--- Log opened Sat Aug 29 00:00:54 2015
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00:10 < fluffypony> so I tried taking a pic like that, but I can't find a passage small enough in my house
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00:39 < smellymoo> I have a really big idea. want to talk it through with some people that ACTUALLY understand :)
00:39 < Eliel> well, this is the right channel if you want to talk to people who actually understand.
00:40 < smellymoo> hard to explain... it will be a decentralized anonymous supercomputer / server / smart contract... like ETR + TOR + TORRENT
00:41 < Eliel> you could start by explaining what's the problem you're trying to solve with it.
00:41 < smellymoo> so like eth, it can run scripts in a VM, but it can also make inbound and outbound connections, like tor.
00:42 < smellymoo> ok... it will be a decentralized dark-cloud hosting / smart contract
00:42 < Eliel> no no, not what it is. What problem(s) it solves
00:42 < smellymoo> ok, millions!
00:42 < smellymoo> list is endless.
00:42 < psztorc> Should be very easy to come up with one!
00:43 -!- Newyorkadam [~Newyorkad@wikipedia/Newyorkadam] has quit [Quit: Newyorkadam]
00:43 < smellymoo> censorship, servers being taken down by law enforment, needing processing power on demand...everything.
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00:43 < smellymoo> ok, I'll try and explain my invention step by step.
00:45 < smellymoo> you have clients and hosts, clients want to do use the cloud for example: dos attack, silk road server, crack encryption keys, smart contracts, indestructible sites... oh anything
00:46 < smellymoo> hosts want to get paid for their spare processing / ram / network capability... as it would be asic resistant they would get a fair price, like maid-safe.
00:47 < smellymoo> the whole network forms a massive supercomputer that can run scripts that it shares in a torrent style way, and each client gets paid to run scripts like eth...
00:48 < smellymoo> scripts run on a VM, so your computer is safe from them. and the scripts can make inbound / outbound connections, if you enable that ability. so you could host your site on this dark-cloud
00:49 < psztorc> Compared to TOR, how does this help with your first problem of "censorship"?
00:49 < smellymoo> so it's like tor+eth+maidsafe kind of. but it's so much more, as it's only limited by your imagination, it's P2P cloud computing :D
00:49 < smellymoo> it's way way better than tor...
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00:50 < smellymoo> as you host the site ON the network... so they kill you, the site is still there running.
00:50 < smellymoo> to access the site, you only need to put a add-on on your browser that does the DNS.
00:51 < Eliel> To be perfectly honest, the system you're describing sounds more ambitious than is possible for at least short term future.
00:51 < smellymoo> as where the site would "be" would be constantly changing as different hosts ran the script (maybe every 10 minutes)
00:52 < smellymoo> right, I am explaining it rather vaguely, as I need to explain what it is and why... before we can talk details... but actually it's not too complex... not more than eth.
00:52 < fluffypony> scripts can make outbound connections, so you can distribute a script that DDoS attakcs a site?
00:53 < smellymoo> fluffypony, yes
00:54 < smellymoo> when you install the client, it would have a page where you select what you will share, each thing gets you different money... so it's like you are getting paid to be a zombie on a botnet... you can choose to allow / or not connections... as it also has millions of other uses... like all the uses of eth, and a lot more...
00:55 < smellymoo> for example you want to crack an encryption key, you upload the script and it runs massively parallel on the dark-cloud network.
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00:55 < smellymoo> or you want to do protein folding, weather sim.... ANYTHING
00:55 < smellymoo> it would be a massive super-computer that you pay to run scripts on.
00:56 < psztorc> Can't you already do that, though? AWS, university supercomputer, etc.?
00:56 < smellymoo> like a botnet, but more ethical, as the zombies would opt in, and choose what they wanted to allow the sandboxed scripts to do.
00:56 < psztorc> Are you aware that Eth has been compared to a 1990's smartphone.
00:56 < psztorc> by them?
00:56 < smellymoo> lol
00:56 < isis> s/TOR/tor/
00:56 < smellymoo> right, but this is not like that.
00:56 < isis> *cough*
00:57 < smellymoo> tor is not the same as this in any way.
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00:58 < psztorc> Well, I mean you just said it WAS "like tor+eth+maidsafe kind of".
00:59 < smellymoo> the way it would work is a custom assembler code, that has opcodes that are designed to stay within the sandbox (so any memory access is kept within bounds for example)... then you can compile any programming language into this virtual assembler and run it... so right your scripts in c++, compile them, then it runs in this process VM... so it would be fast... maybe java speed. not like eth.
01:00 < smellymoo> psztorc, look, when you need to explain something that doesn't exist, you must use things that do.
01:01 < psztorc> I agree, but you said it was "like tor" and then you said it was "not the same in any way", so what am I supposed to learn from that?
01:01 < smellymoo> I am not the best at explaining, but I will try, and hopefully I can get you all understanding how ground-breaking this is, and then we can talk about the technical aspects.
01:02 < smellymoo> psztorc, ok, it's got a similar use to what tor does, but it doesn't function like it in any way... so for example it will run silk road ON it, not hide silk road
01:02 < psztorc> ok
01:02 < smellymoo> lets start again.. just too excited :D.
01:03 < smellymoo> my idea is: a massively distributed cloud computer, that the nodes get paid to run scripts.
01:03 < psztorc> All the nodes must run all of the scripts?
01:04 < smellymoo> this would allow anything from dead man switces, ddos attacks, websites that run and can't be killed, smart contracts, data proccessing, .... everything
01:05 < smellymoo> psztorc, no... it's like torrent, not like block-cahin
01:05 < smellymoo> each node says what they will share, then the software decides what scripts match, and tells the network and it's arranged.
01:06 < fluffypony> so what if I claim I'm going to run a script
01:06 < fluffypony> and then don't
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01:06 < smellymoo> fluffypony, first thing I thought about ;)
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01:06 < smellymoo> which I have mostly solved (now this is getting good, talking technical :D)
01:06 < smellymoo> there are a number of ways...
01:07 < smellymoo> one is in your script you make a way to check it has been run, like a check sum, or what ever you like, for example you ask at the end it connects to your ip and sends you a digest..etc
01:08 < fluffypony> sure, so let's say you need exactly 1 node to run the script, it takes 6 hours, and then it returns to you
01:08 < smellymoo> other way is the network has a tron script that sends scripts to people and asks them to run them, checks they did it right.
01:08 < fluffypony> after 6 hours you realise my node is lying, and so you send it out again
01:08 < fluffypony> another one of my nodes picks it up and pretends to run it
01:08 < smellymoo> no...
01:08 < smellymoo> ok...
01:08 < smellymoo> the jobs would be split into small jobs...
01:09 < smellymoo> at a guess maybe 1-10 minutes.
01:09 < smellymoo> there is a queue.
01:09 < fluffypony> not always possible
01:09 < smellymoo> and after each job clients and hosts get ranking points, either by the tron script from mystery shopping.
01:09 < fluffypony> if the state required to process a script is large, then it's extremely inefficient to move the job around
01:09 < smellymoo> or by the clients proving their work.
01:10 < smellymoo> fluffypony, right...
01:10 < fluffypony> if it takes 20 minutes to update that state and have it ready for the next processor then what good is 1 minute of processing time
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01:10 < smellymoo> fluffypony, ok... but that wouldn't be something that would be good on this cloud.
01:10 < fluffypony> also how do you avoid Sybil attacks
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01:11 < fluffypony> I can just send out a bunch of jobs, pay for them, and then rate all participants poorly
01:11 < smellymoo> the payments are not direct.
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01:11 < fluffypony> and thus make nodes under my control the only ones with a positive rating
01:11 < smellymoo> they go into escrow, tron holds them.
01:11 < fluffypony> doesn't matter, I'm still participating 100% honestly
01:11 < fluffypony> I'm just giving them a bad rating
01:12 < smellymoo> tron mystery shopping
01:12 < smellymoo> when you pay, you also pay a small amount of tax, then goes to tron, and he mystery shops everyone.
01:12 < fluffypony> still doesn't matter, I can put up 20 000 jobs, pay for them, and rate the participants with -10
01:13 < fluffypony> tron is centralised, which means it isn't censorship resistant
01:13 < smellymoo> would be a problem if you did 20000 jobs from 20000 accounts.
01:13 < smellymoo> tron would have the ability to mascerade as any other account.
01:13 < fluffypony> still centralised
01:13 < fluffypony> which means it can be controlled by an attacker
01:13 < smellymoo> yes
01:13 < smellymoo> no
01:14 < fluffypony> so you're going to run it on a hack-proof box
01:14 < fluffypony> completely cordoned off from all physical access
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01:14 < smellymoo> tron script would be run by the dev team
01:14 < fluffypony> and you're somehow impervious to rubberhose cryptanalysis
01:14 < fluffypony> oh and it's 100% bug free
01:14 < smellymoo> lol
01:14 < smellymoo> ok, their now we are talking the problems ;)
01:14 < smellymoo> *there
01:15 < smellymoo> it would be open source, so it would have similar problems to bitcoin.
01:15 < fluffypony> the problem with ANY decentralised system is that you either have to have a central command structure, in which case it isn't decentralised at all, or you have to have real value at stake to prevent Sybil attacks
01:15 < fluffypony> you're describing an extremely convoluted and inefficient central command structure
01:15 < fluffypony> if you're going to have a centralised element controlled by the dev team just make the whole thing simpler
01:15 < smellymoo> right...
01:16 < fluffypony> trusted directory servers or something
01:16 < smellymoo> but actually its simple.
01:16 < smellymoo> it would be 1 user is dev, and their scripts would have extra powers.
01:16 < fluffypony> so you've reinvented BOINC
01:17 < smellymoo> also, the bitcoin going in, goes to the dev account, and their scripts distribute the coins for work.
01:17 < smellymoo> BOINC? *checks*
01:17 < smellymoo> you guys are being really helpful :)
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01:18 < smellymoo> oh, btw, the tron script only runs when someone is marked as bad, so sybil wouldn't work?
01:19 < fluffypony> so then I'm tying it up the whole time by marking good nodes as bad
01:19 < smellymoo> boinc is 60%, but I am talking about cloud-hosting capabilites, and smart contracts in bitcoin too.
01:20 < fluffypony> the reason BOINC works is because it's not incentivised, except by karma / gamification / rankings on a website
01:20 < smellymoo> fluffypony, it would just make scripts maybe 1-10% more expensive to run during the attack.
01:20 < fluffypony> incentivising anything is hard, to the point where 99.9999% of the time you'll over-incentivise or under-incentivise
01:20 < smellymoo> also accounts would get ratings over time, so in an attack it would just fall back to more trusted nodes.
01:21 < fluffypony> any accumulated rankings model is open to Sybil attacks and gaming
01:21 < smellymoo> fluffypony, actually, it would be free market... as they get paid by the people offering a price.
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01:21 < fluffypony> I can create a special script with actual work in it, but a flag that indicates (to my nodes) that they can skip the work and just send me a confirmation of completion
01:22 < fluffypony> so my nodes appear to be able to process that script thousands of times in a second
01:22 < fluffypony> where normal nodes take 10 minutes
01:22 < fluffypony> I create a completely closed circle of ratings
01:22 < smellymoo> fluffypony, ok, so do you get my idea a bit? what would your solution be to that? as I think the tron mystery shopper + tron holding all funds in escrow would stop sybil
01:23 < smellymoo> fluffypony, interesting.
01:23 < fluffypony> the only two ways to stop Sybil attacks are qualitative trust networks, or making it too expensive to attack (ie. high barrier to entry, high barrier to participation, long timelines and lots of effort required to even start getting paid)
01:23 < smellymoo> but what advantage would that cause? maybe I should have used the word flag not rating... people get flagged for extra mystery shopping.
01:23 < fluffypony> you can't do the first option programmatically, since by its nature it requires human interpretation of the WoT relationship
01:24 < fluffypony> and two is just Bitcoin mining
01:24 < psztorc> In principle, if there is no cost to becoming a node, then everyone has simultaneously infinite nodes (relative to themselves) and zero nodes (relative to others).
01:24 < fluffypony> ^^
01:24 < smellymoo> true...
01:24 < fluffypony> the nothing-at-stake problem
01:24 < smellymoo> but...
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01:25 < smellymoo> if your script you post has it's own checks you code in that are unique, then each script would have a different weakness, so it would be more work than just to process the scripts properly.
01:26 < smellymoo> a client can only make an account with a 1$ minimum deposit.
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01:26 < fluffypony> no no, it just has a little note at the top of the script that effectively tells my nodes "if you are a fluffy-node then just skip to the end of the script and contact my IP with the secret password"
01:26 < smellymoo> a host can only get paid after a delay for tron to verify them with mystery shopping.
01:26 < fluffypony> so to any observer, including your mystery shopper, my nodes are processing my own script thousands of times in a second
01:26 < smellymoo> fluffypony, yes, I understnad.
01:26 < fluffypony> as well as genuinely processing other scripts
01:27 < smellymoo> ok...
01:27 < smellymoo> but I made a mistake... not a rating system.
01:27 < smellymoo> a flagging system.
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01:27 < smellymoo> it flags black nodes, and withholds their payment.
01:28 < smellymoo> you guys are pumping out great arguments at a massive speed, this is so helpful :D
01:29 < fluffypony> ok so then flagging has its own set of problems
01:30 < fluffypony> I can just flag genuine nodes as being bad
01:30 < smellymoo> so, if you have nodes not doing the processing, and skipping to the end, the scripts that handle their own protection, figure it out, and the ones that don't the tron mystery shopper marks the node as bad and doesn't pay.
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01:30 < fluffypony> making the mystery shopper pointlessly tied up
01:30 < smellymoo> right, but you flag good as bad, the mystery shopper script tries, and doesn't find a problem and pays out.
01:30 < smellymoo> think about it with an example...
01:30 < fluffypony> still tying up your central command structure in pointless effort
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01:30 < fluffypony> plus I fail to see how you'd verify the work
01:31 < fluffypony> you'd have to send the same script, in which case it could behave because it's seen this script before and knows it's probably the mystery shopper now
01:31 < fluffypony> or you'd send a different script, in which case you're proving nothing
01:31 < smellymoo> a hash cracker... the node runs a few thousand cycles. with lots of other scripts running too, one being the mystery shopper.
01:32 < smellymoo> fluffypony, thought about that....
01:32 < smellymoo> the mystery shopper could work in so many ways...
01:32 < fluffypony> so then I behave when asked to crack hashes, and misbehave when aggregating data
01:33 < smellymoo> one is it puts in arbitrary code from any script on the network that doesn't have outbound connections, then adds some code that is mutated.
01:33 < fluffypony> worst case scenario I lose out on not being paid for 10 minutes of computing time, and I have to switch to a different IP
01:33 < smellymoo> every single account has certain barriers.
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01:34 < smellymoo> the hosts would be like google-adsense... they hold your money, show you how much you have earned, and sneakily verify your work and then cancel your account before payout if you cheat.
01:35 < smellymoo> the clients would get the accounts taken, and the money too if they flagged to many white nodes.
01:35 < fluffypony> who controls the money
01:35 < smellymoo> tron.
01:35 < smellymoo> under dev control/
01:35 < fluffypony> so then why all the complexity
01:35 < smellymoo> so people would need to see that everyone was getting paid properly to trust it.
01:35 < fluffypony> you control the money
01:36 < smellymoo> yes.
01:36 < fluffypony> you control the network
01:36 < fluffypony> just have a proper centralised control system
01:36 < smellymoo> but it's better that it's controlled by a script on the network.
01:36 < fluffypony> all this mystery shopper stuff is overly complex and can be cheated
01:36 < smellymoo> it would defend aggainst attack a million times better if its a script running on the network itself, would scale better.
01:37 < smellymoo> it's not complex.
01:37 < smellymoo> a script runs, and verifies it was executed, if someone flags a hsot.
01:38 < smellymoo> it would have central command... this would make a lot of things better... like if the network is being attacked it could be switched into a mode to resist... tron script changed, etc...
01:39 < smellymoo> but there is great reason for tron...
01:40 < smellymoo> this network would actually be dentralised as script would run on the network, a dead man switch, that if I didn't report for deity, every client could nominate a replacement dev.
01:41 < fluffypony> so then I DDoS the script and everyone nominates me
01:41 < smellymoo> there are many reasons for tron being in charge, not the owners / devs directly. it would guard against the problem of attacking the weakest link, the owners of the network.
01:42 < smellymoo> yeah... ;)
01:42 < smellymoo> lol.
01:42 < smellymoo> that one needs thinking about.
01:42 < fluffypony> plus it means you have to have the script open-sourced, along with its checks, which means that I can recognise mystery shopper checks and act accordingly
01:42 < smellymoo> well, everything except the mysteryshopper would be open.
01:43 < fluffypony> but then there's no possibility of handover in the even of your demise
01:43 < smellymoo> that's fine. they right a new one.
01:44 < fluffypony> well I don't even need to, I just need to get everything handed over to me, and I'll pretend I've got a mystery shopper for a few weeks
01:44 < fluffypony> and then cut and run with the money I've accumulated
01:46 < smellymoo> or I share the mysteryshopper with the possible future devs?
01:46 < smellymoo> *write not right... dyslexic
01:46 < smellymoo> well...
01:46 < smellymoo> maybe the vote is only out of the list of possible future admins :)?
01:46 < smellymoo> so when I prove I'm still alive, I also give a list of possible successors (private keys).. then when I die, everyone votes for a new core dev.
01:46 < smellymoo> so the drift to evil would be slow and difficult.
01:48 < smellymoo> so think about this, you only withdraw at a 1$ or after a time limit... so to earn that, you would need to run many scripts a lot of times... so just say 10'000, out of them, one script run would be a test. that would work right?
01:49 < smellymoo> also a person could accept work done or not... so if it's rejected, it flags the person for more checks, but "more" would only still be 0.1%... so it would no attack.
01:50 < smellymoo> people could post their own jobs that they do easier, but it would gain nothing.
01:50 < smellymoo> people could flag white nodes, but it would also not stop anything.
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01:52 < smellymoo> only way to cheat it, would be to only process the mystery shopper script, but to do that, would be difficult, as the devs job would be to keep that script very hard to desern... so for example it would copy random scripts and modify them to add a check of some type.
01:54 < smellymoo> ok... got a great example...
01:57 < smellymoo> the mystery shopper, it would set a one time magic sequence into the storage of it's process. then the tron script having admin powers, later would run and search the storage of the whole sandbox environment for the magic sequence starting tag, then return the value. if the value matches what the mystery shopper set... then it would know the node ran everything.... as how would you filter the scripts for one setting ram with a unknown pattern?
01:58 < smellymoo> there are a million ways it could mystery shop, and it would be the devs job to keep them interesting ;)
01:58 < smellymoo> fluffypony? are you busy writing the white paper to take credit? :D
01:59 < fluffypony> lol no, I'm busy having breakfast
01:59 < smellymoo> when you are done, please review my ramblings... I really am onto something :D
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02:10 < smellymoo> also it could easily mystery shop just by sending a script that has already completed and checking it gives the same value on an other node. variation in methods would be important to make it secure.
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02:29 < smellymoo> fluffypony?
02:29 < fluffypony> sorry it's a Saturday, so in and out
02:30 < fluffypony> tbh I'm still not seeing the value in the complexity
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02:30 < fluffypony> and more importantly, it doesn't make it easier to scale, it makes it harder
02:31 < fluffypony> a proper centralised system with checks and balances will scale significantly better
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02:31 < fluffypony> and will be able to catch outliers
02:31 < fluffypony> the whole setup is decentralised theatre, better to just eschew that and do it properly
02:32 < fluffypony> scripts are submitted to a single, central controller, and that controller is responsible for dispatching them to participants, and paying them
02:33 < fluffypony> additionally you could distribute a script to multiple participants (say, 3) and then if any of them have differences in returned data you get one more participant to run it, and so on until you have 3 that agree
02:33 < smellymoo> hmmm
02:33 < fluffypony> certainly not failsafe, but easier to control and respond and blacklist naughty participants
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02:35 < smellymoo> not disagreeing with you about centralisation, actually, the reason for admin scripts on the network doing most of it would be for speed and scalability. a big attack would be handled mostly automatically.
02:35 < smellymoo> maybe payment would be best handled manually...
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02:36 < smellymoo> but the tron script / mystery shopper (be it asking to do the script 3 times, or random checks or what ever) helping the process of black listing / accepting.
02:36 < fluffypony> also check http://www.cpusage.com
02:36 < fluffypony> and http://www.gomezpeerzone.com
02:36 < smellymoo> seen...
02:36 < fluffypony> and the defunct https://pluraprocessing.wordpress.com
02:37 < fluffypony> and http://www.slicify.com
02:37 < smellymoo> but this is WAY better
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02:37 < smellymoo> as it has the idea of running hosts ON the network, like tor hidden services.
02:38 < smellymoo> one reason for wanting the network to handle the verification is to stop me being the weak link that the NSA / etc can disable.
02:38 < fluffypony> what happens if the data gets deleted by the node hosting it?
02:38 < smellymoo> what happens when that happens on torrents?
02:39 < fluffypony> a torrent has multiple seeders that all host the data, but the checksum on that data is publicly known
02:39 < fluffypony> there's little point in hosting a website with static data
02:39 < fluffypony> and if the data is dynamic then you're at risk of it being lost
02:39 < smellymoo> all nodes that are running a certain script connect together with each other and keep state up to date... there is a queue that times events... hard to explan.
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02:40 < fluffypony> Bitcoin is literally the first thing in history to solve the problem of "keeping state up to date" in an adversarially-heavy, decentralised system
02:40 < smellymoo> so steal from it.
02:40 < fluffypony> and it requires the entire network to keep the same state in order to be trustless
02:41 < smellymoo> so each group of nodes that are hosting a script do that.
02:41 < fluffypony> they can collude
02:41 < smellymoo> ...
02:41 < fluffypony> they can lie and say they're keeping the data without actually keeping all of it
02:41 < fluffypony> that way they can participate in hosting "more"
02:41 < fluffypony> and get paid more
02:42 < smellymoo> mystery shopping?
02:42 < fluffypony> they just store the data for a month and then figure out which parts of it are requested most often, and drop the rest
02:42 < fluffypony> how is the mystery shopper going to know they're keeping the actual data unless it has the actual data as well?
02:43 < fluffypony> in which case the mystery shopper has to have EVERY piece of data
02:43 < smellymoo> no, it checks if they store the mystery shopper data.
02:43 < smellymoo> or it checks a checksum of the data.
02:43 < fluffypony> so then I just store checksums and not the data
02:43 < fluffypony> hell I'll even store salted checksums as a rainbow table
02:43 < smellymoo> ok, give me one second to process.
02:44 < smellymoo> it's statistical
02:44 < smellymoo> the mystery shopper verifies that a host does it's job.
02:45 < fluffypony> how
02:45 < smellymoo> by running a script and verifying it did.
02:45 < fluffypony> let's take data storage as a basic example
02:45 < smellymoo> right.
02:45 < fluffypony> it has to verify that the host is storing that data
02:45 < fluffypony> how
02:45 < smellymoo> easy.
02:46 < smellymoo> store this... later... checksum this... does the answer match
02:46 < fluffypony> is the mystery shopper retaining the checksum or the actual data to check with my node later?
02:46 < smellymoo> could do either.
02:47 < fluffypony> ok so then I just store the checksum, not the actual data
02:47 < fluffypony> you request the checksum, I give you the checksum
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02:47 < smellymoo> point is, you don't know which script is verifying you.
02:47 < smellymoo> but!...
02:47 < fluffypony> doesn't matter, if it asks for a checksum I give it a checksum (that I already have)
02:47 < smellymoo> you don't know how the second script will calculate the checksum!
02:48 < fluffypony> how would I not know that
02:48 < smellymoo> as in it asks a test question, that you would have needed the data for.
02:48 < fluffypony> virtually any tests you can come up I can store data for that is less than the actual data
02:49 < smellymoo> not true.
02:49 < fluffypony> and, more importantly, you have to either devise those tests at the outset when you actually have the data
02:49 < fluffypony> or you have to keep the data
02:49 < smellymoo> but that's easy.
02:49 < fluffypony> which part, keeping the data or devising the tests?
02:49 < smellymoo> you are the person testing...
02:50 < smellymoo> so for you you pre calculate the answer.
02:50 < smellymoo> but the test is something that varies. so the host can't.
02:50 < fluffypony> ok so here's an easier scenario: I run 30 000 nodes that claim to store data, but only 1 node that actually stores it
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02:50 < fluffypony> every time you give me a data test I just ask that 1 node for it
02:50 < smellymoo> no.
02:50 < smellymoo> wouldn't work.
02:51 < fluffypony> why
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02:51 < fluffypony> works for Bitcoin: https://github.com/basil00/PseudoNode
02:51 < fluffypony> what makes you think it won't work for your scheme
02:51 < smellymoo> look, you generate a random test data, for each storage mystery shop, and you generate the result. then you do one to a node, then the test script.
02:52 < smellymoo> with a delay.
02:52 < smellymoo> so...
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02:52 < fluffypony> and you think that if I'm running 30 000 nodes I can't figure out that the same (or similar) script is being sent to the bulk of my nodes over a period of time
02:52 < fluffypony> and thus figure out the mystery shopper's behaviour
02:53 < smellymoo> data: 123456789 ... random test... 5th character... store (5) in mystery shop script) send to node data... 1 hour later... do test.
02:53 < fluffypony> you are not as random as you think you are
02:53 < fluffypony> *holds up spork*
02:53 < smellymoo> hmm
02:53 < fluffypony> remember, smellymoo, an attacker has both virtually unlimited time and virtually unlimited resources
02:53 < fluffypony> your model is classic security-through-obscurity
02:53 < smellymoo> that is why I said about copying code from random scripts, then adding a mutated part that can be checked later.
02:54 < fluffypony> you assume that an attacker cannot know who the mystery shopper is, but they can
02:54 < smellymoo> true.
02:54 < fluffypony> which means your entire model is dependent on the mystery shopper or it's patterns not being "discovered"
02:55 < smellymoo> then maybe steal from the bitcoin model, and make one state shared by all that is for verification?
02:55 < fluffypony> well done, you've just reinvented Ethereum :-P
02:55 < smellymoo> very true.
02:55 < smellymoo> right...
02:55 < smellymoo> but made it actually useful.
02:55 < smellymoo> can't host silk road on eth.
02:56 < smellymoo> can't mount a ddos with eth.
02:56 < fluffypony> http://counterparty.io/news/counterparty-recreates-ethereums-smart-contract-platform-on-bitcoin/
02:56 < fluffypony> just build it on top of CounterParty
02:56 < fluffypony> or as a sidechain
02:56 < smellymoo> will look at counterparty.
02:56 < fluffypony> at least you're inheriting the Bitcoin network's security
02:57 < smellymoo> ok...
02:57 < smellymoo> but you see the validity of my idea.
02:58 < fluffypony> oh sure, I definitely think that there's scope for distributed programming and distributed storage etc., I just think that doing it securely is extremely hard
02:58 < smellymoo> instead of torrents outliving their orignal seeders, scripts including websites could.
02:58 < smellymoo> that's why it's been good talking it through with you.
02:59 < fluffypony> 100%
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03:00 < smellymoo> mystery shopping is security-through-obscurity, if done right, it would work, but would always be waiting to be hacked, so maybe some form of bitcoin style security must be done... but can't understand how it would work yet.
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03:03 < smellymoo> how will counterparty help verify that a host has executed the code or not... can't see the connection.
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03:04 < fluffypony> counterparty is built on top of Bitcoin, and all counterparty nodes execute the same scripts (that shared state thing we were talking about)
03:05 < fluffypony> spinza: dag sê
03:05 < smellymoo> the way I see it, there are only 3 ways to verify if the host has run the script: mystery shop, run more than once and check the outputs match, inbed checks in the script that verify (eg: post checksum to this webserver, which the script owner owns ... or post onto the network the checksum, or what ever)
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03:06 < smellymoo> dunno... as the power of my idea is that you can use it different ways, having the same script ran on all nodes is weak...
03:07 < smellymoo> if there was a way to have 1% of it being a script that is run on all, and blockchain secured, that then secured the different scripts running... but don't see it.
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03:09 < fluffypony> 1 has problems, 2 is possibly workable (but then it's just a decentralised version of MongoDB), and 3 is open to the owner cheating (ie. lying and saying that the work hasn't been completed, so that can get a refund)
03:11 < smellymoo> but if 1 and 3 are combined.
03:11 < smellymoo> actually, all 3?
03:12 < fluffypony> you can't stop the owner from cheating by "mystery shopping"
03:12 < fluffypony> it's literally his word against the node that processed it
03:12 < smellymoo> ok... so use the blockchain tech to keep one version of data, and that data is the digest replies from running scripts.
03:12 < smellymoo> but client flags, then it triggers mystery shop
03:13 < fluffypony> ok so then let's say that the script evaluates the outcome of a sports game and awards Better A or Better B the total bet of 50 Wafflecoin
03:13 < smellymoo> yes
03:13 < fluffypony> to do this it pings api.somesportsresultssite.com/outcome?gameid=7
03:13 < smellymoo> right
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03:14 < fluffypony> so Better A colludes with somesportsresultssite.com to change the outcome in their API when the bet is resolved
03:14 < fluffypony> but then give the actual result to any requests thereafter
03:14 < smellymoo> for what end?
03:14 < fluffypony> script runs, pays out to Better A (who then splits the profits with the site)
03:14 < fluffypony> Better B loses
03:14 < smellymoo> don't get how anyone benefits from that?
03:15 < fluffypony> because Better A isn't the legitimate winner
03:15 < smellymoo> as it's about getting scripts processed.
03:15 < smellymoo> but that doesn't matter, that's gaming something else.
03:16 < smellymoo> it's a massive processor... not a currency
03:16 < fluffypony> sure, but what I mean is that your mystery shopper setup won't catch that
03:16 < smellymoo> but it's a closed loop...
03:16 < fluffypony> that relies on external data
03:16 < fluffypony> and posts to an external system
03:16 < smellymoo> client and host are the same person.. so no one gains anything
03:16 < fluffypony> so it's not a closed loop at all
03:17 < smellymoo> who gains? it's a processor, not a currency.
03:17 < fluffypony> you're missing the point
03:17 < fluffypony> if your mystery shopper runs the same script it'll have a different result
03:17 < fluffypony> because the data it relies on has changed
03:18 < smellymoo> right
03:18 < fluffypony> so now what do you do
03:18 < fluffypony> not pay out?
03:18 < smellymoo> but that would be a shit mystery shopper
03:18 < smellymoo> a good one would be something like...
03:19 < smellymoo> copy another random script, add somewhere X=DFG_65443... later run admin script that checks all sandbox memory for DFG_*
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03:20 < smellymoo> match 65443 against stored check value.
03:20 < smellymoo> then they most keep all memory from all scripts to pass.
03:21 < fluffypony> forever?
03:21 < smellymoo> no.
03:21 < smellymoo> just for the run cycle.
03:21 < smellymoo> whatever that might be
03:22 < smellymoo> wait wait wait...
03:22 < smellymoo> maybe, there is one shared state, using blockchain tech...
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03:23 < smellymoo> each script has a digest value...
03:23 < smellymoo> they are all written to this ledger.
03:23 < smellymoo> then after it is trivial to check a flagged script.
03:23 < fluffypony> so my naughty nodes will behave and keep the shared state
03:23 < smellymoo> right...
03:23 < fluffypony> but will evaluate scripts to their benefit
03:24 < smellymoo> but they must add to the ledger a digest to get payment.
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03:25 < smellymoo> so for example, the digest could be a checksum of the final ram state of that scripts vm.
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03:26 < smellymoo> what about that? :D
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03:29 < smellymoo> so, tax is taken out of the payments, to pay for the scripts to double check flagged hosts execution of scripts, if the digest of execution in the blockchain matches then the host is paid.
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03:32 < smellymoo> so it would be important to make fairly big "execution allotment blocks" otherwise the digest blockchain would be too big. so the smallest unit would need to be quite big, like 1 minute of processing, or a non-trivial amount, probably best if it was quantified by payout.
03:35 < smellymoo> fluffypony, what about that :D? that would fix it no?
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03:53 < smellymoo> fluffypony, now you are definitely off writing the write paper to take the credit ;)
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03:57 < smellymoo> ok, gtg, bbl
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04:17 < fluffypony> lol because that's what I do with my Saturdays in sunny South Africa
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05:40 < smellymoo> fluffypony, back
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05:42 < smellymoo> still on? thought about it, and if you have one blockchain for digests (processing proofs), then you still have the problem of hosts faking and saying they did the work or using it as an attack and spaming it with fake digests. so it only fixes the problem of no proof of the claims.
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05:44 < smellymoo> but, the client side bad actors are easy to mitigate, each script posted needs a minimum amount in the account, like 0.1$ which the change could be returned if no foul play... so posting 10000 scripts would be 1000$ and you would lose it.
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10:26 < kanzure> OP_PARTIAL_MERKLE_ROOT https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=175639.0
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10:47 < kanzure> "persistent transaction sequences" https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=255110.msg2717864#msg2717864
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10:53 < ielo> phantomcircuit, patrick
10:53 < kanzure> "The "chain" isn't really a chain, it is a tree.  However, normally, the main branch is the only one that is extended.  The tree becomes a single branch with a few small orphan branches. When a fork happens, there are 2 branches that are being extended.  Headers should be forwarded if they extend the tree, even if they aren't part of the main branch (and even if the blocks they represent are invalid)."
10:53 < kanzure> from https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=262281.0
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10:57 < kanzure> "include the input value of the transaction in the transaction hash" hm
11:02 < Taek> why do you want to forward headers that don't extend the longest chain?
11:03 < Taek> "The ideal solution is that all miners switch to fork B, since 100% of miners consider it valid." ==> also, this just seems abusable to me
11:03 < Taek> you essentially end up letting 25% of the miners dictate what counts as a valid block
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11:04 < Taek> makes soft forks a lot easier, but also censorship a lot easier
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13:36 < kanzure> "extended merkle tree: The merkle tree currently ends at the transaction level.  This means that to prove that a particular output is valid, you need to provide the entire transaction.  If the merkle tree continued down to the inputs and outputs of the transaction, then only a merkle path would be required to prove that an output is valid." https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=844944.0
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13:39 < kanzure> "[With the current system and not using sum-merkle-trees,] if blocks are 20MB, then spv fraud proofs could be 60MB or more."
13:39 < kanzure> from https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=845978.msg9435205#msg9435205
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14:00 < kanzure> streaming block validation, oof
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15:21 < kanzure> "transaction senders should attach a pow proof to avoid paying a transaction fee" https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=80989.0
15:21 < kanzure> actually i'm not sure if that's a good summary.. hm.
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15:41 < gmaxwell> "Transaction proof of work to reduce block proof of work to incentivize transaction inclusion"
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15:50 < kanzure> are "auxiliary blocks" and "extension blocks" the same thing? https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=283746.0
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19:00 < gmaxwell> Wow. bitcoin-development has reached a new low.
19:01 < gmaxwell> Recently Peter R posted a very long highly technical paper (with nice illustrations) which argued that there is an implicit economic block size limit which would result in the creation of a fee market as a result of orphaning.
19:03 < gmaxwell> Peter R's had previously made similar arguments to a non-technical audience using an overly technical presentation (which was not fitting for the material or the audience)-- I felt his activities were intentionally obfscuating. And I responded correcting his technical errors and included a line calling him out on it. He responded at lenght complaining that I was trying to suprress his ability to
19:03 < gmaxwell> communicate, and of course not addressing the technical remarks.
19:04 < gmaxwell> A month or so later he published this paper.  Learning from the poor expirence last time I, instead, contacted him in private. Hoping that he would revise or retract the incorrect aspects of his work, and that we could have a more productive interaction privately.
19:04 < gmaxwell> His work failed completely, in my view, due to to unrelated mistaken assumptions on his part. I explained each in detail, including providing fairly concrete constructions for situations under which they would be violated.
19:05 < gmaxwell> His response (to my read) suggested that he understood my position, and agreed _at least_ that they presented significant limitations on his work.
19:05 < gmaxwell> He said that he would take a number of corrective actions.
19:06 < gmaxwell> In the time since, he has posted publically about his work, promoting it, and making no corrective action; which I understand can just be the result of revisions taking time.
19:06 < gmaxwell> A third party begain extension work, consulting with him privately-- and he failed to disclose my communicaton to this person. Their extension work fails due to the same mistaken assumptions in Peter R's work.
19:07 < gmaxwell> I wrote Peter R again and complained that his lack of action and failure to communicate this to the other author has wasted their time.
19:08 < gmaxwell> I then sent, without comment, the correspondance with Peter R to this other author.
19:09 < gmaxwell> The other author is angry with Peter due to his misconduct, and wrote him complaining. After which Peter R just turned around and blasted me on the list as if I'd done something wrong.
19:10 < kanzure> yeah peterr's email fails to mention that the disagreement was about the assumptions or the lack of idnetification of those assumptions, and instead thinks your original emails were about something else apparently
19:10 < kanzure> he also seems to be confused about why you would be concerned about wasting people's time
19:11 < gmaxwell> Af if the situation wasn't bad enough where people who benefited from PeterR's mistaken arguments, including ones whos own work contributed to their invalidation, have failed to speak up... I'm getting attacked for sharing a completely uninteresting techincal discussion with another author, whos work was undermined by Peter R's conduct, when he'd already written me that claiming that he intended
19:11 < gmaxwell> to publish the substance of our discussion.
19:11 < gmaxwell> So what did he expect me to do, go waste my time in another long 1:1 discussion with the other author who was mislead by his work?
19:12 < kanzure> "trying to suppress his ability to communicate" deserves the typical lecture about how talking about vulnerabilities/problems is not suppression, etc.
19:12 < gmaxwell> I was already considering just posting the discussion in public, due to his unresponsiveness in correction and his continued statements which seem to be in conflict with his apparent (to me?) agreement that I have a point.
19:13 < kanzure> were his assumptions clearly stated and the obvious violations enumerated? if the answer's no then i think that should be clarified; there's no good reason to have wrong assumptions or even probably-wrong-assumptions silently failing to make an appearance in a research doc.
19:14 < kanzure> looking at his bitcoin-dev email it looks like he is claiming that "simplifying assumptions are good and important" and not at all addressing your actual concerns "that assumptions should be explicitly stated especially if they might be wrong or simplified too much in certain directions that might cause problems in the resulting analysis". i think there's a difference.
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19:15 < gmaxwell> Hie prior, loosly related work which I publically flamed was at: https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/3c579i/yesterdays_fork_suggests_we_dont_need_a_blocksize/csscnfy
19:17 < kanzure> "Just because the proof makes simplifying assumptions, doesn't mean it's not useful in helping us to understand the dynamics of the transaction fee market." it helps to understand dynamics under those assumptions, but assumptions should be stated clearly. especially if they are possibly contentious anyway.... i think he's just conflating your claims with some other paranoid stuff.
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19:18 < gmaxwell> It's especially obnoxious that his last communication to me was "I'm going to take these corrective actions"  but today, after yelling at him again in private his response was to say " I look forward to a white paper demonstrating otherwise!".
19:18 < gmaxwell> kanzure: the simplifying assumption he makes that isn't disclosed in the paper is that miner centeralization isn't a concern or a consideration.
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19:18 < kanzure> he already agrees that his assumptions are simplified, so i don't see why he wants a whitepaper in reply. maybe just dump your email to pdf and format with latex, who cares.
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19:20 < gmaxwell> The incorrect belief he has about relality is that block propagation time is necessairly linearly proportional to block size. He waxes on for two pages of equations and mumblb mumble shanon-hartley theorem.  I responded with a simple protocol suggestion (which we've talked about here in the past) that makes it O(1) and not iblt-like O(1) but O(1) under much weaker assumptions.
19:21 < gmaxwell> because I should be forced to waste hundreds of hours is a pretext battle with an anonymous party who has already demonstrated a remarkable lack of intellctual integrity on several occasions?
19:22 < kanzure> this all seems pretty simple to fix by email in reply to him; if he prefers to think of himself as a victim after that then whatever nobody can stop him.
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19:23 < gmaxwell> Not sure how. He's currently attempting to exploit that people are not going to spend their time reading the discussion and notice that at the end of he was agreeing to revise it his work, only to weeks later demand a paper from me... from something the anyone else needs only a two line correction for.
19:23 < gmaxwell> fucking toxic enviroment.
19:24 < kanzure> the agreement he gave you doesn't matter, what's more important is the original details (the assumptions that you wanted to point out so that others might not waste as much time). everything else is just peterr trying to reframe what you said.
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19:40 < fkhan> fwiw, after reading the actual discussion the context of peter's email seemed exaggeratted
19:45 < fkhan> and, the miner block propogation scheme was something i hadn't heard proposed before
19:45 < fkhan> i mean, the weaker assumption version
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19:48 < gmaxwell> It's been discussed a couple times in the past in varrious guises, e.g. as a way to get faster soft-confirmation. I didn't expect PeterR to be aware of it (though he should have made clear at least that his proprtionality could be arbritarily small), thus the discussion.
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20:14 < gmaxwell> http://pastebin.com/AdNVmfUM  this sound reasonable?
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20:24 < kanzure> "seemingly (to me)" is too ambiguous
20:24 < kanzure> because it reads as "you made these comments to me"
20:25 < kanzure> "reasonable to demand" -> "reasonable to insist", only you or i would use the word demand there :P
20:26 < kanzure> otherwise seems fine
20:27 < kanzure> whoops too late
20:29 < moa> gmaxwell: "level centralisation" should be "level of centralisation" ... i think
20:30 < gmaxwell> yea, sorry, I need to be more patient.
20:30 < gmaxwell> My bad pratices are made worse by the recent norm of things showing up sensationalized on reddit before I can get a response out.
20:30 < moa> take it easy
20:32 < moa> that guy is making my blood boil with his demands for an equally vacuous 'white paper' to refute his 'conclusions' drawn from some seriously questionable assumptions
20:33 < moa> it's like a new layer of high priests of economics is attempting to install themselves as 'system experts' or some such ....
20:33 < kanzure> i don't think blood is supposed to boil
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20:33 < moa> I think the kids might say ... "dude, do you even code?"
20:35 < gmaxwell> Well you can see Peter Todd blew up on the original post.
20:36 < gmaxwell> It's infuriating when someone makes an intellectually weak argument, but slateers it in so much (very nicely constructed) pretext and trappings that people who aren't interested or lack the context to evaluate it on its merits are too busy being mesmorized with the leather binding. :)
20:37 < gmaxwell> or at least it's infuriating if its done intentionally.
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20:38 < dgenr8> Dumb question. If actual block propagation requires 0 or almost 0 information xfer, why it there any need to limit the notional size of the block at all?
20:41 < moa> gmaxwell: I was willing to give him the benefit of the doubt but I called him out on some of the obvious flaws and he only refutes what he can or ignores
20:42 < moa> so it looks like it's a "made for public consumption" argument from leather-bound authority designed to sow doubt ... or he just doesn't want to confront big porblems
20:42 < gmaxwell> dgenr8: Fine distinction; information must be transfered at _some time_, but not with the block.  You could imagine instead that there was no block limit but was instead a global transaction limit.  That would be equally sufficient, --- it's just that the having a global, consistent, transaction limit already implies a block limit.
20:43 < dgenr8> do we need a global transaction limit?
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20:44 < gmaxwell> dgenr8: PeterR's argument hingest critically that block propagation is delayed from the moment the solution is found proportional to the information transmitted.  He then argues that the existance of a "healthy fee market" (term of art, defined in his paper) unescapable; because miners must limit their blocks size to prevent those delays from costing them subsidy.
20:45 < gmaxwell> His argument fails on several points (1) the more cenetalized miners are (under his model) the more fees they can collect, and at the limit of a single miner, his proposed mechenism results in an infinite sized blocks and fees of 0.  He failed to consider miners could respond to high propagation costs by centeralizing.
20:46 < moa> he makes zero attempt to show how "healthy fee market" --> security ... and ignores any questioning along that line, just for reference
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20:47 < gmaxwell> (2) the whole argument depends on relay times being proportional to block size (they're already not with matt's relay network protocol, but there is some weak relation: so I gave another example system which much more strongly eliminates the relationship).
20:47 < gmaxwell> (3) He depends on the subsidy, his model becomes much less effective without it. And in general even without assuming the above to points, as moa notes the "market" his model produces doesn't neceessarily do anything useful. E.g. may be purely theoretical.
20:48 < gmaxwell> (and would be increasingly so as subsidy falls away).
20:48 < gmaxwell> So no biggie. I mean, I argue things less well advised than PeterR's all the time.   Fortunately, in private discussion he agreed with me about most of the substance of my complaints.
20:49 < gmaxwell> (He seems to not quite buy my argument for absolutely 0 proportionality, but he agrees that it can be very small and so not of pratical importance)
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20:58 < aj> gmaxwell: fwiw, his analysis assumes the subsidy exists by assuming that a 0-size block is profitable when producing the "neutral profit curve" (M_supply(Q)) in eqn 6
21:00 < aj> gmaxwell: at least, i think that's where it was last time i looked...
21:00 < gmaxwell> aj: my impression when I read it initially was that getting rid of subsidy didn't break it, but it did make the concrete numbers so high as to be obviously unrealistic, even leaving the rest alone.
21:02 < aj> gmaxwell: from the paper -- "We conclude by noting that the analysis presented in this paper breaks down when the block reward falls to zero. It suggests that the cost of block space is zero; ..."
21:03 < gmaxwell> oh well indeed then!
21:05 < gmaxwell> Though thats undone by a single altruistic participant that always pays a 1 satoshi fee transaction regardless of whats going on in every block. :)
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21:12 < smellymoo> fluffypony?
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21:18 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, i really want to respond to his last post on the mailing list with "let me explain to you what packets are"
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21:42 < gmaxwell> Should I respond further? I wrote a response... pointing out that basically every block on the network today is mined with a protocol that sends constant data when a block is found.
21:43 < gmaxwell> it's ... offensive that he's trying to argue that what I'm suggesting is theoretical and not physically possible.
21:44 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, im not sure there's any point; he's clearly got some kind of agenda and is refusing to admit the truth
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21:44 < smellymoo> tin foil hat
21:45 < gmaxwell> phantomcircuit: thats the "bitcoin spinoffs" guy.
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21:46 < kanzure> phantomcircuit: fwiw i would be interested in the "what are packets" answer :-)
21:46 < kanzure> always good to cover the basics
21:46 < smellymoo> lol
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21:59 < gmaxwell> phantomcircuit: pfft, don't make the SNR levels worse
21:59 < gmaxwell> phantomcircuit: if you feel like causing trouble is important for your well being, send the guy an email about why he suddenly became so concerned about publishing private email threads now when he wasn't a week ago? :)
22:00 < gmaxwell> man, at least I only sent to to a single person the guy was actively screwing over. :-/
22:01 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, heh
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23:02 < ryan-c> will a transaction propagate through a node if that node has not seen the output the transaction spends?
23:17 < phantomcircuit> ryan-c, no
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--- Log closed Sun Aug 30 00:00:55 2015