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09:15 < maaku> digitsu: why does it matter?
09:16 < maaku> if miners started systematically breaking lightning, they'll find the POW function changed in a heartbeat
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18:17 < digitsu> maybe, but that is a nuclear option, one that has other side effects
18:17 < digitsu> if LN was popular changing the mining network underneath it with a sudden PoW would be... interesting to say the least.
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18:18 < digitsu> it may be more of a suicide vest instead of the laser guided bomb that people initially thingk
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20:00 < jl2012> digitsu: it's a basic assumption that miners will mine any valid transactions with adequate fee. If they don't that's already a 51% attack
20:06 < rusty> digitsu: yes, it turns out we always relied on censorship-resistance.  But the difference is that lightning makes it profitable to censor for a well-specified time (vs. "nobody will mine your txs until you pay me a fee" which has a less-well-defined time window).
20:09 < digitsu> yep.  I have been referring to this as an inversion of the Bitcoin security model.
20:11 < digitsu> which makes in less secure to do high value txn on LN (which is fine because the banner has always been high value txn should be on Bitcoin anyway) but also sets a higher bar for required privacy measures or TOR use on LN
20:18 < rusty> digitsu: I'm not sure it's quite true.  It seems like it would be a straightforward deal: miner delays in return for reward later.  It looks provable (since miners can see the later transaction), but actually it's not.  If Bob is trying to rip off Alice, they're better off coming to their own deal and cutting the miners out.
20:18 < rusty> digitsu: imagine I see someone send a tx to a ransomware site today.  I know they're prime pickings for extortion, so I bribe miners not to mine their tx, and contact them asking for money.
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22:21 < digitsu> the inversion I'm speaking of is the ability to defraud money based on the ability to keep information from Alice from being broadcast to the network.
22:21 < digitsu> which of course needs to be offset by alice paying 'insurers' to broadcast for her in the event of a breach txn being seen.
22:22 < digitsu> so the cost to secure a txn has a new element which bitcoin does not have, namely the cost of that insurance.
22:23 < digitsu> also the "threat" of filtering out breach remedy txns may be enough to scare Alice into closing channels (in the extreme case inciting a full blown bank run) or in the best case, it could just increase the cost of Alice's insurance fees.
22:24 < digitsu> there are a lot of new dynamics at play here.
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