--- Log opened Sun Jun 21 00:00:47 2015 00:05 -!- davi [~davi@gnu/davi] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 00:08 -!- _biO__ [~biO_@ip-37-24-195-112.hsi14.unitymediagroup.de] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 00:08 -!- _biO_ [~biO_@80.156.183.43] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 00:09 -!- _biO_ [~biO_@ip-37-24-195-112.hsi14.unitymediagroup.de] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 00:26 -!- bramc [~bram@99-75-88-206.lightspeed.sntcca.sbcglobal.net] has quit [Quit: This computer has gone to sleep] 00:27 -!- helo_ is now known as helo 00:28 -!- Guest60314 [~NSA@193.138.219.233] has quit [Ping timeout: 276 seconds] 00:29 -!- nullbyte [NSA@gateway/vpn/mullvad/x-nlrxngevgvzomxej] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 00:40 -!- Mably [~Mably@unaffiliated/mably] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 00:45 < nsh> wait 00:48 < nsh> never mind 01:03 -!- andy-logbot [~bitcoin--@wpsoftware.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 01:03 * andy-logbot is logging 01:04 -!- sparetire_ [~sparetire@unaffiliated/sparetire] has 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02:45 -!- gill3s [~gill3s@pat35-3-82-245-143-153.fbx.proxad.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 02:46 -!- Adlai [~Adlai@unaffiliated/adlai] has quit [Quit: Insufficient entropy for original quit message] 02:46 -!- Tiraspol [~Tiraspol3@unaffiliated/tiraspol] has quit [Ping timeout: 265 seconds] 02:58 -!- shesek [~shesek@IGLD-84-228-3-15.inter.net.il] has quit [Ping timeout: 256 seconds] 03:02 -!- LeMiner2 is now known as LeMiner 03:02 -!- LeMiner [LeMiner@5ED1AFBF.cm-7-2c.dynamic.ziggo.nl] has quit [Changing host] 03:02 -!- LeMiner [LeMiner@unaffiliated/leminer] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 03:07 -!- AaronvanW [~ewout@unaffiliated/aaronvanw] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 03:15 -!- shesek [~shesek@IGLD-84-228-3-15.inter.net.il] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 03:19 -!- Mably [~Mably@unaffiliated/mably] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 03:26 -!- jaromil_ is now known as jaromil 03:28 < CodeShark> bramc, that author keeps on saying that O(2^(log^a n)) is more general than poly(n)...but aren't they essentially the same thing? 03:28 < CodeShark> oh, I guess he's gone :) 03:29 < CodeShark> I guess that question goes out to anyone else who might know an answer: how is O(2^(log^a n)) more general than O(a^n) ? 03:29 < CodeShark> err, I mean O(n^a) 03:31 < CodeShark> oh, nm :p 03:44 -!- wump is now known as wumpus 03:49 < sipa_> what is log^a 03:49 < sipa_> (log n)^a ? 03:53 -!- optimator [~optimator@unaffiliated/optimator] has quit [Read error: Connection reset by peer] 03:53 -!- optimator [~optimator@unaffiliated/optimator] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 03:54 -!- adam3us [~Adium@c3-219.i07-1.onvol.net] has quit [Quit: Leaving.] 03:54 -!- adam3us [~Adium@c3-219.i07-1.onvol.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 03:56 -!- davi [~davi@gnu/davi] has quit [Ping timeout: 246 seconds] 04:00 -!- wallet42 [~wallet42@85.100.40.253] has quit [Quit: Leaving.] 04:01 -!- Aquentin [~Aquentin@unaffiliated/aquentin] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 04:03 -!- darwin__ [~darwin@88-103-255-166.jes.cz] has quit 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Incorporating the property of untraceability of payments into off-line electronic cash systems has turned out to be no easy matter. Two key concepts have been proposed in order to attain the same level of security against double-spending as can be trivially attained in systems with full traceability of payments. The first of these, one-show blind signatures, ensures traceability of double-spenders after the fact. The realizations of this conce 11:01 < nsh> pt that have been proposed unfortunately require either a great sacrifice in efficiency or seem to have questionable security, if not both. The second concept, wallets with observers, guarantees prior restraint of double-spending, while still offering traceability of double-spenders after the fact in case tamper-resistance is compromised. No realization of this concept has yet been proposed in literature, which is a serious problem. It seems tha 11:01 < nsh> t the known cash systems cannot be extended to this important setting without significantly worsening ... 11:01 < nsh> -- 11:01 -!- erasmospunk [~erasmospu@46-198-61-117.adsl.cyta.gr] has quit [Read error: Connection reset by peer] 11:04 < kanzure> nsh: only these, 11:04 < kanzure> http://diyhpl.us/~bryan/papers2/bitcoin/Untraceable%20Digital%20Cash,%20Information%20Markets,%20and%20BlackNet.html 11:04 < kanzure> http://diyhpl.us/~bryan/papers2/bitcoin/Untraceable%20electronic%20cash.pdf 11:05 < nsh> ty 11:06 < nsh> isis[?] / someone has it in this library: https://github.com/isislovecruft/library/tree/master/cryptography%20%26%20mathematics/cryptocurrencies 11:06 < nsh> 'Add Brands' canonic e-cash design paper.' 11:07 < nsh> but no-one else seems to have cited it in relation to bitcoin, afaict 11:07 < nsh> belay that, https://scholar.google.co.uk/scholar?q=bitcoin&btnG=&hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C5&sciodt=0%2C5&cites=6825807548228841601&scipsc=1 11:08 < nsh> this would be a nice review paper, were it not being hoarded by science-haters springer: http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-19713-5_36 11:09 -!- erasmospunk [~erasmospu@lw.serv98.quikefall.com] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 11:10 < kanzure> .title http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-19713-5_36 11:10 < yoleaux> Non-conventional Digital Signatures and Their Implementations—A Review - Springer 11:18 -!- jmcn_ [~jamie@2.24.158.62] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 11:19 -!- rusty2 [~rusty@pdpc/supporter/bronze/rusty] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 11:20 -!- jmcn [~jamie@2.24.158.106] has quit [Ping timeout: 276 seconds] 11:21 -!- mjerr [~mjerr@p578EAB34.dip0.t-ipconnect.de] has quit [Ping timeout: 256 seconds] 11:27 < akrmn> sipa: For the subchains thing, I've been thinking more about it and I have some ideas to resolve your concerns, but I need more time to fully think about it. Also, gmaxwell said that extension blocks can be argued to be strictly greater than increasing the blocksize. Also, there's the miner decentralization benefits (even Peter Todd agrees). So I think there are some important applications. Give me a week, maybe I'll have more ideas. 11:27 < akrmn> sipa: In the meantime, I would like to know what your vision is for scaling Bitcoin and how will it address censorship resistance and miner decentralization? 11:27 -!- afk11 [~thomas@46.7.4.219] has quit [Ping timeout: 248 seconds] 11:27 -!- antanst [~Adium@adsl-125.46.190.29.tellas.gr] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 11:34 -!- tcrypt [~tylersmit@c-67-169-17-114.hsd1.ca.comcast.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 11:35 -!- bramc [~bram@99-75-88-206.lightspeed.sntcca.sbcglobal.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 11:40 -!- tcrypt [~tylersmit@c-67-169-17-114.hsd1.ca.comcast.net] has quit [] 11:42 -!- afk11 [~thomas@46.7.4.219] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 11:42 -!- priidu [~priidu@unaffiliated/priidu] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 11:49 -!- hashtag_ [~hashtag@cpe-69-23-213-3.ma.res.rr.com] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 11:51 -!- Guyver2 [~Guyver2@guyver2.xs4all.nl] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 11:53 -!- davi [~davi@gnu/davi] has joined 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[~mike@84-75-197-78.dclient.hispeed.ch] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 12:59 -!- jaekwon [~jae@2601:645:c001:263a:691d:3e08:1eb8:d14b] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 13:03 -!- darwin__ [~darwin@88-103-255-166.jes.cz] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 13:05 -!- sparetire_ [~sparetire@unaffiliated/sparetire] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 13:06 -!- MoALTz [~no@78.11.179.104] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 13:10 -!- jtimon [~quassel@69.29.134.37.dynamic.jazztel.es] has quit [Ping timeout: 252 seconds] 13:10 -!- MoALTz__ [~no@78.11.179.104] has quit [Ping timeout: 256 seconds] 13:11 -!- DougieBot5000_ is now known as DougieBot5000 13:13 < warren> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev Everyone please subscribe to the new list, it opens after 9pm UTC. 13:13 -!- droark [~droark@209-6-53-207.c3-0.smr-ubr1.sbo-smr.ma.cable.rcn.com] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 13:17 < isis> that is my library, yes. 13:19 < isis> brands' work can sometimes be hard to obtain copies of, not to mention that brands' wasn't shy about patenting every whim that floated through his head. 13:20 -!- shesek [~shesek@IGLD-84-228-3-15.inter.net.il] has quit [Ping timeout: 265 seconds] 13:21 -!- www [~v3@f052166043.adsl.alicedsl.de] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 13:22 * nsh nods 13:24 -!- erasmospunk [~erasmospu@lw.serv98.quikefall.com] has quit [Ping timeout: 256 seconds] 13:24 -!- erasmosp_ [~erasmospu@179.43.156.130] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 13:26 -!- Burrito [~Burrito@unaffiliated/burrito] has quit [Quit: gonna try restarting hexchat] 13:26 -!- Burrito [~Burrito@unaffiliated/burrito] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 13:31 -!- wallet42 [~wallet42@78.164.239.225] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 13:31 -!- temujin [~temujin@75.133.112.155] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 13:33 -!- wallet42 [~wallet42@78.164.239.225] has quit [Read error: Connection reset by peer] 13:34 -!- KFl6WxEUI1Zbp2 [~textual@c-73-189-234-152.hsd1.ca.comcast.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 13:35 -!- _biO_ 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ZZZzzz…] 15:52 -!- hearn [~mike@84-75-197-78.dclient.hispeed.ch] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 15:53 -!- KFl6WxEUI1Zbp2 [~textual@c-73-189-234-152.hsd1.ca.comcast.net] has quit [Quit: My Mac has gone to sleep. ZZZzzz…] 15:56 -!- KFl6WxEUI1Zbp2 [~textual@c-73-189-234-152.hsd1.ca.comcast.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 16:03 < phantomcircuit> warren, can you send out a test message so people will know that they're subscribed to the correct list? 16:03 < sipa> he's sent a bunch of test mails 16:03 < sipa> others too 16:04 < phantomcircuit> guess im not subscribed correctly.. 16:06 -!- adam3us1 [~Adium@195.138.228.37] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 16:06 -!- adam3us [~Adium@c3-219.i07-1.onvol.net] has quit [Ping timeout: 264 seconds] 16:07 -!- adam3us1 [~Adium@195.138.228.37] has quit [Read error: Connection reset by peer] 16:07 -!- adam3us [~Adium@195.138.228.37] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 16:10 < kanzure> git history and light cones http://yarchive.net/comp/linux/git_bisect.html 16:12 < nsh> whoever maintains mailman ironically seems to keep not getting the memo about it no longer being 1992 and asking for passwords so you can send them back in plaintext is maybe not a great idea 16:12 < kanzure> it's not really a password it's more like a textbox where you type random insults 16:13 < nsh> hehe 16:13 < nsh> [random insults which are stored against your permanent record in XKEYSTORE until the heat death of Utah] 16:13 -!- prodatalab [~prodatala@2602:306:ceef:a750:2cc4:ac9b:5a93:715d] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 16:15 -!- rusty2 [~rusty@pdpc/supporter/bronze/rusty] has left #bitcoin-wizards [] 16:17 -!- hearn [~mike@84-75-197-78.dclient.hispeed.ch] has quit [Read error: Connection reset by peer] 16:18 -!- hearn [~mike@84-75-197-78.dclient.hispeed.ch] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 16:18 -!- jmcn_ [~jamie@2.24.158.30] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 16:21 -!- jmcn [~jamie@2.24.158.68] has quit [Ping timeout: 276 seconds] 16:23 -!- chmod755 [~chmod755@unaffiliated/chmod755] has quit [Quit: Leaving] 16:26 < phantomcircuit> nsh, given utah heat death is continuously imminent 16:27 * nsh smiles 16:28 < nsh> i think they figured out how to stop everything turning into fire 16:28 < nsh> for the moment, anyway 16:34 -!- darwin_ [~darwin@88-103-255-166.jes.cz] has quit [] 16:38 -!- jtimon [~quassel@69.29.134.37.dynamic.jazztel.es] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 16:42 -!- hearn [~mike@84-75-197-78.dclient.hispeed.ch] has quit [Quit: My MacBook Pro has gone to sleep. ZZZzzz…] 16:46 < bramc> After thinking about it some more, I think that practically any attempt to query what the transaction rate on recent blocks were is fraught with danger 16:47 < bramc> Miners can artificially bump up that value with self-payments, which can massively inflate the price if wallets follow it 16:48 < bramc> The only really safe thing is for a wallet to make their first payment by rising up from a small starting value, then each subsequent payment take their last successful value and use some fraction of that as a starting point 16:51 < nsh> why would wallets want to use a measure of transaction volume in making decisions in any case? missed something... 16:51 < nsh> oh, for fee estimation 16:51 < nsh> ? 16:54 -!- dEBRUYNE [~dEBRUYNE@239-196-ftth.onsbrabantnet.nl] has quit [Ping timeout: 244 seconds] 16:55 < leakypat> bramc doesn't that mean waiting to see if it got confirmed before raising the fee? 16:55 < bramc> leakypat, Yeah you raise the fee for each minted block which it didn't get accepted to 16:56 < bramc> nsh, Yeah I'm talking about fee estimation 16:56 * nsh nods 16:56 < leakypat> Right, but that could be hours waiting around and bumping fees 16:56 < nsh> is it not possible to offer variable fee and let miners undercut each other? 16:57 < nsh> not easily at present, i think 16:58 < nsh> some way to recoup a percentage of a high fee offer to ensure rapid confirmation subsequent to mining would be ideal i guess 16:59 < nsh> or could add fee gossip to the network protocol but that would probably be gamed too 17:09 -!- Giszmo [~leo@pc-185-201-214-201.cm.vtr.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 17:12 < bramc> leakypat, That depends on where you start and how quickly you raise 17:13 < bramc> If you start at 1/10 the fee you'll need, and raise by an average of 10% every round, then it will take, about 3 hours 17:15 -!- n0n0_ [~n0n0___@x5f77b37e.dyn.telefonica.de] has quit [Ping timeout: 246 seconds] 17:16 -!- zooko [~user@2601:281:8101:3c71:40d1:c44c:ba43:df6b] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 17:17 -!- KFl6WxEUI1Zbp2 [~textual@c-73-189-234-152.hsd1.ca.comcast.net] has quit [Quit: My Mac has gone to sleep. ZZZzzz…] 17:25 < CodeShark> it would be nice to specify the range and increment up front...and then have the miner prove they got you the best price they could given the market...but miners could always cheat by inserting high fee transactions in their blocks 17:25 < bramc> CodeShark, Yes, exactly 17:26 < CodeShark> however...by doing this they crowd out their own blocks 17:26 < CodeShark> so there must be some equilibrium 17:27 < CodeShark> given a sufficiently small range and a sufficiently large volume, miners would rather be honest than cheat 17:27 -!- priidu [~priidu@unaffiliated/priidu] has quit [Ping timeout: 264 seconds] 17:28 < bramc> It's monopoly pricing if they set their own prices, if they game the system by making fake rates in earlier blocks to raise the amounts in later blocks then the amounts transaction rates could go up to based on fraud are unlmited 17:28 -!- JackH [~Jack@host-80-43-142-154.as13285.net] has quit [Ping timeout: 244 seconds] 17:29 < CodeShark> they could only really set their own prices by forming a cartel, though - miners can already choose to block transactions at will 17:30 < bramc> Individual mining pools are big enough to pull it off 17:30 < CodeShark> so I think the conclusion is that any fee estimation must also use unconfirmed propagated transactions (mempool) 17:30 < bramc> If a single block with crazy prices were to cause prices to remain sky high for hours, then lots of pools are big enough to incentivize them to accept 17:31 < bramc> That would help a bit, but it's much safer to only trust your own local experience 17:31 < CodeShark> by own local experience you mean just your own attempts to send? 17:32 < bramc> Yeah 17:32 < CodeShark> I suppose you could "probe" the state of the network by sending a bunch of transactions with different fees and seeing when they confirm 17:33 < CodeShark> but that seems rather expensive...and still isn't particularly fast 17:33 < bramc> There's no point in probing until you have a payment you actually want to send 17:33 < CodeShark> but you might not want the real transaction to take hours 17:33 < CodeShark> so you probe a few hours before you'll make the real transaction 17:34 < CodeShark> but you still miss things like daily cycles and other high frequency phenomena 17:34 < bramc> No, you remember your last transaction which worked and start at half that rate 17:35 < bramc> Actually I did my math wrong - that one should be four hours 17:35 < CodeShark> well, three or four hours...still WAY too long 17:35 < bramc> and It's bad to increase by a random amount every time, if you're going to increase by 10% then your first value should be increased by a random amount in the range between 0 and 10%, and the following ones should go up by 10% exactly 17:36 < bramc> too long for what? 17:36 < CodeShark> to send a transaction 17:36 < bramc> You're free to make it go faster by doubling your fee every time 17:36 < bramc> But that costs more, and is likely to hit bad parts of the daily cycle (taking a while might have inherent advantages) 17:37 < CodeShark> unless you check the mempool, there's no data for you until the next block...which not only is relatively infrequent...it has large variance 17:37 -!- jtimon [~quassel@69.29.134.37.dynamic.jazztel.es] has quit [Ping timeout: 244 seconds] 17:37 < CodeShark> so I think any practical approach will have to check the mempool 17:37 < leakypat> bramc: I'm trying to picture the scenario, I guess it is systems bidding to settle large transactions? 17:38 < bramc> bitcoin payments are not what you call fast. If you want fast transactions, you use micropayment channels 17:39 < bramc> leakypat, In the long run it's likely to be that most transactions are large 17:39 < CodeShark> bramc: I think most users would prefer to pay a little extra but have more certainty in this - and if the cost for this is far more we have a serious problem 17:39 < leakypat> I agree with you on this stuff, yes 17:39 < bramc> Or maybe there will be small transactions, but they'll get settled at midnight PST when fees are a tenth what they are at other times 17:40 < leakypat> So who's might be a lightning channel or centralized micropayment system bidding to settle their payments 17:40 < leakypat> They just want the cheapest fee they can get and require settlement within x hours 17:41 < bramc> CodeShark, It isn't far more. If you compare doubling versus going up by 10% every time, the former will pay an average of an extra of 50% on the transaction fee 17:41 < bramc> er, 45% I mean, but due to noise it may be worse 17:41 < bramc> leakypat, micropayment channels can completely short circuit all of this stuff once their initial deposits are put down 17:42 < leakypat> The channels have to close to the blockchain at some point right? 17:42 < bramc> leakypat, When their net is settled out, yes 17:42 < leakypat> Or have the possibility to do so 17:42 < leakypat> Yes, that's what I was imagining 17:43 < sl01> is there any issue using centralized service(s) that provide APIs to wallet to get fee estimate information? 17:43 < sl01> and those services can use whaterver witchcraft they want to provide you best guess information on fee and conf times 17:43 < bramc> So for example I put down $100 because I intend to spend money. That's one transaction up front, then I spend no transaction fees until I've either sent a total of net $100 (people can send me money as well) or I want to take my money back out 17:43 -!- c0rw|afk is now known as c0rw|zZz 17:44 < bramc> sl01, We're discussing the mechanics of that 17:44 < leakypat> It will be on the miners interests to have a transparent fee market 17:44 < sl01> bramc: it seems more like you guys were discussing how a wallet can do this completely automated with no human interaction, aka not a "service" 17:44 < leakypat> Although , Hmm, there is no guarantee who is going to mine which block ... Interesting 17:45 < bramc> sl01, Well 'no requests' is a simple to implement API :-) 17:45 < sl01> which makes the problem much harder 17:45 < leakypat> So users aren't direct customers in that sense 17:45 < sl01> thats why i was just wondering if it might become 100x easier if you just "rely on a service" 17:45 < CodeShark> everything is a lot easier if you just "rely on a service" 17:45 < CodeShark> the challenge is how not to 17:45 < bramc> sl01, Not really harder, if you follow the scheme I suggested then there isn't much worry about you getting fleeced by whoever you made a request to lieing about how high fees are right now 17:46 < sl01> right, and for some things in bitcoin you dont want to, but this seems like the sort of thing its ok to 17:46 -!- Aquentin [~Aquentin@unaffiliated/aquentin] has quit [Ping timeout: 252 seconds] 17:46 < bramc> sl01, Also prices are a bit dynamic. Even if a service is in principle good for one peer, it can get stuck in a feedback loop if everybody uses it 17:47 < sl01> but it seems like a service has a much better chance of giving dynamic/contextual fee estimates than some code built into clients 17:48 < bramc> sl01, Eh... sort of. It can possibly come up with more accurate amounts faster. 17:48 < bramc> sl01, But you'll always be able to get payments sent with lower transaction fees if you're willing to wait longer 17:48 < bramc> Possibly vasty different. It wouldn't surprise me to get a daily cycle of fees with swings of 10x 17:48 < CodeShark> I think we need to consider these as somewhat separate use cases 17:49 < CodeShark> if you want to optimize the fee as much as possible, that's one use case - if you want relatively predictable rates, that's another 17:49 < CodeShark> there' 17:50 < CodeShark> there could even be a market for "fee market makers" :p 17:51 < sl01> i mean big wallet sites like coinbase will likely do this themselves already without anyone asking them to, and probably publish their current fee estimate / conf time tradeoff or whatever you want to call it 17:51 < bramc> You can't have particularly steady rates if everybody wants their transactions to go through fast. The day/night cycle will really hit you 17:51 < bramc> Maybe smart wallets could recombine their dust in the middle of the night. 17:51 -!- adam3us1 [~Adium@195.138.228.37] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 17:52 -!- adam3us [~Adium@195.138.228.37] has quit [Read error: Connection reset by peer] 17:53 -!- d1ggy_ [~d1ggy@dslb-178-003-120-184.178.003.pools.vodafone-ip.de] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 17:53 < CodeShark> the solution to leakypat's observation that users aren't direct consumers of miners is probably some sort of system with fee market makers 17:55 < CodeShark> hmm - it's tricky :) 17:56 < CodeShark> not sure I like the idea of entities having mining contracts on behalf of clients 17:56 < bramc> I'm proposing straight escalator as a starting point. It should be the beginning. 17:57 -!- d1ggy [~d1ggy@dslb-092-077-242-026.092.077.pools.vodafone-ip.de] has quit [Ping timeout: 255 seconds] 17:57 -!- belcher [~belcher-s@unaffiliated/belcher] has quit [Quit: Leaving] 17:59 < CodeShark> so concretely, how does this work? you send a transaction...then wait for the next block. if your transaction was included, wonderful. if not, increase by x% and try again and wait until the next block? 17:59 -!- Quanttek [~quassel@ip1f10af17.dynamic.kabel-deutschland.de] has quit [Ping timeout: 272 seconds] 18:00 < bramc> Yes that's the idea. For the first payment you ever make you start at a very low value and wait. For later payments you start at, say, half the transaction fee you paid last time. 18:00 < bramc> You take your starting amount, increase it by a random amount in the range 0-10%, that's the first amount you use. Then each block you don't get committed to after that you raise by 10% 18:01 < bramc> This is a very conservative approach which is optimizing for low fees over time, although its amounts of time aren't crazy 18:01 < CodeShark> with a fee market like this, accepting zero confirmation transactions becomes even more dangerous because no malicious intent is required from the buyer...they might just set the fee too low and it never makes it in 18:02 < nsh> apropos of nothing, i wonder if using coin-colouring you could allow groups of people or orgs to create a scarce enough asset that they can make practical use of deflation by burn 18:02 < sl01> do wallets need a new anti dos for this? can someone flood the network with a single tx by repeatedly sending it over and over against incrementing the fee by 1 satoshi each time? 18:02 < bramc> sl01, petertodd's code has a minimum increment 18:02 < sl01> ah cool, didnt see that 18:03 < bramc> Although there is an interesting question of how escalator might interact with the minimum increment, which I think is rather large right now 18:03 < nsh> (because by selectively destroying some combination of assets over another, you can effect relatively-arbitrary implicit one-to-many transactions amongst the scarce asset basket holders) 18:03 < bramc> One could reasonably argue that the minimum increment should be a percentage 18:04 < bramc> CodeShark, zeroconf is such a profoundly busted concept that it isn't worth worrying about. I need to write up a post on how to fleece fools who accept zeroconf 18:04 < CodeShark> yes, please do that 18:04 < CodeShark> I really wish people would stop claiming that we need to make Bitcoin integration possible for even idiots 18:05 < ggreer> oh, zero confirmations. for a second I thought you talking about zero configuration networking 18:06 < bramc> CodeShark, That will probably be the next one I post after the one I've already got written, no cookie for guessing what it's about. 18:06 < CodeShark> Bitcoin is based on a particular security model - it is what it is - if you make any assumptions beyond those you better know what you're doing...and have a good risk model. If not, you probably shouldn't be writing financial applications 18:08 < CodeShark> in infosec, "I've never gotten hacked before so it's probably OK to continue doing" is how many downfalls begin :) 18:08 < bramc> Yes, I for one had an unnecessarily negative view of bitcoin initially because I'd read people talking about it and they were using zeroconf and I had the impression that that was how it worked. 18:10 < CodeShark> there are certain use cases for zero conf that could have acceptable levels of risk - but I don't think that very many people accepting zero conf transactions even know what a risk model is 18:12 < CodeShark> and encouraging people to accept them just to "boost adoption" is folly 18:12 < CodeShark> might as well encourage people to use shitty passwords to encourage more "online banking" 18:15 < CodeShark> I don't even understand why this would be controversial 18:15 < CodeShark> other than complete myopia 18:16 < bramc> It isn't very controversial in this crowd, except for two people, you'd have to ask them why they like it 18:20 < jgarzik> c.f. the mailing list to which I responded 18:20 < leakypat> Bitcoin has been sold as send money anywhere in the world instantly for free 18:20 < jgarzik> plenty of business cases where zero conf works just fine -- it's in the realm of business risk 18:20 < jgarzik> physically shipping goods - just fine to initiate order @ 0-conf 18:20 < jgarzik> it doesn't go out the door until confirmed. order processing occurs in parallel with confirmations 18:20 < jgarzik> ditto subscriptions - the good can be revoked 18:21 < CodeShark> agree, jgarzik. point is the business risk needs to be properly assessed...and we shouldn't be encouraging any acceptance of zero confirmation transactions without these things being thought out 18:21 < CodeShark> thoroughly 18:21 < petertodd> jgarzik: it'd really help this discussion if for those cases you said you weren't relying on zeroconf 18:21 < petertodd> jgarzik: I'm finding people thinking that zeroconf means someone other than the sender can cancel the tx 18:23 < CodeShark> basically, if you choose to accept unconfirmed transactions you can no longer rely on bitcoin's security model at all 18:23 < CodeShark> so you need to create another security model 18:23 < jgarzik> correct 18:23 -!- MrTratta [~MrTratta@2-228-102-98.ip191.fastwebnet.it] has quit [Read error: Connection timed out] 18:23 < jgarzik> zero conf = zero security, by default 18:23 < jgarzik> It does not however mean zero security holistically, when including business risk and business case 18:24 -!- MrTratta [~MrTratta@2-228-102-98.ip191.fastwebnet.it] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 18:24 < bramc> jgarzik, That isn't really zero conf, it's delaying the conf until later 18:24 < bramc> real zeroconf is letting you take money out of the ATM 18:24 < jgarzik> yep 18:25 < jgarzik> bramc, nevertheless, programmatically Some Things Happen at zero confirmations at legit merchants without introducing risk 18:25 < CodeShark> letting you take money out the ATM could still make sense with zero conf as long as the ATM has a deposit large enough to cover its losses...or some form of collateral...or a way of pressing charges...etc...but NONE of these rely on ANY of bitcoin's security 18:26 < jgarzik> correct 18:26 < leakypat> I suppose the question is, should the fact these external systems exists dictate how the Bitcoin protocol is developed? 18:26 < bramc> Also authorizing the customer to walk out of the store with the goods 18:26 < jgarzik> i.e. some businesses get ID and/or take pictures of their customers, which provides recourse and mitigate risk 18:26 < jgarzik> amusingly to address chargeback fraud primarily 18:27 < jgarzik> leakypat, dictate - no - however it is true that you cannot just nuke zero-conf without a What To Transition To plan 18:27 < jgarzik> ie. no mainstream wallet yet supports even 2-way payment channels 18:28 < bramc> jgarzik, Arguably it only matters for vendors of ATMs and payment processors who rely on it 18:28 < jgarzik> Just complaining or nuking does nothing to help users today 18:29 < jgarzik> bramc, CodeShark: FWIW I encourage people to write about zero conf and point out its low security - just do so with a holistic approach, noting there are layers of business security as well as bitcoin security that mitigate this decision. 18:30 < bramc> jgarzik, If a payment processor decides to use zeroconf and completely rely on non-bitcoin security measures for their actual security, then that's fine for them, credit cards do seem to work 18:31 < bramc> jgarzik, The points that zeroconf has no real security and what should be done about it are two separate things 18:31 < jgarzik> bramc, e.g. You seem to have missed the relevant mailing list discussion 18:31 < jgarzik> that CodeShark participated in 18:31 < petertodd> well, this is rehashing the usual... but the big risk with the "no sense making things worse" approach is that we stand a very real risk of services failing to improve on this situation, and instead adopting easier ways out like getting hashing power contracts, which in turn can lead to those contracts saying "reorg double-spend blocks out of the blockchain" 18:32 < petertodd> the only entitites who have any hope right now of getting anywhere near safe zeroconf acceptance are a few big payment processors - if more than a handful did this the network would collapse anyway because it's a sybil attack on the p2p layer 18:33 < bramc> I'm not on the mailing list 18:34 -!- fanquake [~fanquake@unaffiliated/fanquake] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 18:34 < CodeShark> it just moved today 18:34 < CodeShark> still not 100% it's all fully working yet...but we'll see :) 18:35 < CodeShark> I'd be happy to write more on this topic, jgarzik. I think people sometimes get too extreme on both sides 18:36 < bramc> I just looked up the mailing list and was going to ask why it's on sourceforge 18:39 < CodeShark> security isn't really about a few crypto algorithms, schemes, and protocols - these are merely tools. it's about managing risk. 18:40 < jgarzik> nod 18:41 < CodeShark> if you rely on someone else's security model, it's best no to stray too far from the assumptions underlying their design - and if you do, you better know what you're doing :) 18:41 < petertodd> CodeShark: ...and whats the best way to manage risk in Bitcoin? if you're a regulated entitiy, having legal contracts with hashing power is a good idea with little direct downside 18:42 < jgarzik> petertodd's favorite theoretical bug-a-boo 18:42 < CodeShark> heh 18:42 < CodeShark> well, it is a potentially serious problem 18:42 < petertodd> jgarzik: hang around bankers more often :) 18:43 < petertodd> jgarzik: and regulators 18:44 < petertodd> while the big visibility public regulatory efforts are mostly focused on endpoints right now, coming down the pipeline is efforts to regulate the network itself 18:46 < CodeShark> we already have far more efficient technology for these kinds of applications...and the entities here don't even need to worry about hashing power and PoW and stuff like that - lol 18:46 < CodeShark> why are they killing Bitcoin to do this? 18:46 < petertodd> CodeShark: enforcing AML/KYC - remember that these are the people who are happy to stop hawala if they can find a way 18:46 < bramc> Yeah, umm, bitcoin-backed credit cards aren't too exciting if they're just ordinary credit cards with bitcoin headaches added on 18:47 < petertodd> CodeShark: it's not about alternatives, is that from their perspective Bitcoin shouldn't exist in its current form (where their==regulators) 18:47 < CodeShark> if you're a regulated entity with contracts and all that, why use a trustless p2p protocol at all? 18:48 < petertodd> CodeShark: equally, for many of the regulated entities int he bitcoin space, a regulated Bitcoin is arguably a positive thing, as it makes life easier for them dealing with said regulators - the fact that once sent bitcoins can be resent to anyone is a major sticking point for many banks in their dealings with bitcoin companies 18:48 -!- zmanian [~zmanian@c-24-5-125-31.hsd1.ca.comcast.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 18:53 -!- Dr-G [~Dr-G@xd9ba10bb.dyn.telefonica.de] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 18:53 -!- Dr-G [~Dr-G@xd9ba10bb.dyn.telefonica.de] has quit [Changing host] 18:53 -!- Dr-G [~Dr-G@unaffiliated/dr-g] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 18:53 < CodeShark> Bitcoin RIP...2009-20?? 18:53 < petertodd> CodeShark: eventually the sun explodes and we all die - I'll make that prediction :P 18:53 < bramc> The next step after having a heavily regulated bitcoin is to dispense with mining and have a central database, then have law enforcement be able to make retroactive changes to it... 18:54 -!- Dr-G [~Dr-G@unaffiliated/dr-g] has quit [Read error: Connection reset by peer] 18:55 -!- Dr-G [~Dr-G@unaffiliated/dr-g] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 18:55 -!- Dr-G [~Dr-G@unaffiliated/dr-g] has quit [Read error: Connection reset by peer] 18:55 -!- Dr-G2 [~Dr-G@x4d08a7a4.dyn.telefonica.de] has quit [Ping timeout: 256 seconds] 18:55 < petertodd> bramc: ah, but look at it from the perspective of the regulators: the point is to keep bitcoin in this weird pseudo-useful state, such that no competitors are going to (easily) arise, because it's still useful, kinda 18:56 < petertodd> bramc: one of those things where you don't be too restrictive 18:56 -!- Dr-G [~Dr-G@unaffiliated/dr-g] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 18:57 < bramc> petertodd, it also doesn't take much of a conspiracy mindset to think that many of the wtf-inducing developer behaviors are happening because they're aligned with those regulatory interests 18:57 -!- Dr-G [~Dr-G@unaffiliated/dr-g] has quit [Read error: Connection reset by peer] 18:57 < petertodd> bramc: not at all - heck, last week I helped write a paper arguing against the crazy "one global blockchain for everything w/ AML/KYC" dreams people in this space are having 18:58 < petertodd> bramc: the blocksize issue *does* come up in these discussions 18:58 -!- Dr-G [~Dr-G@unaffiliated/dr-g] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 18:59 < petertodd> bramc: one of the arguments we used in that paper (and presentation) was talking about the dangerous data leak potentials of such schemes - the recent OPM hack was a very useful talking point there 18:59 < petertodd> bramc: (this was the conf/workshop: http://blockchainworkshops.org/) 19:00 < bramc> KYC is a ludicrously expensive program for the actual amount of law enforcement it results in 19:01 < petertodd> bramc: indeed 19:06 -!- moa [~kiwigb@opentransactions/dev/moa] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 19:08 -!- Burrito [~Burrito@unaffiliated/burrito] has quit [Quit: Leaving] 19:18 -!- jaekwon [~jae@2601:645:8001:f5c8:a4c7:ca9f:e92e:2b49] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 19:21 < bramc> jgarzik, The subtext for discussing zeroconf on here isn't so much whether zeroconf should be allowed by some vendors in some contexts, it's whether zeroconf is a good reason for holding up accepting transaction malleability 19:22 < bramc> err, I mean replace by fee, I guess that's the term of art for actually malleating transactions in practice 19:23 < bramc> malleating by changing the outputs I mean 19:24 < bramc> Arguably now that one major pool is accepting rbf the jig is up and everyone else will just follow 19:28 -!- erasmosp_ [~erasmospu@179.43.159.194] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 19:30 < leakypat> It's interesting, every Bitcoin transaction is see/do out in the wild doesn't wait for confirmation, but this is essential for most people to start using it, and the "instant" part of it has been sold heavily, not just by companies but also by bitcoin evangelists 19:31 < leakypat> In one sense a lot of companies / people are pushing adoption to the wrong use case 19:31 < jgarzik> bramc, FSS RBF, not full RBF 19:32 < moa> leakypat: only misinformed people were 'selling' bitcoin as instant 19:32 < jgarzik> bramc, https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/6176 19:32 < leakypat> moa: I know, but that's most people 19:33 < moa> or duplicitous maybe 19:33 < jgarzik> petertodd, FYI I'm meeting with Coinalytics... should be interesting 19:33 < jgarzik> petertodd, FYI I'm meeting with Coinalytics... should be interesting 19:33 * jgarzik kicks xchat 19:33 < petertodd> jgarzik: yeah, I know jonathan levin from coinalysis 19:34 < petertodd> jgarzik: or is there now a Coinalytics?! 19:34 -!- jgarzik [~jgarzik@unaffiliated/jgarzik] has quit [Quit: Leaving] 19:34 -!- jgarzik [~jgarzik@unaffiliated/jgarzik] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 19:35 < leakypat> How will layer 2 networks play out for these kind of companies I wonder 19:35 < leakypat> I'm still sketchy on the privacy of lightning etc. 19:35 -!- yossef [~androirc@114.121.154.91] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 19:35 < jgarzik> petertodd, http://coinalytics.co 19:35 < jgarzik> petertodd, they are doing something w/ AML too 19:35 < jgarzik> don't know what 19:36 < petertodd> jgarzik: god help us... purely on the basis of shit names :) 19:36 -!- yossef [~androirc@114.121.154.91] has left #bitcoin-wizards [] 19:37 < moa> ... and ye shall know them by there fruit 19:38 < bramc> leakypat, the privacy implications of lightning are complicated. It avoids broadcasting some information to the entire world, but gives more more detailed information to a few select parties. 19:38 < moa> hide in the weeds versus hide in the crowds 19:39 < leakypat> bramc eg. If I hop to user c via user b? User b will see my transactions 19:40 < petertodd> bramc: note how lightning is not unlike Tor in this respect when you think about it 19:40 < bramc> wait, isn't FSS policy of requiring all outputs to get an equal or greater amount backwards? You need for the fee to go up, and that requires some output be lower, unless you add a new input... 19:40 < bramc> petertodd, Yes you could in principle provide onion payment services through lightning 19:41 -!- yossef [~androirc@114.121.154.91] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 19:41 < bramc> leakypat, Yeah that's the idea 19:41 < leakypat> bramc: you add new inputs and outputs as required 19:41 < leakypat> As long as the original ones are still there 19:41 < petertodd> bramc: exactly! :) 19:41 < bramc> That makes FSS a disaster for increasing fees to make payments go through, because it requires transactions keep being made larger as fees go up 19:41 < petertodd> bramc: equally, hub-and-spoke can do privacy tech like chaum tokens pretty easily and obviously 19:42 < petertodd> bramc: yeah, that's kinda ugly 19:42 < leakypat> bramc: yes 19:43 < bramc> For fee increases you want the exact opposite, that outputs can only go down and no new outputs can be added 19:44 < leakypat> Yeah really you would just drop the value of your change output, but which one is the change? 19:44 < bramc> Maybe you want a heuristic that the last output is the 'change' output, and that's the only one which can change at all 19:44 < petertodd> leakypat: whichever one you want it to be ;) 19:44 < jgarzik> bramc, which sucks for privacy 19:44 < leakypat> s/really/ideally 19:46 < bramc> jgarzik, Fee increasing is not so hot for privacy in general, it's obvious that the reduced output is the one which is the change output 19:46 < bramc> jgarzik, And forcing a new input to be added is arguably even worse 19:47 -!- hashtagg_ [~hashtag@cpe-69-23-213-3.ma.res.rr.com] has quit [Ping timeout: 265 seconds] 19:47 < petertodd> bramc: yeah, yet another reason why estimating the fee correctly in the first place is ideal 19:48 < bramc> It's funny that a reasonable security argument can be made for seemingly opposite heuristics. If nothing can go down then nobody gets stiffed. If nothing can go up then there's no kickback. 19:49 < bramc> petertodd, I think trying to always estimate the fee correctly in the first place is a foolish goal. If there's a system for estimating fees based on previous fees, then it can end up estimating fees based only on its own outputs, which is a problem. 19:49 < bramc> I mean, it can wind up in bizarre and incorrect feedback loops. 19:50 < petertodd> bramc: indeed, which fss-rbf can help with, as it makes it much more reasonable to set your feedback loop to tend towards fees going down 19:50 < petertodd> bramc: making a bad estimate once in awhile isn't such a big deal 19:51 < bramc> petertodd, Thus far I haven't seen even a good argument for what the method of estimation should be, and I don't understand your point about fss-rbf, it seems to go for maximum pain on fee changes. 19:52 < petertodd> bramc: the point with fss-rbf is that it's possible to actually deploy in the current political environment :) heck, greenaddress said on list the other day that they'll look into how to do both simultaneously when raising fees 19:52 < petertodd> bramc: (f2pool implementing full-rbf was kinda surprising to me actually) 19:53 < bramc> didn't jgarzik just say that f2pool only implemented fss-rbf? 19:53 < jgarzik> bramc, they went full first, then backed down to fuss 19:53 < petertodd> bramc: part of my thinking re: my long post on the topic was that if they had made a mistake about what they did, I wanted to get out there as fast as possible to take the blame for it 19:54 * jgarzik kicks autocorrect 19:54 < jgarzik> bramc, they went full first, then backed down to fss 19:54 < petertodd> bramc: (they're chinese, so there can be language barriers and misunderstandings obviously) 19:54 < leakypat> So full rbf is what is required to do the fee adjustments in practice, otherwise you are adjusting transaction size and leaking privacy 19:54 < petertodd> bramc: right now I think they knew exactly what they were doing :) 19:54 < petertodd> leakypat: to be exact, the extra input is what is bad for privacy - you'll leak what your change output is 19:54 < jgarzik> leakypat, nothing about RBF is privacy enhancing... you leak privacy no matter what you do 19:55 < petertodd> leakypat: fss-rbf is worse than rbf, but they're both worse than guessing right in the first place 19:55 < jgarzik> RBF is an outlier action 19:55 < jgarzik> makes you stick out in the noise 19:55 < bramc> the big problem with fss-rbf is that you're wasting transaction space while increasing your fee 19:55 < petertodd> leakypat: though one good thing is that there are a whole bunch of other ways to use RBF - e.g. for paying additional people after the fact, and some of them are indistinguishable from each other. Equally, you can choose to spend a bit more in fees to complicate the anlysis. 19:56 < petertodd> bramc: did you see my careful analysis on the topic? I worked out exact numbers for full-rbf, fss-rbf, and cpfp methods of increasing fees 19:56 < bramc> petertodd, No I did not 19:57 < petertodd> bramc: http://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg07829.html http://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg07813.html 19:57 < petertodd> bramc: and also http://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg07868.html 19:57 < bramc> All this discussion is a good example of how you actually need to hit the transaction limit for things to actually get solved 19:57 < petertodd> bramc: which we've done! changetip is one such example 19:59 -!- KFl6WxEUI1Zbp2 [~textual@c-73-189-234-152.hsd1.ca.comcast.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 20:00 < bramc> petertodd, I don't see how changetip fixes anything btc-related other than just avoiding it completely 20:00 < petertodd> bramc: prior to changetip there were on-chain tipping services, where much of the tip was eaten up by fees 20:00 < petertodd> bramc: it might not be a pretty solution, but it very much is a solution 20:01 < petertodd> bramc: for a service like changetip where the average person might have $20 max deposited, there's just not much demand for security 20:01 * leakypat wonders if mining will end up with cartel style fee pricing 20:01 < petertodd> leakypat: explain? 20:01 < leakypat> They just come to a general agreement of what the fees should be and all play ball 20:02 < petertodd> leakypat: if they enforced that, they'd need to 51% attack other miners... 20:02 < bramc> leakypat, depending on how things set their fees there might be some of that, the idea with fee setting algorithms is to try to make it so that as long as some miners are breaking ranks people are okay 20:03 < petertodd> leakypat: note how jgarzik's miner vote proposal is not unlike a gentlemanly and safe way of negotiating such a cartel 20:03 < leakypat> petertodd: I don't understand the 51% attack thing..? 20:03 < bramc> petertodd, That isn't quite so simple. Depending on the algorithms used to set the prices, it's entirely plausible that even a minority miner could find it useful to throw in a lot of self-payments 20:03 -!- hashtagg_ [~hashtag@cpe-69-23-213-3.ma.res.rr.com] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 20:04 < petertodd> leakypat: if 75% of miners play ball, and the other 25% don't... then what? (esp. in an unlimited blocksize scenario) 20:04 < petertodd> bramc: you're probably not familiar with the sorrid history of gavin's fee estimator... :) 20:04 < jgarzik> petertodd, sorry, you continue to vastly oversimplify BIP 100 to the point of being inaccurate 20:04 < petertodd> bramc: this isn't something you can fully automate anyway - any automatic algorithm will have cases where the fee is unreasonable, and the human being sending the payment would probably just wait 20:05 < leakypat> petertodd: I see 20:05 < bramc> petertodd, I am not. From that comment it sounds like it's about as troubled as I'd expect. 20:06 < bramc> petertodd, I'd argue that you always want *some* fraction of all wallets to be doing at least some amount of escalator, or everything is busted 20:06 < petertodd> bramc: so version #1 of it estimated fees based on fees in blocks; version #2 estimated fees based on the mempool; the latter actually had an exploit where based on just a single high-fee tx it would estimate a ridiculously high fee and you could wind up with an empty wallet 20:06 < bramc> Really, even with fss, they'll be doing that, because anyone with any sense will let their old transaction wait a while to see if it goes through 20:07 -!- prodatalab [~prodatala@2602:306:ceef:a750:2cc4:ac9b:5a93:715d] has quit [Ping timeout: 248 seconds] 20:07 < petertodd> bramc: indeed. More importantly, in periods of high demand there are all kinds of ways to determine what fee might be reasonable - e.g. look on twitter 20:07 < petertodd> bramc: no need to let perfect be the enemy of better here - providing users a last ditch option to get their tx mined is already categorically better than giving them nothing at all 20:08 < bramc> petertodd, I've foreseen those problems and didn't even have to code them up to realize it :-P 20:09 < petertodd> bramc: now from a "-wizards" point of view, fee estimation and rbf has an interesting issue that it's very hard to come up with a reasonable way to know if you're being sybil attacked... but IMO a reasonable answer is to be very non-wizardly and rely on central servers for version #0 of it :) 20:09 < bramc> petertodd, I wouldn't say that the escalator approach is 'perfect', but it's conservative, in that it always works and always behaves reasonably, albeit at the expense of transaction speed 20:10 < bramc> Unfortunately it doesn't work at all in fss-rbf world 20:11 < petertodd> bramc: well, a reasonable approach also is if I'm sending $5,000 I might just throw in another $1 because I don't really care :) 20:11 -!- hashtagg_ [~hashtag@cpe-69-23-213-3.ma.res.rr.com] has quit [Ping timeout: 248 seconds] 20:12 < bramc> Yes that's fine although presumably a large number of transactions are on the edge 20:12 < petertodd> bramc: meanwhile it took a long time before, say, Aschildbach's android wallet even let you see fees *at all* - and it's still just a "econ" "normal" "priority" thing IIRC :( 20:12 < bramc> And also I'm guessing the daily cycle will be quite prominent 20:13 < bramc> petertodd, *insert rant about how the ethos of bitcoin is that broken software will be weeded out and die here* 20:13 < petertodd> keep in mind that things like securing financial records may help dampen out some of those cycles by providing more non-time-sensitive usecases 20:14 < bramc> Presumably the not-time-sensitive applications will need different fee setting algorithms 20:14 < petertodd> equally, many of those use-cases can have very strong incentives to use the best chain out there, and are also sufficiently well fudned to happily pay $10+ fees 20:16 -!- jmcn_ [~jamie@2.24.158.30] has quit [Ping timeout: 277 seconds] 20:17 -!- jmcn [~jamie@2.24.158.30] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 20:17 < bramc> The only way to find out is to have real fees with algorithms which set the fees properly and see what happens 20:17 < bramc> A bit advantage of escalator is that it clearly works properly. The stuff about using mempool seems dubious. 20:18 < petertodd> I'm genuinely surprised no-one has done some pretty graphs of this stuff like you see for bid-ask spreads in btc markets 20:27 -!- hashtag_ [~hashtag@cpe-69-23-213-3.ma.res.rr.com] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 20:31 < jgarzik> and insert block size debate at this point :) 20:31 < jgarzik> no real fees without block pressure 20:31 < jgarzik> economic policy -- for years -- has been to suppress fee pressure 20:31 -!- hashtag_ [~hashtag@cpe-69-23-213-3.ma.res.rr.com] has quit [Ping timeout: 244 seconds] 20:40 -!- justanot1erusr [~Justan@unaffiliated/justanotheruser] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 20:41 -!- justanotherusr [~Justan@unaffiliated/justanotheruser] has quit [Quit: Reconnecting] 20:42 < bramc> What does cpfp stand for? 20:44 < jgarzik> bramc, Child Pays For Parent. A secondary transaction boosts the priority of the primary transaction. 2nd tx adds fees to 1st. 20:44 < bramc> jgarzik, You keep saying that but I'm not sure what you're referring to, other than the raising of the soft limit 20:44 < bramc> Oh right. cpfp has overhead and may need to increase its own fee, which runs into the same issues 20:44 -!- justanot1erusr [~Justan@unaffiliated/justanotheruser] has quit [Ping timeout: 252 seconds] 20:45 < jgarzik> bramc, "The only way to find out is to have real fees" -- noting that will not happen, or be more difficult, in current economic regime 20:45 -!- justanotherusr [~Justan@unaffiliated/justanotheruser] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 20:46 < leakypat> CPFP is worse because you have to pay twice too 20:46 -!- KFl6WxEUI1Zbp2 [~textual@c-73-189-234-152.hsd1.ca.comcast.net] has quit [Quit: My Mac has gone to sleep. ZZZzzz…] 20:46 -!- [7] [~quassel@rockbox/developer/TheSeven] has quit [Ping timeout: 256 seconds] 20:46 < bramc> cpfp can be made radically more space efficient if an opcode is added to assert that a particular transaction is not in the current set, then a third party transaction can make a long list of those referring to grandparents 20:47 < bramc> jgarzik, Huh? There's a transaction rate limit and it hasn't been hit yet. When it is hit there will be pressure 20:47 -!- jaekwon [~jae@c-98-234-63-169.hsd1.ca.comcast.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 20:47 < bramc> Unless a hard fork is done to make full nodes continue to heavily subsidize everybody else as part of the united socialist democratic republic of bitcoin 20:47 -!- jaekwon [~jae@c-98-234-63-169.hsd1.ca.comcast.net] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 20:48 < jgarzik> bramc, The block size limit, which implies the transaction rate limit, yes. The current community debate is about raising that limit. 20:48 < jgarzik> bramc, when that happens there will be little fee pressure 20:48 < jgarzik> bramc, which has been the case historically for years 20:48 < jgarzik> bramc, anytime fee pressure approaches, people lobby miners to raise their soft limit, eliminating fee pressure 20:48 < bramc> jgarzik, I for one am very strongly against raising that limit, for a number of reasons 20:50 < bramc> One of them being that low transaction fees are a bad thing unto themselves 20:51 < moa> anybody know what a BIP 47 payment code actually looks like? 20:51 < moa> i.e. data format? 20:51 < jgarzik> bramc, It is an economic policy choice, to subsidize adoption. There are merits and demerits. It prevents a healthy fee market from developing, for example. Changing the block size limit reboots the fee market. 20:52 -!- TheSeven [~quassel@rockbox/developer/TheSeven] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 20:52 < jgarzik> bramc, You don't want to be penny wise and pound foolish, optimizing for the short term at the cost of the long term. 20:52 < bramc> jgarzik, Raising the limit is the thing which optimizes for the short term at the expense of the long term 20:53 -!- KFl6WxEUI1Zbp2 [~textual@c-73-189-234-152.hsd1.ca.comcast.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 20:54 < bramc> Long term it's lower mining rewards and higher costs of running full nodes, and all the fee handling stuff will have to be done eventually anyway 20:54 < bramc> Plus damage to the credibility of the claim that bitcoin isn't centrally controlled 20:55 < jgarzik> bramc, that fails to take into account people who look at bitcoin, run numbers, and abandon plans to use it before they begin. Bitcoin works just fine at high tx rates. 20:55 < jgarzik> bramc, i.e. externalities 20:55 < bramc> jgarzik, A single order of magnitude increase changes very few of those calculations. 20:57 < bramc> Another short term thing: only having fss-rbf instead of full rbf. That's to protect zeroconf, and even with your semantic point about zeroconf can be used for something in some systems, using fss-rbf doesn't make it any more useful. 21:02 < jgarzik> I never claimed fss-rbf makes zero conf more useful. I only claim full-rbf is overly disruptive and anti-social in the current ecosystem, making fraud much easier. 21:02 < bramc> I meant to say that full-rbf doesn't make it less useful 21:02 < jgarzik> From that narrow perspective, fss-rbf is simply less damaging 21:04 -!- KFl6WxEUI1Zbp2 [~textual@c-73-189-234-152.hsd1.ca.comcast.net] has quit [Quit: My Mac has gone to sleep. ZZZzzz…] 21:04 < bramc> All that zeroconf really does is demonstrate that the supposed signer really does have control of the key. Which is something. But further advantages about miners not doing rbf are mostly illusory and temporary 21:05 < jgarzik> bramc, agree with the latter statement (temporary) 21:06 < jgarzik> bramc, It very much depends on the real world risk scenario whether it is sane or not 21:07 < jgarzik> In fact, I think a timeline for deploying full-RBF would help focus people 21:07 < jgarzik> Wallet software and other stuff needs much work still 21:07 < bramc> That is something I would be fine with 21:12 < petertodd> jgarzik: potentially could be done with a Bitcoin Core release that enabled full-RBF at a specific date in the future 21:12 -!- sadoshi [~Sadoshi@31.220.4.123] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 21:14 < jgarzik> petertodd, I'm OK with that 21:15 < jgarzik> petertodd, Decidedly -not- OK with surprise rollouts the community is not prepared for 21:15 < bramc> Wow, we're having actual productive discussion 21:15 < petertodd> jgarzik: rough guess, how far into the future? 21:16 < jgarzik> petertodd, rough guess? 6 months too short, longer than 12 months probably too long 21:16 < petertodd> jgarzik: 9 months it is :) 21:17 < bramc> 9 months sounds great 21:17 < jgarzik> Have to upgrade -all- wallet software, websites, decentralized wallets, etc. 21:17 < jgarzik> Have to endorse a useful solution like CLTV+paychan 21:17 < jgarzik> ie. wallet software authors need to know a direction other than "panic!" 21:18 -!- KFl6WxEUI1Zbp2 [~textual@c-73-189-234-152.hsd1.ca.comcast.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 21:18 < petertodd> How far away are we from releasing v0.11.0 do we think? Also, is this change too big to go into v0.11.0? 21:18 < bramc> uh, dumb question, what is cltv? 21:19 < petertodd> bramc: CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY - BIP65 - my baby :) 21:19 < bramc> Also, the thing which full rbf breaks is zeroconf, not transaction fee pressure 21:19 < bramc> petertodd, Is that including relative now? Is it in utxos or transactions or both? 21:20 < petertodd> bramc: just absolute, to keep the # of lines of code changed down 21:20 < petertodd> bramc: I 100% agree relative would be nice, but I wanted something *really* simple as a first-effort 21:20 < petertodd> bramc: I've literally given more interviews about CLTV than there are lines of code in CLTV... 21:20 < moa> CLTV is going into v0.11.0 ? 21:20 < jgarzik> bramc, CLTV is _huge_. Freeze funds on-chain until X time. 21:20 < jgarzik> lots of uses 21:21 < bramc> petertodd, cltv in utxos is the least important thing, because cltv is already in transactions 21:21 < petertodd> moa: well, it got a bunch of review by maaku for elements, which helps 21:21 < petertodd> moa: we don't actually have the exact deployment method figured out - hoping sipa will get some code soon re: his nVersion's soft-fork scheme 21:21 < bramc> Although I agree that it's the simplest thing 21:21 < jgarzik> CLTV prevents duress risk in holding funds. CLTV secures refunds. CLTV enables provably committing X amount of funds - you then provide that proof to a third party. 21:21 < jgarzik> Much better than proof-of-burn. 21:22 < jgarzik> CLTV enables pay-to-future miner. 21:22 < jgarzik> (freeze an anyone-can-spend TX) 21:22 < jgarzik> CLTV must be integrated ASAP. :) 21:22 < petertodd> jgarzik: CLTV is both a floor wax and a dessert topping! 21:22 < jgarzik> and sex lube too 21:22 < moa> jgarzik: california loosens the tongue 21:22 < bramc> jgarzik, A bunch of its use cases can technically speaking be hacked together with the existing timelock on transactions. Not that I'm against integrating it asap :-) 21:23 < bramc> jgarzik, You're in the bay area now? I'm headquartered here. 21:23 < jgarzik> bramc, agree -- the main issue is that locktime transactions are not relayed across the network, nor remembered in mempools. easy DoS + malleate. 21:23 < jgarzik> gotta get it into the chain. 21:23 < CodeShark> making timelock part of the script is far more powerful 21:23 < jgarzik> yep 21:24 < bramc> Although relative timelock, both in transactions and utxos, should get in asap as well. 21:24 < petertodd> jgarzik: +1 21:24 < petertodd> jgarzik: (the sex lube bit) 21:24 < CodeShark> gotta work on the branding 21:25 < jgarzik> bramc, I'm in the Bay area every other week, almost. NASA & space investors are here. I'm lofting a network of 24 nano-satellites carrying the blockchain into Low Earth Orbit. 21:25 < jgarzik> based in Atlanta 21:25 < bramc> jgarzik, I can't tell if that's satire 21:25 < jgarzik> bramc, nope 100% truth 21:25 -!- cosmo [~james@unaffiliated/cosmo] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 21:26 < bramc> jgarzik, I... I can't... I don't know what to say 21:26 < jgarzik> bramc, rackspace in space 21:26 < bramc> Because latencies on earth are too low? 21:28 < jgarzik> bramc, hehe actually with some of the space networks being built it will eventually be faster than terrestrial fibre optic, using space optical comms. 21:29 < bramc> The latencies on earth are mostly incurred at the local ISP and by limitations in the speed of light. 21:29 < CodeShark> you don't really gain much in the latter, do you? 21:29 < jgarzik> bramc, But no, telecom is not our gig. There are in-space customers coming down the pipe, plus high security customers, plus space enthusiasts. 21:30 < jgarzik> bramc, yes - it's the hops - in space has fewer optical hops at speed of light 21:30 < jgarzik> easier to repair than sea cables too 21:30 < bramc> space is also fairly high up there. At least for geosync satellites once you've bounced the signal back to earth you've already lost 21:30 < bramc> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BVn1oQL9sWg 21:31 < CodeShark> I think he said LEO 21:31 < jgarzik> yep 21:31 < KFl6WxEUI1Zbp2> jgarzik: don't blockchain satellites also allow people to avoid certain miner attacks? 21:31 < jgarzik> under the van allen rad belts 21:31 < CodeShark> geostationary satellites are good for high throughput/high latency 21:32 < jgarzik> correct 21:32 < bramc> for LEO it depends on exactly how high 21:32 < jgarzik> geostationary are way up there, higher earth orbit, higher power, higher rad shielding, higher launch costs, higher latency 21:32 < moa> bramc: space money jurisidiction has low latency dev times 21:32 < CodeShark> but the simpler the math :) 21:33 < moa> he's the CEO of LEO 21:33 < jgarzik> rofl 21:33 -!- shesek [~shesek@IGLD-84-228-3-15.inter.net.il] has quit [Ping timeout: 248 seconds] 21:33 < CodeShark> I'm still not 100% sure I fully grok the vision, jgarzik 21:33 < KFl6WxEUI1Zbp2> jgarzik was that 'correct' directed at me or CodeShark 21:33 < CodeShark> I mean, I understand that satellites and space are cool and all 21:33 < jgarzik> CodeShark, yeah I can't say too much in public about the stealth mode bits ;p 21:34 < CodeShark> but to an outside observer it just looks like a very expensive way to do something relatively simple 21:35 < jgarzik> the public gets the basic open source satellite design, but not the biz details. http://dunveganspace.com/assets/bitsat-design-pdr.pdf 21:35 < bramc> CodeShark, But it's spaaaaaace! 21:35 < jgarzik> KFl6WxEUI1Zbp2, both! :) 21:35 < jgarzik> Let's just say you can do a lot with worldwide global broadcast network 21:35 < zooko> lol ; I love this channel. Especially the bit about "CTLV must be deployed!" 21:36 < zooko> I think I might have played a role in getting petertodd started on CTLV. 21:37 < KFl6WxEUI1Zbp2> jgarzik exactly, every other communication network runs sats it would be highly unlikely, from a technological perspective, that there wouldn't be _some_ advantage for bitcoin sat 21:37 < jgarzik> all other sats are "dumb" repeaters with no trustless crypto security vis the ground 21:38 < KFl6WxEUI1Zbp2> all other ^bitcoin sats? 21:38 < bramc> The best use of super low latency communications is price arbitrage between the london and nyc stock exchanges 21:39 < jgarzik> all other satellites besides my own BitSats 21:40 < moa> jgarzik: could i reserve some dedicated hardware on a BitSat ... sole access, etc? 21:41 < CodeShark> how much to rent a rack? :) 21:42 < jgarzik> moa: In theory yes - probably outside your budget though :) - See MSRP: http://dunveganspace.com/assets/bitsat-infosheet.pdf 21:42 < moa> that's presumptious but thanx 21:42 < CodeShark> $19 million for a 24 unit constellation - what a deal! 21:42 < jgarzik> some customers are looking to put custom circuits on board 21:43 < jgarzik> CodeShark, in space terms it is 1000x cheaper than 10 years ago for same capability :) 21:43 < CodeShark> yes, so are CPUs :p 21:43 < moa> neilsen's law in space too? 21:43 < KFl6WxEUI1Zbp2> moa lol 21:43 < jgarzik> yep. same cost curves are applying to space now. launch & spacecraft costs fell exponentially, and will continue another iteration. 21:44 < bramc> A lot of those price falls haven't been new technology so much as the legacy space launch system finally getting replaced 21:46 < zooko> goodnight folks. Don't break the internet before I wake up. 21:46 -!- zooko [~user@2601:281:8101:3c71:40d1:c44c:ba43:df6b] has quit [Quit: ERC Version 5.3 (IRC client for Emacs)] 21:47 < jgarzik> bramc, that's one part 21:47 < moa> i'm intrigued by the 'Dunvegan' name origin ... sounds irish 21:48 < jgarzik> bramc, legacy replacement + reuseable + increased competition for smallsat launches + ride-share 21:48 < jgarzik> moa: Dunvegan Castle in Scotland 21:48 < bramc> jgarzik, Yes there's new tech, but what we're seeing now isn't so much new tech in the last 10 years as all the new tech since the 60s hitting at once 21:48 < CodeShark> when does economy of scale start to kick in? 21:48 < moa> ah 21:48 < moa> celtic 21:49 -!- shesek [~shesek@IGLD-84-228-3-15.inter.net.il] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 21:49 < jgarzik> CodeShark, "soon but not yet" 21:49 < jgarzik> when Elon's or Branson's 1000+ constellations start going up, then you see real volume 21:49 < moa> yeah when SpaceX gets true private competitor 21:50 < jgarzik> Of course must be wary of https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kessler_syndrome Everybody has a deorbit plan these days. 21:50 < bramc> The main fundamental limit on costs of getting stuff into space has to do with the fuel used in the rocket, that's around $500/pound if I recall correctly 21:51 < CodeShark> what about a space elevator? 21:51 < moa> jgarzik: that's topical, you probably seen this link http://science.slashdot.org/story/15/06/19/1623200/orbiting-rest-stops-could-repair-crumbling-satellites 21:51 < CodeShark> or other form of propulsion where the fuel doesn't need to be carried on board 21:51 < rasengan> what if it was cheap back in the day but the lack of transparency allowed funds to be funneled into peoples pockets thru a space program which was believable to be an entity thst would spend a lot due to thr collosal task at hand 21:51 < bramc> space elevator doesn't work from a cost standpoint. Skylon does work in principle. 21:51 < jgarzik> bramc, yes and no -- currently rockets are built and then thrown away. Imagine costs involved in building a one-time-use 747 airplane. 21:52 < moa> orbital service stations could change craft design 21:52 < jgarzik> fuel itself is cheap 21:52 < jgarzik> CodeShark, long way off 21:52 < jgarzik> reuseable rockets bring launch costs down to that of a first class ticket to Paris 21:52 < bramc> jgarzik, Getting the second stage to reuse might be a bit of a pipe dream. The first stage should be doable. Also a much bigger thing getting reused 21:52 < jgarzik> think scale, too -- smallsat rockets are much smaller. One company is using high altitude balloons + old missiles. 21:53 < jgarzik> airplanes and balloons already exist for a usable first stage 21:53 < jgarzik> *reusable 21:53 < bramc> jgarzik, When I ran the numbers on high altitude balloons they didn't seem even vaguely promising, they don't get you very high or very fast 21:53 < CodeShark> certainly not very fast 21:53 < CodeShark> but they can get you pretty high 21:54 < jgarzik> exactly 21:54 < bramc> CodeShark, Not really so high, the atmosphere gets thin fairly quickly 21:55 < CodeShark> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flight_altitude_record 21:56 < CodeShark> looks like the unmanned gas balloon record is 53km 21:56 < bramc> CodeShark, Yeah last I ran numbers getting 100km in the air didn't seem like much of a boost 21:56 < moa> if the air's thin then accelerating the craft is a lot cheaper 21:56 < moa> and speed is ultimately what you want 21:56 < moa> deltaV 21:57 < bramc> It all boils down to how much less gas you need to carry in order to get into orbit. It doesn't take much gas to get 100km in the air, but the quadratic increase in gas amounts for getting into orbit can make even small boosts helpful 21:58 < jgarzik> moa: yep 21:58 < moa> well every pound less fuel is an additional pound of payload 21:59 < bramc> moa, it's more than that because fuel is used to carry up other fuel. Most of the fuel on a space rocket is used for lifting other fuel. 21:59 < moa> yes, lifting and accelerating 21:59 < bramc> It also may help to start in a thinner atmosphere as you said because you can accelerate faster without destroying the rocket 22:00 < moa> you have less drag friction so it takes less fuel 22:00 < ggreer> rockets lose what, 2km/sec ∆v due to gravity losses and atmosphere? it's significant, but not a game-changer 22:01 < moa> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tsiolkovsky_rocket_equation ... now we're really OT 22:03 -!- shesek [~shesek@IGLD-84-228-3-15.inter.net.il] has quit [Ping timeout: 275 seconds] 22:05 < bramc> No that isn't the issue, it's that what you really want to do is get up to full speed instantly so that you aren't wasting fuel to lift other fuel. The problem is that those sorts of forces (a) destroy everything on board and (b) cause you to get destroyed by the atmosphere if you're too low 22:05 < CodeShark> unless you're at relativistic speeds, doesn't F=ma continue to hold? 22:06 < CodeShark> and doesn't conservation of energy imply that it doesn't matter how quickly you accelerate? (again, assuming nonrelativistic speeds) 22:07 < bramc> CodeShark, You've got gravity dragging on you the whole time. The quicker you're moving fast enough to not have to waste fuel counteracting gravity, the less of it you waste 22:07 < ggreer> bramc's saying you could get around the rocket equation if you didn't have to carry your fuel up with you. that means an explosion (or a cannon) 22:08 < CodeShark> hmmm - but total energy (kinetic + potential) is also conserved 22:08 < CodeShark> I guess the catch here is that m is changing 22:08 < ggreer> yes 22:08 < bramc> CodeShark, Unfortunately you've got this giant momentum sink called 'the earth' 22:09 -!- cosmo [~james@unaffiliated/cosmo] has quit [Quit: Leaving] 22:10 < bramc> Ironically nuclear rockets have a lot of problems because they tend to put out energy too slowly or, ahem, too quickly. 22:10 < ThinThread> what about https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EmDrive 22:11 < ggreer> the constraints for getting off the earth are pretty tricky. you need high energy density, low capital cost, political feasibility, and thrust/weight ratio >> 1 22:11 < bramc> Anyway, somewhat back on topic: I don't get the point of bitcoin in space, although I do somewhat see the point of LEO internet connectivity if it's done absolutely right and low latency is critically important, but satellites at less than $1 million/satellite are a great deal and undoubtedly good for a lot of stuff. 22:11 < ggreer> yeah. secondary payloads are pretty cheap these days. imagine how cheap they'll be when rockets are reusable 22:11 < jgarzik> yep :) 22:12 < jgarzik> and note that $1M is to-orbit price. includes a much-cheaper spacecraft, plus launch, plus insurance and other costs 22:12 < jgarzik> you can reduce a lot of that with volume in various places 22:12 < bramc> The miniaturization of satellites themselves helped a lot by the miniaturization of computers and cameras helps a lot of course 22:12 < jgarzik> that's the one-off price 22:13 < jgarzik> open source + commodity parts lowers costs greatly 22:13 < bramc> jgarzik, Also literally ditching designs which were either from the 60s or based on using contractors in a particular senator's home state 22:13 < ggreer> tiny sats in LEO make sense. they don't have to be reliable; just launch a bunch of them. they can basically be smartphones with a few add-ons. a few years later when they're obsolete or broken, they re-enter and burn up 22:14 < jgarzik> bramc, indeed, that saves quite a bit :) 22:14 < bramc> Also dumping the manned program helps a lot 22:17 -!- frankenmint [~frankenmi@c-24-22-67-17.hsd1.or.comcast.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 22:18 -!- shesek [~shesek@IGLD-84-228-3-15.inter.net.il] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 22:21 -!- fanquake [~fanquake@unaffiliated/fanquake] has quit [Ping timeout: 275 seconds] 22:21 -!- KFl6WxEUI1Zbp2 [~textual@c-73-189-234-152.hsd1.ca.comcast.net] has quit [Max SendQ exceeded] 22:25 < maaku> bramc: ? 22:27 < maaku> manned space has done more than just about anything in bringing down cost per lb 22:27 < maaku> you only *need* heavy-lift for manned programmes 22:30 -!- GAit [~lnahum@2-230-161-158.ip202.fastwebnet.it] has quit [Read error: Connection reset by peer] 22:32 < bramc> maaku, It's a lot cheaper to not include the goldfish bowl 22:32 -!- GAit [~lnahum@2-230-161-158.ip202.fastwebnet.it] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 22:33 < CodeShark> it's also possible to abort the mission by just blowing it all up...without the negative PR aspect 22:35 < CodeShark> for some reason, dead astronauts tends to bug the public 22:36 -!- droark [~droark@209-6-53-207.c3-0.smr-ubr1.sbo-smr.ma.cable.rcn.com] has quit [Quit: ZZZzzz…] 22:36 -!- frankenmint [~frankenmi@c-24-22-67-17.hsd1.or.comcast.net] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 22:37 -!- GAit [~lnahum@2-230-161-158.ip202.fastwebnet.it] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 22:38 < CodeShark> getting astronauts back to earth in one piece is very expensive 22:38 < CodeShark> one-way manned space program...now that has some potential :) 22:42 -!- Giszmo [~leo@pc-185-201-214-201.cm.vtr.net] has quit [Quit: Leaving.] 22:45 < amiller> jgarzik, i want to hear more about bitcoins and space plans 22:45 < amiller> somehow, that must be on-topic here! 22:46 < amiller> like, is it supposed to be some kind of science experiment? or something that bolsters the network 22:48 < amiller> ok i guess there's a lot more detail than ive ever seen before in the scrollback already.. 22:49 < jgarzik> amiller, indeed. I don't want to spam the channel with the same info - happy to chat about it over email or some other day (heading for bed here) 22:50 -!- _biO_ [~biO_@ip-37-24-195-112.hsi14.unitymediagroup.de] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 22:53 -!- sy5error [~sy5error@unaffiliated/sy5error] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 22:53 -!- Xh1pher [~Xh1pher@pD9E38632.dip0.t-ipconnect.de] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 23:00 -!- _biO_ [~biO_@ip-37-24-195-112.hsi14.unitymediagroup.de] has quit [Read error: Connection reset by peer] 23:04 -!- jmcn [~jamie@2.24.158.30] has quit [Ping timeout: 276 seconds] 23:05 -!- jmcn [~jamie@2.24.158.30] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 23:08 -!- antanst [~Adium@ppp-2-86-206-246.home.otenet.gr] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 23:16 -!- damethos [~damethos@unaffiliated/damethos] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 23:16 -!- ThomasV [~ThomasV@unaffiliated/thomasv] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 23:27 -!- mjerr [~mjerr@p578EAB34.dip0.t-ipconnect.de] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 23:31 -!- Xh1pher [~Xh1pher@pD9E38632.dip0.t-ipconnect.de] has quit [Read error: Connection reset by peer] 23:32 -!- jmcn [~jamie@2.24.158.30] has quit [Ping timeout: 276 seconds] 23:32 -!- jmcn [~jamie@2.24.158.30] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 23:32 -!- Xh1pher [~Xh1pher@pD9E38632.dip0.t-ipconnect.de] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 23:36 -!- gill3s [~gill3s@pat35-3-82-245-143-153.fbx.proxad.net] has quit [Quit: My Mac has gone to sleep. 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