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04:35 < shesek> jeremyrubin, what's their incentive to do so? they would be taking a risk if a reorg ends up happening anyway
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09:24 < Chris_Stewart_5> Is there a word for the property that bitcoin transactions are "self-contained" i.e., we don't need to look outside of the tx for verification of the tx itself inside of Script
09:27 < nsh> hmm
09:32 < ghost43> no free variables;   well not exactly a word
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10:10 < kanzure> ChristopherA___: you do need to look outside the transaction for validation (utxo spentness)
10:11 < sipa> not just spentness; utxo contents as well
10:11 < sipa> and there is a dependency on the block height and timestamp
10:14 < kanzure> whoops wrong christopher
10:15 < sipa> it is true however that script validity does not depend on outside context beyond some immutable data being available
10:16 < sipa> and that's very much a design property: otherwise reorgs would require re-executing all mempool scripts
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10:52 < jb55> bitcoin might be succeptible to a relativistic computation attack: put miner around a black hole at relativistic speeds to do a billion years of mining in a short timespan. pull off massive re-org from genesis. although the amount of energy required to do this may be very large.
10:53  * jb55 goes to do some calculations
10:55 < nsh> hypercomputation is not a bitcoin-wizards topic until you get it to work :)
10:55 < jb55> k
10:56 < nsh> (or it appears immanent. planning ahead is fine, but imagination itself isn't a development)
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11:01 < jb55> although how would miners even get these blocks relayed to them so they could start mining on the alien-being-dicks chain? not sure how the code would handle that?
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11:26 < _Sam--> hi, im not very technical so please bear with me.   can you tell me what some of the downsides to this idea are?   https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-ml/2018-March/000688.html
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11:48 < jeremyrubin> shesek: it gives them some notion of economic finality, which is something that businesses require
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13:17 -!- Topic for #bitcoin-wizards: This channel is for discussing theoretical ideas with regard to cryptocurrencies, not about short-term Bitcoin development | http://bitcoin.ninja/ | This channel is logged. | For logs and more information, visit http://bitcoin.ninja
13:17 -!- Topic set by sipa [~pw@unaffiliated/sipa1024] [Thu Oct 29 17:53:34 2015]
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13:17 -!- Irssi: #bitcoin-wizards: Total of 255 nicks [1 ops, 0 halfops, 0 voices, 254 normal]
13:17 -!- Channel #bitcoin-wizards created Mon Feb 25 23:24:47 2013
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14:13 < gmaxwell> jeremyrubin: there are a number of ideas like the use of single show signatures that make sense 'academically' but I think don't make pratical sense because they're so exceptionally brittle. ... where any kind of mistake or error turns into funds loss, or where otherwise benign 'vulnerablities' in hardware wallers or the like complete blow their security.  Key publishing is one such idea.
14:13 < gmaxwell> jeremyrubin: consider, use of BIP32 public derrivation is pretty ubiquitious. Publish a private key and have a known chaincode?  OOPS: all your private keys are published
14:15 < gmaxwell> jeremyrubin: regarding finalization, there are other safer ideas around improving finalization.  In particular, one I posted a long time ago was that transactions could sign the block at a particular height and either (1) be invalid if that match fails, or (2) have their fees either burned or returned to geometric issuance  (the latter basically making it so that the user's fees aren't equally
14:15 < gmaxwell> paying for security OR an attack).
14:17 < gmaxwell> But the challenge is that pinning the chain identity is incompatible with reorgs which are necessary, and breaking reorgs is bad for decenteralization and stability.  So any kind of pinning would need to be reorg safe, e.g. by requiring the block pinned be (say) 100 back.  But then thats another design wrinkle.
14:18 < gmaxwell> As an aside, in the conversation that led to the creation of the taproot annex proposal that _exact_ chain pinning idea was cited as one of the things it could have been used for.
14:20 < gmaxwell> In any case, I think that kind of approach is better for finalization than leaking keys. Hard pinning that means a long reorg has an increased amount of guarenteed disruption, meaning more users are incentivized to fight it,  or soft-pinning which just changes the economics of reorg attacks, reducing the payment to the attacker. (which will be more important as subsidy decreases...)
14:22 < gmaxwell> I suppose one could imagine a kind of ultra-hard pinning, where the transaction could be included in a pin violating chain but instead of the outputs being created all the sepent funds is returned to circulation by being added to the pool of funds being handed out.... I think this idea is silly, but it's still better than key publishing. :)
14:24 < gmaxwell> spent*
14:26 < gmaxwell> All these ideas run into the a problem that they require a user to take an action that benefits the ecosystem but which might hurt them personally, and which is probably not a decisive benefit in and of itself.
14:26 < gmaxwell> Like there is a big reorg that survives, and damnit your txn history wasn't included because of a pin, and you get doublespent, and you're sad.
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14:27 < gmaxwell> And you can't _mandate_ pinning a moderately recent chain without breaking the ability to produce transactions offline or in advance.
14:27 < gmaxwell> I suppose the best consensus rules could do is treat txn that don't pin as having higher weight, so you get a discount for doing it.. but then thats yet another subject design parameter.
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20:35 < jeremyrubin> gmaxwell: I messaged Adam with a refinement to that idea this morning https://twitter.com/JeremyRubin/status/1126142347870269442
20:35 < jeremyrubin> Rather than leaking the key directly, you can sign a txn which agrees to burn it/release to fee with the old UTXO
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20:36 < jeremyrubin> I think this form of pinning is a little bit better than what you're describing
20:38 < gmaxwell> you seem to be just ignoring that it's a private cost for a diffuse public benefit?-- so everyone is incentivized to defect...
20:41 < jeremyrubin> I'm not ignoring, I'm just making sure we're on the same page with how you might do it
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20:42 < jeremyrubin> I think that the private cost is small
20:42 < jeremyrubin> And the benefit is large
20:42 < jeremyrubin> If you are a company, and this is a standard business practice, it lets you wash hands of liability for dealing with forks after a N block re-org
20:43 < gmaxwell> lol
20:43 < jeremyrubin> it also should honestly signal that you won't accept a reorg predating your signing of that, which helps 'lock in' finality of transactions preceding that point
20:44 < gmaxwell> that is the most absurd thing I've heard this week, and thats saying a lot since I read a bunch of rbtc. To strawman it just a little, thats like saying a business can wash their hands of liability for a robbery by rigging their building to self destruct if one happens.
20:45 < jeremyrubin> Well I hope to keep on surprising you then
20:45 < jeremyrubin> It's a commitment to hard fork
20:45 < jeremyrubin> because you're basically saying that unwinding beyond that point is unthinkable for your business
20:46 < jeremyrubin> and rather than just *state* it, you give an honest signal
20:46 < gmaxwell> to whatever (probably limited) extent any such commitment would have value at all, you could obtain it simply by making it and following through..  not dorky boobytraps required.
20:46 < jeremyrubin> No, the dorky boobytraps guarantee that you'll have no economics on the reorg chain
20:47 < jeremyrubin> so your switching cost would be much higher
20:47 < jeremyrubin> rather than getting coins on both chains
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20:47 < jeremyrubin> If you don't release the pinning txn, then you maintain your optionality
20:48 < gmaxwell> Yes, I understand that. But this has nothing to do with your liability for mismanging customer funds.  "Sorry, you can't blame me that I sprained your dogs leg. Our policy is to incenerate all pets where the surgery goes poorly, thus guarenteeing that the dog will only live on in your memory as a happy, healthy, animal."
20:49 < jeremyrubin> Let's not use whimsical analogies
20:49  * jeremyrubin remind me to not let greg near my dog
20:51 < jeremyrubin> The idea is that you've effectively staked your operations on a specific chain history. This allows others to coordinate, knowing how much value has staked at a reorg height
20:52 < jeremyrubin> In terms of limiting liability, IANAL but I can ask one and let you know what they say
20:52 < gmaxwell> as an aside, your revised idea doesn't work at all on technical grounds regardless.
20:53 < gmaxwell> because the reorg can just prohibit those transactions. (though I think this is not an interesting comment, because the whole idea is profoundly confused, but it's hard to resist pointing out a simple technical fault)
20:54 < jeremyrubin> Well, prohibiting those txns is hard
20:54 < jeremyrubin> But pinning the reorg to include those txns in the reorg sounds like a good outcome!
20:55 < jeremyrubin> Either include my TXN as is, not at all, or burn it
20:55 < jeremyrubin> I suppose technically they could accept any restrictions
20:55 < jeremyrubin> and allow double spends only
20:55 < jeremyrubin> I am unsure if a reorg can coordinate that much though
20:56 < gmaxwell> how is it "hard" to ignore transactions when already you are assuming that miners are violating honest consensus by ignoring the most work chain?
21:00 < gmaxwell> unrelated, the fact that your interaction with binance is being promoted by binanace and the media as "Bitcoin core developers" advised them to do that nonsense, has strongly disinclined me from ever working with you again.
21:00 < gmaxwell> And I am almost certantly not alone in this.
21:00 < jeremyrubin> I have no control over that media narrative
21:01 < jeremyrubin> I didn't represent myself to them at any time as
21:01 < jeremyrubin> hi I'm here from the bitcoin core to do this
21:01 < gmaxwell> Sure you do, your twitter profile prominently states "Bitcoin Core" -- this isn't somethign that even sipa does.
21:01 < gmaxwell> All the stellar materials talking about you describe you as "bitcoin core developer"
21:02 < gmaxwell> Certantly _binance_ paid attention to it because they believed they were getting advice from "bitcoin core"
21:02 < jeremyrubin> How do you suppose I tell people that I have previously worked on bitcoin software development and actively follow activity in the repository?
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21:04 < gmaxwell> I don't claim to have all the answers. But strangely this problem never seems to arise for sipa; where on account of something he said companies are announcing they are considering trying to undermine the honest operation of the system at the advice of bitcoin developers.
21:04 < jeremyrubin> Bitcoin.org lists me as a Bitcoin Core COntributor
21:04 < jeremyrubin> maybe you should get that taken down (I don't know who runs it)
21:05 < jeremyrubin> Maybe if I were a founder of blockstream they'd list that instead?
21:06 < gmaxwell> I guess the advice I'd give is that if you want to stay in good standing with others, you may have to do some legwork to combat that sort of misunderstanding, and to smooth irritation in the community when people feel they've suffered on account of it.
21:06 < jeremyrubin> also pieter's bio used to be "@pwuille. Bitcoin developer. Blockstream co-founder. Puny person. Mountain View, CA "
21:06 < jeremyrubin> I somehow missed the memo that we shouldn't say we work on bitcoin
21:07 < gmaxwell> It would be more accurate and better for you to say "Bitcoin developer"!
21:07 < jeremyrubin> I thought Bitcoin Core Contrib (which is what is in my bio and what I usually say) is most accurate
21:08 < gmaxwell> Be socially aware enough to know when you're being listened to because someone is talking to you because they think you're speaking as an authority... and defuse misunderstandings.
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21:13 < jeremyrubin> I dunno, I seem to recall similar sort of position-signalling around UASF from certain quantities
21:13 < jeremyrubin> So I'm just not certain how much i can actually effectuate change on that
21:14 < jeremyrubin> but as a show of good faith, I'll ammend my twitter bio
21:14 < gmaxwell> Thanks!  I mean, no one can ask you to do more than make an earnest effort, same as anyone else.
21:15 < gmaxwell> and that goes all around, if you think other people's words are being stuck in your mouth and it makes you uncomfortable, speak up.
21:16 < gmaxwell> To some extent your suffer from bad expirences I've had with other people, that isn't your fault. :)
21:16 < jeremyrubin> Yeah, I hope you (and others) no that at no point do I *ever* in conversation speak on behalf of core developers
21:16 < jeremyrubin> I always disambiguate if people say core team
21:17 < gmaxwell> it's not at all easy, people really want to deal with authorities and it breaks their brains when there isn't one readily available.
21:17 < jeremyrubin> in talking with CZ, he didn't seem to have any pretenses that he was speaking with me (and other bitcoin-adjacent developers) as an individual
21:17 < jeremyrubin> ^^ Ooops I inverted that one
21:17 < gmaxwell> understood
21:17 < jeremyrubin> He didn't have any pretenses that I was there as an emissary of core
21:17 < gmaxwell> I think thats actually unlikely, but I can see why you could have believed that.
21:20 < gmaxwell> (and difficult to control other than with the hurestic that its very rare that a business leader that you don't know personally or have a relationship otherwise (e.g. as a contractor, customer, etc) is ever going to bother talking to you unless they think you're representing something they have an interest in.  In some venues there are actions you can take to deformalize communication to avoid
21:20 < gmaxwell> confusion but the limited bandwidth of twitter might not leave a lot of options for that)
21:21 < gmaxwell> unfortunately this isn't changed by having a really good idea,  since outside of engineering venues ideas are usually judged by who presents them, not by their merit. :) (and even in engineering venues, most of the time)
21:22 < jeremyrubin> Well, to be fair by the time I talked with him directly it was in a telegram group with 10 other folks who had been chatting for a bit about the options
21:22 < jeremyrubin> Including other engineering voices
21:22 < jeremyrubin> Not sure what was said at that point
21:24 < gmaxwell> Also to be clear: this is not at all a problem for just you. It's generally an unsolved thing in our industry. strangely it seems to be much worse for us than in other open projects I've been around, ... I am not sure why.
21:25 < jeremyrubin> FWIW I'm fairly certain CZ did understand fairly well the incentives and optics. He was pretty dead-set on using it as a pure attrition with the attacker
21:26 < jeremyrubin> I think part of the issue is just language imprecision; there aren't great terminologies
21:26 < gmaxwell> not so sure about that, perhaps he had the same understanding as /you/.  But the "decided not to do it"  vs "decided it would be ineffective" suggests to me that there was not actually a strong understanding of the politics.
21:27 < gmaxwell> If they'd attempted it, the reorg wouldn't have happened
21:27 < gmaxwell> There is a lot of hashpower that would not participate at any price.
21:27 < gmaxwell> (at least not after the first couple blocks)
21:28 < jeremyrubin> Also reading thru the backlog, I specifically asked them to hop on IRC to chat with you specifically
21:28 < jeremyrubin> not sure if anyone did
21:28 < gmaxwell> and I know as soon as those tweets went up multiple users indpendantly wrote patches to pin the chain (I know because I had one code review request and another person asking me about it).
21:29 < gmaxwell> Nah.
21:30 < gmaxwell> (I told the users that the whole thing appeared to be silly, that I thought it wasn't going anywhere, and that I thought feeding the drama would be a poor idea. I don't think anyone posted any?-- but they would have if it went forward)
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21:31 < gmaxwell> On the plus side, this probably renewed interest in anti-fork-creation logic in miner firmware (like what BFGminer does).
21:32 < jeremyrubin> Yeah I think 'decided not to do it' was not how I would have worded it. 'Decided not to attempt incentivizing' or something is better, but it's 280 char twitter
21:32 < gmaxwell> yeah that would be fair.
21:33 < jeremyrubin> But from what I can tell, binance team were well aware that most likely the attacker would counteroffer by releasing absurd fees
21:33 < gmaxwell> the 'decided to no do it' is whats blowing a lot of people up, because it's read as implying that they could just push a button and do it.
21:34 < gmaxwell> jeremyrubin: I don't know if you caught my comment but the attacker had a significant advantage, he could keep well over 1000 BTC and still significantly outbid binance, even ignoring the hashpower that wouldn't participate and the politics.
21:34 < gmaxwell> because all the blocks already on the attacker side directly decrement what he has to pay in order to be paying more.
21:34 < jeremyrubin> Yeah... I have a mixed feeling on that given that Coinbase and others are blacklisting the attacker's coins
21:35 < jeremyrubin> Not sure how easy it will be to spend those coins
21:35 < gmaxwell> lol well maybe they'll just get donated to BU like the kraken stolen coins. :P
21:35 < jeremyrubin> lol
21:36 < gmaxwell> There are a lot of strategies that attackers can use, though in the past we haven't seen them use them.
21:36 < gmaxwell> Probably the electrum thefts will be interesting to watch for that.
21:36 < jeremyrubin> I do still think that having software which handles these reorgs up to say 6 blocks would be interesting
21:37 < jeremyrubin> It probably hurts bitcoin QoS, but would make custodians use more robust practices...
21:37 < jeremyrubin> trial by fire
21:38 < gmaxwell> I expect the next wave of mining firmware will refuse to self fork, largely taking the ability away from pools to do this.
21:38 < gmaxwell> bfgminer has done it for years, but there wasn't much reason for people to bother implementing it.
21:39 < jeremyrubin> huh... so the miner has some state?
21:39 < jeremyrubin> But what happens if your block gets orphaned?
21:39 < gmaxwell> Nothing, the new block you work on will have equal or greater work.
21:40 < gmaxwell> The thing in bfgminer doesn't prevent reorging, it prevents reorging to a chain with less work from the same source.
21:40 < jeremyrubin> Ah i see
21:40 < gmaxwell> in a natural fork you're still always moving to a chain with more work.
21:40 < jeremyrubin> This seems bad if you want to use a miner on mainnet then testnet
21:40 < luke-jr> well, it prevents going back to a recent block
21:40 < gmaxwell> nah, just needs to keep the two seperate.
21:40 < luke-jr> it might not be sufficient for a deep reorg
21:41 < gmaxwell> luke-jr: yea, it could be made stronger with explicit work tracking.
21:41 < luke-jr> jeremyrubin: BFGMiner understands that there are multiple chains possible
21:41 < luke-jr> jeremyrubin: since it supports GPU mining, I needed to have a way for it to switch between different algorithms even ;)
21:42 < jeremyrubin> Hm. I think users would want to be able to switch between bcc and btc as well...
21:42 < luke-jr> jeremyrubin: sure, it can do that too
21:42 < luke-jr> point is it's aware of multiple chains
21:42 < gmaxwell> no reason it couldn't. I believe the bfgminer code right now will just work for this.
21:42 < jeremyrubin> so then how is it precluding reorgs?
21:42 < luke-jr> and pools can even specify which chain they're using (which could be an issue, but it needs to be manually enabled by the user)
21:43 < luke-jr> jeremyrubin: so long as a pool is assigned to a specific blockchain (the default), it can't go back to an older block
21:43 < gmaxwell> jeremyrubin: because the way its currently implemented it only detects a reorg that goes back to a common block that its already moved past.
21:43 < luke-jr> gmaxwell: his point, I think, was that the reorg could "appear" to be a new chain
21:43 < gmaxwell> jeremyrubin: so it'll mine a fork once one exists, but it won't help create one. You start trying to create a fork, all those miners failover to another pool.
21:44 < jeremyrubin> Where's this firmware sitting?
21:44 < jeremyrubin> I thought you meant it's like on the boards
21:44 < gmaxwell> jeremyrubin: this is the code that runs in the mining devices.
21:44 < gmaxwell> (they run linux)
21:44 < luke-jr> it's a software setting; I have no clue what various web interfaces do - I guess probably don't expose it
21:44 < jeremyrubin> Ah ok
21:44 < jeremyrubin> so people can just flash different firmware
21:45 < gmaxwell> sure. or even just restart it, it doesn't persist this state.
21:45 < gmaxwell> But now if you want to convince people to attack the stability of bitcoin, you don't just need to convince a half dozen pool operators, _also_ need to convince far more parties running mining farms.
21:46 < jeremyrubin> gotcha. I'm groovy with that
21:46 < gmaxwell> the same protection stops all sorts of ugly abuses, not just your "but I really ment well when I rounded up and gassed the blocks" anti theft reorg. :)
21:46 < gmaxwell> so even if people are ambilivent to "get paid more to reorg" it's still worth running this protection.
21:47 < jeremyrubin> Yeah. I don't like the idea of miners somehow low level firmware locked to mine most work chain
21:47 < jeremyrubin> but a high level firmware to enforce a more rational mining setup sounds fine
21:47 < jeremyrubin> If users want to participate in a reorg, they can use firmware which can calculate their payouts
21:49 < luke-jr> well, it's only most-work, if you helped mine to that point ;)
21:49 < luke-jr> ie, you can't reorg out your own blocks
21:50 < luke-jr> [04:47:57] <jeremyrubin> If users want to participate in a reorg, they can use firmware which can calculate their payouts <-- on that note, Core's policy to implement all economically preferrential policies *ought* to include going along with these reorgs..
21:50 < luke-jr> just saying ;)
21:51 < jeremyrubin> I'm not sure exactly what you're expressing sentiment for happening
21:51 < gmaxwell> luke-jr: you can't actually economically justify a reorg except with really exceptional logic in any case.
21:51 < luke-jr> gmaxwell: if there's conflicted transactions outvaluing the subsidy of a new block..
21:52 < luke-jr> (yes, this logic requires you to assume the remaining 50+% will also go along with it, but that's true of any policy)
21:52 < jeremyrubin> luke-jr: I agree that it makes sense to implement the logic to act aggresively rationally with respect to reorgs
21:52 < gmaxwell> luke-jr: it's not true of all polices though. e.g. taking the highest fee txn makes you money even if other miners use a different policy.
21:52 < jeremyrubin> luke-jr: I would think having it be configurable to 6 blocks or something
21:53 < luke-jr> gmaxwell: but the current policy *assumes* other miners *won't* be trying to reorg - if they are, you lose
21:53 < gmaxwell> luke-jr: if they're trying to reorg you would lose regardless, creating your own new fork doesn't make you a winner.
21:53 < luke-jr> jeremyrubin: I disagree with the economically-preferrential-only Core policy in general, just pointing out this would fit in it
21:54 < jeremyrubin> luke-jr is right I think
21:54 < gmaxwell> to get what you you're going for requires tracking and validating multiple tips.  which regardless of other arguments isn't worth the risk/complexity/cost.
21:54 < jeremyrubin> You don't want to build on top of something you think miners will abandon
21:54 < jeremyrubin> Even if it is the most work
21:54 < luke-jr> gmaxwell: sure, my point is that no matter what policy you implement, you have to assume other miners are using the same one; and this one could be it
21:54 < jeremyrubin> gmaxwell: I think the logic can be handled as a policy on top of core, running multiple nodes
21:54 < gmaxwell> luke-jr: you're missing my point. Even if other miners are creating a fork, creating your _own_ fork will not help you.
21:55 < jeremyrubin> gmaxwell: they should gladly accept your block?
21:55 < luke-jr> gmaxwell: it could very well coordinate the fork
21:55 < luke-jr> jeremyrubin: yep, especially if they need it to make 50+$
21:55 < luke-jr> %
21:55 < gmaxwell> in any case, a reorg of 6 blocks would already be devistating to the network, many (most?) exchanges accept 3 blocks as final now.
21:55 < gmaxwell> jeremyrubin: no, not if they have another fork of their own.
21:56 < jeremyrubin> too many forks
21:56 < jeremyrubin> So you mine on their fork
21:56 < jeremyrubin> and they have another fork of it?
21:56 < luke-jr> gmaxwell: they can adapt, just like everyone else has had to with big blocks
21:56 < gmaxwell> yes, but doing that requires that you know it exists. The network doesn't relay it, you won't have fetched it or validated it even if it did.
21:56 < luke-jr> gmaxwell: if Core implements it, everyone knows
21:57 < gmaxwell> even single block reorgs have become very rare now, we're seeing less than one a month last I looked.
21:57 < gmaxwell> luke-jr: yes, sure, but right now there is no reason to implement it.
21:57 < gmaxwell> luke-jr: similar to not RBFing non-optin transactions.
21:57 < luke-jr> gmaxwell: it fits into the enforced policies Core has been implementing for other parts
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21:58 < luke-jr> hmm, I suppose the opt-out of RBF is a counter-example
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21:59 < jeremyrubin> I think opt-out RBF should go away
21:59 < jeremyrubin> makes it easier for hackers ;)
21:59 < luke-jr> gmaxwell: I'm not suggesting we *should* do this, I'm trying to use it as an example that the pressure to only do economically-preferrential things in Core is a mistake
21:59 < gmaxwell> luke-jr: I would agree with your "fits in" _if_ the practice already existed. Creating the practice where it doesn't exist doesn't fit in.
22:00 < luke-jr> it does exist; hence the removal of blockmaxsize, coin-age priority, etc
22:00 < gmaxwell> also it would be extradonarily expensive to do (in terms of development cost, dos risk, etc) even ignoring the desirability of it
22:00 < luke-jr> expensive for the implementors (ie, us), not the miners
22:00 < gmaxwell> luke-jr: you disagree but we did extensive testing on priority mining.
22:01 < luke-jr> (I think a lot of the complexity would actually provide useful functionality otherwise, BTW)
22:01 < gmaxwell> luke-jr: also resource expensive, and getting knocked out due to a dos attack (which miners are frequently targeted with is chea)
22:01 < luke-jr> gmaxwell: the testing didn't support the removal..
22:02 < luke-jr> gmaxwell: I could dig out other examples too - like the one forbidding address reuse per block
22:02 < gmaxwell> I think it did.
22:04 < gmaxwell> (also the total lack of wallets that made any any real use of it in coin selection, in spite it being useful and usable for _years_-- bitcoinj's fifo doesnt' count as it made really bad use of it, needlessly burning up priority like a fee wallet never taking change :))
22:04 < luke-jr> gmaxwell: the testing only ever showed that there were no "free" transactions being priority-mined; insofar as selection of non-"free" transactions, it was always effective
22:04 < luke-jr> special use by wallets isn't needed for it
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22:06 < luke-jr> and then with its removal, we had spam effective in halting transactions below their fee floor; Bitfury experimented with insane "fit as many txs per block" policies that could have been better off just using blockprioritysize; etc
22:06 < jeremyrubin> luke-jr: I think that if you're against economic-maximization in core, you shouldn't argue that not all policies should be economic, you should find a model where they are economical
22:06 < jeremyrubin> luke-jr: there are rich toolsets avail for modeling things that otherwise don't seem likely (like altruism)
22:06 < luke-jr> jeremyrubin: that requires softforks/hardforks, and is a lot more complex to model
22:07 < jeremyrubin> No I'm just talking about modeling
22:07 < jeremyrubin> so no hardfork/soft
22:07 < luke-jr> jeremyrubin: for example, with segwit we balanced the weight of inputs and outputs, and broke incentives in other places
22:07 < jeremyrubin> You can still make an economic model
22:08 < luke-jr> I have no idea what you're suggesting then.
22:08 < luke-jr> the economic model is fixed by the protocol rules
22:08 < jeremyrubin> no
22:08 < jeremyrubin> I mean like a simulation
22:08 < jeremyrubin> (but not neccesarily simulated)
22:09 < jeremyrubin> You can then prove a result about the rule you prefer, giving evidence that it is a preferable rule
22:09 < luke-jr> jeremyrubin: we had real-world data showing coin-age priority was helpful
22:09 < gmaxwell> I don't agree we had that.
22:09 < jeremyrubin> real world data is anecdata
22:09 < jeremyrubin> ;)
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22:10 < jeremyrubin> A richer theoretical model of coin priority should tell you if it will continue to be useful
22:10 < gmaxwell> I think we had real world data showing that longtime bitcoin users like luke and myself could use it to make free or really cheap transactions, while most ordinary users didn't benefit at all... which to the extent it did anything created an incentives misalignment between developers and end users.
22:10 < jeremyrubin> and will give a precise language to statements like 'helpful'
22:11 < luke-jr> gmaxwell: unless you were doing transactions every block, a lot of people benefitted
22:12 < gmaxwell> the priority rule required 1 BTC stationary for one day. per input+output...
22:12 < luke-jr> which was much less back then, and multiple days reduced it
22:12 < luke-jr> (in fact, that suggests further than it wasn't all a few people taking advantage of it)
22:13 < jeremyrubin> luke-jr: you should talk to eric budish I thinl
22:13 < luke-jr> IIRC, that was just for gratis transactions anyway, not priority mining policies
22:13 < luke-jr> jeremyrubin: does he have a nickname?
22:14 < gmaxwell> luke-jr: bitcoin was at like $3k when priority was turned off by default, IIRC.
22:15 < jeremyrubin> actually maybe not eric I'm thinking of
22:19 < jeremyrubin> Jacob Leshno is who I meant (they're colleagues)
22:19 < jeremyrubin> https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3032375
22:19 < jeremyrubin> https://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/jacob.leshno/Research/Bitcoin%20Market%20Design.pdf
22:20 < jeremyrubin> He could probably help put together a formal model showing impact of priority on fee revenue
22:21 < jeremyrubin> And model the corresponding price impact
22:21 < luke-jr> jeremyrubin: well, obviously fee revenue would go down :p
22:21 < jeremyrubin> It's important that you measure in dollars
22:21 < luke-jr> Bitcoin price is not predictable
22:22 < luke-jr> I would be shocked if someone managed to get information to show that X is good or bad for price.
22:22 < jeremyrubin> read leshno's research -- a system with too high or too low fee should be bad for price
22:23 < jeremyrubin> you can model if priority pushes you further away from ideal revenues
22:24 < luke-jr> sounds too math-y for me
22:24 < jeremyrubin> Well that's why I'm saying talk to him! He's a friendly guy.
22:24 < jeremyrubin> Can help construct a model & walk you through the model as is if need be
22:24 < luke-jr> ☺
22:25 < jeremyrubin> These chicago guys are sharp
22:25 < jeremyrubin> I was very impressed with their methodologies & understanding of the tech compared to other econ-types
22:25 < jeremyrubin> they're also pretty keen to get their research impacting the real bitcoin ecosystem
22:26 < jeremyrubin> so if you would like to chat with them, let me know
22:27 < luke-jr> they could just join us here? :P
22:27 < jeremyrubin> That's even less likely than convincing Greg that you should reenable priority ;)
22:27 < luke-jr> :|
22:31 < jeremyrubin> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pgdSui7_PTw
22:31 < jeremyrubin> talk version of the paper
22:33 < luke-jr> speaking of which, I need to actually start on my talk for MCC :x
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22:39 < jeremyrubin> email sent, did my best to summarize
22:40 < luke-jr> jeremyrubin: thanks
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--- Log closed Thu May 09 00:00:07 2019