--- Log opened Sun Jul 30 00:00:14 2023
00:19 < harding> _aj_: does this require each hop to pay the same fee so that there's no incentive to hold a channel open at a cost of x when an upstream node is receiving y where y>x?
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00:37 < _aj_> each hop pays whatever they're requested downstream (B pays A) and requests whatever they like upstream (B: C you better pay me x, cancel/timeout the htlc, or Imma close the channel). So B would choose to collect more from C than he pays to A in normal circumstances; but it's C's choice to cancel B's profit generating scheme. (If B tries to hold C hostage, C closes the channel)
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08:25 < harding> Yeah, that makes sense once I diagramed it out.  Thanks!
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13:53 < harding> _aj_: If upfront forward commitment fees aren't scaled to the amount being transfered and reverse hold fees don't begin acruing immediately, I don't think this substantially helps with jamming.  At 1msat per hop, the commitment fees are $0.30 per million.  That means Mallory can send 50,000 payments along 20 hops each to lock up a substantial portion of the network's liquidity for an inconsequential amount.  The payments will need to be cancelled 
13:53 < harding> every block, but the cost is about $50/day. I don't think that's satisified by your anti-DoS framework of making attackers pay for infrastructure because anyone who expects to receive one commitment fee per block per year (~50,000 msat, or about $0.015 USD) for a given amount of capital wouldn't invest more than $1.5 of capital on the expectation of 1% pa returns, and Mallory's jamming would probably be plenty successful even if she only made 
13:53 < harding> HTLCs significantly larger than that.
13:55 < harding> (Sorry for the multiple criticisms; I really like the idea, I'm just bumping into "whatabouts" as I try to write it up for Optech.)
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20:47 < _aj_> harding: if all your liquidity is being used up at a rate of 1%, then you're not charging enough, so you should raise your rate, eg to 2%. if they keep attacking, congrats, you've doubled your profit, and you should repeat. eventually you're making 10% or 20% pa from spammers alone, or the spammers run out of money.
20:50 < _aj_> harding: a better criticism seems to me to be "if you don't start charging for X blocks, then they just cancel at X-1 blocks, and then send a new htlc of the same amount" -- then they can dynamically hold your funds hostage at no cost. but the dynamicism there at least allows you to apply randomisation or reputation approaches more flexibly, and gives more opportunities for legit users to win the race
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23:22 < harding> Yeah, that's the point I was trying to make; sorry it was confusing.  I agree that your approach seems to solve slow jamming, but it doesn't seem to change anything wrt fast jamming compared to today.
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--- Log closed Mon Jul 31 00:00:15 2023