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06:57 < bsm117532> Taek: why does the block time matter for your arguments?
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08:10 < Eliel_> Taek: I think it could be interesting to implement Jute as an algorithm for decentralized mining "pool". If done right and it works well enough to get a large majority of miners using it, I suspect you could even eventually soft-fork bitcoin into using that as a primary mechanism.
08:11 < bsm117532> I've had the same thought.  A while back I talked to some p2pool folks about doing that...
08:13 < Eliel_> and once it's used widely enough by miners, the jute ordering becomes reliable enough that it's a strong indication for what transactions are going to go through much earlier than in bitcoin currently.
08:15 < bsm117532> I want to see a proof that Taek's ordering (or any other) restores the 51% rule even in the face of selfish mining first though...
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08:54 < kanzure> git hash-object data format is "blob <size>\0<content>" and ls-tree format is also similarly encumbered, making it highly annoying to do merkle tree inclusion proofs of files in git tree hashes. :\
09:02 < kanzure> if it was "blob <size>\0<hash of content>" then you could prove the inclusion of your hash in the merkle tree, without also revealing your content. (unless your content is low size, like 0 <= x <= 8)
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11:33 < kanzure> .title http://liw.fi/larch/
11:33 < yoleaux> larch: Python B-tree library
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16:51 < Taek> <bsm117532> I want to see a proof that Taek's ordering (or any other) restores the 51% rule even in the face of selfish mining first though...
16:52 < Taek> I'll write a formalization.
16:52 < Taek> But it's there - once the majority of miners are confirming a particular ordering, they will not start confirming a different ordering unless >51% hashrate is working to change the vote structure
16:53 < Taek> Though, a strong enough attacker could potentially prevent the majority of miners from confirming a particular ordering, or could make it so that certain blocks never make it into the majority-voted ordering
16:53 < bsm1175321> A formal proof would be great, but an empirical demonstration of (probability of reversal) vs. (attacker hashrate) would be still powerful (and understood by more people than a proof).
16:54 < Taek> I will definitely cover all of that to the best of my ability in Milan.
16:56 < bsm1175321> I'm concerned that graphs are complicated, and there may be edge cases that a proofs miss.  So I think I will add an "attacker" to my sim and give him some fraction of the hashrate, and attempt to reverse a particular block's ordering.  Should be able to give a graph a la section 11 of Satoshi's paper (his calculations).
16:58 < Taek> One great construction is 1 miner with 45% hashrate + instant propagation vs. 55 miners with 1% hashrate each
16:58 < Taek> instant propagation means that when the attacker mines a block, all other miners see that block instantly. And when another miner mines a block, the attacker sees that block immediately
16:59 < Taek> There are two types of graphs in particular that I find tend to 'break' algorithms
16:59 < Taek> the first is a hidden attacker with like 40% hashrate, who continuously merges the other blocks on the network but never announces his own blocks
17:00 < Taek> and the second is a public attacker with like 40% hashrate who announces blocks but refuses to merge any blocks but his own
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17:00 < bsm1175321> So a long range attack...you can calculate his probability of success but you don't know how many times he tried?
17:00 < Taek> well you know he tried at most 1 time per block that was mined on the network
17:01 < Taek> so there's at least an upper bound
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17:01 < Taek> and with more rigor you can bring the upper bound on attempts a lot lower, as attempts take multiple blocks
17:01 < bsm1175321> With a work weighting, both cases would see their blocks de-weighted relative to the higher work main chain.
17:02 < FNinTak> Taek> when you say strong you mean wrt. ability to partition the network, affect propogation times, etc?
17:04 < Taek> FNinTak: 'strong' attacker to me means a big hashrate advantage and a big latency advantage. e.g. able to mine 40% of the blocks and propagate many per network propagation cycle
17:04 < Taek> And by network propagation cycle, I mean the approx. amount of time it takes honest miners to tell eachother about blocks they've seen.
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17:05 < Taek> If the block rate is higher than the network propagation cycle by very much, the attacker is inherently weak b/c they fundamentally can't consistently mine + propagate multiple blocks per network tick
17:05 < bsm1175321> I'm confused how latency matters...AFAICT in what I've coded up it doesn't.  Cohorts become larger, but if that's accounted for properly, I don't see it as a problem.
17:05 < Taek> An attacker with instant propagation abilities can have their blocks being mined on by 100% of the hashrate immediately every time
17:06 < Taek> that means their blocks will inherently get more confirmations
17:06 < FNinTak> Latency advantage has value separate from hashrate, i.e. can purposefully broadcast conflicting blocks to different segments of the network faster than they should propogate
17:06 < bsm1175321> Oh Taek I'm making a big assumption that maybe you're not: keep ALL blocks. The PoW and coinbase get rewarded, ALL of the time, even if the other transactions in the block are de-weighted by another block.  ("Equal pay for equal [proof-of-]work")
17:06 < bsm1175321> This assumption is necessary to solve the selfish mining problem.
17:06 < Taek> no I have that assumption as well
17:07 < bsm1175321> Ok then I'm confused how latency matters.
17:07 < Taek> with most weighting algorithms I've seen either an attacker is able to indefinitely prevent the network from achieving consensus around a particular ordering, or the attacker is able to commit censorship
17:07 < FNinTak> Isn't there, at least in Jute, an upper bound on blocks included per cycle?
17:07 < Taek> e.g. iirc one of your cohort algorithms required the DAG to occasionally be less than 1 wide
17:08 < Taek> if your block time is very low, that's an impracticability
17:08 < Taek> *exactly 1 wide
17:08 < bsm1175321> Well...only if you require that at some point, the ordering of blocks is fixed and transactions can't be reversed.  That isn't true in Bitcoin (checkpoints are only convenience)...
17:08 < bsm1175321> IOW I would happily merge a block that only refers to the genesis block, if it met PoW targets.
17:09 -!- nooblord [~Nooblord@190.8.88.169] has quit [Quit: Leaving]
17:09 < bsm1175321> It destroys an intuitive conversion into a chain-like structure, of course.  But I don't see that as a fundamental problem.
17:09 < Taek> how are you setting the PoW targets?
17:10 < Taek> hmm
17:10 < Taek> I think it makes the most sense to use the PoW of the current chain
17:10 < bsm1175321> Given the median cohort time and the "network size" parameter derived from it, you can compute a window of acceptable targets, given expected network latencies.
17:11 < Taek> hmm
17:11 < bsm1175321> Hmmm merging a block which refers only to the Genesis means I need to rethink what is the "set of cohorts" considered for the median calculation.
17:11 < bsm1175321> (Because afterwards there's only one canonical cohort)
17:11 < Taek> yeah, that's the main reason I don't like thinking about cohorts
17:12 < Taek> a 10% attacker can fairly easily ensure that (over a long enough peroid of time) the DAG is always at least 1.0x wide
17:12 < Taek> and realistically "long enough" would be like 15 blocks or something
17:13 -!- FNinTak [~jonhbit@dhcp-18-189-115-32.dyn.mit.edu] has quit [Quit: Leaving]
17:14 < Taek> I'm trying to find an algorithm that works well when your block time is much, much less than your latency. When your average dag is 50 blocks wide, a 40% attacker with propagation superpowers becomes way more menacing
17:14 -!- FNinTak [~jonhbit@dhcp-18-189-115-32.dyn.mit.edu] has joined #bitcoin-wizards
17:15 < FNinTak> Why would you want a block time below the latency floor? by definition network wouldn't be able to keep up
17:16 < Taek> FNinTak: more miner payouts, more consistent resource load
17:16 < Taek> the more consistent resource load has large implications for scalability
17:16 < Taek> and more miner payouts means you can solo mine with much less investment
17:17 < Taek> more blocks also means a lot less variance for things like confirmation times, and it also means that attackers have a much lower chance of 'getting lucky'.
17:17 < bsm1175321> Well using the "median" cohort time, for a reasonable definition of "set of cohorts" takes care of the problem.  That one guy doesn't have an impact on anyone else.
17:18 < FNinTak> isn't estimated latency floor ~15 seconds? already very low
17:18 < Taek> Right now in Bitcoin a 45% attacker can reorg the chain 1 hour deep with like 25% probability. But if 1 hour meant 10,000 blocks, the probability would be nearly zero
17:18 < FNinTak> also other strange things that happen like perverse incentives to mine empty blocks, as seen with ETH
17:18 < bsm1175321> 6s by my calculations, and that's only because Bitcoin's p2p network is randomly interconnected.  It can be brought below 1s for better network topologies.
17:19 < Taek> (worth adding that if the attacker failed, they'd lose all those blocks)
17:19 < Taek> (so in bitcoin today it doesn't make sense. In orphan-free land, the attacker does not lose all of those blocks, so it makes more sense to try more often)
17:20 -!- FNinTak [~jonhbit@dhcp-18-189-115-32.dyn.mit.edu] has quit [Quit: Leaving]
17:20 < bsm1175321> Taek I don't think that (block time) << (latency) is a limit necessary to consider.  The latter is fixed by physics.  The former is correlated with hashrate.  So yes, if there exists an attacker with MUCH more than 50% of the hashrate, he could achieve that limit, but let's admit we couldn't defeat such an attacker in the first place.
17:22 < Taek> block time is a setting that you pick
17:22 < Taek> you can choose to set (block time) << (latency) if you felt it was worthwhile
17:22 < bsm1175321> One can only achieve a small block time by increasing your hashrate...
17:23 < Taek> re: latency, network latency under normal conditions is not necessarily going to match network latency under adversarial conditions. I'm not sure how much it would go up but if you route around all of the pre-forwarding that happens, maybe you could push it to 30s
17:23 < Taek> (handwave handwave speculate speculate)
17:24 < bsm1175321> Well, remember that the "median" calculation is exceptionally good at discarding outliers.  So an attacker doing that doesn't move the median very quickly or easily.
17:25 < bsm1175321> You get to decide the time window considered  for the median calculation.  In the present case, I think it makes sense to consider all cohorts.  Physics isn't going to change.
17:25 < Taek> you mean adjusting the block time based on network conditions?
17:25 < bsm1175321> Yes.
17:25 < Taek> that's something that makes me inherently nervous, it would take a lot to convince me that it's a safe idea
17:25 < bsm1175321> Ah, another point I should emphasize...it's possible to completely decouple the block time from the target difficulty.
17:26 < Taek> ?
17:26 < Taek> isn't the difficultly what inherently ratelimits the network?
17:27 < bsm1175321> No, they can be decoupled.
17:27 < bsm1175321> err...rather...difficulty does inherently ratelimit the network.  But you don't have to use it as your timing parameter.
17:28 < bsm1175321> With a DAG you additionally have graph structure to measure the latency.  Equivalently you can use the orphan rate.  You can measure it and use it to set the block time, totally independently from the difficulty.
17:29 < bsm1175321> (This is the analysis I present at the bottom of https://rawgit.com/mcelrath/braidcoin/master/Braid%2BExamples.html)
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17:31 < Taek> ok. You mean that you set the difficulty based on the DAG structure, and not based on the timestamps in the blocks
17:32 < Taek> fwiw I have a limited trust in the virtue of trusting the block timestamps as well, though the fact that machines will reject blocks that have timestamps too far in the future makes it better.
17:32 < bsm1175321> Correct.
17:33  * Taek needs more sleep
17:33 < bsm1175321> At some point I calculated, I think the minimum of that curve has on average \sqrt{2} blocks per cohort.
17:38 < Taek> I think another heuristic that's been useful to me in reasoning about DAGs is asking whether or not an attacker with 51% hashrate exactly (or a 51% softfork) is succesfully able to ignore/censor the other 49% of blocks
17:39 < Taek> if the answer is 'no they cannot', I think it's resonable to show that the algorithm is not safe
17:40 < Taek> because it means that a minority hashrate attacker will be able to manipulate history in some way
17:40 < Taek> namely by inserting their blocks after-the-fact
17:41 < Taek> using the same methods that the 49% would use to circumvent censorship
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17:47 < bsm1175321> Well, I think a corollary to Satoshi's 51% is that if you have more integrated hashpower in a given time window than the entire network since it's beginning, you can also rewrite it from the beginning.
17:49 < bsm1175321> But, the assumption is that during that time window when you're rewriting history, the rest of the network writes more blocks, so you have more history to rewrite...and I believe this collapses back to requiring 51% of the hashrate.
17:50 < Taek> the original algorithm I used for Jute was the 'heaviest parent' rule, which meant you would prioritize merging the thread that had the most blocks in it. That was in violation of the 51% censorship rule, because the next block could always just merge the existing 51% and become heavier
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17:55 < Taek> https://postimg.org/image/7kdqyeja3/
17:56 < Taek> This is the sort of graph I'm talking about
17:56 < adlai> the sidebar?
17:56 < Taek> yeah, you've got 2 chains here. 1 has >51% hashrate and no knowledge of the other chain
17:56 < Taek> the other has a decent amount of hashrate, and is continuously merging the 51% chain
17:56 -!- snthsnth [~snthsnth@128.54.232.177] has joined #bitcoin-wizards
17:56  * adlai was making a funny but maybe moloch gives you more-sfw advertisement
17:56 < Taek> so that chain will always have more work in it
17:57 < Taek> oh I didn't realize there were ads
17:57 < bsm1175321> Consider the following algorithm: given any two or more beads in a cohort having mutually common ancestors, assign the work of all *common* descendants to the bead having the highest work (defined by summing its own PoW and all it's uncommon descendants).  "Uncommon" = (descendants) - (mutual descendants)
17:58 < bsm1175321> adlai: Go install AdBlock now.  Or I will give your silicon children virii.
17:58 < adlai> adblock doesn't block aids
17:58  * Taek will not use postimage again
17:58 < adlai> Taek: i use imgur to host images, afaict they only advertise when you use it as a social media site by browsing the frontpage
17:59 < luke-jr> haha, side effect of ad blockers: people don't know when they're pushing your ads on others
17:59 < luke-jr> adlai: imgur crashes my Chromium lately :|
17:59  * adlai doesn't use adblock because he likes scamming people who PPV
17:59 < adlai> luke-jr: even when people deeplink the image only?
17:59 < Taek> my uploads were failing on imgur. Something about being behind Tor I think
17:59 < adlai> ah yes, they're nazi like that.
17:59 < luke-jr> adlai: surely there's a way to adblock without disabling the PPV
18:00 < adlai> luke-jr: sure, but that story will be told by a better liar than baudolina
18:00 < bsm1175321> FWIW, zerobin.net is my goto for incentive-compatible pasting of text.  I haven't found anything for images yet.  Any suggestions?
18:00 < adlai> bsm1175321: base64
18:01 < bsm1175321> This totally does not work: https://www.zerobin.net/?4c9541c2186c4fb0#gh79yAIOpdbP3LXpP6WApGhZCU9dGGyVJ3J0fF6iDl0=
18:02 < adlai> what are you trying to do?
18:02 < adlai> you pastebin (at any text pastebin, eg http://wotpaste.cascadianhacker.com/ ) a base64-encoded version of your image, and then raff your way all the way to the bitbank, or somesuch
18:03 < adlai> bonus points if it's pgp signed, so we don't have to worry about feh exploits
18:03 < bsm1175321> eh I pasted a data:image/png;base64.  Totally does not work.
18:03 < bsm1175321> adlai: And where did you get my pgp key and can you trust it?
18:04 < bsm1175321> Teh pgp is exploited.
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18:04 < Taek> at some point we should be able to use ipfs
18:04 < adlai> given your attempted contributions to decentralized finance, i'd probably trust your pgp key enough to load an image on my shitware box
18:04 < bsm1175321> Zerobin for files: https://github.com/sebsauvage/ZeroBin/pull/57
18:05 < adlai> "files" doesn't cut it, what we want is "conning 'web' browsers into rasterizing stuff'
18:05 < bsm1175321> Any dork can pop in this channel with bsm117532*
18:05 < adlai> is this a critique of pgp fingerprint almost-collisions, or... uh?
18:05 -!- bsm117532 is now known as Guest95984
18:05 -!- bsm1175321 is now known as bsm117532
18:05  * adlai sighs
18:06 < bsm117532> Also, do you trust that NickServ and the IRC server are not compromised?
18:06 < adlai> it must be way past your bedtime, or maybe mine
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18:07 < bsm117532> Let's just say I'm working on an identity platform.  Bitcoin is a keyserver, augmented with a transaction system, protected by PoW.  If only pgpkeys.mit.edu was so reliable...
18:07 < adlai> do i now need to explain how reliable key distribution works?
18:08 < adlai> or shall i compromise on "let's say i downloaded your pgp key over http(no s!) two years ago, but have verified every single paper about braids that was published since then, and compromising this would require MITMing every single connection i made, so i elect to trust it enough to render a fucking png"
18:08 < kanzure> opentimestamps should be timestamping the pgp key server dumps
18:08 < kanzure> it would be good to have timestamps for a bunch of those public keys
18:08 < adlai> no, because any fool can shit into keyservers
18:08 < kanzure> so what?
18:08 -!- TheSeven [~quassel@rockbox/developer/TheSeven] has quit [Ping timeout: 248 seconds]
18:09 < kanzure> at least you would have timestamped shit :)
18:09 < kanzure> you couldn't prove that you were missing data, of course
18:09 < adlai> at the very least, 8-char keyids should be killed
18:09 < adlai> because they are KNOWN to be broken
18:09 < kanzure> it's still useful to positively attest that you definitely knew some pubkey at some moment
18:09 < adlai> "you"
18:09 < adlai> what about "everybody"?
18:09 < kanzure> "you" is irrelevant
18:09 < kanzure> no that's not how it works
18:09 < adlai> proof of publication > proof of existence
18:09 < kanzure> preimages only have to be known by at least one person, not a specific person, and not everyone
18:09 < adlai> with no disrespect to petertodd, but timestamps are the latter, not the former
18:10 < adlai> what we need is a spamatron
18:10 < kanzure> do you really want a browser rendering svg from zerobin? O_o
18:10 < bsm117532> There is only one resource accountably tied to the real world: proof of work.  If you're not using it to distribute keys, someone else will.
18:11 < adlai> this is exactly why i say, PoP > PoE
18:11 < adlai> PoP is tied to the value of PoW, whereas PoE is tied to the value of pretty much nothing
18:12  * adlai can spam eg opentimestamp or deedbot.org as much as he likes, and nobody will complain - but if he tries to encode a dickpick into the actual blockchain, his own wallet will cry
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18:12 < kanzure> and what particular distinction are you making between the two, again?
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18:13 < adlai> there's a difference between proving that $random_server_of_random_signature_algorithm knows your G*p, and proving that $random_plebe could have downloaded it
18:15 < adlai> if you proof-of-publication a pubkey, nobody can claim to have not noticed that $hitler did a birthday attack on the fingerprint
18:15 < adlai> well, they can claim, but you'll laugh.
18:16 < kanzure> "could have downloaded it" what's the benefit of that, again?
18:16 < adlai> what's the benefit of bitcoin? let's just use food as money and spare all these idiots the trouble of learning math
18:17 < kanzure> huh?
18:17 < adlai> by "proof-of-publication", i mean, anybody could have reconstructed this data from the PUBLIC blockchain
18:18 < kanzure> you mean, the preimage?
18:18 < adlai> no need to run an updated-yesterday client, no need to be part of some privileged network, etc
18:18 < adlai> no, i mean the data itself.
18:18 < adlai> if your data is important, it's available. if it's sensitive, it's encrypted; but that doesn't void the previous qualification.
18:19 < kanzure> so you want to publish raw data, rather than attest to its existence? why
18:20 < kanzure> did i get myself into some sort of strange OP_RETURN argument that i'm not aware of?
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18:20 < adlai> why even attest to its existence? just send it to your three friends, get their pgp (or whatever other pubkey crypto you trust... really, that is a question, what other pubkey crypto do you trust, bsm117532 ????? ) and be done with
18:20 < adlai> you got yourself into a s-can-be-anything argument
18:20 < bsm117532> Prove to me you are not all three friends.
18:21 < bsm117532> I can generate 4 pgp keys before you type your response.
18:21 < adlai> sure, but i can prove that mine was available.
18:21 < bsm117532> Define "available"
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18:21 < kanzure> what is an availability proof, anyway
18:21 < adlai> reconstructable by anybody who had a synchronized bitcoin client.
18:21 < adlai> ie, "available" is qualified by bh, blockheight
18:22 < bsm117532> You waited?  You established a key and then later established another?  Let me introduce you to my friend sleep(3)
18:22  * adlai sighs
18:22 < kanzure> well he's talking about signed data i think
18:22 < bsm117532> There is only one resource.  It is work.
18:22 < kanzure> the signature on the hash of the data and then the data itself (like a movie i guess?)
18:23 < adlai> work is worth ~nothing, if it's the wrong kind of work. and you don't prove data with mere 'work'... work is worth something if it's on extending the bitcoin chain. or do you keep your net worth in ethereum classic?
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18:24 < adlai> sorry, i forgot to include xmr. and script. and all the other shit.
18:24 < bsm117532> Any dickhead can backdate things if he acquires the timestamping key after the fact.
18:24 < adlai> there is tangible value in proving that your pubkey was available to anybody, and slightly less - but nonzero - value in proving that your data was available to anybody who knew some decryption key
18:25 < adlai> this is not about backdating! this about publication. ie, joe the plumber, given the guage of wrench, could have walked into walmart (i mean bitcoin) and bought it
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18:30 < bsm117532> adlai: please introduce your legal framework and evidentiary mechanism in code form.  Because you just made that shit up out of your cake hole, I'm pretty sure.
18:30 < bsm117532> Also please introduce evidence that you could not possibly have bribed the plumber.
18:31 < adlai> the second is void, given the first -- but the first could exist someday, just like $bitcoin_2.0_project
18:32 < bsm117532> And the walmart employee regarding the gauges of wrenches that were available at the time before the introduction of metric in the US, and the impossibility of using a non-metric wrench on said bolt.
18:32 < bsm117532> Please account for your accusations in economic terms.
18:33 < adlai> well, cryptograffiti.io or whatever it's url is - exists
18:33 < adlai> my typos do too, appparently.
18:33 < bsm117532> And I trust them.  Their owner TOTALLY couldn't be bribed.
18:34 < adlai> so you want another version of the code that pulls data pushed using their interface?
18:34 < adlai> that's a much lower target than what i imagined first!
18:34 < adlai> or maybe we could keep this discussion civil, or theoretical, or whatever this channel is supposed to be
18:35  * adlai has been thinking about an in-signature-spamatron since last year, but the details... those fucking details
18:37  * bsm117532 introduces adlai to sarcasm.
18:37  * adlai introduces bsm117532 to bsm117321
18:38 < bsm117532> hahaaaa oh no.
18:38 < adlai> we can duke this out in milan, i failed out of high school wrestling!
18:38 < adlai> or are you not attending
18:40 -!- frkbmb [~frkbmb@2601:483:8000:f5a0:d840:5098:71c:8d5e] has quit [Ping timeout: 248 seconds]
18:40 < bsm117532> I'll be there.  Please introduce yourself using your IRC handle. ;-)
18:42  * kanzure wonders if he should have submitted a talk proposal re: "scaling my giant conversation database"
18:44  * adlai sighs, again... what did we even accomplish here, except for making himself feel bad that he hasn't yet published a spamatron?
18:44 < bsm117532> kanzure: I expect a transcript in the morning.  ;-)
18:45 < kanzure> of what
18:45 < bsm117532> Wait, wut?  I'm supposed to feel bad for my lack of proof of work on a spamatron?
18:45  * adlai will publish a base64d (that's like sha256d... not) transcript in realtime!   . . . n o t
18:45 < bsm117532> kanzure: nothing.  Truly.  Can we delete this shit from the archives?
18:45 < adlai> can we undo this transaction?
18:46 < bsm117532> I'm sure a helpdesk in India can do that.  As long as you know your mother's maiden name, and your last street address.
18:46 < kanzure> stop...
18:46 < bsm117532> Things totally not exploitable by an attacker.
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--- Log closed Tue Oct 04 00:00:12 2016