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03:37 < nickguest> solo mine spartancoin
03:37  * nsh looks at nickguest 
03:42 < fluffypony> nickguest: has spamming that junk ever worked for anyone ever?
03:42 < fluffypony> hint: the answer is no.
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04:01 < phantomcircuit> ffs nobody with ops is awake
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04:04 < phantomcircuit> sipa, nickguest is trying to spam some silly altcoin
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04:06 < sipa> phantomcircuit: i've warned him about it before
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04:09 < phantomcircuit> sipa, thanks
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04:33 < Muis> Is there a proven method to distract a pseudo-random number from the chain that cannot be influenced by miners, or is that impossible by design?
04:34 < stonecoldpat> what do you mean by distract
04:34 < sipa> you can make it arbitrarily expensive
04:34 < sipa> he means extract
04:34 < stonecoldpat> ah sorry
04:34 < sipa> but you can't make it non-influencable
04:37 < phantomcircuit> sipa, arbitrarily expensive?
04:39 < sipa> by waiting long enough
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04:41 < phantomcircuit> sipa, oh
04:41 < phantomcircuit> sipa, well you can get reasonably small amounts of entropy from the high? low? bits of the blockhash
04:42 < phantomcircuit> but that's about it really
04:42 < phantomcircuit> it would cost whatever the block reward is multiplied by 2^(fixed bits beyond target) to cheap
04:42 < phantomcircuit> cheat*
04:43 < phantomcircuit> even a small amount of cheating would be very expensive
04:43 < stonecoldpat> argubly that random number (blockhash) is influenced by the miner, if its a random number he doesnt like, then he doesnt publish it (at the cost of 25btc)
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04:43 < stonecoldpat> ^ just as you said...
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04:49 < phantomcircuit> stonecoldpat, yeah i wouldn't suggest it for sure since there are better sources of entropy
04:49 < phantomcircuit> but for an application where you need widely witnessed entropy from the future
04:50 < phantomcircuit> well i cant actually think of anything else
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04:52 < Muis> if you take the hash of all the blocks in the chain
04:52 < Muis> does that make the number more random or secure than the hash of the last block
04:53 < phantomcircuit> sure but it's predictable
04:53 < Muis> since then an attacker would have to start from genesis
04:53 < phantomcircuit> or i guess known?
04:53 < Muis> how do you mean predictable?
04:53 < phantomcircuit> i dont mean you can predict the next one
04:53 < Muis> ah okay :)
04:53 < phantomcircuit> i mean that if you start now using previous block hashes doesn't help
04:54 < phantomcircuit> since everybody already knows those
04:54 < Muis> i dont mean the previous block hashes, but hashes over the full block (more work-intensive)
04:54 < Muis> but that doesnt change much to the concept
04:55 < stonecoldpat> Muis: the blockheader should already be the hash of all the blocks in the chain
04:55 < Muis> true
04:55 < Muis> but if you are a miner
04:55 < Muis> and you want to influence the random miner
04:56 < Muis> its harder to find a hash with difficulty X over the contents of all blocks, then to find over a hash, since that doesnt require much I/O
04:57 < Muis> *random number
04:59 < Muis> so SHA(SHA(B[0] + B[1] + B[2])) instead of SHA(SHA(MERKLE[0] , MERKLE[1])), etc.
05:00 < stonecoldpat> intuitively i think both of them are the same thing
05:00 < Muis> I guess they aren't
05:00 < stonecoldpat> since under all of that - the randomness comes from the signatures which both of them include
05:01 < Muis> because when you say: the order of the blocks doesnt matter
05:01 < Muis> and you want to try all combinations of orders
05:01 < Muis> would you rather hash hashes or hash blockcombinations?
05:01 < stonecoldpat> thats what i mean, hash hashes or hash block combinations, both of these are increated from the randomness in the public keys and ecdsa signatures, they are just different represetnations of the same randomness
05:02 < stonecoldpat> both of these are created*
05:02 < Muis> true
05:02 < Muis> but the sheer amount of data is much bigger
05:02 < Muis> and the time for a hash is dependant on the amount of data
05:02 < stonecoldpat> a hash just makes something look more random, but it may not necessarily be any more random than something that used the same source
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05:04 < Muis> true
05:04 < stonecoldpat> ive got to run, but it is an interesting thought experiment
05:04 < Muis> but I mean it requires all miners to have fast access to a copy of the whole chain
05:04 < Muis> that is good for SPV nodes :)
05:04 < Muis> you cannot make such garantuees by hashing hashes
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05:06 < Muis> phantomcircuit: suppose my 'coin' uses the bc.info to fetch a random value from bitcoins chain, instead of my own (poor secured) chain
05:06 < Muis> which value should I use?
05:06 < Muis> the number of transactions in a block? the block hash? something else?
05:07 < Muis> I just need the bitcoin protocol to give me a INT32 that I know is expensive too cheat, and will change frequently
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05:08 < Muis> the total number of bytes from the block maybe?
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05:26 < kanzure> Muis: fetching data from blockchain.info is a very bad design decision
05:27 < Muis> kanzure: if they dont trust it, they can use another explorer, or run a full client
05:27 < kanzure> that's not how consensus works
05:28 < Muis> i am not creating a financial network, so most people will trust blockchain.info to publish the correct chain, more than they have trust in my network
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05:28 < kanzure> arguably you are not; you are creating a security vulnerability waiting to happen.
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05:30 < eudoxia> he does have a bit of a point about trust
05:30 < eudoxia> then again there's probably a way you can offer users to verify your chain is the consensun
05:30 < eudoxia> consensus*
05:30 < kanzure> yes, it's possible that his software does not implement decentralized consensus, but integrating with a third party api like blockchain.info is trivial so i would assume that's not what he's asking about
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05:43 < Muis> i need to select random miners for my blocks, and it seems more logical to pick them based on a random number in the bitcoin chain, then to let them do massive amounts of pow just so I can select one
05:47 < justanotheruser> Muis: what are you doing?
05:48 < kanzure> you could pick the same pubkey that mined the latest bitcoin block
05:48 < kanzure> in fact, you can implement bitcoin consensus
05:48 < kanzure> and directly connect to the bitcoin p2p network
05:48 < justanotheruser> PoW is only partially there to randomly select a miner. It is also there so it is prohibatively costly to create a fork.
05:50 < Muis> what I want to accomplish is that I can group my nodes in 255 groups
05:51 < Muis> they are free to pick a group, but they are not free to switch groups faster than 10 blocks
05:51 < Muis> then every block I select a random group that is allowed to mine
05:51 < Muis> and all others groups can switch off their equipment during that block
05:51 < Muis> since they already know they can never get the block reward
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05:52 < Muis> now if the numbers I pick are reasonably random
05:53 < Muis> then won't my network offer better security as bitcoin with less power?
05:53 < Muis> since miners have no incentive to switch groups
05:53 < Muis> you could even allow them to already do PoW for their group
05:53 < kanzure> your idea seems to be vulnerabile to sybil
05:53 < Muis> and that that PoW stays valid for 3 blocks
05:54 < Muis> why?
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05:54 < Muis> if the group-number is included in the hash?
05:54 < kanzure> for the same reason all of your other ideas are vulnerable to sybil. we were just talking about this yesterday. read the backlog.
05:54 < Muis> how can a an attacker mine for two groups?
05:54 < Muis> if he can proof he spend X work for group X
05:55 < kanzure> identity just doesn't work. that's what sybil is able to exploit.
05:55 < Muis> and cannot do X work for all groups?
05:56 < justanotheruser> Muis: https://download.wpsoftware.net/bitcoin/pos.pdf
05:56 < Muis> the flaw in proof of stake seems to be that there is nothing at stake
05:56 < justanotheruser> basically decentralized consensus works through the burning of an external resource and probably can't be done otherwise
05:56 < Muis> so you can easily mine at two chains simultanously
05:56 < Muis> that flaw is not present in my idea?
05:56 < justanotheruser> yes, but this paper can apply beyond PoS
05:57 < Muis> so if there is a second flaw in PoS
05:57 < Muis> i am curious to know it. but I will read the paper first
05:57 < justanotheruser> Muis: so it's impossible for anyone but the selected miner to mine the block?
05:57 < Muis> justanotheruser: no
05:57 < justanotheruser> okay, so they can mine a fork and forge the timestamp
05:58 < kanzure> i agree with justanotheruser that pos.pdf is about more than just proof-of-stake
05:58 < Muis> its impossible for anyone outside the selected group to mine the block
05:58 < kanzure> haha
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05:59 < justanotheruser> Muis: basically how do you prove you're in a group
05:59 < Muis> suppose we say a group = a gps coordinate, and you publish yours, and the difficulty is the distance between your coordinates and the target. then everyone can mine a block, but some are more lucky than others, because their location is closer to the target
05:59 < kanzure> gps is spoofable
05:59 < Muis> you proof you are in a group by comitting to a group
05:59 < kanzure> no
06:00 < Muis> so I hash my own gps coordinates for 2 years long
06:00 < kanzure> please read more about sybil attacks
06:00 < Muis> and I collect proof of work for that location
06:00 < Muis> if I want to collect pow for other coordinates
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06:00 < Muis> how would that work? I would have to split the work
06:00 < justanotheruser> Muis: okay, so ignoring the fact that GPS is spoofable, I rent 255 servers for $2/month and they all talk to my full node multiplying my profits by 255
06:01 < Muis> that doesnt work
06:01 < Muis> i mean it does work
06:01 < justanotheruser> lol
06:01 < Muis> but you are at a disadvantage to the people that are really in that group
06:02 < Muis> because you do POW together with a partner, you hash eachother responses
06:02 < Muis> and you will always be the slowest one because of your proxy
06:02 < kanzure> trivial to just join a billion groups. there's no such thing as identity so you can run as many fake nodes in fake groups as you want.
06:02 < justanotheruser> yeah, my partner is another program running on my server
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06:04 < Muis> you commit PoW to a group, so you cannot join a thousands groups, and be the biggest every where. and you can do pow together with somebody else in that group. Suppose I have 10000 sybils, if I want to join group X, i need a 10000 real people that want to partner with me, otherwise I have to do twice the work for half the reward
06:04 < Muis> so unless thats a very popular group, every miner most likely already has a partner there
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06:04 < kanzure> not half the reward
06:06 < justanotheruser> you keep redefining this system
06:07 < justanotheruser> and requiring a group creates a huge economy of scale.
06:07 < Muis> economy of scale?
06:08 < justanotheruser> it becomes more profitable the more money you spend
06:08 < Muis> suppose we label the group by GPS coordinates, you can make them more precise? So first you mine for your continent, later you mine for your country or city, and when its mainstream you mine for your street.
06:09 < justanotheruser> ehh, read up on sybil attacks, this isn't workable
06:09 < Muis> wouldnt that spread out nicely across the globe, instead of 3 large datacenters
06:09 < justanotheruser> there is no trustless proof-of-coordinate
06:09 < kanzure> Muis: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sybil_attack
06:09 < Muis> I prevent the sybil attack by including the group-name in the pow hash?
06:10 < Muis> and I cannot think of a way an attacker could get around that
06:10 < justanotheruser> by writing a different group name
06:10 < Muis> because the amount of work you did for group X prooves your weight in that group
06:10 < Muis> how can you write a different group name?
06:11 < justanotheruser> Muis: okay, so alice is mining in one group right?
06:11 < Muis> yes
06:11 < justanotheruser> and bob is mining in another group right?
06:11 < Muis> yes
06:11 < justanotheruser> and alice can't be in bobs group at the same time?
06:11 < justanotheruser> right?
06:11 < Muis> alice can be in bobs group
06:11 < justanotheruser> but, since they're in another group they can't be
06:11 < Muis> but she must split her hash-power equalyy between the groups
06:12 < Muis> ok
06:12 < justanotheruser> well if you are using maximal hashpower your system doesn't accomplish it's original goal of reducing elecricity expended
06:13 < justanotheruser> but sure, you can put "Hey guys, I'm in group 193" in the coinbase if you like, not that it would do anything
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06:17 < Muis> If a group decides to mine even though their group-number is so far away from the target, that they most likely always will be beaten, that's their choice, and in that case electricity is not reduced. but for the rational miners it is
06:18 < Muis> so if only 50% of them act rational and financially motivated, then 50% energy is saved
06:19 < kanzure> group membership doesn't work like that
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06:19 < Muis> why not
06:19 < kanzure> do you know what i am going to say?
06:19 < Muis> screw you
06:19 < Muis> :)
06:19 < kanzure> i am just asking
06:19 < Muis> no what did you plan to say?
06:19 < Muis> no
06:20 < kanzure> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sybil_attack
06:20 < Muis> lol
06:20 < Muis> I am willing to read all I can, but I still haven't heard a practical example of how someone can cheat in my scheme
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06:20 < Muis> and I thought justanotheruser was about to explain one
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06:22 < Muis> you pay 'rent' for a group, if you want to join multiple, no problem, but you pay much more in rent for many groups were you contribute small hashpower, than renting one group and focussing all your power there
06:23 < justanotheruser> Muis: your system has only been defined to the extent that you can throw on another component and fix the problem I just explained, only to create another problem.
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06:24 < justanotheruser> Pastebin a definition for the system that is thorough enough so you can't say "oh, this additional component will fix that" in response to me pointing out a flaw.
06:25 < Muis> :)
06:26 < kanzure> Muis: i think the more interesting thing you should be trying to learn is why bitcoin seems to be sybil-resistnat.
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06:26 < kanzure> whoops i mean sybil-resistant
06:26 < kanzure> rather than trying to come up with your own sybil-resistant implementation (which so far you have not been able to do....)
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06:28 < Muis> isnt it sybil resistance because you proof you dedicated effort into something that isnt fungible?
06:29 < kanzure> nope, bitcoin is sybil-resistant because who you are doesn't matter
06:30 < Adlai> bitcoin's PoW is equally difficult if you make your one huge mining farm look like $maxint small miners
06:30 < Muis> its not 1 cpu = 1 vote anymore, so who you are is defined by the amount of hash-rate that you have
06:30 < Adlai> there's no "who you are", only "what you can do with the hardware you control and the energy you feed it"
06:30 < kanzure> "1 cpu = 1 vote" was the wrong idea
06:30 < Muis> why
06:31 < kanzure> because it's nonsense. votes don't even make sense. there's no way to "register" a single cpu. it's all kinds of dumb.
06:31 < justanotheruser> oh here comes the vote discussion
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06:31 < kanzure> "1 cpu 1 vote" is not sybil-resistant
06:31 < Muis> lol
06:31 < Adlai> it's closer to "1 hash/second = 1 lottery ticket"
06:31 < Muis> its in the Satoshi paper
06:32 < justanotheruser> the important thing is it still is 1 cpu 1 vote in the sense that now a 1000000 CPUs can fit into a single piece of hardware
06:32 < Muis> but it was the wrong idea and not sybil-resistant?
06:32 < Muis> does Satoshi know that?
06:32 < kanzure> there are many things that satoshi didn't know
06:32 < kanzure> like how to write a standard
06:32 < justanotheruser> Muis: he just disagrees with using the word "vote" to describe it
06:32 < kanzure> justanotheruser: i also disagree with the "1 cpu" thing too.
06:33 < Muis> im trying to find a way to bring back the idea of 1 person = 1 vote, and there may be solutions to accomplish that, and it could that it turns out that CPU was a bad measurement
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06:33 < kanzure> Muis: there was never an idea of "1 person = 1 vote". sorry.
06:33 < Muis> 1 person = 1 cpu = 1 vote
06:33 < kanzure> Muis: there is no way for a computer to "know" "your identity"... that's not a computable concept.
06:34 < justanotheruser> 1 hash one lotto ticket!
06:34 < Muis> lets stick to the lotto ticket analogy
06:34 < Muis> suppose I can buy a lotto ticket
06:34 < kanzure> you can't...
06:34 < Muis> and with every ticket sold I decrease the total jackpot, and my own expected value
06:34 < Muis> would I buy two tickets? or 1000 as a Sybil?
06:35 < Muis> it would be in my best interest to act rational and buy one
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06:35 < Muis> and hope that other people act rational too
06:35 < Muis> but Im assured that even if they do not
06:35 < Muis> they will make a loss
06:36 < Muis> so on average, they will
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06:39 < p15x> do you know about the prisoner's dilemma
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06:58 < Muis> yes
06:58 < Muis> its kinda similar
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07:06 < stonecoldpat> I would agree with Aldai in the defintion that its more a lottery ticket than a vote
07:06 < stonecoldpat> its not the most votes who win, its just who gets the winning lotto ticket
07:08 < smooth> kanzure: who you are does matter in a way, because 51 people with 1% of hash power each is not the same as one person with 51% hash power
07:08 < kanzure> smooth: what do you mean?
07:08 < smooth> the incentives are different
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07:09 < smooth> the assumption of the poorly named 1-cpu-1-vote is that all votes are "small"
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07:16 < justanotheruser> smooth: all votes are about the same size because rational actors will use up to date ASICs
07:16 < justanotheruser> 1 cpu 1 vote doesn't really imply a person can't have 10000 CPUs
07:17 < smooth> yes thats why i said its poorly named
07:17 < justanotheruser> oh, I see
07:17 < smooth> although i would argue it DID imply that
07:18 < smooth> well maybe 10k cpus fine, but not say 100m or more
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07:20 < Muis> would there buy a problem if PoW is not coupled to a block
07:21 < Muis> that you can save it, as long as it can only be used once?
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07:24 < Muis> my feeling says its insecure, but I cant really figure out why
07:26 < Muis> so for example, the only requirement for bitcoin miners is that they provide a hash for the string "BITCOIN" + random, which meets the difficulty, but the hash does not include the timestamp nor the blocknumber.
07:27 < Muis> and once you use one your hashes to create a block, you cannot use that same hash again for another block
07:28 < Muis> but you may store them or sell them as long as they dont get published
07:28 < stonecoldpat> if i understand what your saying... that means that hash could be used for *any* block, you produce the hash, i steal it and use it with my block - theres no criteria to stop it being used more than once
07:29 < stonecoldpat> the PoW is used to protect the integrity of the block - to make sure its contents cannot be changed without changing the PoW
07:29 < Muis> but if the hash is recorded in the chain, you could just lookup if its already used?
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07:30 < Muis> if I produce it you can steal it, but we cannot both use it on the same chain
07:31 < stonecoldpat> the reason it cant be stolen today is because it is coupled with a block - otherwise its up to anyones discretion to choose which chain they follow - as using *any* pow with a block would allow infinite possible chains
07:32 < Muis> okay, thats true
07:32 < Muis> so if you couple a time, but not a block, does that make things different?
07:32 < stonecoldpat> well, the PoW acts as a relative timestamp - thats why it solves the decentralization problem
07:33 < justanotheruser> Muis: progress in PoW is bad. If you want more reading, pow.pdf is easier to understand and a nice read.
07:33 < Muis> relative to the blockheader it hashes
07:33 < Muis> justanotheruser: i will, tnx
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07:41 < andytoshi> Muis: can you make precise this "more tickets you buy the smaller the jackpot gets" notion? specifically what is the likelihood of winning (i guess (#tickets bought)/(#total tickets)) and how does your jackpot function work ... i wonder if it's possible to set one up such that for each player the maximum expected payoff is achieved for 1 ticket (not zero) or at least for some small finite number of
07:41 < andytoshi> tickets
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07:42 < Muis> It works exponential
07:42 < andytoshi> i think that's a well-defined mathematical problem, i think in solving it you'll convince yourself it's impossible (but maybe not, which would interest me too), and should provide some intuition about game theory ... then we can worry about things like "how to determine the number of tickets bought"
07:42 < Muis> So it decreases really quickly
07:43 < Muis> But starts very large
07:43 < justanotheruser> is the sybil problem even what a PoW solves? If sybil is solved, you need an incentive to keep all the actors in line.
07:43 < andytoshi> what i'm asking for is a mathematical proof that expected utility for each player is maximized if the player buys some small nonzero number N of tickets
07:44 < Muis> I am trying to accomplish that by making the entry fee for the lottery higher than the expected payout
07:44 < Muis> But because transaction fees also happen to be entry fees
07:45 < andytoshi> do whatever you want; i'm telling you that you can mathematically prove whether or not it accomplishes your goal (which i have stated precisely for you)
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07:45 < Muis> People dont mind if they loose if they needed to make one anyway
07:45 < Muis> But if you buy tickets (make transactions) just for the jackpot
07:46 < andytoshi> and i'd like you to do this because these sorts of handwavey arguments don't accomplish anything; i suspect all parties are talking past each other because english is ambiguous and super bad at detecting miscommunication.
07:46 < Muis> You have a negative expected value
07:46 < andytoshi> no. write out the equations.
07:46 < Muis> I will try to make some document which proofs this
07:49 < Muis> But it can all be boiled down to this: in a regular lottery you buy tickets. here you get a ticket for free with each transaction, but they earn less on average than the tx fee costs.
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07:53 < Muis> Would you join that lottery unless you really had to make a transaction? If your answer is no andytoshi, then it must be proovable
07:55 < kanzure> andytoshi: i think this guy is just bad at reading
07:55 < andytoshi> Muis: it's easy to make the EV negative regardless of the number of tickets i buy, have your payout function be 0. i thought you wanted to encourage participation but not sybilling, so you want my optimum number of tickets to be positive but not infinite
07:55 < kanzure> andytoshi: i don't have any other explanations to give you
07:56 < smooth> Muis: do this: < andytoshi> no. write out the equations.
07:56 < smooth> you are risking unnecesarily alienating people at this point
07:57 < Muis> andytoshi: I encourage particpation by giving away free tickets to the people paying TX fees?
07:57 < andytoshi> kanzure: :/       Muis: i'd like you to explore the math probelm i gave you above (devise a jackpot function which does what you want), i can't respond anymore to you until you do it because it's using a lot of -wizards scrollback, as well as the time of myself and other readers; i'm saying this because it's true, not to be mean
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07:59 < stonecoldpat> +1 andytoshi point, unless you write a clear description then its hard to debate (as seen earlier by 'adding-on' new components)
07:59 < Muis> Okay, np
08:04 < Muis> Every TX is a ticket, every ticket earns back its total transaction-fee but only every 3 blocks on average. That is a good lottery if I need to make TX for other reasons, and a bad lottery if I try to use it to sybil attack or to make profits or spam. Thats a clear and well defined scheme.
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08:48 < andytoshi> Muis: why do you say "every 3 blocks on average" instead of just "consistently 1/3 its fee" ... introducing randomness seems like totally unnecessary complexity. then why 1/3 rather than 0? i don't see how that changes the incentives. finally: if your transactions receive no payout (which i think is incentive-equivalent to what you described) what do you think you have accomplished? "here's my
08:48 < andytoshi> system: there are transactions"?
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08:48 < amiller_> andytoshi, i think what he's saying is very simple, i don't see what you're sending him to the chalkboard for
08:48 < amiller_> he's just saying there's a -EV lottery
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08:49 < amiller_> that's easy, you just delete some fraction of the transaction fees
08:50 < amiller_> and i think the point that he's making is one that i like to make, which is that people play -EV lotteries all the time, that's why charity fundraising drives often have 'raffles'
08:50 < andytoshi> amiller_: earlier he was suggesting a +EV lottery except it's -EV if you buy more than one ticket (to discourage sybilling). somehow he is trying to assemble a consensus system from all this, i'm just giving him subproblems so he can see what a concrete piece of something looks like
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09:17 < Muis> andytoshi: always 1/3 is not the same as once every 3 blocks. Because when I have to make a single TX, one in 3 times i will make a profit and double my fee. And the other two times I loose nothing.  With your scheme i can predict my return, which is not wanted
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09:19 < Muis> Its true that over a long period it will have the same returns
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09:40 < kanzure> "I am your enemy, the first one you've ever had who was smarter than you. There is no teacher but the enemy. No one but the enemy will tell you what the enemy is going to do. No one but the enemy will ever teach you how to destroy and conquer. Only the enemy shows you where you are weak. Only the enemy tells you where he is strong. And the rules of the game are what you can do to him and what you can stop him from doing to you. I am ...
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09:40 < kanzure> ... your enemy from now on."
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09:42 < amiller_> andytoshi, agreed. Muis I don't want to discourage you because i think there's something useful in there, trying to design more carefully the incentive reward / lottery scheme to achieve some kind of effect on the participation distribution.
09:43 < amiller_> but it's really hard to analyze all this even just by thinking through it
09:43 < amiller_> try to find any way you can to break off a chunk of this as a subproblem and just discuss that maybe
09:44 < amiller_> i think do think that a -EV lottery is self-stabilizing and resistant to sybils
09:44 < amiller_> the economic assumptions that could justify this are a) individuals play lotteries, but only a limited amount over time, e.g. people that spend $10/week on lottery tickets or a few hours at a casino a year
09:45 < amiller_>  and b) as a trend, "large entities" tend to be closer to expected utility theory and less likely to gamble compared to small individuals
09:46 < amiller_> the first one (a) is needed to justify having a -EV incentive scheme in the first place, and the second one (b) is why a -EV is inherently sybil resistant
09:47 < amiller_> anyway, this is a "subproblem" because i'm just talking for now about participation levels (who spends resources to participate and how much), and it doesn't say anything about "mining" or consensus reallly
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09:48 < amiller_> forget about consensus and blocks and tx fees for now, if the incentive stuff ends up appealing, we could probably build a mining game around it, but its the incentive stuff that's weird / interesting to start with.
09:49 < kanzure> there may be valuable immunity in a direction like "fraud proofs and once showing a fraud proof being able to replace a large participant with any number of smaller participants without losing out on hashrate or being vulnerable to hashrate attacks from the larger participant that might decide to switch to your separate blockchain to mess with your retargeting".
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09:50 < kanzure> (that sort of immunity makes larger participants less problematic)
09:50 < kanzure> ((i was not proposing a mechanism))
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10:21 < kanzure> "Password recovery attacks against RC4 in TLS" http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/RC4passwords.pdf
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11:08 < huffer> Yeah, hello :) I was watching a talk of DevCore, and Gavin mentioned this chat room so I wanted to check if it exists :)
11:09 < Adlai> indeed it does, although discussion is slow sometimes (and rapidfire at others)
11:09 < huffer> so it does exist, though it’s awfully quiet in here
11:09 < huffer> :)
11:10 < huffer> well, many thanks Adlai
11:10 < Adlai> all but the busiest irc rooms have dead time
11:11 < huffer> I don’t have a topic of discussion for now so I won’t bore you or distract you guys anymore - but thanks for future conversations
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11:12 < phiche1> @huffer that's how I found this channel too. It was busy earlier today. Don't worry there is probably plenty of stuff in here to look forward to that will go right over your head (like mine)
11:13 < Adlai> if you're looking for immediate gratification, see /topic
11:13 < huffer> cool, phiche1, looking forward…
11:13 < phiche1> thanks for the tip Adlai!
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14:02 < BlueMatt> does anyone have any opinions on relative-to-my-inputs-OP_CLTV?
14:02 < BlueMatt> ie <N> RCLTV is equivalent to <N + height the input I'm spending is confirmed at> CLTV?
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14:02 < BlueMatt> maybe petertodd?
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14:04 < BlueMatt> its useful in some contracts that take the form OP_IF everyone_signs OP_ELSE something_is_published_in_this_output (maybe just the fact that this output exists) <wait until N after this is published OP_ENDIF
14:06 < BlueMatt> ehhh, I'll move to -dev, its not very wizard-y
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15:56 < kanzure> factom stuff http://sourceforge.net/p/bitcoin/mailman/message/33603951/
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15:57 < moa1> "The largest verified computation (SETI@home) uses verification by replication." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Verifiable_computing
15:57 < moa1> you could argue bitcoin is a larger set of verified computations?
15:58 < phantomcircuit> moa1, bitcoin is actually a fairly small amount of verified computation
15:59 < phantomcircuit> it is however far more secure than seti@home's replication model
15:59 < moa1> done by > 6000 nodes though
15:59 < kanzure> what's the right measurement for the "size" of a verification? number of bits ?
15:59 < phantomcircuit> (they dont worry too much about people faking work)
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15:59 < maaku> moa1: the amount of computation actually verified by bitcoin is small
16:00 < moa1> maaku: heh yes but ...
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16:03 < moa1> 6500 nodes verifying a small problem uses more computation resources than 2 nodes verifying a large problem
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16:13 < phantomcircuit> moa1, you're massively under estimating the volume of work that goes through seti@home...
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16:19 < phantomcircuit> petertodd, is it even possible to prove that you published something and that it's the only version without having censorship issues?
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16:28 < amiller_> phantomcircuit, sure it is, petertodd convinced me by telling me how
16:28 < phantomcircuit> amiller_, ha
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16:29 < phantomcircuit> amiller_, but how
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16:30 < phantomcircuit> his scheme with the encryption of the key?
16:30 < amiller_> give me a sec, its simpler, trying to reconstruct it from memory now
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16:33 < amiller_> okay got it in head-ram, gonna try explaining this, ive been trying to figure out how to unravel the idea, its really clever but a bit tricky to explain.
16:33 < amiller_> i'll try this way.... here's how you set it up.
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16:34 < amiller_> start by putting on the blockchain an ordinary transaction with a single output you can spend
16:34 < amiller_> there's nothing apparently special about this transaction, it looks just like all the others and isn't "linked" to you
16:36 < amiller_> now, publish a transaction containing a description of your gadget (how the description is constructed i'll describe later),
16:36 < amiller_> the idea is this description is the name of a "write once, but *later*"
16:37 < amiller_> you will *later* want to choose that message, and prove to someone that you set it to one particular value and can't equivocate by convincing two different people you set it two different ways
16:37 < amiller_> okay i'm a little bogged down already by trying to describe the *goal* but since you brought it up, i think you get it, so ill switch to how it works.
16:38 < amiller_> this "description" is actually a commitment (a hash plus some randomness) of the nondescript transaction output we prepared earlier.
16:39 < amiller_> ah okay here's where the encryptoin comes in, the commitment is to a) that transaction output, and to b) a symmetric encryption key
16:39 < amiller_> okay so
16:40 < amiller_> you "write once" to that value by *spending* that output, and including an encryption of your message, under the symmetric key i mentioned, in some steganogrphic bits, like the transaction output pubkey hashes
16:41 < amiller_> this is the crux of the idea, you have already *committed* to the transaction output you are going to spend, but you haven't revealed any information about what it is yet
16:41 < phantomcircuit> amiller_, yeah i think that's what i was thinking of before
16:41 < amiller_> so you can actually do the spending of it and embed your message covertly.
16:41 < amiller_> okay
16:42 < amiller_> sorry, if i had remembered it required encryption i would have assumed you knew it when you mentioned that. oh well, i guess i got the practice explaining it i wanted. i think its a really great idea it took me a while to understand
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16:42 < phantomcircuit> that's not actually censorship proof but it is resistant
16:44 < phantomcircuit> since a miner/relay node that understands the protocol can clearly block the last step
16:44 < amiller_> no
16:44 < amiller_> which last step
16:44 < amiller_> its censorship-proof
16:44 < phantomcircuit> two transactions A and B
16:45 < amiller_> the miner can't tell which transactions are involved
16:45 < amiller_> this technique involves hiding data in perfectly ordinary transactions, there's really no way to tell
16:45 < amiller_> the output can be any output you can spend
16:45 < phantomcircuit> sure they can, the set of possible candidates is small enough to brute force
16:45 < amiller_> wat no its not
16:45 < amiller_> oh, i think you misunderstood when i said "commitment"
16:45 < amiller_> not just the hash, but a hash plus some randomness
16:46 < amiller_> you can't just try all the transactions and see which one the hash matches, until i reveal the randomness (which i can do privately to anyone i want to give my unequivocable message to)
16:46 < amiller_> oh, actually encryption isn't required at all.
16:46 < phantomcircuit> amiller_, so the randomness is basically a key
16:47 < phantomcircuit> and i can publish multiple versions of the same thing only not using the same transaction output
16:47 < amiller_> yes
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16:48 < phantomcircuit> i feel like there's an issue with that but i cant quite put my finger on it
16:48 < amiller_> there's not, i checked lol
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16:49 < phantomcircuit> it clearly basically solves asset tracking issues but only if the transaction output is tied to the asset
16:49 < phantomcircuit> oh wait
16:50 < phantomcircuit> i was going to say there's nothing stopping you from committing to the txo twice with different random values butt hen i realized derp
16:51 < amiller_> its less obvious to me how it clearly solves asset tracking, im still trying to figure that part out actually.
16:51 < phantomcircuit> amiller_, i dont see how you could both track an asset using transaction outputs and keep the first transactions output censorship proof
16:52 < amiller_> well you have to start somewhere
16:52 < phantomcircuit> amiller_, that ones easy, you generate the next spend transaction in advance and commit to it with the message you're making censorship resistant
16:52 < phantomcircuit> whoever controls that output controls the asset
16:52 < amiller_> okay then you're done, what else is there exactly
16:53 < phantomcircuit> im not sure you can actually make that work without revealing to the world that the next transaction output is going to be though
16:53 < phantomcircuit> no you can
16:53 < phantomcircuit> neat
16:54 < phantomcircuit> well sort of
16:54 < phantomcircuit> anybody who has ever known which outputs the asset corresponds to can censor transactions
16:54 < amiller_> no
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16:55 < amiller_> you can like, lazy load a chain of these things
16:55 < phantomcircuit> in that example they can because they would be able to identify the "next" output
16:55 < amiller_> use output #1 for your message, and #2 for the commitment to the next hidden-in-plain-sight transaction
16:55 < phantomcircuit> amiller_, that makes the protocol interactive and involves everybody whose ever owned the asset....
16:55 < amiller_> as long as you can keep putting nondescript transactions in the chain, you can link these together
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16:56 < amiller_> of course it's interactive but not prohibitively so? one transaction per... transaction
16:56 < phantomcircuit> the random values need to be published at each step to prevent the thing from being a huge nuisance
16:57 < phantomcircuit> oh and this would be horribly broken by even a small reorg
16:57 < phantomcircuit> heh
16:57 < amiller_> no it wouldn't
16:57 < amiller_> you wait for longer than a small reorg before revealing your randomness
16:57 < phantomcircuit> sure it would since you have to reveal the random value
16:57 < amiller_> this is a lot like guy fawkes signatures
16:57 < phantomcircuit> a reorg would make it censorable
16:58 < phantomcircuit> i guess you could commit to two outputs one for the message and one for the random value
16:58 < phantomcircuit> and then delay the random value disclosure for long enough that a reorg wouldn't break the system
16:58 < phantomcircuit> it's certainly not a general solution to the problem i described though :P
16:58 < amiller_> no you commit to one output, but you "use" that output in a transaction with two outputs
16:58 < phantomcircuit> there's a bunch of edge cases
16:59 < amiller_> i think all of your criticisms have been due to the proposed solution being hard to visualize
17:00 < phantomcircuit> maybe
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17:05 < phantomcircuit> amiller_, iirc he had a scheme that involved commitments to a future key or something too
17:06 < amiller_> that doesn't really seem necessary
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17:06 < amiller_> phantomcircuit, do you know any keywords id use to search for his prior explanations of this
17:06 < amiller_> i heard it from him through a private and equivocable channel :(
17:06 < phantomcircuit> proof of publication
17:07 < phantomcircuit> found his bitcoin-dev email
17:07 < phantomcircuit> [Bitcoin-development] Setting the record straight on Proof-of-Publication
17:08 < amiller_> jeez i read that and it made no sense there
17:08 < amiller_> i think i got pissed off about some other aspect of that message and replied about it
17:08 < phantomcircuit> "If these commitments are encrypted, each commitment C_i can also commit to the encryption key to be used for C_{i+1}"
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17:10 < petertodd> < amiller_> i heard it from him through a private and equivocable channel :( <- lolol
17:10 < petertodd> so I think you're making this too complex...
17:10  * nsh listens
17:10 < petertodd> (though I stopped reading when you said "encryption")
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17:10 < nsh> that is the wort part of crypto tbh
17:11 < nsh> *worst
17:11 < petertodd> first of all, none of this stuff needs to have anything publishe din the blockchain at all - what you're doing is making one-time seals
17:12 < amiller_> the encryption thing was a mistake :o
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17:14 < petertodd> here's the single-use-seal code: http://0bin.net/paste/vLDRrhx-ALufTR94#DmA7QRjxtKebJ66MJfbQTrVYPUKC1khfdpWT8pdbZpJ
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17:15 < petertodd> now, a globally unique mapping is basically to take that single-use-seal concept, and apply it to a merkle tree of some kind, e.g. a merbinner tree/binary prefix tree
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17:16 < petertodd> now I can take the hash of the *single-use-seal* at the top of that mapping, give it to Alice and Bob, and whatever I close that seal over (including subsequent seals!) is guaranteed to have global consensus
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17:17 < petertodd> of course, I could fail to give Alice one of the key:value pairs in that map... but I can't lie to her by giving her a different pair than what I gave Bob
17:18 < phantomcircuit> petertodd, forming a chain; but can anybody who has ever seen a piece of the chain identify all future pieces
17:18 < amiller_> no
17:18  * amiller_ goes to make some kind of illustration
17:18 < phantomcircuit> because you dont give them the seal
17:18 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: no! in the chain is mearly commitments to what txout will be spent, not the txout itself
17:18 < petertodd> *merely
17:19 < phantomcircuit> petertodd, yeah i get that
17:19 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: now there is a sublety there, which is I can't prove to Alice that I haven't added something to the mapping without making it possible for her to tell miners what txout to censor, but if I don't need to prove to here that a given prefix *isn't* mapped there's no censorship risk
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17:20 < amiller_> petertodd, i think you could do that kind of proof using zero-knowledge proofs
17:21 < amiller_> prove that you know an opening of the commitment and it isn't the hash of any known transaction
17:21 < petertodd> amiller_: oh sure, but but I'm only an earthling
17:21 < phantomcircuit> :P
17:21 < amiller_> snarks are for chumps im into harder shit now anyway
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17:22 < phantomcircuit> petertodd, that was my point, there's a set of people who know what is going to happen and they can get stuff censored
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17:22 < phantomcircuit> the set can be anything from you to everybody
17:23 < amiller_> phantomcircuit, thats ridiculous
17:23 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: sure, but self-censorship isn't all that interesting
17:23 < amiller_> that's like saying Alice can censor herself by turning off her computer
17:24 < phantomcircuit> amiller_, maybe alice is a jerk and wants to watch the world burn
17:25 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: *her world burn
17:27 < amiller_> alice could have stayed quiet too
17:27 < petertodd> anyay, IMO the interesting thing about this is how it makes factom looks stupidly complex in comparison...
17:29 < petertodd> it's also nicely generic, and can be applied to any tech that gives you single use seals (e.g. trusted oracles)
17:30 < amiller_> i didn't realize there was so much concern about miner censorship of that sort of thing but i guess it makes sense
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17:31 < petertodd> well part of the thing is by building systems where that's impossible we discourage people from even thinking about it
17:31 < amiller_> yeah agreed, makes sense
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17:32 < petertodd> also, relying on a single use seal abstraction rather than the underlying proof-of-publication abstraction is better for cases where you have the indexes available... (shoot, I gotta finish off my reply to your email!)
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--- Log closed Tue Mar 17 00:00:24 2015