing power without actually expending x amount of computing power
15:12 < andytoshi> for correctness you also want "claims to be produced with x amount of computer power" to actually mean that x amount of power was used on average
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15:13 < andytoshi> so if one party's computing power is worth more than another's, depending what "claim" means either the advantaged party breaks the security property or the disadvantaged one can't achieve the correctness property
15:14 < maaku> andytoshi: well certainly an important feature is that the cost-of-entry is the same for all participants
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15:14 < Taek> just trying to be general, but what if you have a DMMS where one party has double strength up to 5%?
15:15 < Taek> that results in a bit of centralization but it's not a huge advantage or security vulnerability
15:15 < andytoshi> so you need both parties to have equally-valued computing power, which i think means ~0 cost-of-entry and also means "X and Y working together" should be exactly as strong as "X and Y each working independently" meaning they aren't communicating
15:15 < rusty> andytoshi, Taek: reminds me of the idea of rewarding future miners during bootstrap by allowing them to mine future blocks at a discount.
15:15 < andytoshi> "not communicating" sounds like "memoryless" which forces you into a poisson process
15:16 < Taek> Perhaps this isn't what you are looking for, but could DMMS properties be achieved using some other barrier to entry than computing power?
15:16 < Taek> (or other close derivatives such as storage)
15:16 < andytoshi> Taek: "double strength up to 5%" means you can force the difficulty up to a point where you have positive EV but others don't (assuming equal electric costs)
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15:17 < andytoshi> Taek: yeah, sure, you just have a "cost function" which in bitcoin's case is actually measured in terms of random oracle accesses
15:17 < Taek> I guess that also fits the SOP definitioin
15:18 < andytoshi> yeah
15:18 < Taek> to be more nuanced: double strength up to 5%, 0 strenght between 5 and 10%
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15:19 < Taek> so beyond 10% you're equally powered
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15:19 < andytoshi> :P that's impossible, just run your 5% miner and then pretend to be a non-advantaged party for the rest
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15:19 < Taek> ah foo
15:20 < benjyz1> "satoshi invented a DMMS which is how we get distributed consensus"
15:21 < benjyz1> compute power was only a proxy. that's something Bitcoiners like to forget
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15:22 < bramc> andytoshi, One wants a little more than 'has eventual consensus' out of a PoS system. You want any party to be able to transfer their shares as long as there isn't a 51% conspiracy trying to stop them
15:24 < andytoshi> bramc: a little more than "has eventual distributed consensus" you mean?
15:24 < andytoshi> i guess so, it's not clear what a 51% conspiracy woud mean if your consensus system had priviledged parties
15:24 < bramc> andytoshi, Having a consensus dictator is a form of consensus :-)
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15:29 < moa> collateralising tax-slaves for sovereign debts is a form of consensus also
15:29 < Taek> I think I do agree that priviledged parties don't really fit the spirit of DMMS
15:29 < benjyz1> devs are priviledged parties already.
15:29 < benjyz1> they have some control over the system without any CPU power or stake
15:30 < moa> benjyz1: only as many nodes are prepared to run their code ....
15:31 < benjyz1> yes, but miners don't write code. and with PoS the relationship is much clearer
15:31 < bramc> What we really need is proof of mutton. Much better than proof of steak.
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15:32 < bramc> andytoshi, It may be that including PoT can improve the security of a PoS system
15:32 < Taek> how so?
15:33 < bramc> It isn't obvious what should be viewed as off limits for a PoS system. Presumably PoD and PoP (proof of power, which is what bitcoin uses) are off the table.
15:33 < benjyz1> one original idea in the original whitepaper: use IP addresses
15:33 < bramc> Taek, using PoT can make it so that an an attacker can't retroactively go back and redo things because they'd fall behind
15:33 < andytoshi> benjyz1: lurk moar pls
15:33 < justanotheruser> benjyz1: what
15:34 < bramc> IP addresses are not a scarce or fairly distributed resource
15:34 < bramc> Also impossible to retroactively authenticate
15:34 < andytoshi> bramc: i don't think you can fix pos with PoT, you can do lots of PoT's in parallel and this is a form of grinding ... if you have 1/Nth of the stake you can do N PoTs in parallel and have a good chance of getting the next block such that you are signer again
15:34 < benjyz1> andytoshi: what's your problem.
15:35 < Taek> andytoshi: what about PoS systems where signers are not chosen randomly but rather all participate in every round using something like byzantine paxos?
15:36 < benjyz1> yes. why are IP addresses allocated the way they are?
15:36 < bramc> andytoshi, Just a thought that they may help in some way, and aren't prohibited by the rules. I wouldn't put money on them fixing everything
15:36 < benjyz1> and could be there a different way
15:36 < andytoshi> Taek: wouldn't that require them all to communicate somehow?
15:36 < bramc> andytoshi, There are a lot of ways which PoT can be used. Grinding is of course a huge issue in most of them though.
15:36 < Taek> you'd need 2/3 of the parties to be in communication every block
15:36 < Taek> and network overhead is severe
15:37 < andytoshi> bramc: ya, i'll definitely keep it in mind
15:37 < andytoshi> Taek: i think your network would be bounded so severely that the network itself would effectively be a "single point of failure"
15:38 < benjyz1> throwing buzzwords around doesn't solve any problem
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15:39 < Taek> You'd probably be alright below 100 signers
15:39 < Taek> hmm that might even be generous
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15:40 < justanotheruser> Taek: I think tendermint tries something like that, but because they have soooo many other design flaws, I don't think their unspecified implimentation of the ideas in "Consensus in the Presence of Partial Synchrony" will be any better.
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15:41 < andytoshi> benjyz1: you are on a research channel. please try to keep the signal-to-noise ratio high; many people here try to read every message. if you don't recognize a term of art please look it up
15:42 < justanotheruser> Even if 2/3 of the voters can come to consensus on what the contents of a block should be, I don't see how you can prevent stake grinding. I pointed out that an individual could try to influence a block so they were the voters for future blocks and they basically said "okay, we'll make it so the voters are predetermined at inception of the currency"
15:43 < benjyz1> andytoshi: I'm asking what your referring to. I don't understand what's wrong with this bitcoin cabaling
15:43 < Taek> justanotheruser: I (think) the setup would be (haven't thought extensively about it) that you pick the X highest stake owners (say 100) and then they participate in every round
15:44 < Taek> there's no computational grinding
15:44 < Taek> though once you are in the top 100, you can only be displaced by someone else gathering up more stake than you have
15:44 < Taek> there'd be incentive to block transactions that pool stake into once place
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15:48 < bramc> Taek, There needs to be some allowances for some fraction of that top 100 being offline, which leads to attackers claiming that they were
15:49 < justanotheruser> Taek: That seems to bring us to the next layer which is the deadlock issue
15:49 < Taek> deadlock can be avoided so long as 2/3 of parties are both online and not acting maliciously
15:49 < Taek> not a great safety margin
15:49 < justanotheruser> yep
15:50 < Taek> I don't have any safe mechanism for resolving deadlock
15:50 < justanotheruser> and even then, "long range" (at least one block back) attacks can be done
15:50 < bramc> Taek, I'm not entirely convinced that that's all been worked out because there's the business of who's holding the next election which seems a little sketchy
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15:53 < Taek> I keep forgetting that parties can go back and change their mind to write a new history
15:54 < Taek> which is particularly dangerous if they sell all of their stake
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15:55 < phantomcircuit> Taek, wrapping your head around that is the difficult part
15:56 < phantomcircuit> you need to create some kind of incentive to always build on the longest chain
15:56 < phantomcircuit> but that doesn't exist in a pure pos system
15:56 < phantomcircuit> (maybe)
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18:21 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: re: fraud proofs, my python-proofmarshal library is specifically meant to make generating fraud proofs natural and easy, althugh I have a fair amount more work left to do there
18:21 < phantomcircuit> petertodd, but how to deal with rules such as block length
18:21 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: it's definitely impossible to create a fraud proof for a block you've never seen!
18:22 < phantomcircuit> not sure how you could generate a compact fraud proof there without moonmath
18:22 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: by making the merkle tree sum up tx size
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18:22 < phantomcircuit> petertodd, ok without also changing the protocol rules
18:22 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: this was talked about on bitcointalk ~2.5 years ago or so, if not longer
18:22 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: yeah, we're screwed there :)
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18:23 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: *lots* of things that are simply impossible to prove in bitcoin in compact ways, although they're all possible to (mostly) prove with soft-fork changes
18:23 < phantomcircuit> sig op counts and such?
18:23 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: good example
18:24 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: also, if a block double-spends
18:24 < Luke-Jr> petertodd: thoughts on the conclusion being that "better chain" is the only fraud proof worth implementing?
18:24 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: (er, sorry, not a grat example, easy to make  a fraud proof there, not easy to avoid needing the whole chain to make it)
18:25 < andytoshi> i rewrote pos.pdf https://download.wpsoftware.net/bitcoin/new-pos.pdf it's over twice as long now, but if anyone would like to proofread that'd be awesome
18:25 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: I think that's nuts and assumes silly things like majority of miners are strictly honest
18:25 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: although with a 1MB blocksize the amount of data to just fully verify is sufficiently low that you *can* get away with it :)
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18:33 < phantomcircuit> petertodd, well that ones each you just give the mt branch for both
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18:33 < phantomcircuit> petertodd, that was my suggestion
18:33 < phantomcircuit> everybody including spv clients should just walk the blockchain once
18:34 < phantomcircuit> dont need to store the blocks or run the scripts just do the normal rule checks
18:34 < phantomcircuit> unfortunately the fraud proof for invalid scripts is "run this script"
18:35 < phantomcircuit> although i guess that's easy to deal with
18:35 < kanzure> andytoshi: woot. i will look soon.
18:35 < phantomcircuit> peer asks you to check a fraud proof
18:35 < phantomcircuit> script is valid
18:36 < kanzure> andytoshi: i strongly encourage you to not call this file new-pos.pdf....
18:36 < phantomcircuit> stop accepting fraud proofs from peer
18:36 < kanzure> andytoshi: for one there's a lot of backlinks to the old one, and second why would anyone know whether or not they have looked at the "actually new" one?
18:36 < kanzure> you should instead move old pos.pdf somewhere else
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18:38 < kanzure> or perhaps calling it something else entirely, if you want pos.pdf to still go to the old one
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18:39 < phantomcircuit> petertodd, actually i guess the easiest "Fraud proof" is a peer telling you they think something about a block is wrong and for you to check it more closely
18:40 < phantomcircuit> but i guess that's more or less the same as "i think this is the tip"
18:41 < phantomcircuit> annnd we're back to
18:41 < phantomcircuit> <Luke-Jr> petertodd: thoughts on the conclusion being that "better chain" is the only fraud proof worth implementing?
18:41 < phantomcircuit> sort of
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18:55 < petertodd> sorry, wifi is dying here
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19:00 < phantomcircuit> Luke-Jr, ha i think i can actually make that work in current bitcoin core without much effort
19:00 < phantomcircuit> doesn't even need a protocol change
19:03 < bramc> The impossibility of proving 'this part of the merkle tree is gibberish' makes it not seem worth worrying about other fraud proofs
19:04 < rusty> andytoshi: s/untimately/ultimately/
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19:08 < phantomcircuit> bramc, huh
19:12 < bramc> If someone wants to defraud they can do it by sending out a a history which is valid except for a single bit of it being missing, so the whole thing will later become invalid for that reason
19:13 < phantomcircuit> oh
19:13 < phantomcircuit> yeah sure
19:18 < kanzure> comments submitted to andytoshi in Private Correspondence haha
19:19 < rusty> andytoshi: Nice. "The author claims without proof that these are not serious problems, only tedious ones"
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19:48 < andytoshi> i've updated the paper from kanzure's comments; there is a new section 2 defining "distributed consensus" and a bunch of minor typographical changes
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20:54 < bramc> andytoshi, The non-dmms system you suggest seems to be non-dmms on a technicality
20:59 < andytoshi> 17:10:55 <andytoshi> yeah, but when i try to formalize dmms i seem to find that either the security property is way too permissive (and doesn't provide any protection against bad histories) or it's tight enough that it eexcludes PoS for reasons that feel like technicalities
20:59 < andytoshi> bramc: so i don't say "pos is not a DMMS so it sucks", i say "pos is an alternative to DMMS but it doesn't work, non-DMMS distributed consensus is still open"
21:00 < bramc> That's all well and good, but waylayed rewards are still rewards
21:03 < kanzure> what?
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21:10 < bramc> kanzure, I'm referring to ", simple changes to Bitcoin’s protocol, such as rewarding miners
21:10 < bramc> 6
21:10 < bramc> In that same blog post, Buterin says “if you are tired of opponents of proof of stake pointing you to this article[Poe14b]
21:10 < bramc> by Andrew Poelstra, feel free to link them here in response”. It is not clear what he means by this; he did not, there or
21:10 < bramc> anywhere, refute that paper’s claim that you cannot produce consensus except by consuming an external resource.
21:10 < bramc> 7
21:10 < bramc> with “coupons” to mine far-future blocks with lower difficulty[BCD+14, Section 6.1] seem unlikely
21:10 < bramc> to harm consensus while definitely not satisfying the given definition of DMMS"
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21:10 < bramc> gack, sorry for the carriage returns
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21:11 < bramc> It seems like those coupons should fall within a not very expanded definition of dmms
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21:12 < andytoshi> bramc: if you think you can expand it i'm open to suggestions at apoelstra@wpsoftware.net ... especially because it'd be nice to have a good argument about the waylayed rewards ... but my feeling after spending a cuople minutes on it was that it'd be messy
21:12 < bramc> Probably messy, yes
21:12 < andytoshi> maybe the definition wouldn't be too bad but the "consensus is possible" argument would be
21:13 < gmaxwell> works fine so long as the cupons are external to the system, internal? it just ends up cyclic and you need a synchronous network assumption to resolve it; I think.
21:13 < gmaxwell> coupons*
21:14 < bramc> gmaxwell, They mostly mess up the discretization into heartbeats
21:15 -!- RoboTeddy [~roboteddy@2601:9:3483:2400:4cdf:538f:a017:db28] has quit [Ping timeout: 256 seconds]
21:15 < bramc> andytoshi, You also skip over the point that it's assumed that nodes have somewhat accurate clocks to ensure that they don't accept histories with too many mining rewards. Bitcoin wouldn't work without that.
21:16 < gmaxwell> e.g. with coupons, how do you prevent existing coupon holders from just denying everyone new the ability to participate? How do you differentiate a simulated alternative history that just plays out differently that goes back before all the current coupons were created, except by assuming that the network is magically synchronous and all the participants will effortlessly agree on the past beyond
21:16 < gmaxwell> some horizon?
21:16 < andytoshi> bramc: that's only necessary as an anti-dos measure
21:17 < gmaxwell> andytoshi: the inflation schedule could play out too fast. Though thats somewhat orthorgonal to the basic consensus mechenism.
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21:18 < andytoshi> oh i see
21:18 < bramc> Maybe we aren't all thinking the same thing about what coupons mean. I'm guessing that they're a bonus for future mining rewards.
21:18 < andytoshi> my bad, i didn't think about that ... im not sure it belongs here tho
21:20 < bramc> andytoshi, It's perfectly fair to say that it's beyond the scope of that document, although it does seem to say that time is totally irrelevant to mining and evaluating a blockchain, which isn't strictly speaking true.
21:20 < bramc> Creates an interesting subtlety in a PoD*PoT system because there are two things which are having their difficulty reset and only one measuring stick to use on both of them.
21:23 < bramc> Gotta reboot, bbiab
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21:26 < moa> https://pthree.org/2014/12/07/use-dev-random-instead-of-dev-null/ something for a friday afternoon
21:27 < Taek> throughput isn't even affected that much
21:29 < rusty> moa: I remember when someone unlinked /dev/null on a SunOS system once.  The resulting content was surprising.
21:30 < rusty> Taek: um, that'd be because dd defaults to 512 byte reads and writes.  The kernel's /dev/null optimizations won't even get a play, really.
21:31  * Taek runs his own benchmarks
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21:32 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, well you can make census work by following the fork but it's more or less useless since you'd constantly be invalidinag outputs that people considered final
21:32 < phantomcircuit> you'd end up with consensus... but it's useless
21:33 < rusty> Taek: 1M blocks here on Ubuntu ISO: /dev/null: real	0m0.198s.  /dev/random: real	0m11.056s
21:34 < Taek> rusty: /dev/random: 91MB/s. /dev/null: 5.0GB/s
21:34 < rusty> Taek: that seems about right.
21:37 < phantomcircuit> rusty, the dd into /dev/random is limited by time in the filesystem code reading the iso
21:37 < phantomcircuit> dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/random will give wildly different results
21:38 < rusty> phantomcircuit: um, no.
21:38 < phantomcircuit> the lower bound is
21:39 < phantomcircuit> also i think dd defaults to 1 byte blocks
21:39 < rusty> phantomcircuit: No, 512.  See above.
21:39 < phantomcircuit> your right it does
21:39 < phantomcircuit> huh
21:39 < rusty> phantomcircuit: sure, you can eliminate the fs overhead, but as you can see above, it's minimal.
21:40 < rusty> phantomcircuit: you have to be old to know this :)
21:40 < Taek> using /dev/zero as input I'm getting approx. the same results
21:40 < phantomcircuit> that's weird
21:40 < phantomcircuit> i bet that guys is reading from disk and not page cache for /dev/random and then from page cache for /dev/null
21:41 < rusty> phantomcircuit: no, I think the syscall overhead is dominating, that's all.
21:41 < phantomcircuit> what kind of horribly kernel is syscall limited for that kind of call
21:41 < rusty> phantomcircuit: oh, actually, yeah.
21:42 < rusty> phantomcircuit: sorry, I get a much worse /dev/random result for 512 blocks too.  He's on crack...
21:42 < rusty> phantomcircuit: ie. you're right.
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21:47 < rusty> phantomcircuit: perhaps he doesn't have 4.5GB of memory free, so he's bounded by reading from disk?  He
21:48 < rusty> 's getting 54MB, I'm getting 84 here (to /dev/random), so perhaps that makes sense.
21:48 < ThinThread> if anyone wants to donate to my Adidab cap fund the address is 1FFUbeoDbX2dCpwBU9GRMgtTfXvKrewujG
21:48 < ThinThread> (all day i dream about bitcoin)
21:50 < phantomcircuit> rusty, he must have a really shitty hdd
21:50 < ThinThread> whats a short way to say that money being the root of all evil only applies to fiat?
21:51 < moa> ThinThread: the accurate quote is "the love of money is the root of all evil"
21:52 < ThinThread> ok, but... i dont think loving bitcoin is bad.
21:52 < moa> depends on your intentions I guess
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21:52 < rusty> ThinThread: I think you're in the wrong channel.
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21:55 < moa> i more interested if it really is such a good idea using /dev/random as a garbage bin?
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22:48 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, so uh i was thinking, cant we just check if any of our peers think there's a fork, validate those headers, and then check the scripts at the fork
22:49 < phantomcircuit> (this is expensive and i hope virtually never happens)
22:49 < phantomcircuit> oh no we cant since i could fork at like block 4 easily
22:49 < phantomcircuit> or worse at block say 200k
22:51 < phantomcircuit> although strictly speaking that wouldn't be anymore work than we're doing now
22:52 < phantomcircuit> and we could check ALL the scripts in the background with a duplicate utxo set
22:52 < phantomcircuit> er not duplicate "forked"
22:52 < phantomcircuit> another
22:52 < phantomcircuit> just another one
22:52 < phantomcircuit> >.>
22:53 < gmaxwell> phantomcircuit: thats a change in the security model, you're not supposed to accept an _invalid_ chain even if all your peers are malicious.  That this is true may decrease the incentive for all your peers to actually be malicious.
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23:04 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, this is along side the height check of course
23:05 < phantomcircuit> in the background you'd be running all the script checks
23:05 < phantomcircuit> but if you saw another peer that had another fork you'd stop and assume the scripts might be invalid
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