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09:26 < Taek> (late to the timezone party) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swatch_Internet_Time
09:27 < Taek> notably, no timezones, and the day gets broken up into 1000 pieces instead of 60*60*24 pieces
09:28 < phy1729> timezones are a good thing  http://qntm.org/abolish
09:28 < Taek> They did choose to start the day based on a geographical location, which means they probably have/need leap seconds.
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09:33 < zookolaptop> https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/ticket/1934
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09:42 < bsm1175321> Hahaaa zooko.  Or option 6, just use TAI (http://www.timeanddate.com/time/international-atomic-time.html) and stop using irregular balls of spinning dirt for reference.
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09:45 < bsm1175321> Long term, I want to find a way to get time back into bitcoin.  I know it's a taboo topic, but the 2-hour/2-week granularity of bitcoin's time measurements are just silly, we could do a lot better without introducing vulnerabilities.
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09:56 < gmaxwell> bsm1175321: thats a big claim to make when even the existing configuration presents vulnerabilties.
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10:00 < kanzure> i feel like the software should come with stronger statements/requirements/guarantees (dunno which) about referential frames
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10:07 < bsm1175321> gmaxwell: It's an area that needs attention, that's for sure.
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10:09 < phy1729> kanzure: you mean account for relativistic problems?
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10:16 < kanzure> well not just problems, but requirements, but yes.
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10:17 < phy1729> should just use TAI then
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12:08 < kanzure> "Current average non-cash tps globally is 12,357tps. Average non-cash transactions increase by around 7% per year. This would mean that by year 2040 it would be 67,067tps."
12:09 < kanzure> why 7% increase in transactions-per-second? is there a study about this?
12:09 < kanzure> why would the rate be linear..? is this about capacity, or is this about actual demand?
12:09 < kanzure> s/actual demand/... hm that's a hrad concept.
12:09 < kanzure> *hard
12:11 < gmaxwell> increased population, increased industrialization, and deprecation of cash would all be obvious candidate drivers.
12:18 < bsm1175321> Everything is linear because people are too lazy to do a more comprehensive analysis.
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12:37 < phy1729> on a small enough scale, all functions are linear
12:37 < sipa> all continuous functions, yes :)
12:39 < phy1729> all functions that are differentable in a neighborhood of the point of interest
12:43 < gmaxwell> e^x is linear?
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12:44 < gmaxwell> considering that all its derivatives are also e^x, that would be a pretty tortured definition of 'linear'. :P
12:46 < phy1729> gmaxwell: y=e^{x_0}(x-x_0)+e^{x_0} is linear
12:46 < sipa> gmaxwell: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stone%E2%80%93Weierstrass_theorem
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12:47 < sipa> gmaxwell: e^x is very linear when restricted to an arbitrarily small domain :)
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12:48 < gwillen> simba: the theorem says 'polynomial', not linear :-P
12:48 < gmaxwell> thats linear.
12:48 < gwillen> er, sipa
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12:49 < sipa> gwillen: it should say "polynomial of any degree, including 1"
12:49 < sipa> gwillen: wait, wrong theorem!
12:49 < gmaxwell> but what I was objecting to was more the approximated. :)
12:50 < gwillen> heh :-)
12:50 < gmaxwell> (there is no polynomal that is _exactly_ e^x on any interval no matter how small or how high the degree)
12:51 < sipa> gmaxwell: the theorem i'm looking for is one that says that any continuous function can be locally aproximated by a linear function in an epsilon-environment around any point
12:51 < phy1729> ok    on a small enough scale, all functions *look* linear
12:52 < waxwing> repeat after me, "given epsilon greater than zero, ..."
12:52 < gmaxwell> phy1729: heh. yea.
12:53 < phy1729> waxwing: \forall\epsilon>0
12:53 < sipa> gmaxwell, phy1729: all continuous functions :)
12:53 < gmaxwell> phy1729: the lying with graphs theorem. :)
12:53  * phy1729 makes a note to append every word with a * while sipa is watching
12:57 < bsm1175321> sipa: you may be looking for the definition of a continuous function (Weierstrauss definition, aka epsilon-delta)
12:57 < bsm1175321> I didn't think continuous math was allowed in here.  ;-)
13:00 < gmaxwell> topic for discussion then,   The mean of the interblock intervals is the ML estimator for the distribution paramter assuming a stationary hashrate; but that estimator is biased.  The unbiased estimator is scale by (n-1)/n where n is the number of observations.  Hypothesis: the biased estimator is less desirable for difficulty control.
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13:21 < aj> sipa: "any continuously differentiable function" not just continuous; abs(x) is continuous but can't be approximated by a linear function at x=0
13:22 < sipa> aj: right!
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13:25 < amiller_> so, any 'smooth' function?
13:25 < aj> sipa: is https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taylor%27s_theorem what you want, or what you'd already found?
13:25 < phy1729> "all functions that are differentable in a neighborhood of the point of interest"
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13:25 < bsm1175321> it's an approximation though
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13:35 < bsm1175321> gmaxwell: FWIW in building a DAG I'm using an actual likelihood to determine which chain-tip has the most work.  I'm also allowing nodes to set their targets on their own, so a DAG-tip will contain blocks with many different work targets.  The log likelihood is easy enough to compute, there's no reason to collapse it to a biased (or unbiased) estimator.
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13:39 < bsm1175321> gmaxwell: You're talking about something slightly different though since bitcoin's target difficulty is a consensus parameter. The error in using a biased estimator can be directly translated into slightly more BTC/time on average, but other than that is pretty unimportant. I think we need to stick with the biased estimator because miners would balk to find that we twiddled their income.
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13:39 < bsm1175321> (not to mention hard fork concerns)
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13:46 < bsm1175321> For reference, the likelihood is the product of the Poisson probabilities for the observed blocks.  One usually takes the log and compares log-likelihoods.  By the Neyman-Pearson lemma this is the most powerful test one can do.  I'm performing a hypothesis test that tip A contains more work than tip B. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neyman%E2%80%93Pearson_lemma
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14:12 < bramc> Real world functions tend to be very noisy and look like noisy fractals at any scale, meaning random walks.
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14:59 < bramc> First draft of the simplest function complete! Sorry for whoever has to unroll this crap in the C port.
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15:02 < bramc> This is some serious recursion right here
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15:17 < bramc> Oh that's a weird subtlety: in the most straightforward patricia tree you can't have proofs of inclusion or disinclusion when there's only a single element included
15:18 < bramc> I mean, when there's only a single thing in your set. Because you can't prove anything about it.
15:19 < bramc> Not sure how best to special case that.
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15:21 < bramc> Maybe it's best that when there's only a single thing in the set the root is just the hash of that thing.
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15:29 < bramc> Really annoying edge case in any case
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15:32 < gmaxwell> I explained BIP113 some here https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/3tyfaa/bitcoin_dev_irc_meeting_in_laymans_terms_20151119/cxapich?context=3 I hope it's usefully clear for people (if anyone sees anything I should tweak, lemme know)
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15:32 < bramc> Oh ugh, no it isn't just a single special case, for proofs in general it needs to hash in information about whether each thing is terminal
15:34 < bramc> gmaxwell, Presumably there are quite a few accepted transactions which have to get grandfathered in?
15:35 < gmaxwell> bramc: standard for softforks: it will only apply after it's activation point.
15:35 < bramc> gmaxwell, Right, but I think most soft forks don't need to grandfather anything in
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15:36 < gmaxwell> Some we've managed with no violations, but not all.
15:36 < gmaxwell> the activation will eventually get reduced to a height check.
15:36 < gmaxwell> BIP30 was somewhat special, since we actually have to enforce it everywhere (Even before it was invented) to prevent local database corruption.
15:37 < bramc> Does BIP113 make time-based unlocks 'okay' or are they still a basically broken concept and strictly inferior to block height based?
15:37 < tulip> bramc: I don't think there's many transactions in the chain using a non-height based nLockTime, but Bitcoin Core now signs transactions with a height based nLockTime though.
15:38 < bramc> tulip, So then why doesn't the fork ban time-based nLockTime altogether?
15:38 < gmaxwell> bramc: it makes them okay.
15:38 < midnightmagic> mining incentives as a whole operates as though miners' groupthink achieves consensus as a result of identical end conclusion. therefore, even though miners are decentralized, if the incentive exists to fudge time, mining decentralization will not alter the end result. BIP113, if it uses MTP, therefore would have to achieve its effect through miner inertia/apathy/lack of global coordination.
15:38 < gmaxwell> bramc: because the block-time controller is not precise enough if you want a 'hit the right day' lock two months from now.
15:39 < gmaxwell> Mostly because it's relatively slow and because it has no integral-error term in its control.
15:39 < bramc> gmaxwell, Median of the last 11 might be a little loose. I'd prefer median of some larger number
15:40 < gmaxwell> I know, we can always make it stricter in the future. 11 had the nice property that it's already used to define the minimum blocktime for a block.
15:40 < midnightmagic> median time of that small number would make it inline with reverse-looking block time variance maximum.
15:40 < bramc> I think a 20% miner would get to set the median of last 11 once every couple days
15:41 < gmaxwell> bramc: to benefit you have to set it, AND you have to mine the next block.
15:41 < gmaxwell> so you effectively have to mine 6 blocks in the window, plus the next block.
15:41 < gmaxwell> And if you miss it, someone else gets the benefit.
15:42 < gmaxwell> (assuming you're trying to blow the time an hour into the future rather than twiddling it around by a few seconds)
15:42 < bramc> gmaxwell, Assuming that others will opportunistically take your own ill-gotten gains if given the chance but not contribute to it themselves then yes, fudging doesn't buy anything for miners
15:42 < gmaxwell> A more conservative scheme would actually use the minimum of a window, instead of the median.
15:43 < bramc> Does that mean that the default mining software should do that sort of opportunistic stealing?
15:43 < midnightmagic> that calculation is something that someone *using* locktime just needs to include in their calculations of when to set the locktime for, similarly to how people must decide how many confirmations they're willing to risk when receiving funds.
15:43 < bramc> minimum of a window can be similarly pushed out by forcing up the global time
15:44 < gmaxwell> in any case, the goal there was the simplest possible thing that (1) breaks expectation that the threshold is the "time" (whatever that means), and (2) minimum needed to avoid forming a unconstrained powerful incentive to lie for every miner regardless of how low their hashpower was.
15:44 < gmaxwell> e.g. require a conspiracy instead of merely just locally greedy behavior.
15:44 < bramc> midnightmagic, Oh good point. In that case it's just important that the mining software cash in on whatever transactions it can include based on its stated time rather than the real time. There's a question of propagation though.
15:45 < bramc> gmaxwell, Fair enough, it seems to mostly do that, and caveat emptor and you can always use block height if you don't trust it.
15:46 < gmaxwell> I would have liked to make it min not median, e.g. 10 of 11 security instead of 6 of 11 security; but right now times on blocks are kinda wacked in general. :(
15:46 < tulip> bramc: you can go pretty far with making "rational" mining software to the point of just being active disruption to the network. especially with the mining reward halving, it's quite realistic to have blocks with more fees than reward which it would be profitable to try to push out of the chain.
15:46 < gmaxwell> yea, we're not really trying to protect time-based-locktime users; we're trying to prevent them from providing local incentives to screw up the network. :)
15:47 < bramc> tulip, Right, you might want to orphan an old block so you can steal its fees. Hopefully fees are smoothed out enough to not make that such a hot idea
15:48 < gmaxwell> bramc: Bitcoin Core 0.12 will very likely lock every transaction it creates at the current height to help discourage that.
15:48 < bramc> Although that does create the bizarre potential for a hot potato transaction, which has very high fees by itself, incenting it to be orphaned, which incents people to not include it in the first place...
15:48 < midnightmagic> I think forcing up the global time requires mass-sybil, will be noticed by miners, would require that no miners take action to correct it (and thus correct likely orphan problems resulting,) and that no users who care about the accuracy of the network also do nothing to correct it, nor notice it nand let everyone know about it
15:48 < gmaxwell> right now it locks 10 back.
15:49 < tulip> in the past 500 blocks there have been 420,000 transactions, 74,000 of them are nlocktimed with a block height, 105 are locked with a timestamp.
15:49 < bramc> tulip, Ouch that's a nontrivial amount
15:50 < gmaxwell> tulip: are you checking finality too?
15:50 < sipa> gmaxwell: i hope that transactions in the chain are final...
15:51 < bramc> Maybe I can fix the cases of only containing a single element or one element by just throwing in two garbage elements right off the bat
15:51 < bramc> If they're 0x00... and 0x111... then that simplifies proofs of inclusion and disinclusion quite a bit.
15:52 < gmaxwell> sipa: pedant, I just mean if they max seq the locktime field is irrelevant.
15:53 < tulip> gmaxwell: not for that statistic, I just assumed that people aren't signing massive amounts of 0xFFFFFFFF sequence nlocktimes transactions for no reason.
15:53 < bramc> That hack I just said is somewhat nauseating, but it sure makes implementation easier
15:53 < gmaxwell> tulip: This is bitcoin!
15:54 < bramc> Is anybody following my babbling about merkle sets? If not, does anybody mind me doing it here?
15:55 < gmaxwell> Semi following, I do not mind (quite the opposite)
15:55 < bramc> Okay, I'll keep up the occasional babbling. It helps me think.
15:56 < gmaxwell> bramc: wrt hot potatoe transactions. in a future hardfork I want to make coinbase outputs immediately spendable by coinbase transactions.  This would let miners pay fees forward.
15:56 < sipa> gmaxwell: and then a softfork later could require them to pay X% forward?
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15:57 < gmaxwell> An equlibrim behavior looks something like "pay forward half the difference between what you got and the fees from the next $block worth of transactions you didn't mine"
15:57 < gmaxwell> sipa: I don't think softforks that require paying forward are sensible, simply because you can fee bypass. But there is a rational equlibrium that being able to pay forkward supports.
15:57 < gmaxwell> but it's one that requires visibility into the mempool.
15:59 < bsm1175321> bramc: I'm following your babbling.  Don't think I'm helping you though, but feel free to babble, it's a relevant topic.
15:59 < bramc> gmaxwell, Isn't immediate spending a hard fork?
16:00 < sipa> bramc: "in a future hardfork" :)
16:01 < bramc> Hard forks are likely to wind up like Perl 6 or Python 3. They either ship never, or never minus a day :-)
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16:02 < tulip> gmaxwell: in the last 500 blocks there's 2 useless nlockTime transactions with maxed sequence numbers.
16:04 < tulip> quite a few with seemingly random sequence numbers too, I wonder what that's about.
16:05 < gmaxwell> (I didn't mean to suggest that I think that particular scheme above is a equlibrium, but something along those lines-- and any would require being able to pay fees forward)
16:07 < gmaxwell> tulip: see?
16:08 < midnightmagic> :-o
16:09 < midnightmagic> "provably destroyed! see?!"
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16:43 < bramc> Why is being able to spend coinbase outputs immediately a good thing? Isn't the theory that being able to do so might somehow make it possible to create incentives to orphan?
16:44 < tulip> it's mostly just to stop big chains of transactions being invalidated in a reorganisation.
16:45 < bramc> tulip, Right, so why re-allow that behavior?
16:45 < tulip> who is suggesting that?
16:46 < bramc> tulip, gmaxwell is, a little bit up in the chat
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16:47 < gmaxwell> bramc: only be other coinbase transactions.  You can already pay to incentivize orphaning, sadly, without using coinbase outputs; just using ordinary transactions.
16:48 < bramc> gmaxwell, I don't follow what you're proposing allowing exactly
16:48 < gmaxwell> Allow coinbase outputs to be spent by coinbase transactions. The coinbase->bitcoin path retains its 100 block delay.
16:49 < gmaxwell> bramc: As an extreme example, right now if a bogon fee (e.g. 50 BTC) shows up ... you might be better off to just not mining the darn thing. (or would be, if miners currently had optimizing software)
16:49 < gmaxwell> this is not good because it means that equlibrium seeking behavior from miners can only get expressed in reorg wars.
16:50 < bramc> What is a 'coinbase transaction'?
16:50 < gmaxwell> The special first transaction that gets paid the fees (and subsidy) in a block.
16:51 < gmaxwell> If, instead, coinbases can spend coinbase outputs, you could take the bogon fee and pay some fraction (e.g. half) of it forward, and now there is a bounty for extending your block drawn from it-- without you having to put up your own coins seperately, in a similar manner.
16:52 < bramc> gmaxwell, Is there some semantics to 'pay this to the next transaction output' that I'm not aware of? If so, what does it allow? For example, can it pay no N+2 and N+3?
16:52 < gmaxwell> well one could presumably use CLTV to achieve that, if only the ability to spend in the first place existed.
16:53 < bramc> And yes, a bogon fee is what I was calling a hot potato fee - Everybody will just orphan the same block over and over again trying to grab it for themselves
16:54 < tulip> there's probably something fun there if you know other peoples behaviours, dropping a large fee in a block and having all the other miners squabble trying to make it stale, while you mine a higher chain away from the noise.
16:54 < bramc> Gets even worse if it can have a max block height
16:55 < gmaxwell> Right I think its likely that there are stable behavior of the class  "consider the total known (or expected) fee income for the next _two_ blocks jointly, compute your block, and then pay half of any excess fee you got from that average forward." you could go next two to next N but the mempool becomes less accurate over time, since the transactions for 10 blocks from now haven't been announced y
16:55 < gmaxwell> et.
16:55 < bramc> gmaxwell, But if you don't need to use the cltv, then doesn't the transaction go immediately from coinbase -> bitcoin on that very first spend?
16:56 < gmaxwell> bramc: no, any coins that come out of a coinbase transaction aren't bitcoins for 100 blocks; as there could be a reorg that forever destroys them even absent any dishonest (or strategic!) behavior.
16:56 < bramc> gmaxwell, Hopefully transactions in general are smoothed out enough that this isn't such a problem, but yeah it's bad if somebody can send the blockchain into a tailspin for days just by spending a few thousand dollars
16:56 < gmaxwell> so the system has a maturity rule that anything coming out of that transaction can't be spent, this includes subsidy and fees.
16:57 < bramc> Ah, but right now there is no coinbase transaction, it just goes to a specific output?
16:58 < bramc> Also, this vague 'pay it forward' functionality isn't in there, right? I mean, right now outputs go to specific keys, not the unknown key of some future block
16:59 < gmaxwell> bramc: there is a coinbase transaction. The first transaction in a block. It's has a single magic input (the all zeros hash) that pays it the subsidy for the height (25 btc currently) and all the fees from the block.  It pays out to 1 or more outputs, just like an ordinary transaction; except with a special behavior that these outputs cannot be used as inputs in any transaction for 100 blocks.
17:00 < gmaxwell> So I would propose allowing coinbase transactions to have multiple inputs, and that its inputs ignore the 100 block coinbase restriction --- after all, if a prior block gets reorged out then _necessarily_ the current coinbase txn will get reorged out too.
17:01 < gmaxwell> There is no pay it forward really possible now, due to the height restriction, well you could pay it forward, but you have to pay a miner 100 blocks from now. :)
17:01 < gmaxwell> as far as how you pay them, you'd just write a output with the scrippubkey OP_TRUE, ... e.g. anyone can spend it.
17:02 < gmaxwell> if you wanted to pay +1 +2 +3 blocks in the future seperately, then presumably you could do height+2 OP_CLTV, height+3 OP_CLTV etc. outputs.
17:02 < bramc> gmaxwell, Oh I see. You can also combine CLTV and OP_TRUE to pay out for the next several blocks
17:02 < bramc> jinx
17:03 < gmaxwell> at least for some models all you need to do is go one forward, and then by induction that guy will keep paying forward.. but with unequal hashpower I think there is a defection problem, e.g. "I'll take the jackpot, and try to reorg war to keep it, because I have more hashpower".
17:03 < bramc> Allowing multiple inputs to a coinbase transactions sounds like a safe and reasonable thing to do, except for that whole hard fork problem
17:04 < kang_> Is it possible that such payforward deals be happening off-chain even now? That ways there's no restriction. I just tell 5 people, if you extend my work I'll send you some money..
17:04 < gmaxwell> I think it's a really modest and uninteresting hardfork in and of itself, at least.
17:04 < gmaxwell> kang_: it's possible, but it's hard to make secure. You can do them "on chain" to by just paying with your own coins, but you'll lose there if there is a reorg.
17:05 < gmaxwell> Lots of things are possible with private deals, but access to private deals is a centeralizing effect I like to avoid the need for. :)
17:05 < tulip> kang_: I don't think anybody has "smart" mining behaviour.
17:05 < kang_> What is the use of allowing this? Doesn't this polarize the protocol?
17:06 < gmaxwell> kang_: you can think of it like: doing it that way requires trust. Trust is a centeraizing force; it would make larger miners more profitable than smaller ones (better able to overcome the constant cost of establishing these relationships)
17:06 < bramc> Although I haven't thought through all the details of how it should work out in practice. Really what you want is for all mining fees to me spread out over the next several blocks, dropping down over time, to avoid such issues. Having fees be set well, for example using the algorithms I've proposed, should fix the problem, but someone can still be a jerk and make a transaction which is too big causing chaos...
17:06 < gmaxwell> kang_: it's already possible, but only in crappy centeralizing ways.
17:06 < gmaxwell> and without it the system is not obviously stable as fees become larger than subsidy.
17:07 < kang_> Yes, I first heard of this durinf scalingBitcoin Montreal on this channel itself
17:07 < gmaxwell> (I mean it might not even be obviously stable _with_ this either, but its very obviously not incentive compatibly stable absent fee sharing.)
17:07 < bramc> gmaxwell, I think with proper fee setting the system is stable-ish, but there's a trivial and inexpensive attack which really fucks shit up
17:08 < gmaxwell> bramc: or errors, we'e had people pay fees much larger than the subsidy apparently on accident.
17:08 < gmaxwell> There has been at least one 300 BTC fee, and I think two 150 BTC fees, and many more at other larger than subsidy sizes.
17:09 < bramc> 'Sorry I dropped $100,000 on the sidewalk'
17:09 < gmaxwell> yea.. mostly due to screwing around with raw transactions without understanding the bitcoin protocol. :(
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17:09 < gmaxwell> every once in a while someone showed up in #bitcoin confused/upset that sendrawtransaction in bitcoin core is rejecting their txn (because it's paying a supermassive fee)
17:10 < tulip> there's also various applications for making transactions which do sanity checking at all.
17:10 < go1111111> bramc: which trivial + inexpensive attack are you referring to?
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17:10 < gmaxwell> (we added a guard rail after seeing several people do this stupidity-- though most people doing it weren't using bitcoin core :()
17:10 < belcher> did you get any "BUT FREEDOM?!" comments against it ?
17:11 < kang_> exactly!
17:11 < gmaxwell> go1111111: paying a fee far in excess of typical income makes the income maximizing behavior to be to reorg the chain constantly until you win it, especially if you have more hashpower than other indivigual miners.
17:11 < bramc> I think your idea of spreading fees over two transactions should work. Ideally the formula for all transactions would be that three units of fee go to this miner, two to the next miner, and one to the miner after that
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17:11 < gmaxwell> go1111111: at least if you work under an assumption that behavior is income maximizing the reorgs would continue until by lock someone gets decisively ahead.
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17:12 < gmaxwell> now obviously there are other forces at play (esp now) but it's preferable if the system works in theory. :)
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17:12 < gmaxwell> esp if there is a simple fix, as we have for BIP113 for a similar problem related to locktime.
17:12 < bramc> If there are only a small number of miners they'll likely agree to simply not do such reorgs because each of them individually will lose more than they might gain as individuals if rewards shut down for a while due to bullshit
17:13 < gmaxwell> belcher: I did have someone angry about it once until I got through their head that it was saving them from a $100 mistake.
17:13 < gmaxwell> That was a good day. :)
17:13 < bramc> gmaxwell, Hard forks are never a simple fix. There's an interesting question of how many small, safe things one might one to squeeze into a hard fork
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17:14 < go1111111> gmaxwell: yeah, that seems correct for situations in which one block contains unusually high fees / rewards. is that what Bram meant with his reference to an attack though? that seems less like an attack and more like broken incentives leading to a bad situation
17:15 < gmaxwell> bramc: there are other reasons to want to allow coinbase spending,.. but yea, in any case, this is one of those really trivial adjustments, in bitcoin core it is likely a couple single character changes.
17:15 < gmaxwell> go1111111: well it's an attack when you trigger it intentionally and then laugh as the incentives make the network attack itself.
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17:16 < gmaxwell> (and then exploit the instability for varrious purposes, like double spending)
17:17 < kang_> But coinbase spending would further worsen it IMO, since a shorter branch would immediately want to share reward just to keep the rst of it
17:18 < bramc> gmaxwell, I'd advocate for forcing all coinbase outputs to include a pay to next transaction of at least x% of the amount they're taking, where x is in the 25-50% range. That isn't quite such a trivial change and more likely to be controversial though.
17:18 < gmaxwell> kang_: people can already share rewards; but only with trusty deals or by having a surplus coins of their own. So to the extent that it could be abused, it already can.
17:19 < gmaxwell> bramc: I don't think forced forwarding makes sense, sadly-- though adding that is just a softfork on top of the spending behavior.  The issue is that people can bypass the fee system entirely.
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17:20 < bramc> gmaxwell, Not sure what you mean about bypassing the fee system
17:20 < gmaxwell> And so unless the forced fordwarding was always at equlibrium it'll start driving people to pay out of band fees. (e.g. by including outputs paying directly to big miners in their transaction; something that has, in fact, been done in the past)
17:20 < kang_> Yes, but lots can happen over trusty deals. When we talk blockchain we cant account them. Atleast not above what the protocol allows..
17:20 < tulip> why pay 50% of the fees to the next block when you can receive them out of band and get 100%?
17:21 < gmaxwell> kang_: what we normally should strive to do is to diminish the advantage of schemes that provide income advantages for larger miners however.
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17:21 < bramc> gmaxwell, I'm just trying to avoid the bogon fee attack in a way which is reliable rather than halfassed and based on social convention
17:21 < gmaxwell> bramc: if you look back in the history here you'll see I described a particular fee forward scheme which I think is actually an equlibrium under some (unrealistic) assumptions;  and its one which cannot be implemented as a consensus rule itself-- because it requires knoweldge of the mempool backlog.
17:22 < bramc> You're right that once the multiple inputs are allowed the forced forwarding is a soft fork, although that's an extremely viscous soft fork.
17:23 < bramc> I don't follow why mempool knowledge is necessary or matters.
17:24 < gmaxwell> because I don't want to reorg you anymore when we share the potentially fees for our two blocks equally. And that depends on the fees in your block plus the fees that will be available in my block.
17:24 < kang_> gmaxwell: pooled mining is beneficial only because of variance. Meni Rosenfield showed long ago that "If you distribute your hashrate among multiple pools in proportion to their respective total hashrate, your variance will be as if you mine in one pool with the total hashrate of all pools." Why then do we still see large operations?
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17:24 < gmaxwell> kang_: many effects, it's hard to gauge their effect size. Probably some we don't know about. Shall I list?
17:24 < bramc> gmaxwell, What's it matter to me if the fees in the next block might go up?
17:25 < kang_> gmaxwell: If you could just give me keywords, I'd find and read
17:26 < gmaxwell> kang_: For one, a large number of miners believe that mining is a race and the largest miner will get much higher rewards.  I don't know if this generally incorrect belief is a majority view, but it's common and I've even heard it exposed by major hardware makers and pool operators. People do _not_ get poisson even when money is on the line.
17:26 < kang_> So education can solve it?
17:26 < bramc> It's funny how VCs pontificate arrogantly about how bitcoin is the future of finance and that's why they're dumping tens of millions of dollars into it, while we have highly technical discussions here in -wizards about how us people who they aren't even paying can keep the whole system from spontaneously imploding.
17:27 < belcher> that insane, how hard can it be that if you're 10% of hash rate you'll get ~10% of blocks
17:27 < gmaxwell> kang_: another is that the above is not actually entirely untrue, because of block propagation delays there actually is an excess return for larger pools; which has become pretty non-neglible over time.  Right now time from first pool to half the pools on stratum servers has a median of about 5.7 seconds. Go compute the orphaning rate for that. :(
17:27 < gmaxwell> this makes education harder.
17:27 < gmaxwell> The worse confusion is one that has an element of truth.
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17:28 < gmaxwell> kang_: another factor is that all existing pools (cept p2pool) are in a trusted position where they can rob their users significantly. The variance of mining is so great an operator can skim several percent for basically forever and be undetectable.  Some popular pools have hit 'luck' that had one in a billion chances of happening at random.
17:28 < bramc> That's about a 1% bonus. Not a trivial amount.
17:28 < kang_> Yeah I heard that in your devcore talk
17:28 < gmaxwell> Meni's scheme maximizes the risk there.
17:29 < gmaxwell> bramc: yea 1% return, and if your profits over returns were small, it can be a big impact on profits.
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17:29 < bramc> Right, 1% of gross, likely 10-50% of net
17:29 < gmaxwell> bigger pools can cheat less without it being detectable, and maybe more eyes would detect cheating (dubious in our case, but not a bad hurestic in general).
17:30 < kang_> belcher: due to variance, if you are 10% of hashrate you'll get >10% of blocks
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17:30 < bramc> Unlike the exchanges. Those are totally trustworthy.
17:30 < gmaxwell> Bigger pools also can provide better user expirences, their frequent blocks are also effectively advertising for them.
17:33 < kang_> So, as a thought experiment, if there was a central bot in the network that was distributing work to everyone and after 10 mins distributes the reward to everyone who contributed, there would be no variance (Basically everyone on one pool) and would solve this (except propagation delay)
17:34 < gmaxwell> Then --- continuing, many of the current big pools are not really the same kind of thing that were pools N years ago; quite a few large miners themselves (either directly or via commonly owned sister orgs); that just let other people use their infrastrcture (to lower the variance).
17:36 < kang_> So if we could design a distributed algo to divide work,(and rather than block reward as lottery, give every hash contributed its share) there would be no variance right?
17:38 < gmaxwell> kang_: in the bitcoin consensus system the variance is an integral component, since its what causes consensus (eventually one fork gets lucky compared to anotherone by enough margin to overcome all communication delays decisively)
17:38 < tulip> dividing work isn't really a thing, either.
17:38 < gmaxwell> but yea sure if something were entirely different than bitcoin and magically solved consensus then one could avoid the specific challenges that arise from bitcoin's scheme. :)
17:39 < midnightmagic> individual hash results being rewarded individually: share rewards would increase coinbase so greatly, in its current form, that it could be an effective ddos that dwarfs all other transaction activity.
17:40 < bramc> Noone who knows it intimately ever accused bitcoin of being elegant and beautiful
17:40 < kang_> Consider the bitcoin network as an entity. It collects raffle tickets over a period of 10 mins and then awards one of them. But if one owns m of total n tickets contributed during that time, their wining probability is not m/n due to variance.
17:40 < tulip> bramc: I disagree, the original 0.1 client is pretty in its own right.
17:41 < kang_> So if block reward was divided equally among n collected, then anyone owning m will win m/n reward only. hence no variance..
17:42 < midnightmagic> the original codebase I found much more modifiable, and easier to track, than its current form. it made a lot more sense.
17:42 < gmaxwell> kang_: it's probably better to stop thinking in terms of reward and remember that the mining process does not exist for reward, it exists to make the system work.  The reward is a secondary effect.
17:42 < gmaxwell> midnightmagic: I agree too, FWIW.
17:43 < kang_> Yes I understand. but this scheme removes the centralization problem
17:43 < gmaxwell> kang_: if you can make that work you can despense with mining entirely and just use it to select transactions.
17:44 < kang_> Nope, because proof of work secures it
17:44 < gmaxwell> I think the properties you're describing are not known to be acheivable in the setting bitcoin operates in. :)
17:45 < kang_> If a competing network was able to perform more than n hashes then the entity rewards it instead (basically the definition of 51% attack)
17:46 < gmaxwell> kang_: you made a comment above which was-- as far as I can tell-- untrue, and I've been trying to figure out what you were thinking. and I'm at a loss
17:46 < kang_> Wizards chan is for thought experiments, anyways :)
17:46 < gmaxwell> "their wining probability is not m/n due to variance"
17:47 < gmaxwell> ignoring _progress_ effects (e.g. due to latency and block processing) the winning probablity actually is your hashrate.
17:47 < kang_> A miner controlling a fraction p of the mining power has a probability p to mine each block. This follows a Bernoulli distribution and the variance is given by p(1-p). Since all blocks are independent, and since in a year there are 365 days of 24 hours of 6 blocks each, the annual variance is 365.24.6.p(1-p) while the expected return is 365.24.6.p  The relative standard deviation is the square root of the variance divided by
17:47 < kang_>  sqrt[ 365.24.6.p(1-p)] / (365.24.6.p)
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17:50 < tulip> lots of things in the code are more complex now in quite understandable ways. having inventory messages obviously reduces the bandwidth significantly down from a full flood system, moving away from BDB makes it a lot faster, removing vulnerable features like product review flooding and IRC based discovery are clearly positive choices. there's probably a lesson about "simple" being too simple, or something, I'm struggling to draw a conclusion
17:50 < tulip>  from that.
17:50 < kang_> A miner projecting to obtain an expected return on investment of 10% and controlling 0.19% of the hashing power would have about a 16% chance of losing money by the end of the year.
17:51 < gmaxwell> kang_: yes, the distribution is not symmetrical; but the expect income is the expected income; the variance doesn't change that.
17:51 < kang_> gmaxwell: So even ignoring progress effects, winning probability is not the hashrate
17:51 < bramc> It's true that the stochastic nature of rewards is part of scaling. The coinbase transaction counts towards the size of the block as a whole for good reason.
17:51 < gmaxwell> gah. thats not correct. Even read the first sentence you quoted.
17:52 < tulip> bramc: if it wasn't counted you could make the block infinitely large, there's no limit on the size of individual transactions other than the p2p message size
17:53 < kang_> ok sorry. I understand my mistake. The probability is yes m/n, but over a period of time the deviation is very high for small values of m
17:53 < tulip> gmaxwell: would a pull request putting Satoshis poker client back into Bitcoin Core be accepted? :P
17:54 < kang_> So larger values of m win over a longer period of time
17:54 < kang_> But you get what I wanna say
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17:55 < kang_> "their wining probability over a longer period of time, say one year, is not m/n due to variance"
17:56 < bramc> kang_ My point is that spreading that out enough starts hitting real transaction fees just for the spreading
17:59 < kang_> gmaxwell: Beg for your patience. Call me wrong but please don't ignore me. I respect your time very much and would never troll you.
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18:05 < kang_> I corrected the statement. So if there was a distributed algorithm that , say, had a score of contributed hashes, and distributed the reward rather than lucky draw, mining variance would vanish
18:06 < tulip> are you aware of p2pool?
18:07 < kang_> Sure. exactly that but for everybody. p2pool as a layer
18:08 < tulip> p2pool has problems though. its block chain is similar to Bitcoins, just with a 30 second block time.
18:09 < tulip> it's latency sensitive, and you have the problem of trying to make hundreds of payments of dust to participants. it's useless for the people mining and produces massive blocks.
18:10 < kang_> Yes, true
18:10 < midnightmagic> that's not quite a correct statement. p2pool provides signifiant advantages and IMO is not useless for the people mining.
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18:10 < midnightmagic> it is less useful for hashrate which is relatively smaller than the overall p2pool hashrate.
18:10 < kang_> Its not useless, but the crux was that it increases block size
18:10 < tulip> sorry, it would be useless if you had all the participants in the network receiving small payouts with it. hypothetical rather than what happens today.
18:11 < kang_> Yes, so the solution for that would be synced mempools.
18:11 < tulip> if you had synced mempools you wouldn't need mining to begin with.
18:12 < midnightmagic> p2pool is not granular on a single sharechain; the threshold of utility is, indeed, unfortunately increasing proportional to overall bitcoin hashrate but smaller chains and collections of cooperative/alternate sharechains are still possible.
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18:14 < midnightmagic> The main issue, it seems to me, is that the larger miners don't use it, and mining is centralized. But there are some really nice possibilities that forrest etc have dreamed up including spontaneous sub-sharechains and ghost-like subshares which *could* eliminate perceived sharechain "efficiency" loss.
18:15 < kang_> Wow! Bitcoin is really in a failing state as of now
18:16 < kang_> tulip: thanks, i get the fault in my line of thinking
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18:35 < kang_> What are the other ways to look at the blockchain than the distributed ledger. For example one is a DMMS algo to secure any token as stated in sidechains whitepaper
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18:51 < bramc> https://twitter.com/bramcohen/status/660316856708763651
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18:52 < kang_> Whole world sees it that way. Other than that?
18:54 < bramc> The counter to the claim that it's a database basically amounts to saying that it's too shitty to be a real database.
18:55 < bramc> rebuttal: It's a shitty database
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19:20 < gmaxwell> kang_: hey, forgive me for leaving for dinner. :)
19:20 < kang_> :) i got my mistake
19:23 < gmaxwell> I see!
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19:41 < gmaxwell> To the extent that commercially significant variance is a cause of centeralization, p2pool had basically solved it prior to the introduction of generation after generation of asic with latency problems; it's novel propagation mechenisms gave it a significant return advantage... but it still was not widely used. I believe that this is due to first (misunderstanding mining as a race) reason I gave,
19:42 < gmaxwell>  as well as the UI ones; but it's hard to say.
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19:50 < bramc> The lack of decent canonical proofs of sequential work algorithms is driving me nuts. There *must* be something better than sequential hashing.
19:52 < bramc> And it just occurred to me that you can make a history much more secure by including a direct link to the previous proof of space in each new proof of space in addition to the proof of time based on that proof of space. That results in a lot less trust when you only spot check the proofs of time.
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19:59 < bramc> I just sent mail to a 'real' cryptographer begging him to come up with better canonical proofs of time
20:00 < bramc> Despite the rube goldbergian nature of the space-based construction I have, the one part I'm really hating on is the proofs of time. Making it so most nodes an only afford to spot check is just gnarly.
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20:18 < bramc> amiller_, http://eprint.iacr.org/2015/366.pdf
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20:22 < bramc> Interestingly, that 'incorruptible public randomness' property is exactly my new idea for improving my old ideas about proofs of space.
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