--- Log opened Fri May 22 00:00:19 2015
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03:36 < jaromil> hay there, anyone knows what's up with bitcoin.it down ?
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03:39 < Taek> jaromil: #bitcoin (server got hacked via social engineeering, had to be reset)
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03:48 < Mably> Do you mean that bitcoin.it and bitcointalk.org are hosted on the same "machine"?
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03:56 < jaromil> ACK, thx
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08:10 < nsh> phantomcircuit / midnightmagic, do you have quote DH group prime generation performance numbers still?
08:11 < nsh> (discussing logjam mitigations at a security group meeting at some university)
08:16 < kanzure> so is this what you were trying to intern at gchq for?
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12:36 < phantomcircuit> <phantomcircuit> nsh, 4096 bit dh prime 7m52.618s
12:36 < phantomcircuit> <phantomcircuit> nsh, real 396m55.804s
12:36 < phantomcircuit> for 8192
12:36 < phantomcircuit> i can redo the smaller ones if you're interested
12:36 < Taek> phantomcircuit: what are you doing?
12:37 < akrmn> Hi so if someone wants to discuss the proposal I made on the mailing list, feel free to do so (titled "Scaling Bitcoin with Subchains").
12:37 < phantomcircuit> i timed generating dh safe primes with openssl gendh
12:37 < phantomcircuit> akrmn, please dont call it scaling
12:37 < phantomcircuit> it's confusing to the general public
12:37 < akrmn> I prefer an answer by mail, but if you prefer IRC, I can also reply
12:38 < phantomcircuit> adjusting the blocksize limits via a hard or soft fork is at best a linear increase
12:38 < phantomcircuit> it doesn't change the fundamental scaling issues
12:38 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: +1
12:38 < akrmn> phantomcircuit: True, that's another reason we should look to other solutions
12:38 < akrmn> I think petertodd would like my proposal. It's similar to his tree chains thing from what I remember.
12:39 < phantomcircuit> you mean the thing which he cant get the incentives right for?
12:39 < phantomcircuit> that's maybe not a ringing endorsement...
12:40 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: nah, incentives for tree chains are easy... actually using it is hard
12:40 < Adlai> akrmn: http://sourceforge.net/p/bitcoin/mailman/message/34127318/ ?
12:40 < gmaxwell> phantomcircuit: I don't know of any such problem. Its just that that vision needs either snarks or potentially huge proofs accepted with payments.
12:40 < akrmn> Adlai: Yes that one
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12:41 < phantomcircuit> petertodd, i remember there being some issue with much larger miners being able to steal rewards from smaller miners
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12:42 < phantomcircuit> am i mistaken or did you fix that?
12:42 < phantomcircuit> akrmn, there is active work being done on trustless micropayment channels in a hub/spoke topology supporting multiple hops
12:42 < phantomcircuit> ie lightning
12:42 < phantomcircuit> (that description is probably broken in some way...)
12:42 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: I think you're mistaken there - though the bigger issue, is I suspect it's not likely to get used for currency stuff directly anyway, for the forseeable future
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12:44 < akrmn> Yes I heard of lightning, still don't fully understand it, but I think it's just if you want "instant" transactions, but doesn't really fix the low volume of transactions problem.
12:44 < Luke-Jr> akrmn: probably would be easier to just leave addresses as a deprecated mainchain-only thing, and extend the payment protocol to decide what sidechain you want to receive the payment on. this could work with non-"scaling" sidechains, and is really orthogonal to your idea IMO
12:45 < Luke-Jr> a year or so ago, I was thinking sidechains may be a scalability solution, but I decided to put further thoughts on this line off until sidechains were more mature, and now think Lightning may make such experiments unnecessary
12:46 < phantomcircuit> akrmn, micropayment channels (which lightning is an extension of) allow for net settlement
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12:46 < petertodd> I suspect where we'll actually see ugly scaling pressure is in people using the blockchain for things like escrow, as well as less-directly financial use-cases
12:46 < phantomcircuit> lightning allows for net settlement through a hub
12:47 < Taek> what timeline are we assuming? Lightning still requires setup transactions, there currently isn't enough room on the blockchain for 7 billion people to each have a setup tranasction
12:47 < phantomcircuit> petertodd, the vast majority of financial cases really just need timestamping
12:48 < akrmn> Luke-Jr: OK that could work too I suppose, instead of deciding based on addresses.
12:48 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: no, they don't... timestamping is not interesting
12:48 < Luke-Jr> akrmn: if you did it based on address, the receiver would need to monitor every such sidechain basically
12:49 < akrmn> Luke-Jr: Well if they use addresses only in the same set, then it should stay in the same sidechain
12:49 < akrmn> But there would be duplication
12:50 < phantomcircuit> petertodd, eh
12:50 < akrmn> where if you have an address from another set involved, it would be duplicated in that one too
12:50 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: what do you mean exactly by "timestamping"?
12:50 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: what are you trying to prevent?
12:50 < akrmn>  I don't see how lightning can solve the storage size problem
12:51 < phantomcircuit> petertodd, enabling someone to make a falsifiable statement is quite often enough
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12:51 < phantomcircuit> "these were out accounting records on may 1, 2013"
12:51 < akrmn> I guess you just store only what you deal with in your own lightning networks
12:51 < akrmn> but I think it's less decentralized, then sidechains/subchains
12:51 < Luke-Jr> akrmn: I suppsoe they can "vanitygen" addresses in the same set, but that's ugly.
12:51 < ajweiss> akrmn: you open up a micropayment contract with an intermediary and fund it, then spend around on the lightning network.  the intermediaries settle on occasion.
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12:52 < phantomcircuit> this obviously doesn't enable interesting things like trustless exchange, but mostly ownership of financials is through a third party trusted issuer
12:52 < akrmn> ajweiss: Ya and it's a bit more restrictive, because it has to be a micropayment contract
12:53 < akrmn> lightning is still complementary to what I propose, just you use it only when you want very fast transactions.
12:53 < ajweiss> well that's the point, it moves from on-chain transactions to offchain transactions with guarantees that no intermediaries are going to screw you over.
12:53 < Luke-Jr> phantomcircuit: eh, the *users* settle on occasion, not the intermediaries..
12:54 < Luke-Jr> phantomcircuit: Lightning is a trustless system
12:54 < Luke-Jr> ajweiss: Lightning hubs can't screw you over (other than locking funds for some predefined time period)
12:54 < akrmn> With subchains, you use the level of chain according to the size of transaction you want to make.
12:55 < phantomcircuit> Luke-Jr, yeah that's what i meant
12:56 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: remember that timestamping *only* proves that *a* particular bit of data existed before a certain time, nothing else
12:57 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: what you usually need for records is that for a given domain only *one* piece of data exists; what my proofchains implements with txouts as anti-doublespend devices
12:57 < phantomcircuit> petertodd, yeah i know, im saying that very often you actually dont need that proof
12:58 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: well, I'm saying you do :) heck, I just got back from ny and multiple meetings with various banks about this stuff...
12:58 < phantomcircuit> but that's maybe not interesting :P
13:07 < akrmn> I don't understand gmaxwell's response: "But it is a functonal reduction to SPV security for anyone who isn't validating the rest, so it retains most of the fundimental centeralization vs scale tradeoff"
13:07 < akrmn> The first part he's talking about SPV security. Aren't SPV nodes just fake unsafe full nodes?
13:08 < akrmn> Then the second part, he says it retains some kind of tradeoff. In a good or bad way?
13:08 < Taek> It's a lot easier to scale a system (distributed or otherwise) when you start introducing centralization
13:09 < akrmn> ok...?
13:09 < Taek> gmaxwell is saying that you have introduced centralization to achieve your scaling, something that is less interesting b/c there are other known ways to achieve that
13:09 < phantomcircuit> akrmn, SPV nodes provide Simple Payment Verification, they are generally safe if you assume that the majority of hashing power is following the rules
13:09 < akrmn> How did I introduce centralization?
13:10 < phantomcircuit> the primary difference in security between a full node and an spv client is the impact of an attack
13:10 < akrmn> Currently, for small transactions we have centralization (off chain transactions) so this eases it by having more decentralized off chain transactions (in sub chains)
13:11 < phantomcircuit> which is to say the security assumptions are the same, but that the consequences of those assumptions being broken is much worse with an spv client
13:11 < akrmn> I will read more about SPV
13:11 < akrmn> but I think the best model is: Run a bitcoin node on your home desktop. Connect to your home desktop bitcoin node via a VPN if you're outside (like on a phone).
13:12 < akrmn> So why do you need an SPV?
13:12 < phantomcircuit> akrmn, spv + trusted full node is the same security as a full node
13:12 < ajweiss> what if i don't want to run infrastructure at home and i just want a smartphone app that works?  then i use spv.
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13:13 < phantomcircuit> spv + lying full node is at least not horribly broken
13:13 < phantomcircuit> where as dumb client + compromised trusted full node is game over
13:13 < phantomcircuit> spv client if you have a trusted full node is just smart risk mitigation
13:14 < akrmn> ajweiss: OK if you don't want, then you can use SPV, but there should be the option for people to run a node themselves, instead of being forced to trust someone else.
13:15 < akrmn> Still I have to understand why the blockchain extension I propose actually weakens SPV security
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13:19 < gavinand1esen> Time for more real-time peer review:  http://gavinandresen.ninja/are-bigger-blocks-better-for-bigger-miners
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13:25 < Taek> gavinand1esen: I'm perhaps not the best person to say this, but my understanding is that the biggest opposition to larger blocks comes from the cost of validation, not from the risk of miner centralization.
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13:26 < gavinand1esen> Taek: I cover cost of validation in http://gavinandresen.ninja/does-more-transactions-necessarily-mean-more-centralized
13:27 < gavinand1esen> I’m trying hard to get people to stop arguing angels-dancing-on-the-head-of-a-pin and actually work out costs so we can have a rational discussion of costs and benefits....
13:27 < phantomcircuit> gavinand1esen, "I ran some simulations, and if blocks take 20 seconds to propagate"
13:27 < phantomcircuit> that's quite an assumption
13:28 < gavinand1esen> phantomcircuit: we validate at about 1MB per second…. I assume miners are on at least 1MB-per-second network connections.
13:28 < gavinand1esen> (well, my old Mac validates at MB per second)
13:28 < Taek> gavinand1esen: running a node on a datacenter requires you to trust that datacenter. It's much safer to run a node at home, where you lose the economic advantages of datacenters; it's especially a lot more expensive if you're in a less developed part of the world
13:29 < Taek> Furthermore, less developed parts of the world appear to have much more to gain from switching to Bitcoin as their banking/financial infrastructure is much weaker in the first place
13:30 < phantomcircuit> gavinand1esen, if slowing validation gives miners an advantage i can think of more than a few ways to do that
13:30 < gavinand1esen> Taek: if you are going to argue that everybody should be able to run a full node over a 56K dial-up modem connection then we’re going to have to agree to disagree
13:30 < gavinand1esen> phantomcircuit: slowing by messing with network connections?  THat’s indepdent of block size.
13:31 < gavinand1esen> Taek: I’m not sure exactly what you are arguing.  What should people be able to do on exactly what type of connection?  Numbers, please.
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13:35 < Taek> As many people worldwide should have access to a node that they trust which is capable of verifying the entire blockchain, furthremore, the process for verifying from genesis needs to achievable: if you can *just* keep up, you don't have enough space to verify from genesis.
13:35 < Taek> 'node that they trust' could include a local library I suppose. It doesn't necessarily need to be in-home
13:36 < Taek> but requiring it to be in a massive datacenter seems unreasonable
13:36 < gavinand1esen> Taek: numbers, please.  The blockchain is 20GB now, and getting bigger… many people will be unable to keep up with what we have NOW.
13:37 < gavinand1esen> Taek: and why are you saying ‘massive datacenter’ ?  I run a full node from home, from my office, and could easily continue to run with 20MB blocks.....
13:37 < Luke-Jr> gavinand1esen: I'm not sure I could.
13:37 < phantomcircuit> gavinand1esen, no ... by adding a bunch of previously unseen transactions to the block
13:38 < phantomcircuit> which will also stall any other blocks from being processed
13:38 < Taek> "I’ll use ChunkHost’s current pricing to do some back-of-the-envelope calculations." --> you're calulations are based on datacenter prices in your blog post.
13:38 < Taek> *your
13:39 < gavinand1esen> phantomcircuit: I cover that in the blog post— a 20MB block full of not-previously-seen transactions takes about 20 seconds to validate on a modest PC.
13:39 < gavinand1esen> phantomcircuit: … and 20 seconds extra propagation is not a big deal.
13:39 < Luke-Jr> uh
13:39 < Luke-Jr> that's 20 seconds *per hop*
13:40 < gavinand1esen> Luke-Jr: yes, but propagation is exponential so it doesn’t really matter.  Play with my simulator a big, I was surprised at how robust even extreme network topologies are.
13:40 < phantomcircuit> gavinand1esen, that is nonsense
13:40 < Luke-Jr> hm
13:41 < phantomcircuit> a 20MB full block with cold cache takes 60 seconds on a 4 core i3
13:41 < Taek> gavinand1esen: http://www.netindex.com/download/allcountries/ - based on this graph I would target 2mbps as a good assumption
13:41 < phantomcircuit> and about 50 seconds on my laptops i7-4700MQ
13:41 < phantomcircuit> and that's without intentionally trying to construct slow nonsense
13:42 < gavinand1esen> phantomcircuit: SSD or spinning disk?
13:42  * ThomasV grabs popcorn
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13:43 < gavinand1esen> phantomcircuit: I benchmarked on my 3.4ghz i7 (4-core, I think), hybrid SSD/spinning disk.
13:43 < Luke-Jr> start talking about SSD, suddenly the cost of storage goes up up up
13:43 < phantomcircuit> gavinand1esen, SSD each with dbcache=4096 and likely entire utxo in page cache
13:43 < gavinand1esen> phantomcircuit: I can easily run a simulation with 60-second propagation… one sec....
13:44 < gavinand1esen> phantomcircuit: … but wait, what attack are you worried about?
13:45 < phantomcircuit> bad simulation leading to decision making attack
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13:46 < gavinand1esen> phantomcircuit:  (if 60 second propagation, a 30% miner could get 31% of blocks)  (assuming the small miners produce 20MB blocks, if they produce 1MB blocks they’ll actually make the 30% miner produce fewer than 30% of blocks)
13:46 < gavinand1esen> phantomcircuit: patches welcome for the simulator code.
13:46 < phantomcircuit> ThomasV, someone was recently saying there's issues with links on electrum.org btw
13:47 < ThomasV> phantomcircuit: links were fixed yesterday I think
13:48 < gavinand1esen> phantomcircuit: RE: validation:  I’m being pretty conservative— not assuming that secp256k1 happens, or any other optimizations.
13:51 < phantomcircuit> gavinand1esen, i have little interest in improving the simulation; a hard forking change to do something that is at best a 1:1 cost increase in transaction volume/full node cost is likely never going to be justifiable
13:52 < gavinand1esen> phantomcircuit: so you’re saying “my mind is made up and there is nothing you can say that will convince me”
13:52 < gavinand1esen> ......
13:52 < gavinand1esen> okey dokey
13:52 < phantomcircuit> same to you
13:53 < Taek> phantomcircuit: I find that argument a little unreasonable. 20kb block sizes are obviously bad for the network. Clearly there's an optimal number, even if scaling is 1:1
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13:53 < gavinand1esen> I am completely open to rational arguments for why a blocksize increase would be :  too expensive, too dangerous ....
13:54 < gavinand1esen> But “more expensive” if “more” is $11 per month will not convince me.
13:55 < phantomcircuit> Taek, there is probably some number which is better than 1MB and it would be nice if that and an algorithm for adjusting it had been implemented before bitcoin was a several billion dollar experiment
13:55 < phantomcircuit> Taek, but it wasn't; so the risk of doing a hard fork has to be weighed against the benefits
13:55 < akrmn> gavinand1esen: storage space is the problem. You can read my recent proposal on the bitcoin dev mailing list. I am open to counterarguments from people who take your side.
13:55 < phantomcircuit> the risk is clearly great and i view the benefits as being effectively zero
13:55 < gavinand1esen> akrmn: storage for what? blockchain or utxo?
13:56 < phantomcircuit> akrmn, storage space is irrelevant
13:56 < phantomcircuit> bandwidth/cpu time/storage in order of relative cost
13:56 < akrmn> Blocks. http://sourceforge.net/p/bitcoin/mailman/message/34127318/
13:57 < akrmn> gavinand1esen: ^
13:57 < Relos> phantomcircuit what exactly are the risks?
13:57 < gavinand1esen> akrmn: chain pruning fixes that problem.
13:57 < akrmn> Well I don't think regular people should accept only having pruned chains
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13:57 < Relos> I mean, gavinand1esen has been posting some blogs to counter such general statements as " the risks are great" so mind being specific?
13:57 < akrmn> while datacenters have the whole thing
13:58 < phantomcircuit> Relos, http://sourceforge.net/p/bitcoin/mailman/message/34090559/
13:58 < akrmn> You lose transaparency of the whole system. Being able to track all the transactions from the past 10 years of your government officials is a good thing that we don't want to lose no?
13:59 < Taek> gavinand1esen: at the Boston dev core you mentioned that your target 'node runner' was someone technically advanced, like a software dev. I'm having trouble accepting this as a good line for where people should stop running full nodes. I confess that I struggle to understand the complete picture when trying to draw the line between who should be able to run a validating node and who shouldn't.
14:00 < phantomcircuit> Relos, off the top of my head; increased cost of operating a full node, systemic risk of various factions economically forking bitcoin (ie coinbase bitcoin, btce bitcoin, bitpay bitcoin, because they all selected different block sizes as the limit)
14:00 < Relos> phantomcircuit, that post is largely general statements...
14:00 < Taek> is it 'good enough' if 99% of people heavily dependent on bitcoin don't run nodes and don't pay attention to the general evolution of the protocol?
14:00 < phantomcircuit> Relos, centralization of mining as a consequence of block processing being massively cpu limited
14:00 < gavinand1esen> Taek: yes
14:00 < Relos> gavin here is giving specific numbers and estimates which presumably is better than simple general statements
14:01 < phantomcircuit> ie i can easily buy a 20k server if i have $1m in hw
14:01 < gavinand1esen> Taek: we are already there, 99% of people use a SPV or hosted wallet. That is OK.
14:01 < phantomcircuit> but not if i have $5k in hw
14:01 < phantomcircuit> gavinand1esen, that is not ok
14:01 < phantomcircuit> what the fuck
14:01 < Taek> gavinand1esen: do you have a blog post explaining that more clearly? I think that's something I would be interested in reading
14:01 < Relos> so if we do specific numbers... increasing cost of operating a full node, by how much, would it increase it to such a degree that with some simple investment ordinary joe can't afford it... etc
14:01 < gavinand1esen> It is just fine, in the same way most people don’t run their own SMTP or web server.
14:01 < Taek> We are already there, you are correct, but I'm not sure that we should consider it an acceptable place to be
14:01 < gavinand1esen> As long as you CAN run your own SMTP or web server....
14:02 < gavinand1esen> The vision was never, ever, everybody in the world will be fully validating every single transaction.
14:02 < phantomcircuit> Relos, his proposal is a 20MB block, which would increase the cost by a minimum of 20x and probably more since hardware costs tend to scale non-linearly with single system performance
14:02 < Relos> thats assuming everyone would use the full blocksize
14:02 < Relos> because of some sort of attack
14:03 < ThomasV> was there ever a vision?
14:03 < Relos> which gavin's new blog post can't see
14:03 < Relos> so maybe specify this attack?
14:03 < Relos> maybe be more objective I guess
14:03 < gavinand1esen> ThomasV: sure, go read THe Book of Satoshi
14:03 < ThomasV> :)
14:03 < akrmn> gavinand1esen: Obviously a regular person can't validate every small transaction, but using my partitioning scheme, you can validate exactly what you want to validate and nothing more and nothing less, without a softfork. That is superior IMO.
14:04 < gavinand1esen> akrmn: no, you can’t, because transaction inputs would span sub-chains.
14:04 < phantomcircuit> Relos, if 99% of the users switch to trusting someone else bitcoin has failed
14:04 < gavinand1esen> akrmn: you need to learn more about how things work.....
14:04 < HostFat> I think that many will argue as much as they can, even if they are wrong. But at the time there will be the problem, when confirmations will start to delay and tx disappear, the first and easy solution will prevail.
14:04 < HostFat> Maybe the 20 MB block, maybe something like the Lightning Network. It doesn't matter what people argue now. Users/market will want an easy and fast solution when they'll clash against the problem.
14:04 < Relos> phantomcircuit why is bitcoin decentralised?
14:04 < phantomcircuit> at that point we might as well just have a set of federated timestamping servers
14:05 < gavinand1esen> phantomcircuit: very modest hardware and pretty-good bandwidth will deal just fine with 20MB blocks
14:05 < Relos> I mean, what does decentralisation achieve?
14:05 < gavinand1esen> phantomcircuit: … or pay a modest amount of money for a VPS in a datacenter....
14:05 < Relos> is the purpose decentralisation itself, or whatever its achievements are?
14:05 < phantomcircuit> gavinand1esen, even you were saying it would cost like $500/year
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14:06 < phantomcircuit> no vps provider is going to let you run a bitcoin node that's spinning the cpu 24/7
14:06 < phantomcircuit> they're all over sold 20-100x
14:06 < binaryatrocity> speaking of general statements o.0
14:07 < akrmn> gavinand1esen: I don't fully understand what you mean. I hope your read what I wrote fully. If I have an address that is associated to only one series of subchains, then my transactions with that address will only end up in those subchains. Yes, there will be duplication if addresses associated with other subchains are involved in the transaction, but that is not a big effect, I think.
14:07 < gavinand1esen> phantomcircuit: why would 20MB blocks spin the CPU 24/7 ?  Validation is spread out over 10 minutes....
14:07 < kanzure> Relos: avoids middlemen
14:07 < gavinand1esen> akrmn: you need to learn more about how things work….
14:07 < akrmn> gavinand1esen: Yes I am willing to learn
14:07 < phantomcircuit> Relos, possibly you're confusing decentralization with reduced trust
14:08 < akrmn> If I am wrong
14:08 < Relos> my pint was decentralisation itself isn't necessarily the aim, but what it achieves, so its an ends to a means, and we are speaking of extremes here really, sort of what if questions
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14:08 < Relos> gavin is producing numbers to show that costs wouldnt increase to such a point where u cant run a node (without some super modest investment)
14:08 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: the funny thing for me about this discussion is how I just got back from NY giving a presentation on Ripple to about a dozen banks... who are all very concerned about how poorly Ripple scales... and this is !@#$ banks who have Budgets(TM)
14:08 < Relos> and giving numbers, analysis, estimates...
14:09 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: (Ripple Labs Ripple that is, the one with a global consensus ledger that every transaction goes on)
14:09 < phantomcircuit> Relos, seriously if you're ok with trusting 5 of 8 big banks to timestamp your messages you can build something much more scalable than bitcoin will ever be
14:09 < Relos> while on the other hand we have general statements without analysis, numbers or estimates, but simple and subjective opinions...
14:09 < phantomcircuit> as in trivially handles 1m tps
14:10 < Taek> petertodd: why are banks interested in decentralized ledgers? Is it fully internal or are there external reasons too?
14:10 < Relos> as I said gavin has produced numbers to show that anyone can run a node with a 20mb blocksize even if, for some reason, the full blcksize was used
14:10 < Relos> so why would it be 5-8 banks? or nodes
14:11 < phantomcircuit> petertodd, Ripple(tm) is how i refer to it
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14:11 < petertodd> Taek: depending on what you mean by "internal" yes :) they're current systems tend to be so horribly insecure that when something goes wrong there aren't genuine audit trails
14:11 < phantomcircuit> petertodd, i still find Ripple(tm) to be super hilarious, they managed to bring together the worst properties of a bunch of systems and almost none of the good ones
14:13 < petertodd> Taek: what the architecture tends to be is to have a central clearing house where transactions are submitted *without* cryptography - at best point-to-point link-level encryption. If the records go out of sync you're never really sure why that happened, which they combat with spectacular amounts of human auditing and paper shuffling.
14:13 < ThomasV> gavinand1esen: assuming 20mb happens, are there other changes that you would like to include in the hard fork?
14:14 < petertodd> Taek: blockchains distributed across multiple parties, with access proven - to a first approximation - by crypto is a pretty big improvement there, but the smarter guys are wary about the poor scaling and inherent upgrade treadmills that blockchains have - the original Ripple concept was a good one in that vein
14:14 < HostFat> I'm waiting to see the new consensus of Stellar running
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14:14 < gavinand1esen> ThomasV: no, because I think arguing over what to include or not would just slow things down.
14:14 < ThomasV> yeah, that's what I thought
14:15 < petertodd> Taek: as for where truly decentralized ledgers can play a part, basically you can use a "permissioned" ledger to prove that the rules were followed by validating the contents of the ledger, and then use a PoW blockchain to prove that there only exists one copy of that ledger - the latter can give a useful energy-based bound on what it'd take to double-spend (basically this is where my proofchains work is going, at ...
14:15 < petertodd> ... least with respect to those clients)
14:16 < kanzure> er with the available pow hashing markets, it's not just energy-based bound but also monetary-bound
14:16 < petertodd> ThomasV: in other contexts they call hard forks "flag days", and avoid them at all costs :)
14:16 < petertodd> kanzure: yeah, it's an imperfect thing, but it can certainly be better than "oh shit, you mean you've been using a different ledger for the past five months?!"
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14:17 < Taek> petertodd: that's fascinating, and seems like it would improve regulation infrastructure substantially
14:17 < kanzure> petertodd: if you are interested in extracting projects and money out of them, i suggest something other than total ledger replacements. even just audit trail stuff sounds like it would be a net win :-/.
14:18 < phantomcircuit> gavinand1esen, lets make the huge assumption that a hard fork is possible without causing massive harm (im 90% sure this is false, but lets assume)
14:18 < petertodd> Taek: yes... and no. :) remember that banks hate regulation too - by "improve" part of that can be that point-to-point ledgers that *aren't* global but are proven consistent with a global blockchain can give you the best of both worlds: privacy, with security
14:18 < phantomcircuit> gavinand1esen, there are lots of things more interesting/useful than changing the blocksize limit
14:19 < gavinand1esen> phantomcircuit: … that don’t require SPV clients to upgrade?
14:19 < petertodd> Taek: there's also jurisdictional risk: if you're "decentralized" ledger is actually controlled by a small number of validators, even if you're law abiding you may find that the people in control of the system aren't in the same jurisdiction you're in, a huge business risk
14:21 < gavinand1esen> I’ve gotta go, catch y’all later….
14:21 < phantomcircuit> gavinand1esen, any half sane spv client would need to upgrade anyways, they are checking merkle tree branch depth... right??
14:21 < petertodd> Taek: one of the things they really like about Bitcoin is that for the purpose of securing other systems, you get this *extremely* jurisdictional neutral layer that anyone can choose to use - lots of prior efforts at modernising financial systems have failed because no-one could come to agreement on jurisdictions (the SWIFT system nearly ended up being a recent case in point when the US tried to kick Russia out - ...
14:21 < petertodd> ... that that could happen at all is really scary)
14:21 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: lol, I noticed today that bitcoinj android wallet doesn't even notice doublespends properly...
14:21 < phantomcircuit> (yeah i know they're not)
14:22 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: SPV trusts miners 99.9% :(
14:22 < Relos> its as if most people dont want to run a full node
14:23 < Relos> coders seem to forget that most people aren't coders
14:23 < gavinand1esen> phantomcircuit: mmm, if I was coding an SPV client I would just have a DoS limit on the merkle branch depth of 111 or something....
14:23 < petertodd> Relos: ...which is an enormous existential risk for bitcoin :(
14:23 < Relos> If  - say as a doctor - I want to use btc - I dont care about nodes, I dont care about anything more than pressing a button and making this thing which is ment to make my life better do what I want it to do
14:24 < petertodd> Relos: well, unfortunately we just don't have the tech yet to give you what you want, sorry
14:24 < petertodd> Relos: Bitcoin is a system that fails if people don't participate in it widely
14:24 < Relos> thats the vast majority which by any common reason would use an spv wallet if they use an offline wallet at all
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14:24 < Relos> so petertodd you want to make everyone a coder? if people wanted to be coders they wouldn't have chosen other professions...
14:25 < gavinand1esen> petertodd: participate how?  Bitcoin will succeed just fine if there are 100,000 fully-validating nodes and 2 billion people using it
14:25 < petertodd> Relos: I want a pony too, but we haven't invented one yet
14:25 < Relos> the vast majority of people dont want to code, don't want to learn about intricacies etc
14:25 < ThomasV> the absence of consensus on a hard fork is a good incentive to run full nodes
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14:26 < gavinand1esen> petertodd: you have a tendency to claim that bitcoin is doomed if everybody isn’t downloading and compiling the code from scratch…..  (ok, I exaggerate. Downloading then checking gpg signatures....)
14:26 < petertodd> gavinand1esen: there are roughly that number of banks in the world...
14:26 < gavinand1esen> petertodd: yes, and the big problem with the banking system is I can’t just up and decide to start one. If bitcoin ever has THAT problem then I’d worry.
14:26 < petertodd> gavinand1esen: no, as I was telling you even just yesterday in that interview, I have a much more nuanced take on it that you like to try to present - stop strawmanning
14:27 < phantomcircuit> gavinand1esen, except you can calculate the minimum size of a transaction and you know the maximum blocksize, so you can also calculate the maximum depth of the merkle tree, which provides a real security benefit, a miner that's generating a block to cheat spv clients is limited in how many fraudulent transactions they can put in the block
14:27 < phantomcircuit> it's not a massive improvement, but when you consider that most spv clients involve small amounts of funds
14:27 < phantomcircuit> it's likely enough
14:27 < petertodd> gavinand1esen: as I have said many times before, what matters most is that people have the option in a genuine and easy way, which changes the political landscape around the system
14:28 < gavinand1esen> petertodd: I think we agree, which is why I’m proposing modest minimum hardware/bandwidth requirements......
14:28 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: also remember the discussions the previous time all this came up of how you need things like merkle sum trees committing too total blocksize
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14:28 < phantomcircuit> petertodd, yeah, that is potentially a softforking change though
14:29 < petertodd> gavinand1esen: and they aren't modest, they conflict with the only way we know how to create an incentive to secure the blockchain in the future, and they give us a tiny improvement in the grand scheme of things, with no clear way to go further
14:29 < phantomcircuit> so im less worried about it
14:29 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: oh for sure
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14:29 < gavinand1esen> petertodd: are you talking about “small blocks means more fees” argument to secure the chain in the future?  I’m getting tired of answering arguments I’ve already written about....
14:30 < gavinand1esen> petertodd: http://gavinandresen.ninja/block-size-and-miner-fees-again
14:30 < petertodd> gavinand1esen: well, you haven't answered those arguments to my satisfaction, or really, anyone else here, so I guess that's that...
14:30 < Relos> I'd rather have 1 million people pay 1 pence than 1 person pay 1 million dollars
14:30 < Relos> how doesn't that answer it?
14:30 < phantomcircuit> writing about something on your blog doesn't mean you've answered the question or even responded to all of the reasonable objections
14:31 < phantomcircuit> which im quite sure isn't true for either
14:32 < gavinand1esen> … now I really do have to go.  The problem with “responding to all the reasonable objections” is I don’t have an infinite amount of time and it is much easier to raise theoretical objections than to carefully think about and explain why everything will be OK
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14:33 < petertodd> gavinand1esen: the fact that you aren't even close to getting consensus on this issue should be telling you something
14:33 < petertodd> anyway, this discussion is unproductive...
14:33 < phantomcircuit> the burden of demonstrating that a huge unsafe change is infact safe lies with the person proposing the change
14:33 < phantomcircuit> as it should be
14:33 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: +1
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14:34 < gavinand1esen> … which is why I’m spending so much time going through the objections....
14:34 < Relos> and not changing the size is a change
14:35 < HostFat> I think that it's better to code than arguing, as satoshi was doing ... if people doesn't understand or just has much more time on talking than coding
14:35 < gavinand1esen> Through the whole discussion just now I got exactly two reasonable objections:  that 20MB blocks will use up 100% CPU on a VPS (which I can test).  And that a hard fork can’t happen because hard forks are bad (which is on my list to respond to)
14:35 < phantomcircuit> Relos, no it's not and that statement is nonsensical to the point of being absurd
14:36 < petertodd> gavinand1esen: btw, re: hearn's fee concerns, any objections to first-seen-safe RBF? (ie the all outputs must be >= replaced tx)
14:37 < gavinand1esen> petertodd: haven’t thought about it… (and now I am REALLY late, so gotta go)
14:37 < petertodd> gavinand1esen: cool
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16:17 < dgenr8> suppose no blocksize limit, and naughty miner makes a 10TB block this afternoon.  what would happen?
16:18 < NewLiberty> No one builds on it?
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16:20 < dgenr8> that's what I was getting at ... but it's not clear what it means to assume no limit on network xfer size
16:20 < ajweiss> it's ~32MB last i checked
16:20 < ajweiss> but this is a #bitcoin discussion
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16:43 < Taek> does 100,000 nodes count as decentralization if they are running code that's only been read/reviewed O(100s) of times?
16:43 < Taek> and if an ignorant person is running a full node, knowing nothing more about the network than it's just good hygene to run a full node, does that count for much?
16:44 < Taek> ah I meant to put this in #bitcoin, sorry
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16:55 < dgenr8> Taek: it counts in proportion to the clients using that fullnode
16:59 < HostFat> "suppose no blocksize limit, and naughty miner makes a 10TB block this afternoon.  what would happen?"
16:59 < HostFat> someone will make a smaller block that will spread faster then the one of 10 TB
17:00 < HostFat> and it will be the winner
17:00 < HostFat> even if it was discovered after the one of 10TB
17:01 < HostFat> miners will not release heavier blocks that can't spread faster on the network
17:01 < dgenr8> okay, I will rephrase: "what very bad thing will happen?"
17:04 < HostFat> maybe there aren't so much bad things as some are saying
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17:05 < HostFat> if the bandwidth isn't enaught to spread faster blocks, and blocks aren't enaught large for every transactions, then there will be a marker of fees
17:06 < HostFat> if there is enaught bandwidth, there will be a "market of blocks". miners will try to have bigger blocks, but at the same time will try to have them smaller enaught to spread faster then other miners's blocks
17:07 < HostFat> I think that the limit of 20 MB is useless
17:08 < Taek> HostFat: if blocks had no size limit, miners could intentionally release blocks that are too large to spread to all other miners before the next one is mined
17:08 < Taek> As long as it reaches 50-70% of miners in time, it will be accepted on the main chain
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17:08 < HostFat> it's the same for the nodes
17:08 < Taek> those miners who are in the minority, have worse infrastructure, etc, will get left out
17:08 < HostFat> I don't think so
17:08 < Taek> and as a result they will have a much higher rate of stale blocks
17:09 < HostFat> a smaller block will be faster to spread then the bigger one, even if the bigger was discovered then the smaller
17:09 < Taek> yes, but not every miner has the same infrastructure
17:09 < Taek> some can download a big block faster than others
17:10 < HostFat> you have to think how the block spread to the nodes more then the miners
17:10 < Taek> If I'm a malicious miner who can download big blocks very quickly, it's to my advantage to try and isolate the slowest 30-50% of the miners on the network by releasing blocks that they can't download inside of a few minutes
17:10 < Taek> what are you arguing?
17:11 < HostFat> how can you isolate other miners? if you are the only one that has received the big block
17:11 < HostFat> the others have reaceived the smaller one, and they are mining it
17:11 < Taek> you aren't the only one who has received the big block, 50+% of the network got the big block
17:11 < HostFat> heavy block will be orfan
17:11 < Taek> it's just the other 50% that got left behind
17:11 < Taek> I'm not making a 10TB block, I'm making one that's just big enough to isolate a minority of miners
17:11 < Taek> but a large minority
17:11 < HostFat> if the block is eavier, it has less probability to spread faster then the smaller one
17:12 < Taek> right, that's the entire goal
17:12 < Taek> the big is going to have a head start most of the time because blocks on average only appear every 10 minutes
17:12 < Taek> if a big + small appear at the exact same moment, the small will win
17:13 < HostFat> so it's better to release smaller blocks
17:13 < Taek> but if the big appears with a 5 minute propagation advantage, it's likely that it'll reach most of the faster miners before it reaches the slower miners
17:13 < HostFat> even if there is no limit
17:13 < Taek> no
17:13 < Taek> it's better to isolate your competition
17:13 < Taek> if my competition has a higher rate of stale blocks than I do, they will not be in business for very long
17:13 < Taek> and since mining is a 0-sum game, that benefits me
17:14 < HostFat> the bandwidth and the power of miners aren't directly related
17:15 < Taek> correct
17:16 < Taek> that doesn't matter
17:16 < Taek> what matters is that some miners have better bandwidth/connectivity than others
17:16 < Taek> that disparity is much easier to exploit when you get to choose your own block size
17:16 < HostFat> so, more then then power, it will be important to have a good connection
17:16 < Taek> no
17:17 < Taek> no matter what your power is, it's important to have a good connection
17:17 < Taek> your stale rate is directly related to your connection
17:17 < Taek> when there is a 1mb cap, it's not that big of a deal, because a cheap connection vs an expensive connection is going to affect you not very much
17:17 < Taek> a cheap connection is pretty much good enough
17:17 < HostFat> but we are still talking about the miners, and not the nodes
17:18 < Taek> why do the nodes matter/
17:18 < Taek> *?
17:18 < HostFat> nodes are more important than the miners
17:18 < Taek> for what?
17:18 < HostFat> they have the controll of the rules of the network
17:18 < Taek> ok
17:19 < Taek> are you arguing that nodes would arbitrarily enforce limits on the block size?
17:19 < HostFat> yes, wait .. :)
17:19 < HostFat> what I'm saying is that, even if miners will find the bigger block at first, they will choice to use the smaller one
17:20 < Taek> the nodes will choose to accept the set of blocks that have the most pow
17:20 < HostFat> because they know that nodes will get it first, so it will be better for them (for the miners) to start mining on the next of the smaller
17:20 < Taek> which blocks the nodes have *right now* has no bearing on what choices the miners will make
17:20 < Taek> miners only care about getting their block onto the longest chain
17:20 < HostFat> miner want to be first than the other miner to find the next block
17:20 < Taek> and they care about the longest chain being accepted *eventually* by the nodes
17:21 < Taek> so they won't make invalid blocks, but that doesn't mean they are compelled to make small blocks
17:21 < HostFat> if there is a block of 1 mb, and one block of 20 mb, the miner will chose to mine after the block of 1 mb, because he know that nodes have already received it
17:21 < Taek> why?
17:22 < HostFat> because the block of 1 mb spread faster
17:22 < Taek> you're missing something in your logic
17:23 < Taek> the miner is going to choose to mine on the block that's most likely to be extended
17:23 < Taek> and the block that's most likely to be extended is the block that most other miners have seen first
17:23 < Taek> nodes have nothing to do with it
17:24 < Taek> if 51% of miners are already mining on the 20mb block, there's absolutely no reason to switch to mining the 1mb block
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17:25 < HostFat> miners need to be sure that the block of 20mb has been recevied from the majority of the nodes
17:25 < HostFat> if they are sure about this, than it's ok
17:25 < Taek> _no_they_don't_
17:26 < Taek> the speed at which the nodes receive blocks is not related to which blocks the miners choose to mine
17:26 < Taek> it's okay if the nodes are several minutes behind the miners
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17:29 < HostFat> if 51% of miners are mining the 20mb, and only 10% of nodes has it, but the 90% has the 1mb blocks, than the miner that will mine after the 1mb has more possibility to get the next block (if it is smaller) validated from the network
17:29 < HostFat> he will probably mine a block smaller than 1mb :D
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17:30 < Taek> HostFat: that's simply not how validation works
17:31 < HostFat> the validation comes from nodes
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17:31 < Taek> the nodes have no input into *which* chain is the longest, they merely verify that the longest chain doesn't violate any consensus rules
17:32 < gwillen> HostFat: the only thing that affects what's in the longest chain is the miners
17:32 < gwillen> non-mining nodes have no way to control what chain ends up longest
17:32 < gwillen> if they get a block first, but that block doesn't end up in the longest chain, they will all eventually reorg that block away
17:32 < gwillen> so they _will_ briefly use it, but it won't matter in the end
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17:33 < HostFat> yes, nodes doesn't know that the miners are mining actuly, they only get blocks, and these blocks need to be connected with the past one
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17:35 < HostFat> so if the minority of nodes haven't the bigger block, but they know the smaller one, than a miner will try to give them (to the nodes) a new block connected with the smaller one, because he know that there is an higt probability that the majority of the nones know the smaller block than the bigger block
17:35 < HostFat> because, the smaller block spread faster
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17:36 < gwillen> you haven't explained why you think the miner would care what nodes get his block
17:36 < gwillen> the only thing he cares is whether his block ends up in the longest chain
17:36 < gwillen> and that is only affected by what other miners get his block
17:37 < HostFat> as I said there will be a "market of blocks", where miners will try to find the bigger BUT faster block that can spread on the majority of the network
17:37 < gwillen> the non-mining nodes have no effect on whether his block ends up in the longest chain
17:38 < HostFat> the chain of the smaller blocks is faster of an heavy chain of bigger blocks
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17:38 < HostFat> it's faster because smaller blocks spread faster, just this
17:39 < HostFat> if 51% or even more of miner will start to ming blocks of 1 GB, and the minority will mine blocks of 1 mb, the minority will probably win on the long run
17:40 < gwillen> HostFat: that _could_ be true but it's only affected by how long it takes block to get to _other miners_
17:40 < gwillen> if those 51% all have very fast connections to each other, they will always win
17:40 < gwillen> if they don't, they could have problems
17:41 < HostFat> to get to the nodes, nodes are more important than the miners
17:41 < HostFat> they are chosing the chain
17:41 < Taek> why are you so certain that the nodes are more important?
17:42 < HostFat> because this is how it works bitcoin, nodes are where the bitcoins are spent, where tx are checked
17:43 < HostFat> they check the blocks and the chain
17:43 < gwillen> but they will always choose the longest chain no matter what
17:43 < HostFat> it is impossible to make an hard fork without changing the nodes
17:43 < gwillen> so if one group of miners can produce a longer chain, the nodes will always choose that chain
17:43 < gwillen> _always_
17:43 < gwillen> so what you have to figure out is who creates the longest chain
17:44 < HostFat> the longeest that they get, and if the nodes have a modem of 56k, they will get the chain of smaller blocks
17:44 < gwillen> even if a node accepts one block over another, it will discard that block again if it's not in the longest chain
17:44 < HostFat> it seems easy to me ..
17:44 < smooth> dgenr8: the bad thing that will happen is that miners will be able to control who is able to access the network
17:44 < gwillen> HostFat: that would only be true if their connection were so slow that they _never_ get the bigger blocks
17:44 < gwillen> HostFat: as long as they _ever_ get the bigger blocks _eventually_, and that chain is longer, they will switch to it
17:45 < Taek> and in that regard there's a consensus risk
17:45 < Taek> because faster nodes may end up picking a different chain
17:45 < gwillen> right, if fast nodes use one chain and slow nodes use another, then you get in real trouble
17:45 < HostFat> if they will get the bigger block, than it's ok, the miners are chosing to relase a right block, of the right size, for the majority of the notes
17:45 < HostFat> than it will be ok
17:46 < HostFat> the miner want to relase a block for the majority of the nodes, because he wants to have a network that works, that gives money to him
17:46 < HostFat> miner will "always" chose to relase the "right" block for the majority of the nodes
17:47 < HostFat> if the majority have a 56k, then the majority of the miners will chose to relase smaller block, even if all of them have 1000 GB of connection
17:47 < HostFat> because, nodes are more important than the miners
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17:54 < smooth> there is to be fair some logic in that
17:55 < smooth> i think it might be work short term, but longer term i think miners and big nodes will want to restrict access and charge those without the ability to operate nodes
17:55 < amiller> BlueMatt, how is the mining backbone going?
17:55 < BlueMatt> amiller: seems most miners use it, software has stabilized mostly
17:55 < amiller> any stats on it?
17:56 < amiller> which miners?
17:56 < HostFat> "i think it might be work short term, but longer term i think miners and big nodes will want to restrict access and charge those without the ability to operate nodes"
17:57 < HostFat> maybe, even if I understand that miners want to restring the network from other miners, but I can't find why some big nodes will want to do the same
17:57 < HostFat> nodes aren't getting any income to be nodes ...
17:58 < smooth> HostFat: they will get income if you cant operate your own node but still want to transact
17:58 < smooth> e.g. coinbase
17:58 < HostFat> hmm
17:59 < HostFat> yes ... this can be a problem if will be difficult to be nodes, or ... of users will prefer to use coinbase than SPV client
17:59 < BlueMatt> amiller: not readily at the moment...I need to fix one more bug then I want to reset and gather stats for a month
17:59 < smooth> HostFat: nodes don't have to provide SPV service for free either
17:59 < BlueMatt> amiller: afaik pretty much all miners with big chunks of hashpower use it +/- one or two
18:00 < HostFat> yes, true ... but they it doesn't cost so much, even less if there are many nodes (and pruning will help to get this)
18:01 < amiller> BlueMatt, ok. i'd be interesting in seeing any stats or info you have about how much it's used and like which miners use it
18:01 < HostFat> it's late here, good night!
18:05 < BlueMatt> amiller: yea, I want to reset everything and see what happens
18:05 < amiller> ok :) (though resetting is unrelated to publishing more about it anyway)
18:06 < BlueMatt> amiller: well, trying to parse out the stats right now would be a pita as there'd be a lot of false sources when nodes were acting up
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18:40 < gmaxwell> Is anyone aware of a web block explorer front end for bitcoin that only uses the rpc? (like the ncurses tool)-- I mean something that lets you explore blocks using getblock / gettransaction verbose exclusively, not something that does its own block parsing. And I don't care if it doesn't have address indexing.
18:40 < gmaxwell> (basically I want exactly the ncurses tool, but in web form. :)) ... bit handicapped with bitcointalk and the wiki being down.
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18:55 < kanzure> gmaxwell: well it's in php but... https://github.com/stolendata/rpc-ace
18:56 < kanzure> and https://github.com/JornC/bitcoin-transaction-explorer
18:57 < gmaxwell> woot, just found the first; hadn't found the second yet.
18:59 < Adlai> is http://webbtc.com as simple as you need?
19:00 < Adlai> might have a bit too many frills
19:01 < kanzure> he needs rpc
19:01 < gmaxwell> Need something that works even if the transaction format is wildly different. :)
19:01 < gmaxwell> its nice though I wish the rpc things were that nice.
19:01 < kanzure> tbh it would be faster to write a quick python wrapper around rpc output
19:02 < kanzure> gmaxwell: like https://github.com/typicode/json-server
19:02  * Adlai has been using https://gist.github.com/adlai/0afc53e42db9caae8c75#file-cjhunt-lisp-L3-L14
19:03 < gmaxwell> yea probably, would be interesting to just display the json output and do minimal parsing to add hyperlinks.
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