--- Log opened Wed Dec 14 00:00:38 2016
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02:02 < fluffypony> yes
02:02 < fluffypony> wrong window, lo.
02:02 < fluffypony> lol
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03:21 < luke-jr> jl2012: why would you suggest softforking a larger locktime, in the context of a HF? :P
03:23 < jl2012> Well, you still want to keep some kind of backwards compatibility
03:23 < jl2012> Changing the tx format would be too much
03:25 < jl2012> Another option is a secondary witness for both absolute and relative lock time. Also a soft fork
03:26 < jl2012> Or just make lock time as part of scripts
03:28 < jl2012> I'm actually doing something like that. Users may sign a script. So signing a CLTV is same as per input nLockTime
03:28 < jl2012> Will tidy it up and publish soon
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07:55 < Taek> petertodd: Your linearization scheme couldn't use bloks as a random beacon unless you had some way to prove that the maximum expected value that could be created by re-rolling a block is less than the value of the block
07:55 < Taek> which means you'd have to limit the size of a transaction spend
07:55 < Taek> no, you'd have to limit the size of all transactions spent within the block
07:56 < Taek> If I spend 50 transactions that are $10,000 each in a single block (but only $5,000 is real, the rest is fraud), the variance on the outcome of the solution is going to exceed the cost of tossing a block.
07:58 < Taek> further, if I understand correctly, this sort of attack can go completely undetected because I never need to publish the results of the transactions that end up fraudulent. I can keep the failures to myself.
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08:16 < JackH> where is Peter Todds alternative merkle tree structure? I believe I read something about a key:value type of tree
08:18 < kanzure> JackH: https://github.com/opentimestamps/opentimestamps-server/blob/master/doc/merkle-mountain-range.md
08:18 < kanzure> JackH: https://github.com/proofchains/python-proofmarshal/blob/master/proofmarshal/mmr.py
08:19 < JackH> there it is indeed, thanks kanzure
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11:33 < Taek> I had an alternate idea for preventing exponential blowup of spending - make it illegal to merge outputs
11:33 < Taek> if outputs only ever split, then their history can only grow linearly
11:34 < Taek> people with more money will typically end up with more outputs and therefore more history, but it sort of makes sense that there is more burden to send lots of money than to send only a little money
11:34 < Taek> I think it's also pretty easy to measure the cost of splitting an output
11:35 < Taek> spending a split output to two different people requires sending twice as much history
11:35 < Taek> and every time the output is sent the amount of history increases by a small amount
11:36 < Taek> If you assume some discount for history, you can discount the value of an output based on how much history it has
11:36 < Taek> this is no different than sending a transction fee
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11:37 < Taek> the output amount may say 0.1btc, but if it carries 50MB of history, you might discount it to 0.099 btc. Then when you send it, that next person discounts it to 0.989 btc, just a tiny bit less than what I was counting it as
11:37 < Taek> *0.0989
11:37 < Taek> since I only received it as 0.099, my cost to send it was not too high
11:38 < Taek> If I choose to split it though (say, send half of it to that person and half of it back as change), I'll have to double the discounts. The receiver is going to disount by 0.0011, and I'm going to have to discount the change address by another 0.0011 for when I want to spend it again
11:39 < Taek> That becomes I think a fairly simple optimization process when a wallet is trying to figure out the best way to send outputs
11:40 < Taek> I guess it's a little harder, because someone who intends to split outputs frequently is going to prefer having outputs with little history
11:40 < Taek> as the cost of doubling that history is cheaper
11:40 < Taek> hmm
11:41 < Taek> I guess it's only easy to price the discount of an output if you know in advance how many times you'll need to split it
11:42 < Taek> Though, if you want to get really ugly you could probably set up networks of output trading, where people with lots of tiny outputs will trade you for your big outputs, so that you don't need to do history splitting.
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12:41 < danrobinson> taek: didn't someone suggest this separately as a solution for anonymity of transactions that are validated on-chain?
12:42 < kanzure> Taek: privacy implications of splitting can probably be resolved through other means anyway (confidentiality through various moon magics)
12:43 < danrobinson> taek: oh, it was you, ha https://botbot.me/freenode/bitcoin-wizards/2016-11-20/?msg=76765759&page=1
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13:17 < kanzure> another way to solve information withholding problems is if you could give someone a copy of block data in such a way that the recipient must pay a certain fee for receiving and utilizing that version of the data
13:17 < kanzure> and then you just have to agree on the fee, and pay it, or provide some reasonable evidene of being able to pay for it
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13:20 < bsm117532> Doesn't this stink of "solving cryptographic problems with economics" though?
13:21 < kanzure> crypto cannot stop someone from withholding information from you
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13:22 < kanzure> the miner can distribute the block contents to the recent spnders and to other miners (like in coalitions or collusion schemes); optimal defense i guess is to not require knowledge of previous merkle tree contents --- any block can have a totes random merkle tree  decided by whatever happy miner got that block.
13:22  * bsm117532 is reading about Oblivious Transfer again.
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13:29 < bsm117532> .title https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/061.pdf
13:29 < yoleaux> bsm117532: Sorry, that doesn't appear to be an HTML page.
13:29 < bsm117532>  An OT extension protocol
13:29 < bsm117532> works by running a small number of "base OTs" depending on the security parameter (e.g., a few
13:29 < bsm117532> hundred) that are used as a base for obtaining many OTs via the use of cheap symmetric cryptographic
13:29 < bsm117532> operations only.
13:29 < bsm117532> This is conceptually similar to public-key encryption where instead of
13:29 < bsm117532> encrypting a large message using RSA, which would be too expensive, a hybrid encryption scheme
13:29 < bsm117532> is used such that the RSA computation is only carried out to encrypt a symmetric key, which is
13:29 < bsm117532> then used to encrypt the large message.
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13:30 < bsm117532> I'm thinking of a totally different context though: SPV clients obtaining the contents of their wallet without the server knowing anything about their wallet.
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13:40 < bsm117532> Since blockchain data can be independently validated against the block headers, blockchain data censorship reduces to (a) falsifying PoW headers or (b) isolating the target from contacting non-censoring servers (e.g. DDoS).
13:41 < kanzure> not quite just (a)--- is it false if nobody ever checks? etc.
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13:41 < bsm117532> I'm assuming SPV clients have block headers.  (again I know we're thinking about different problems)
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14:46 < bsm117532> These protocols have a tremendous amount of overhead in "checks" that the server is sending you the correct data.  I wonder how much it could be sped up if you're accessing a data structure with its own internal, DMMS-type cryptographic consistency check.  You could get corrupted data, but it seems to me a retry costs less than all their checks...
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19:29 < petertodd> Taek: that's the thing, I suspect you can design a system where that's provable
19:29 < petertodd> Taek: yeah, I had the merge avoidence idea ages ago; iiirc my treechains writeup mentions it as a possibility before mentioning linearization
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19:42 < petertodd> Taek: note how one of my ideas here is to institutionalise that kind of fraud, by making it how miners earn a living
19:45 < kanzure> instead of a subsidy rule?
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19:48 < petertodd> kanzure: somethng like that; not clear exactly what would work yet
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19:49 < petertodd> re: expected value, another concept would be to design the system such that the % of hashing power you would need to pull that off is ~100% - in that circumstance you have a big risk in addition to that type of fraud
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19:50 < kanzure> probabilistic validation doesn't really solve all the bandwidth problems...
19:50 < petertodd> my thinking as how to derive the random beacon is essentially to mix many differnt blocks together; via addition sems possible
19:51 < petertodd> kanzure: hmm? it's a huge improvement over the exponential blowup
19:51 < petertodd> kanzure: er, also, tx history linearization isn't the same as probabilistic validation
19:52 < kanzure> is it more like: random beacon picks some keys from the k-v tree, and the miner has to supply some amount of information, and they might experience bad luck and have not put in any of the requested information and therefore their block is deemed invalid ?
19:53 < petertodd> kanzure: oh, no, that's something very different than history linearization; I suspect prob validation can't be made to work reliably enough
19:53 < petertodd> kanzure: otoh, proving you have posession of block contents via prob sampling is fine, because failure isn't a big deal
19:55 < kanzure> what's the worst that can happen with no double spending protection in the consensus layer.   you have to incentivize everyone to report double spends, right?
19:56 < petertodd> if you're relying on people reporting double spends, I think you're doing it wrong
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19:57 < kanzure> you end up with indefinitely hidden double spends i guess, which can be revealed at any time later -- but pruning should nix that i think?
19:57 < petertodd> proof-of-publication schemes *are* double-spending protection, yet there's no reporting of double-spends
19:57 < kanzure> hm? you have to report double spends somehow-- that's what the block contents are for, right?
19:57 < petertodd> I mean, the worst case is to imagine a timestamping scheme w/o publication... and I don't see how that'd ever be reliable
19:58 < petertodd> kanzure: no, there's no reporting - I prove to you there isn't a double-spend, but no-one else is able to find the double-spend
19:58 < petertodd> kanzure: remember that you can (and should!) encrypt the actual stuff getting published to make it meaningless garbage to anyone w/o the key
19:58 < kanzure> right, well, i mean the block ontents really. that's the source of the bandwidth issue. so removing it solves the problem.  it introduces double spending though... no way for you to check.
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19:58 < kanzure> *contents
19:59 < petertodd> kanzure: well, lemme finish this next post... bandwidth isn[t as bad as you'd expect
19:59 < kanzure> bandwidth is the entire bottleneck
20:00 < petertodd> it'll nevre be worse than k*# of movements
20:00 < kanzure> yeah but that's a terrible limitation
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20:01 < petertodd> you're missing my point - no client-side validation scheme can do better than that anyway; reporting double-spends doesn't prove anything about the coin being valid, so is irrelevant to the bigger problem
20:01 < kanzure> hm? reporting to the potential recipient, i mean. you basically go out and pay for block data and transaction history from your friends/peers and figure out what they have. if thy have anything that conflicts, then you don't accept the payment.
20:02 < petertodd> I have to provide you with sufficient tx history proof to prove the coin is valid in the first place; even if I magically could eliminate doubelspends in that proof that's still a fair bit of data
20:02 < petertodd> e.g. imagine if we had trusted computing that could implement a single-use-seal, but *not* attest to the validity of history - even with tx linearization you'd have k*#of-spends sized history proofs
20:02 < kanzure> if you have two outputs in a merkle root in some block, you would never reveal both to me when you're making a payment
20:03 < kanzure> *payment to me
20:03 < petertodd> like I say, that's irrelevant to the bigger problem
20:03 < petertodd> also, the idea that the blocks contain the outputs is wrong - blocks would contain spends
20:03 < kanzure> so the worst case scenario of double spending here is that, you spend to two different people, and then 10 years later the two different sectors of society finally interact and they find out about your fraudulence
20:04 < petertodd> yes, I get that - point is even if you solve that problem, you still have to pass around a lot of data!
20:04 < petertodd> fortunately, there are ways to potentially make that data e the *same*  data for every person
20:05 < petertodd> with an economy that joins coins sufficiently often, everyone will converge towards having their coins have the same tx history proofs (if linearized)
20:05 < petertodd> e.g. what my scaling bitcoin presentation examined (and found to be not applicable in bitcoin's current economy)
20:06 < petertodd> anyway, bbl, breakfast!
20:06 < petertodd> 7am here, and we have a 8am bus to the conference venue... :/
20:06 < kanzure> for what conference
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20:45 < petertodd> kanzure: blockchain workshops kenya
20:51 < petertodd> JackH: https://github.com/proofchains/python-proofmarshal/blob/master/proofmarshal/merbinnertree.py <- actually this is the k:v tree
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