--- Log opened Mon Jun 22 00:00:48 2015 00:09 -!- DougieBot5000 [~DougieBot@unaffiliated/dougiebot5000] has quit [Quit: Leaving] 00:09 -!- bramc [~bram@99-75-88-206.lightspeed.sntcca.sbcglobal.net] has quit [Quit: This computer has gone to sleep] 00:11 -!- ThomasV [~ThomasV@unaffiliated/thomasv] has quit [Ping timeout: 252 seconds] 00:19 -!- n0n0_ [~n0n0___@x5f7687b6.dyn.telefonica.de] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 00:26 -!- paveljanik [~paveljani@unaffiliated/paveljanik] has quit [Ping timeout: 264 seconds] 00:27 -!- priidu [~priidu@unaffiliated/priidu] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 00:46 -!- rht__ [uid86914@gateway/web/irccloud.com/x-hbtnhrnlcydjzjwl] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 00:58 -!- jtimon [~quassel@69.29.134.37.dynamic.jazztel.es] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 00:59 -!- Aquentin [~Aquentin@cpc13-walt14-2-0-cust31.13-2.cable.virginm.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 00:59 -!- Aquentin is now known as Guest86574 01:03 -!- andy-logbot [~bitcoin--@wpsoftware.net] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 01:03 -!- andy-logbot [~bitcoin--@wpsoftware.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 01:03 * andy-logbot is logging 01:06 -!- ThomasV [~ThomasV@unaffiliated/thomasv] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 01:07 -!- antanst [~Adium@ppp-2-86-206-246.home.otenet.gr] has left #bitcoin-wizards [] 01:08 -!- jcluck [~cluckj@pool-108-16-231-242.phlapa.fios.verizon.net] has quit [Read error: Connection reset by peer] 01:08 -!- mkarrer [~mkarrer@148.Red-88-8-116.dynamicIP.rima-tde.net] has quit [Read error: Connection reset by peer] 01:08 -!- jcluck [~cluckj@pool-108-16-231-242.phlapa.fios.verizon.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 01:08 -!- fanquake [~fanquake@unaffiliated/fanquake] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 01:09 -!- mkarrer [~mkarrer@148.Red-88-8-116.dynamicIP.rima-tde.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 01:09 -!- Guest86574 [~Aquentin@cpc13-walt14-2-0-cust31.13-2.cable.virginm.net] has quit [Quit: Leaving] 01:09 -!- darwin__ [~darwin@88-103-255-166.jes.cz] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 01:10 -!- AaronvanW [~ewout@unaffiliated/aaronvanw] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 01:12 -!- phantomcircuit [~phantomci@smartcontracts.us] has quit [Ping timeout: 250 seconds] 01:12 -!- kanzure [~kanzure@unaffiliated/kanzure] has quit [Ping timeout: 250 seconds] 01:13 -!- kanzure [~kanzure@unaffiliated/kanzure] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 01:13 -!- rubensayshi [~ruben@91.206.81.13] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 01:15 -!- fanquake [~fanquake@unaffiliated/fanquake] has quit [Quit: Leaving.] 01:15 -!- yossef [~androirc@114.121.154.91] has quit [Ping timeout: 255 seconds] 01:16 -!- phantomcircuit [~phantomci@smartcontracts.us] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 01:18 -!- MrTratta [~MrTratta@2-228-102-98.ip191.fastwebnet.it] has quit [Ping timeout: 264 seconds] 01:18 < phantomcircuit> petertodd, note that micropayment channels make leaking of the change address significantly less of an issue 01:18 -!- MrTratta [~MrTratta@2-228-102-98.ip191.fastwebnet.it] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 01:31 -!- dEBRUYNE [~dEBRUYNE@239-196-ftth.onsbrabantnet.nl] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 01:36 -!- hearn [~mike@84-75-197-78.dclient.hispeed.ch] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 01:40 -!- Quanttek [~quassel@ip1f10af17.dynamic.kabel-deutschland.de] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 01:41 -!- CoinMuncher [~jannes@178.132.211.90] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 01:47 -!- dEBRUYNE [~dEBRUYNE@239-196-ftth.onsbrabantnet.nl] has quit [Ping timeout: 244 seconds] 01:49 -!- hearn [~mike@84-75-197-78.dclient.hispeed.ch] has quit [Read error: Connection reset by peer] 01:49 -!- hearn [~mike@84-75-197-78.dclient.hispeed.ch] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 01:50 -!- JackH [~Jack@host81-154-202-222.range81-154.btcentralplus.com] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 01:53 -!- orperelman [~orperelma@109.67.207.175] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 01:53 -!- ThomasV [~ThomasV@unaffiliated/thomasv] has quit [Quit: Quitte] 01:54 -!- MrTratta [~MrTratta@2-228-102-98.ip191.fastwebnet.it] has quit [Ping timeout: 246 seconds] 01:55 < CodeShark> how far along are you with the segregated witness thing, sipa? 01:55 -!- MrTratta [~MrTratta@2-228-102-98.ip191.fastwebnet.it] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 01:55 < CodeShark> is there anything I can help you with? :) 01:57 -!- cdecker [~cdecker@pc-10367.ethz.ch] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 01:58 < sipa> no, it was trivial to implement, it works 01:58 < sipa> we need tests :) 02:00 -!- priidu [~priidu@unaffiliated/priidu] has quit [Ping timeout: 252 seconds] 02:02 -!- priidu [~priidu@unaffiliated/priidu] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 02:03 < CodeShark> so you essentially added an extra hash method 02:03 < CodeShark> you have four hashes now 02:04 < CodeShark> hash, hashWitness, hashFull, hashBitcoin 02:05 < sipa> the last one is for compatibility reasons 02:05 < sipa> but essentially, txid = hash of everything except witness data 02:05 < sipa> txidwitness = hash of just witness data 02:05 -!- MrTratta [~MrTratta@2-228-102-98.ip191.fastwebnet.it] has quit [Ping timeout: 244 seconds] 02:05 < sipa> blocks commit to txidfull = H(txid || txidwitness) 02:06 < sipa> but everything else just uses txid 02:06 -!- Quanttek [~quassel@ip1f10af17.dynamic.kabel-deutschland.de] has quit [Ping timeout: 276 seconds] 02:06 -!- MrTratta [~MrTratta@2-228-102-98.ip191.fastwebnet.it] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 02:06 < sipa> witness data is scriptsigs, but also the range proofs needed for confidential transactions 02:07 < sipa> they don't change the effect of a transaction, only theit validity 02:07 -!- Quanttek [~quassel@2a02:8108:73f:f6e4:e23f:49ff:fe47:9364] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 02:08 < CodeShark> right 02:08 -!- airbreather [~airbreath@d149-67-99-43.nap.wideopenwest.com] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 02:09 < sipa> and since the range proofs are huge, this makes a large difference in the amount of data you need to download 02:09 < sipa> if you do not care for signature validation 02:09 < CodeShark> yeah, for sure 02:10 < CodeShark> we'll eventually want to move to a model where not everyone has to validate everything :) 02:10 < CodeShark> but something that actually works, unlike SPV 02:10 -!- paveljanik [~paveljani@unaffiliated/paveljanik] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 02:12 -!- stonecoldpat [~a9380004@janus-nat-128-240-225-56.ncl.ac.uk] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 02:12 -!- MrTratta [~MrTratta@2-228-102-98.ip191.fastwebnet.it] has quit [Ping timeout: 265 seconds] 02:13 < CodeShark> and something where you CAN validate what's important to you without having to trust the prover 02:14 < CodeShark> so what you should do then is use H(txid || H(txidwitness)) 02:14 < phantomcircuit> CodeShark, tree of hashes of all the things in the transaction 02:14 < CodeShark> yeah 02:14 < phantomcircuit> download/validate only what you care about 02:15 < CodeShark> exactly 02:15 -!- ThomasV [~ThomasV@unaffiliated/thomasv] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 02:19 < CodeShark> I've also been thinking about how to reduce the reorg fragility if we ever want to move to a model where even miners might not validate everything 02:19 -!- sparetire_ [~sparetire@unaffiliated/sparetire] has quit [Quit: sparetire_] 02:19 < CodeShark> in principle, we don't need to revert an entire block just because of one bad transaction 02:19 < CodeShark> we can still use the block for PoW 02:19 < CodeShark> but just revert all the dependencies of that transaction 02:20 < sipa> amiller had a model a long time ago, where a block could commit to multiple parents, but only one counted for effects; the rest only for pow 02:21 < sipa> and the system's difficulty aimed for a constant not-on-main-chain rate, rather then constant block rate 02:22 -!- MrTratta [~MrTratta@2-228-102-98.ip191.fastwebnet.it] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 02:22 < CodeShark> what do you mean by not-on-main-chain rate? 02:22 < sipa> it measures the recent percentage of blocks that are in such secondary parents 02:23 < CodeShark> are we still talking a single blockchain? or multiple blockchains? 02:23 < sipa> one dag 02:23 < sipa> which defines a chain by following only primary parents 02:24 -!- Mably [56401ec5@gateway/web/freenode/ip.86.64.30.197] has quit [Ping timeout: 246 seconds] 02:25 < CodeShark> still not sure I fully get it - so the same block is used for both effects and pow but is inserted in multiple parents of this dag? 02:26 -!- Mably [56401ec3@gateway/web/freenode/ip.86.64.30.195] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 02:27 -!- MrTratta [~MrTratta@2-228-102-98.ip191.fastwebnet.it] has quit [Ping timeout: 264 seconds] 02:27 < CodeShark> so if the block turns out to be invalid, it is still used for PoW but the effects are voided? 02:28 < CodeShark> or two separate blocks entirely - one only used for PoW and the other used only for effects? 02:29 < sipa> no 02:29 < sipa> every block has two parents 02:29 < sipa> one from which it inherits utxo state and pow 02:29 < sipa> another from which it only inheritd pow 02:30 < sipa> the best-pow one with only valid first-parents wins 02:30 -!- cdecker [~cdecker@pc-10367.ethz.ch] has quit [Ping timeout: 276 seconds] 02:30 -!- cdecker [~cdecker@pc-10367.ethz.ch] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 02:30 < sipa> the utxo set is defined by purely following the first parents up, and these need to be valid 02:31 < sipa> the blocks reachable through non-first parents count for pow, but are otherwise not validated 02:31 < CodeShark> ah, so the objective is to allow miners to create usable blocks without having to validate anything? 02:31 -!- MrTratta [~MrTratta@2-228-102-98.ip191.fastwebnet.it] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 02:32 < CodeShark> do these PoW-only parents have parents as well? 02:32 < CodeShark> still not sure I'm getting it p 02:32 < sipa> they are just blocks 02:33 < sipa> and miners still have to validate everything 02:33 < sipa> it is just blocks that would have beenbreorged out in bitcoin 02:33 < CodeShark> oh, so something more akin to GHOST, in a sense 02:33 < amiller> its not a lot different than GHOST 02:33 < sipa> now become linked into the chain again as such a second parent 02:33 -!- hearn [~mike@84-75-197-78.dclient.hispeed.ch] has quit [Read error: Connection reset by peer] 02:33 < CodeShark> ok :) 02:33 < sipa> lol 02:34 < CodeShark> the pow parents are what some are calling "uncles" 02:35 -!- hearn [~mike@84-75-197-78.dclient.hispeed.ch] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 02:35 -!- cdecker [~cdecker@pc-10367.ethz.ch] has quit [Ping timeout: 276 seconds] 02:36 < amiller> yes 02:36 < amiller> so the difference is 02:36 -!- cdecker [~cdecker@82.130.102.226] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 02:36 < amiller> GHOST has some proposed incentive policy about how much reward the uncles get 02:36 -!- MrTratta [~MrTratta@2-228-102-98.ip191.fastwebnet.it] has quit [Ping timeout: 246 seconds] 02:36 < amiller> it's kind of a loose parameter IMO, they don't justify that choice too well.. i think they have an exponential decay thing 02:37 < amiller> also, in every GHOST proposal I know of, including ethereum's, there's still a fixed minimum-time parameter 02:38 < amiller> so... retrofitting that idea as an extension to GHOST, the point of this thing is to use the GHOST incentives to *tune* the block arrival rate. 02:38 < amiller> no more magic block time number! hooray! defeating a magic parameter is its own reward 02:39 < CodeShark> so basically narrowing the variance 02:39 -!- MrTratta [~MrTratta@2-228-102-98.ip191.fastwebnet.it] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 02:39 < CodeShark> and not wasting PoW in side chains 02:40 < amiller> yes 02:40 < amiller> i still think thats a good idea but i didn't finish it 02:41 < amiller> also why should there be any particular fixed fraction 02:42 < CodeShark> if you can incorporate pooled mining into it as well somehow, even more horray! :) 02:43 -!- Mably [56401ec3@gateway/web/freenode/ip.86.64.30.195] has quit [Ping timeout: 246 seconds] 02:43 < amiller> basically i think people should spam their partial proofs of work as far as they can 02:43 < CodeShark> yeah 02:44 < amiller> somehow those shares should tolerate a "lossy" network 02:44 < amiller> like, it's okay if not everyone gets all of those 02:44 -!- Mably [56401ec3@gateway/web/freenode/ip.86.64.30.195] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 02:44 < amiller> the things that are currently really 02:45 < amiller> infrequent, and worth thousands of dollars, should still propagate everywhere 02:45 -!- Tiraspol [~Tiraspol3@unaffiliated/tiraspol] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 02:45 < amiller> i think this is about as well thought out as treechains :O 02:46 -!- Tiraspol_ [~Tiraspol3@x5ce0998c.dyn.telefonica.de] has quit [Ping timeout: 272 seconds] 02:47 < CodeShark> it's a good start of something :) 02:50 -!- cdecker [~cdecker@82.130.102.226] has quit [Ping timeout: 276 seconds] 02:51 -!- hearn [~mike@84-75-197-78.dclient.hispeed.ch] has quit [Quit: My MacBook Pro has gone to sleep. ZZZzzz…] 02:52 -!- cdecker [~cdecker@pc-10367.ethz.ch] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 02:53 -!- bedeho [~bedeho@195.159.234.190] has quit [Ping timeout: 272 seconds] 02:53 < CodeShark> have you gotten as far as modeling anything, amiller? 02:57 -!- jmcn [~jamie@2.24.158.30] has quit [Ping timeout: 276 seconds] 02:58 -!- jmcn [~jamie@2.24.158.30] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 03:00 -!- bedeho [~bedeho@195.159.234.190] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 03:00 < amiller> uh, i remember trying to cram it into the pretty limited set of byzantine generals problem things i knew about, and it didn't work very well 03:03 < amiller> since then, some actual people who know what they're doing in that field modeled the "backbone protocol", and i've also learned to use more abstract tools to talk to cryptographers, like Fblockchain 03:04 < CodeShark> fblockchain - not sure I'm familiar with that one 03:05 -!- jmcn [~jamie@2.24.158.30] has quit [Ping timeout: 277 seconds] 03:05 < CodeShark> who are some of these actual people, btw? :) 03:05 < amiller> its kind of an overidealized "proof of publication"... it's a "simulation based definition" 03:06 < amiller> https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/765 03:06 -!- btcdrak [uid52049@gateway/web/irccloud.com/x-nabfjrkamedlfrit] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 03:06 < amiller> .title 03:06 < yoleaux> Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2014/765 03:06 < amiller> oh well: The Bitcoin Backbone Protocol: Analysis and Applications. Juan Garay and Aggelos Kiayias and Nikos Leonardos 03:08 -!- jmcn [~jamie@2.24.158.30] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 03:14 < stonecoldpat> CodeShark: for f_{blockchain}, i'm guessing amiller is using the terminology that his supervisor used during a presentation to describe the blockchain as a function, https://youtu.be/FQ6Hii69b5U?t=268 03:15 < CodeShark> ah, I see 03:15 -!- afk11 [~thomas@46.7.4.219] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 03:15 < amiller> yes! :D also we will release a preprint of that in a couple days or something 03:16 -!- Populus [Populus@gateway/vpn/mullvad/x-lenzbkcyfmpxthsf] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 03:16 -!- d1ggy [~d1ggy@dslc-082-082-155-231.pools.arcor-ip.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 03:19 -!- d1ggy_ [~d1ggy@dslb-178-003-120-184.178.003.pools.vodafone-ip.de] has quit [Ping timeout: 265 seconds] 03:19 -!- dEBRUYNE [~dEBRUYNE@239-196-ftth.onsbrabantnet.nl] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 03:23 < CodeShark> sipa: no new genesis block for elements alpha? 03:24 < sipa> eh yes there is 03:24 < sipa> the format for blocks is even different 03:24 < CodeShark> so then it must be somewhere other than chainparams.cpp 03:25 < sipa> no? 03:25 -!- pavel_ [~paveljani@14.150.broadband14.iol.cz] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 03:25 < CodeShark> because in there I only see the familiar one 03:25 < CodeShark> or the familiar two, I should say :p 03:25 < sipa> are you looking in the ElementsProject/elements, branch alpha? 03:25 < CodeShark> The Times 03/Jan/2009 Chancellor on brink of second bailout for banks 03:25 < CodeShark> oh, branch alpha 03:25 < CodeShark> yes 03:25 < CodeShark> I am 03:25 < CodeShark> https://github.com/ElementsProject/elements/blob/alpha/src/chainparams.cpp 03:26 < stonecoldpat> amiller: awesome looking forward to it 03:26 -!- pavel_ [~paveljani@14.150.broadband14.iol.cz] has quit [Client Quit] 03:27 < sipa> CodeShark: perhaps the message wasn't changed 03:27 < sipa> but the serialized format of blocks is different 03:27 < sipa> as it has signatures instead of pow 03:27 < CodeShark> but the hash is the same, too :) 03:27 < CodeShark> 0x000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f 03:28 -!- paveljanik [~paveljani@unaffiliated/paveljanik] has quit [Ping timeout: 244 seconds] 03:28 < CodeShark> did you break sha256, sipa? :) 03:31 < sipa> heh 03:31 < sipa> what are you looking at? 03:31 < CodeShark> chainparams.cpp 03:32 < CodeShark> class CMainParams 03:32 < CodeShark> it looks a little bit too familiar ;) 03:37 < sipa> look at testnet 03:38 < sipa> there is no alpha mainnet 03:38 < sipa> but we probably did not remove it from chainparams 03:39 < CodeShark> ok, yeah - CTestNetParams does look a little different 03:40 -!- SDCDev [~quassel@unaffiliated/sdcdev] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 03:40 -!- prodatalab [~prodatala@2602:306:ceef:a750:577:5919:1b9c:af13] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 03:40 < CodeShark> so when it runs it just uses testnet...and the --testnet option does nothing? 03:41 -!- Netsplit over, joins: cfields 03:41 -!- Netsplit *.net <-> *.split quits: ThinThread, rasengan, afk11, adams__, null_rad-, Jaamg, lnovy, Zouppen, Taek, jonasschnelli, (+4 more, use /NETSPLIT to show all of them) 03:41 -!- Netsplit over, joins: lnovy 03:42 -!- Netsplit over, joins: rasengan 03:42 -!- Netsplit over, joins: afk11 03:42 -!- tromp [~tromp@ool-18be0b4d.dyn.optonline.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 03:42 -!- Netsplit over, joins: Luke-Jr 03:42 -!- Netsplit over, joins: Taek 03:45 < CodeShark> the default datadir needs to be changed as well 03:45 -!- adams__ [sid73416@gateway/web/irccloud.com/x-crnvejqpkuszikbh] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 03:45 < CodeShark> and the pid 03:46 -!- catcow [sid62269@gateway/web/irccloud.com/x-chpuajbjcwkdnyow] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 03:47 -!- null_radix [Elite7851@gateway/shell/elitebnc/x-zcjbwsuouzbugkvr] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 03:48 -!- huseby [~huseby@unaffiliated/huseby] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 03:48 -!- jmcn [~jamie@2.24.158.30] has quit [Ping timeout: 276 seconds] 03:49 -!- jmcn [~jamie@2.24.158.30] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 03:51 -!- jonasschnelli [~jonasschn@2a01:4f8:200:7025::2] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 03:55 -!- adam3us1 [~Adium@195.138.228.37] has quit [Ping timeout: 265 seconds] 03:56 -!- orperelman [~orperelma@109.67.207.175] has quit [Ping timeout: 276 seconds] 03:57 -!- adam3us [~Adium@c3-219.i07-1.onvol.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 03:58 -!- orperelman [~orperelma@bzq-109-67-207-175.red.bezeqint.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 04:05 < sipa> CodeShark: you can run --notestnet, but it will fail if you fo 04:05 < sipa> the datadir should be ~/.bitcoin/alphatestnet3 04:06 < CodeShark> oh, hmmm 04:07 < CodeShark> I was thinking perhaps it would be a good idea to move it into an entirely separate directory 04:07 < CodeShark> makes it harder to corrupt an existing bitcoind installation 04:09 < CodeShark> the two databases are diverging quickly, after all - and will be less and less mutually compatible :p 04:11 -!- ThomasV [~ThomasV@unaffiliated/thomasv] has quit [Ping timeout: 256 seconds] 04:11 < CodeShark> and then https://github.com/ElementsProject/elements/blob/alpha/src/util.cpp#L480 04:13 -!- _biO_ [~biO_@80.156.183.43] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 04:14 -!- jrayhawk_ is now known as jrayhawk 04:17 -!- hashtag_ [~hashtag@cpe-69-23-213-3.ma.res.rr.com] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 04:21 -!- damethos [~damethos@unaffiliated/damethos] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 04:27 -!- hearn [~mike@79.108.199.178.dynamic.wline.res.cust.swisscom.ch] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 04:28 -!- orperelman [~orperelma@bzq-109-67-207-175.red.bezeqint.net] has quit [Read error: No route to host] 04:29 < CodeShark> time for bed - I'll continue checking it out tomorrow, sipa 04:30 -!- orperelman [~orperelma@bzq-109-67-207-175.red.bezeqint.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 04:32 -!- c0rw|zZz is now known as c0rw1n 04:38 -!- SDCDev [~quassel@unaffiliated/sdcdev] has quit [Quit: http://quassel-irc.org - Chat comfortably. Anywhere.] 04:38 -!- SDCDev [~quassel@unaffiliated/sdcdev] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 04:41 -!- wallet42 [~wallet42@88.229.219.239] has quit [Quit: Leaving.] 04:43 < sipa> CodeShark: 'diverging' ? 04:43 < sipa> they're entirely separate, all the time 04:46 -!- wallet42 [~wallet42@88.229.219.239] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 04:47 -!- bliljerk101 [~bliljerk1@pool-74-109-193-20.pitbpa.fios.verizon.net] has quit [Ping timeout: 248 seconds] 04:50 -!- orperelman [~orperelma@bzq-109-67-207-175.red.bezeqint.net] has quit [Ping timeout: 256 seconds] 04:51 -!- stonecoldpat [~a9380004@janus-nat-128-240-225-56.ncl.ac.uk] has quit [Quit: Leaving.] 04:55 -!- ThomasV [~ThomasV@unaffiliated/thomasv] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 04:57 -!- SDCDev [~quassel@unaffiliated/sdcdev] has quit [Ping timeout: 276 seconds] 05:02 -!- chmod755 [~chmod755@unaffiliated/chmod755] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 05:06 -!- lnovy [~lnovy@2002:4d57:f055::1] has quit [Ping timeout: 248 seconds] 05:07 -!- lnovy [~lnovy@2002:4d57:f055::1] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 05:10 -!- jmcn [~jamie@2.24.158.30] has quit [Ping timeout: 276 seconds] 05:11 -!- jmcn [~jamie@2.24.158.30] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 05:18 -!- SDCDev [~quassel@unaffiliated/sdcdev] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 05:18 -!- SDCDev [~quassel@unaffiliated/sdcdev] has quit [Client Quit] 05:22 -!- SDCDev [~quassel@unaffiliated/sdcdev] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 05:22 -!- mjerr [~mjerr@p578EAB34.dip0.t-ipconnect.de] has quit [Ping timeout: 250 seconds] 05:24 -!- erasmospunk [~erasmospu@179.43.169.226] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 05:27 -!- stonecoldpat [~a9380004@janus-nat-128-240-225-56.ncl.ac.uk] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 05:28 -!- erasmospunk [~erasmospu@179.43.169.226] has quit [Ping timeout: 244 seconds] 05:29 -!- moa [~kiwigb@opentransactions/dev/moa] has quit [Quit: Leaving.] 05:39 -!- erasmospunk [~erasmospu@179.43.144.66] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 05:47 -!- ThomasV [~ThomasV@unaffiliated/thomasv] has quit [Ping timeout: 246 seconds] 05:48 -!- instagibbs [32f65962@gateway/web/freenode/ip.50.246.89.98] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 05:53 -!- hearn [~mike@79.108.199.178.dynamic.wline.res.cust.swisscom.ch] has quit [Quit: My MacBook Pro has gone to sleep. 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[Killed (sendak.freenode.net (Nickname regained by services))] 09:13 -!- wallet421 is now known as wallet42 09:13 -!- MrTratta [~MrTratta@2-228-102-98.ip191.fastwebnet.it] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 09:15 -!- shen_noe [~shen_noe@wired042.math.utah.edu] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 09:17 -!- davi [~davi@gnu/davi] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 09:19 -!- Cory [~Cory@unaffiliated/cory] has quit [Ping timeout: 264 seconds] 09:20 -!- sy5error [~sy5error@unaffiliated/sy5error] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 09:20 -!- Pasha [~Cory@unaffiliated/cory] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 09:21 -!- AndroUser2 [~androirc@180.252.72.109] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 09:24 -!- cdecker [~cdecker@82.130.102.226] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 09:25 -!- kmels [~kmels@186.64.110.122] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 09:27 -!- gill3s [~gill3s@pat35-3-82-245-143-153.fbx.proxad.net] has quit [Quit: My Mac has gone to sleep. ZZZzzz…] 09:27 -!- Pasha is now known as Cory 09:27 -!- JackH [~Jack@host81-154-202-222.range81-154.btcentralplus.com] has quit [Ping timeout: 244 seconds] 09:32 -!- lnsybrd [~lnsybrd@fwsm-io-azp-dmz.phx1.ip.io.com] has quit [Quit: lnsybrd] 09:32 -!- Mably [56401ec3@gateway/web/freenode/ip.86.64.30.195] has quit [Quit: Page closed] 09:34 -!- blablaa [~st4fdds@unaffiliated/blablaa] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 09:35 < blablaa> are there some altcoins working entirely using tx fees? 09:35 < sipa> did you use 'altcoins' and 'working' in the same sentence? 09:36 < blablaa> sipa, well yes... 09:36 < sipa> there are a few who have done interesting development, but they are a very small minority 09:36 < sipa> also, offtopic here 09:37 < blablaa> sipa, it's related to bitcoin because bitcoin as it is is supposed to be funded by tx fees in the future 09:37 < sipa> blablaa: that is a controversial position 09:39 < blablaa> sipa, i'm wondering if fees will stay sufficiently high without a strict cap on block size. i know all this is controversial, but it's also interesting, so i'm throwing the question here. 09:40 < zooko> blablaa: I think your question is a good one. 09:40 < zooko> blablaa: I think the answer to it is: the evidence from altcoins so far doesn't tell us. 09:40 < sipa> agree with zooko 09:41 -!- gill3s [~gill3s@pat35-3-82-245-143-153.fbx.proxad.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 09:41 -!- Burrito [~Burrito@unaffiliated/burrito] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 09:42 -!- Emcy_ [~MC@cpc3-swan1-0-0-cust996.7-3.cable.virginm.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 09:42 -!- Emcy_ [~MC@cpc3-swan1-0-0-cust996.7-3.cable.virginm.net] has quit [Changing host] 09:42 -!- Emcy_ [~MC@unaffiliated/mc1984] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 09:43 < blablaa> zooko, ok, thx for your answer, i'll wait for more answers :) 09:45 -!- Emcy [~MC@unaffiliated/mc1984] has quit [Ping timeout: 276 seconds] 09:46 < bramc> The current transaction rate in altcoins seems unlikely to be able to keep things stable based on transaction fees alone 09:47 < sipa> yes, you need a simulation of an economy for that 09:47 < sipa> blablaa: also, apologies, i thought we were on #bitcoin-dev 09:47 < zooko> sipa: Oh, I was wondering about that. So this topic *is* on topic here? 09:47 < sipa> i would say so 09:47 < zooko> Cool. 09:48 < sipa> people talk about (interesting) changes to bitcoin all the time here, including those implemented in altcoins 09:48 < tromp_> this could be called bitcoin-fantasies :) 09:48 < zooko> lol 09:48 -!- jmcn [~jamie@2.24.158.30] has quit [Ping timeout: 276 seconds] 09:49 -!- elastoma [~elastoma@162.248.160.175] has quit [Ping timeout: 276 seconds] 09:49 -!- jmcn [~jamie@2.24.158.30] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 09:49 -!- ThomasV [~ThomasV@unaffiliated/thomasv] has quit [Ping timeout: 252 seconds] 09:50 -!- damethos [~damethos@unaffiliated/damethos] has quit [Quit: Bye] 09:51 -!- tucenaber [~tucenaber@unaffiliated/tucenaber] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 09:51 -!- lnsybrd [~lnsybrd@72.44.238.238] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 09:54 -!- erasmosp_ [~erasmospu@gateway/vpn/privateinternetaccess/erasmospunk] has quit [Quit: ttm] 09:54 -!- erasmospunk [~erasmospu@gateway/vpn/privateinternetaccess/erasmospunk] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 09:55 -!- gill3s [~gill3s@pat35-3-82-245-143-153.fbx.proxad.net] has quit [Quit: My Mac has gone to sleep. ZZZzzz…] 09:56 < adam3us> bramc: note in your medium post gavin's latest proposal ses blocks auto-growing from 8MB to 8GB in 2x increments on a biennial schedule. 09:56 -!- mjerr [~mjerr@p578EAB34.dip0.t-ipconnect.de] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 09:57 < kanzure> "Eventually the two currencies will be completely separated and peacefully coexist," this is not always going to be the outcome, especially if people lose tremendous amounts of BTC during the transition (or when software is spending to the wrong addresses on the worng blockchains, etc.) 09:58 < adam3us> bramc: not that that is necessarily any better. effect i shard to predict but if understand the intent is to subsidise fees to something approximating effectively free fees for foreseeable future 09:58 -!- Mably [~Mably@unaffiliated/mably] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 09:58 < adam3us> bramc: wow that text got mangled some how! 09:59 < bramc> adam3us, I'm trying to word what I'm saying carefully to not be accused of misrepresenting what somebody else says. I included some comments about gavin's latest proposal being even more extreme and him saying specifically that he's doing it because of people arguing with him originally but removed them because it sounded a bit personal 09:59 < adam3us> bramc: try again. not that that is necessarily any better. the effect is hard to predict, but if understand Gavin's intent, he aims to subsidise fees so that there are effectively free fees for the foreseeable future 09:59 -!- wallet42 [~wallet42@unaffiliated/wallet42] has quit [Quit: Leaving.] 10:00 < bramc> adam3us, I'm going to write another essay later about the long term effects of all this stuff, I'll include all that thinking in there 10:00 < adam3us> bramc: fair enough. thanks for writing anyway - for some reason the tech news seems to focus on some confusion that industry wants this or that gavin is lead developer and other things. 10:00 < bramc> (because, apparently, there isn't enough stress in my life, so I'm proactively delving into bitcoin) 10:00 -!- goregrind [~goregrind@unaffiliated/goregrind] has quit [Ping timeout: 252 seconds] 10:00 < bramc> Thanks for the props, adam3us 10:01 -!- nwilcox_ [~nwilcox@74-95-207-205-SFBA.hfc.comcastbusiness.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 10:01 < bramc> I've gotta run now, laters everybody 10:01 -!- bramc [~bram@99-75-88-206.lightspeed.sntcca.sbcglobal.net] has quit [Quit: Leaving] 10:02 -!- jmcn [~jamie@2.24.158.30] has quit [Ping timeout: 276 seconds] 10:02 -!- jmcn [~jamie@2.24.158.30] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 10:04 -!- nwilcox [~nwilcox@74-95-207-205-SFBA.hfc.comcastbusiness.net] has quit [Ping timeout: 256 seconds] 10:04 -!- dEBRUYNE [~dEBRUYNE@239-196-ftth.onsbrabantnet.nl] has quit [Ping timeout: 255 seconds] 10:06 -!- nwilcox [~nwilcox@74-95-207-205-SFBA.hfc.comcastbusiness.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 10:06 -!- nwilcox_ [~nwilcox@74-95-207-205-SFBA.hfc.comcastbusiness.net] has quit [Ping timeout: 252 seconds] 10:07 -!- priidu [~priidu@unaffiliated/priidu] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 10:08 -!- wallet42 [~wallet42@88.229.219.239] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 10:09 -!- wallet42 [~wallet42@88.229.219.239] has quit [Client Quit] 10:10 -!- wallet42 [~wallet42@88.229.219.239] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 10:11 -!- elastoma [~elastoma@162.248.160.175] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 10:11 -!- bliljerk101 [~bliljerk1@pool-74-109-193-20.pitbpa.fios.verizon.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 10:12 -!- n0n0_ [~n0n0___@x5f7687b6.dyn.telefonica.de] has quit [Ping timeout: 256 seconds] 10:13 -!- wallet42 [~wallet42@88.229.219.239] has quit [Client Quit] 10:16 -!- damethos [~damethos@unaffiliated/damethos] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 10:16 -!- wallet42 [~wallet42@88.229.219.239] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 10:16 -!- Emcy_ [~MC@unaffiliated/mc1984] has quit [Ping timeout: 255 seconds] 10:17 -!- goregrind [~goregrind@89.137.127.229] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 10:17 -!- goregrind [~goregrind@89.137.127.229] has quit [Changing host] 10:17 -!- goregrind [~goregrind@unaffiliated/goregrind] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 10:18 -!- gill3s [~gill3s@pat35-3-82-245-143-153.fbx.proxad.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 10:20 -!- damethos [~damethos@unaffiliated/damethos] has quit [Ping timeout: 255 seconds] 10:24 -!- gill3s [~gill3s@pat35-3-82-245-143-153.fbx.proxad.net] has quit [Quit: My Mac has gone to sleep. 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ZZZzzz…] 10:46 -!- jaekwon [~jae@2601:645:8001:f5c8:dcd4:830:a4df:e259] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 10:46 -!- wallet42 [~wallet42@88.229.219.239] has quit [Client Quit] 10:47 -!- wallet42 [~wallet42@88.229.219.239] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 10:47 -!- jmcn [~jamie@2.24.158.30] has quit [Ping timeout: 275 seconds] 10:47 -!- cdecker [~cdecker@82.130.102.226] has quit [Ping timeout: 275 seconds] 10:47 -!- jmcn [~jamie@2.24.158.30] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 10:47 -!- eudoxia [~eudoxia@r167-57-17-47.dialup.adsl.anteldata.net.uy] has quit [Quit: Leaving] 10:48 < heath> did discussion die down in the mailing list or all the messages ping requests / test messages 10:48 < heath> or +are all the... 10:48 -!- cdecker [~cdecker@pc-10367.ethz.ch] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 10:51 -!- lnsybrd [~lnsybrd@72.44.238.238] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 10:52 -!- ThomasV [~ThomasV@unaffiliated/thomasv] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 10:53 -!- wallet42 [~wallet42@88.229.219.239] has quit [Quit: Leaving.] 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#bitcoin-wizards 11:46 -!- shen_noe [~shen_noe@wired042.math.utah.edu] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 11:46 -!- Xh1pher [~Xh1pher@pD9E38632.dip0.t-ipconnect.de] has quit [Read error: Connection reset by peer] 11:50 -!- erasmospunk [~erasmospu@lw.serv66.quikefall.com] has quit [Ping timeout: 256 seconds] 11:55 -!- davi [~davi@gnu/davi] has quit [Ping timeout: 246 seconds] 11:57 -!- cdecker [~cdecker@pc-10367.ethz.ch] has quit [Ping timeout: 277 seconds] 12:03 -!- cdecker [~cdecker@pc-10367.ethz.ch] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 12:05 -!- qawap_ is now known as qawap 12:11 -!- cdecker [~cdecker@pc-10367.ethz.ch] has quit [Write error: Broken pipe] 12:12 -!- cdecker [~cdecker@pc-10367.ethz.ch] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 12:17 -!- cdecker [~cdecker@pc-10367.ethz.ch] has quit [Ping timeout: 276 seconds] 12:20 -!- cdecker [~cdecker@pc-10367.ethz.ch] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 12:28 -!- rht__ [uid86914@gateway/web/irccloud.com/x-hbtnhrnlcydjzjwl] has quit [Quit: Connection closed for inactivity] 12:31 -!- frankenmint [~frankenmi@c-24-22-67-17.hsd1.or.comcast.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 12:33 -!- mjerr [~mjerr@p578EAB34.dip0.t-ipconnect.de] has quit [Ping timeout: 256 seconds] 12:35 -!- frankenmint [~frankenmi@c-24-22-67-17.hsd1.or.comcast.net] has quit [Client Quit] 12:36 < StephenM347> "Your membership in the mailing list Bitcoin-development has been disabled due to excessive bounces..." 12:36 < StephenM347> Anyone else get this? 12:36 -!- eudoxia [~eudoxia@r167-57-17-47.dialup.adsl.anteldata.net.uy] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 12:37 < kanzure> yep 12:37 < kanzure> check #bitcoin-dev irc logs 12:37 < StephenM347> kanzure: thanks, will do 12:41 < StephenM347> kanzure: http://bitcoinstats.com/irc/bitcoin-dev/logs/ doesn't seem to offer a search? 12:43 < kanzure> brutal... hmm. 12:43 < kanzure> well, one of the emails to bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net mentioned this, so perhaps view that email thread 12:46 -!- contrapumpkin [~copumpkin@unaffiliated/copumpkin] has 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#bitcoin-wizards 14:53 -!- gnusha [~gnusha@unaffiliated/kanzure/bot/gnusha] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 14:53 -!- Topic for #bitcoin-wizards: This channel is not about short-term Bitcoin development | http://bitcoin.ninja/ | This channel is logged. | For logs and more information, visit http://bitcoin.ninja 14:53 -!- Topic set by andytoshi [~andytoshi@unaffiliated/andytoshi] [Fri Aug 22 14:51:37 2014] 14:53 [Users #bitcoin-wizards] 14:53 [@ChanServ ] [ catlasshrugged ] [ Giszmo ] [ kanzure ] [ nwilcox ] [ stevenroose ] 14:53 [ [ace] ] [ cdecker ] [ gnusha ] [ kinlo ] [ OneFixt ] [ STRML ] 14:53 [ [d__d] ] [ cfields ] [ go1111111 ] [ koshii ] [ optimator ] [ sturles ] 14:53 [ _biO_ ] [ chmod755 ] [ goregrind ] [ Krellan ] [ otoburb ] [ SubCreative ] 14:53 [ _whitelogger ] [ CodeShark ] [ Graet ] [ kumavis ] [ p15x ] [ sundance ] 14:53 [ a5m0_ ] [ comboy ] [ grandmaster ] [ kyuupichan ] [ paveljanik ] [ superobserver ] 14:53 [ AaronvanW ] [ copumpkin ] [ GreenIsMyPepper] [ larraboj_ ] [ 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computer has gone to sleep] 16:04 -!- PaulCapestany [~PaulCapes@204.28.124.82] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 16:19 -!- rustyn [~rustyn@unaffiliated/rustyn] has quit [Ping timeout: 250 seconds] 16:21 -!- rustyn [~rustyn@unaffiliated/rustyn] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 16:21 -!- ThomasV [~ThomasV@unaffiliated/thomasv] has quit [Ping timeout: 272 seconds] 16:25 -!- DougieBot5000 [~DougieBot@unaffiliated/dougiebot5000] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 16:29 -!- Tebbo [~Jerry`@ip72-211-88-176.no.no.cox.net] has quit [Read error: Connection reset by peer] 16:30 -!- Tebbo [~Jerry`@ip72-211-88-176.no.no.cox.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 16:32 -!- lnovy [~lnovy@2002:4d57:f055::1] has quit [Ping timeout: 252 seconds] 16:33 -!- lnovy [~lnovy@2002:4d57:f055::1] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 16:35 -!- sipa [~pw@unaffiliated/sipa1024] has left #bitcoin-wizards [] 16:36 -!- zmanian [~zmanian@12.226.88.52] has quit [Ping timeout: 252 seconds] 16:37 -!- jgarzik [~jgarzik@unaffiliated/jgarzik] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 16:40 -!- zmanian [~zmanian@12.226.88.52] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 16:43 -!- gmaxwell [greg@wikimedia/KatWalsh/x-0001] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 16:43 -!- PRab [~chatzilla@2601:40a:8000:8f9b:959b:96b6:9b51:62f5] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 16:45 -!- melvster1 [~melvster@ip-86-49-18-198.net.upcbroadband.cz] has quit [Ping timeout: 252 seconds] 16:46 < CodeShark> is it possible to create an efficient accumulator that can be used to validate an entire transaction graph? 16:46 < gmaxwell> nwilcox: I think we identified some time ago what additional commitments are needed to efficiently randomly verify all rules (or at least most of them). Indeed, that could have some nice properties; but we're left with a couple issues: 16:47 -!- dEBRUYNE [~dEBRUYNE@239-196-ftth.onsbrabantnet.nl] has quit [Read error: Connection reset by peer] 16:48 < gmaxwell> one is that the additional commiments are expensive to maintain (e.g. vaguely a 20 fold increase in IO costs for full nodes) which is a bit unfortunate but perhaps surmountable, more problematic is the issue of censorship, how do you avoid the case where everyone just plays dumb about some invalidity to prevent you from detecting it? 16:48 < gmaxwell> That latter issue makes it less exciting. 16:49 < nwilcox> CodeShark: I'm curious if an "accumulator" is also possible... 16:49 < nwilcox> gmaxwell: Are these additional comments merkle paths to block header for each txin? 16:50 < nwilcox> s/comments/commitments/ 16:50 -!- c0rw|away is now known as c0rw1n 16:51 < CodeShark> recent results on zkSNARKs give proofs that do not depend on the size of the program nor input...but constructing the proof still is expensive 16:51 < gmaxwell> nwilcox: no, that wouldn't be sufficient because it can't be used to efficiently show the absense of a double spend. State commitments ("an accumulator" as you note) are sufficient (and I think necessary). https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/User:Gmaxwell/features#Proofs is the circa 2011/2012 stuff. IIRC there was something else that needed to be commited to that I forget now that isn't there. (kinda 16:51 < gmaxwell> stopped updating it when 99% of the effect it was having was feeding plagerism) 16:52 < gmaxwell> CodeShark: the proof in that space isn't 'recent results' it was always the case that the proofs were constant size, the name even means that ('Succinct' argument of knoweldge). :) 16:53 < CodeShark> right, well I only encountered it recently...so I'm a little behind :p 16:53 < CodeShark> if the cost of proofs are moved over to the sender, it could be conceivably made to scale 16:54 < CodeShark> the sender would only have to incorporate one more witness into the proof they got from each of their inputs 16:54 < gmaxwell> CodeShark: you still need publicaiton unfortunately, proving that a block is valid is fine, but if no one but the block author had the updated accumulator state then only they can produce more blocks. :( 16:56 < CodeShark> why would only the block author have the updated accumulator state? 16:58 < nwilcox> gmaxwell: (I haven't read the wiki link yet...) I was imagining SPV-style PoW verification as a "strong bet" against double spends, so I don't quite follow your comment. 16:58 < CodeShark> wouldn't it be sufficient for a sender to prove that the output they've created has witnesses all the way back to valid coinbase transactions? 16:58 * nwilcox skims wiki page. 17:00 -!- zooko [~user@2601:281:8101:3c71:9422:f2cb:c0e2:3299] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 17:02 -!- melvster [~melvster@ip-86-49-18-198.net.upcbroadband.cz] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 17:02 < gmaxwell> nwilcox: if you're trusting the hashpower then you can stop at just whats in bitcoin today. No more is needed. But _why_ trust the hashpower? it's a necessarily anonymous self-selecting group (you hope) of parties. :P There is a hope that the hashpower is economically incentivized to conform to the protocol because if they don't they'll get caught and their blocks ignored; but there needs to be 17:02 < gmaxwell> a mechenism for that to actually happen. :P 17:03 < gmaxwell> CodeShark: no because that doesn't show the absense of a double spend. 17:04 < nwilcox> gmaxwell: Well, yes, removing the reliance on PoW assumptions would be awesome. I wasn't considering that. 17:05 -!- jmcn [~jamie@2.24.158.69] has quit [Ping timeout: 276 seconds] 17:05 < gmaxwell> K. well if you're willing to make them, then bitcoin's SPV ought to be enough. 17:05 -!- jmcn [~jamie@2.24.158.69] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 17:05 < nwilcox> CodeShark: That sounds sufficient to me *iff* you assume PoW validation protects against double spends, right? 17:06 < gmaxwell> it's totally wasteful though, because you don't have to do that at all if you're trusting pow, just check the initial membership. Also I suggest traversing the graph of some coins sometime, for a great many you are rapidly casually connected to a signficant fraction of all transactions. :) 17:07 < gmaxwell> (thanks betting sites. :) ) 17:09 < nwilcox> I blame non-hoarders for tightly interweaving the transaction graph. 17:09 -!- erasmospunk [~erasmospu@gateway/vpn/privateinternetaccess/erasmospunk] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 17:10 < gmaxwell> nwilcox: there have been a number of on-blockchain betting services that their specific design required them to jointly spend coins from multiple sources that are atypically good at comingling histories, esp since moast of the transactions to them are numerous tiny amounts.. 17:10 < gmaxwell> er most 17:15 -!- d1ggy_ [~d1ggy@dslb-088-070-161-193.088.070.pools.vodafone-ip.de] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 17:18 -!- d1ggy [~d1ggy@dslc-082-082-155-231.pools.arcor-ip.net] has quit [Ping timeout: 265 seconds] 17:19 < CodeShark> gmaxwell: what about schemes that incentivize demonstration of double-spend proofs? 17:20 < CodeShark> point is construction of the proof could be offloaded to specialists who make it their business to detect them 17:20 < CodeShark> yes, there could be a conspiracy to withhold them 17:21 < CodeShark> but assuming the incentives are not misplaced and the system is sufficiently decentralized, can't it be made at least extremely difficult to enforce withholding? 17:21 -!- erasmospunk [~erasmospu@gateway/vpn/privateinternetaccess/erasmospunk] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 17:23 < CodeShark> actually...if you were to keep track of the total amount of existing coins on the network, wouldn't that also be a way to track double-spends? 17:23 < CodeShark> or detect them, rather 17:23 < gmaxwell> CodeShark: I am disappoint at your lack of reading sometimes, it makes talking with you a lot less fun. 17:23 < CodeShark> what should I read? 17:24 < gmaxwell> What I said in the discussion here (and #bitcoin-dev!) if I say something you don't get please ask me to cliarify. State commitments are sufficent to make the checks efficient (maybe necessary, not quite sure, e.g. commitments to a hashtree over the utxo set. 17:24 < gmaxwell> Then there are compact proofs for both double spending and spending a non-existing coin. 17:25 -!- tcrypt [~tylersmit@c-67-169-17-114.hsd1.ca.comcast.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 17:25 -!- tcrypt [~tylersmit@c-67-169-17-114.hsd1.ca.comcast.net] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 17:26 < CodeShark> the thing you seemed to be concerned about was withholding attacks 17:26 < CodeShark> everyone playing dumb 17:27 < CodeShark> and I, admittedly, hadn't clicked on your proofs link 17:28 < gmaxwell> it's okay, it's just that you seem to be reinventing this I'd just mentioned! :) 17:29 < CodeShark> so then what's the downside to state commitments? 17:29 < CodeShark> :) 17:30 < nwilcox> miner overhead? 17:30 < CodeShark> presumably we need a scheme that does not require even miners to perform full validation 17:30 < CodeShark> so asymptotically, it would actually reduce miner overhead 17:31 < gmaxwell> CodeShark: it's a large overhead for verifiying, because now you have to verify that the stat updates are faithful, which needs a bunch more random IO. 17:31 < gmaxwell> "asymptotically" is a good way to talk yourself into a lala land of irrelevance though. :) 17:32 < CodeShark> well, even for finite systems that are growing exponentially :) 17:32 < dgenr8> i don't read either. what stops somebody from presenting a perfectly good UTXO proof from two years ago when it was spent an hour ago? 17:32 < gmaxwell> basically with the right commitment sets you can avoid having anyone store the state, but then you end up carrying around membership and update proofs for each input (hashtree fragments) and for our current utxo set size they end up being a couple kilobytes. 17:33 < gmaxwell> "so great, you've saved a $1 one time disk space cost for a $50/mo bandwidth cost. :P (or what have you, random numbers -- the point I'm making is that asymptotics can be misleading) 17:34 < CodeShark> I'm talking about a model that can survive exponential growth in usage (at least for a while) 17:35 < CodeShark> if the usage were to remain constant, then yes, it's silly 17:35 < dgenr8> CodeShark: with full-node security, or SPV? 17:35 < CodeShark> with something a lot better than SPV - but not necessarily deterministic 17:35 < CodeShark> let's say with negligible failure rate 17:36 < CodeShark> or with mitigated failure 17:36 < dgenr8> CodeShark: akin to SPV with arbitrarily many peers? 17:37 < gmaxwell> as I said, these are not new ideas; you are _years_ behind on this, please go actually crunch the numbers on what it looks like and you'll see the tradeoffs are not attractive at least anywhere within the realm of reasonable loads (e.g. supportable on today's hardware) 17:37 < nwilcox> "CodeShark> presumably we need a scheme that does not require even miners to perform full validation" Woah... so, relaxing global consensus? 17:37 < CodeShark> gmaxwell: forgive me for being behind - I have not seen the literature with these numbers and can't possibly follow all the forums and mailing lists and read everything back to the beginning of time 17:37 < gmaxwell> dgenr8: SPV security is not really improved by 'arbitrarily many peers'. 17:38 < CodeShark> so if you have some good literature with a summary it would be greatly appreciated 17:39 < dgenr8> gmaxwell: no? if an SPV node connects to the entire network, how does withholding work? 17:39 < nwilcox> +1 for literature summaries for people catching up (if you can afford the effort/time). 17:40 < gmaxwell> CodeShark: you're forgiven, there is no great one stop shop to catch up in an instant; thats not what I'm barking about. But actually following the links I give in context would be good. 17:41 < gmaxwell> The key words in this space are "txo commitments" "stxo commitments" "utxo commitments" and "stateless mining". 17:41 < CodeShark> I usually do - I got interrupted by a phone call in this instance 17:41 < gmaxwell> :) 17:41 < gmaxwell> dgenr8: withholding _what_? 17:42 < CodeShark> believe me, gmaxwell, there's nothing I'd rather be working on more than solving these exact issues...unfortunately I also have a bunch of other stuff to attend to :p 17:42 < CodeShark> so if you can help me catch up so I can usefully contribute it would be very much appreciated 17:42 -!- jtimon [~quassel@69.29.134.37.dynamic.jazztel.es] has quit [Ping timeout: 246 seconds] 17:43 < gmaxwell> Will do. (But I don't have the time to do so right this second, but indeed collecting pointers on this would be very useful; since it seems a few new people have shown up) 17:43 < dgenr8> gmaxwell: spentness 17:43 < CodeShark> I think a bunch of people are essentially trying to invent the same thing here...and there isn't the best amount of communication 17:44 < gmaxwell> CodeShark: there was a ton of communication this litterally 100s of posts, mailing lists entries, presentations, wiki articles, implementations. 17:45 < CodeShark> please point :) 17:45 < CodeShark> most of the stuff on these things is noise 17:45 < gmaxwell> As I mentioned at the top, enthusasim has waned in part because of those two technical issues. 17:45 < CodeShark> and I just can't go through all of it 17:45 < phantomcircuit> Emcy, IPC is roughly irrelevant for bitcoin validation speed 17:45 < phantomcircuit> Emcy, i would be entirely surprised if intel is holding back on raw processing speed 17:45 < Emcy> what about moar coars 17:45 < phantomcircuit> probably the only way to significantly increase validation speed would be ops specifically intended for it 17:46 < hulkhogan_> CodeShark, grep ;p 17:46 < gmaxwell> dgenr8: what if no one at all knows? CodeShark's premise was that there are not full nodes at all, not even miners. So what if you create an invalid block and then just plead ignornace? 17:46 < Emcy> thye prob would put EC hardware in the cpu eventually but very liekly not the curve bitcoin uses 17:46 < gmaxwell> "oh, you want to test this part of it.. oh nope, don't know anything about that part" 17:46 < Emcy> EC is getting some widespread use now i think 17:47 < Emcy> though something bothers me about a CPU having all this hardware for very specific functions 17:47 < gmaxwell> Emcy: intel IPC has actually increased tremendously in recent parts.. count the actual cores. 17:48 < gmaxwell> they now ship 18 core parts... 17:49 -!- shen_noe [~shen_noe@wired042.math.utah.edu] has quit [Quit: Leaving] 17:50 < dgenr8> gmaxwell: the interesting question is how to serve a couple billion SPV nodes. for that, the network should not need to be all full nodes. miners though, they need full node security afaict 17:50 -!- Aquentin [~Aquentin@unaffiliated/aquentin] has quit [Ping timeout: 265 seconds] 17:51 < CodeShark> the only thing useful about the SPV concept is the hash tree - everything else I'd be totally happy scrapping :p 17:51 < gmaxwell> dgenr8: then you're talking about something different from codeshark. 17:52 < Emcy> 18 cores damn 17:52 < Emcy> not consumer though 17:52 < gmaxwell> Emcy: right because consumers would have no clue what to do with it, unfortunately. 17:53 < gmaxwell> applications have not scaled well to multicore in general, and consumers are (as we've noticed) now been conditioned to believe that fully using a core for more than a fraction of a second means the software broken. :( 17:53 < Emcy> how do we make sure bitcoin wont end up only runnable on server market parts 17:54 < jgarzik> throttle adoption 17:54 < gmaxwell> Emcy: non-server market seems mostly to be optimizing for power usage and size right now. 17:54 < leakypat> jgarzik: +1 17:54 -!- belcher [~belcher-s@unaffiliated/belcher] has quit [Quit: Leaving] 17:54 -!- c0rw1n is now known as c0rw|zZz 17:55 < gmaxwell> disagree that throttle adoption is necessary or sufficient. 17:56 < gmaxwell> A single person could drive bitcoin to require a 18 core server cpu to keep up with absent limits, behold the power of "while true"; mean while the overwhleming majority of bitcoin denominated transactions happen without perturbing the blockchain (inside exchanges.). 17:56 < leakypat> To clarify, I mean adoption of blockchain written transactions 17:57 -!- nwilcox [~nwilcox@c-76-103-245-13.hsd1.ca.comcast.net] has quit [Quit: leaving] 17:57 < gmaxwell> leakypat: yea, with that context I agree more! 17:57 -!- nessence [~alexl@162.17.137.27] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 17:58 < dgenr8> a UTXO set is a performance enhancement for a full node. since "everyone playing dumb" is a problem, it's probably just as well to skip the whole exercise of trying to prove unspentness... 17:58 < dgenr8> ...and just directly distribute the exercise of proving spentness. which just requires a tx index, not a summary database. 17:58 -!- gmaxwell [greg@wikimedia/KatWalsh/x-0001] has left #bitcoin-wizards [] 17:59 < dgenr8> ...and allows individual nodes to have less than the full blockchain. ie they are capable of proving spentness for a certain part of the space 18:00 < CodeShark> what about an incentives model? 18:00 < CodeShark> why would they be interested in proving it? 18:00 < Emcy> it seems the only consumer hardware still going for raw power is gfx cards 18:00 < Emcy> so bitcoin has to better utilise those right 18:01 < dgenr8> CodeShark: well when resource requirements were lower, I hear there were 350K nodes 18:01 < Emcy> amd is pretty good at the gpu compute stuff right 18:02 < CodeShark> dgenr8: but generally, yes - incentives for proofs of spentness seems like a promising approach 18:03 < phantomcircuit> Emcy, even gpu's aren't designed for continuous load 18:04 < Emcy> well bitcoin isnt continuous 18:08 -!- rht__ [uid86914@gateway/web/irccloud.com/x-zwbthifqrbevlaks] has quit [Quit: Connection closed for inactivity] 18:08 -!- shen_noe [~shen_noe@wired042.math.utah.edu] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 18:09 < dgenr8> CodeShark: suppose you had both. if you ask about a txout, and you get both an "unspent proof" and a "spent proof", guess which one wins ;) 18:09 < CodeShark> unspent proof seems a lot harder 18:13 < dgenr8> lack of an unspent proof is a lousy substitute for a spent proof. lack of a spent proof gets more interesting the larger the set who fail to provide it 18:14 < CodeShark> the only person who might perhaps have the proper incentives to provide unspent proofs are the spenders 18:15 < CodeShark> *is the spender 18:15 < CodeShark> for anyone else it 18:15 < CodeShark> it's too expensive 18:15 < CodeShark> not worth it 18:16 < CodeShark> however spent proofs are relatively cheap 18:17 -!- jb55 [~jb55@208.98.200.100] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 18:18 -!- jb55 [~jb55@208.98.200.100] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 18:18 < CodeShark> presumably if you got a spent and an unspent proof something broke :p 18:19 < dgenr8> CodeShark: unspent is fleeting. spent is forever (modulo reorgs) 18:20 < CodeShark> right - the unspent proof would only say "unspent within this particular chain" 18:21 < CodeShark> once the chain grows or changes, all bets are off 18:22 < CodeShark> so if a spender were to want to provide a proof of unspent, they'd have to continue updating the proof as the chain grew 18:22 -!- jb55 [~jb55@208.98.200.100] has quit [Ping timeout: 255 seconds] 18:23 -!- erasmospunk [~erasmospu@lw.serv194.quikefall.com] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 18:23 < dgenr8> i'm not sure that's harder than keeping a txindex, but the logical properties of an sxto query seem superior 18:23 < CodeShark> well, it's also difficult because the witness must be compressed 18:24 < CodeShark> it must use some SNARG or SNARK of some sort 18:24 < CodeShark> whereas proof-of-spent can be easily accomplished with a single witness...the transaction that spends it 18:25 < dgenr8> yes. the other stuff is reading-list material for me ;) 18:25 -!- bramc [~bram@99-75-88-206.lightspeed.sntcca.sbcglobal.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 18:25 < phantomcircuit> Emcy, IBD is continuous load 18:25 < bramc> There seems to be a law of commenting on bitcoin online: No matter what you say, somebody will accuse you of being a socialist 18:26 < CodeShark> pinko! 18:27 < CodeShark> hmm, not sure I've gotten that accusation from bitcoin specifically, bramc 18:27 < zooko> bramc: I'm just saving up my favorite Bram Cohen quote about Bitcoin for the right moment. 18:27 < Emcy> yes but not forever 18:27 < Emcy> cards are coming with stock waterloop snow anyway 18:29 < bramc> zooko, Huh? 18:30 < Emcy> >mfw "If there is hope, it lies with the gamers" 18:30 -!- GAit [~lnahum@2-230-161-158.ip202.fastwebnet.it] has quit [Read error: Connection reset by peer] 18:31 < Emcy> socialism is ok 18:31 < Emcy> it saved my nans life a few months back after a series of 4 minor strokes 18:32 -!- priidu [~priidu@unaffiliated/priidu] has quit [Ping timeout: 264 seconds] 18:32 -!- GAit [~lnahum@2-230-161-158.ip202.fastwebnet.it] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 18:33 < bramc> Emcy, My own economic outlook isn't so simplistic, I'm just confuzzled that people are accusing me of being a socialist for wanting to have prices set by market demand instead of subsidizing them to be zero 18:33 < bramc> supply and demand I mean 18:33 < zooko> bramc: I was just reminded of my favorite quote by Bram Cohen about how stupid Bitcoin is. 18:33 < zooko> bramc: I was teasingly claiming that I'm waiting for the worst possible moment to quote you on it. 18:33 < bramc> zooko, Using bitcoin as a 'store of value' continues to be ridiculous 18:33 * zooko cackles gleefully 18:34 < Emcy> subsidising the fees? 18:34 < bramc> zooko, People are quoting me on it to attack me now, I don't care. I will happily remind people about the track record of bitcoin to date in terms of what's it's done to people who have bought into it 18:35 < Emcy> what you described seems the opposite of socialism 18:35 < bramc> Emcy, subsidizing the transaction costs I mean. I just finished driving for two hours and am not wording good 18:36 < bramc> Emcy, Hence my being confuzzled! 18:36 -!- erasmospunk [~erasmospu@lw.serv194.quikefall.com] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 18:36 < Emcy> except if it counts as corporate socialism to the miners, which is the only kind of socialism people seem to be blind to heh 18:42 < zooko> bramc: wait, they're already quoting you from when you said something like "Bitcoin is just digital goldbuggery, which is even more idiotic than normal goldbuggery" ? Damn, there goes my chance to embarass you in public. 18:42 < bramc> zooko, It's golbuggism not goldbuggery, and yes they are 18:42 < amiller> rofl goldbuggery 18:43 < bramc> And I've always said, and continue to say, that getting excited about bitcoin because the value is going up is stupid, and saying it's a failure because the value is going down only marginally less so. 18:43 < Emcy> >goldbuggery 18:43 < Emcy> it seems it is you who has provided a quote for the ages zooko 18:44 < zooko> lol 18:44 -!- zmanian [~zmanian@12.226.88.52] has quit [Ping timeout: 272 seconds] 18:52 -!- shen_noe [~shen_noe@wired042.math.utah.edu] has quit [Quit: Leaving] 18:52 -!- erasmospunk [~erasmospu@179.43.144.98] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 18:52 -!- Dr-G [~Dr-G@unaffiliated/dr-g] has quit [Disconnected by services] 18:52 -!- Dr-G2 [~Dr-G@xd9bf77f7.dyn.telefonica.de] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 18:54 -!- Dazik [~Dazik@2607:fcc8:bd85:fa00:44d9:c7ff:a324:29df] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 19:03 -!- jaekwon [~jae@2601:645:8001:f5c8:dcd4:830:a4df:e259] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 19:11 -!- nessence [~alexl@c-68-51-194-2.hsd1.mi.comcast.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 19:13 -!- airbreather_ [~airbreath@d149-67-99-43.nap.wideopenwest.com] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 19:19 -!- erasmospunk [~erasmospu@179.43.144.98] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 19:23 -!- cosmo [~james@unaffiliated/cosmo] has quit [Quit: Leaving] 19:42 -!- Dazik [~Dazik@2607:fcc8:bd85:fa00:44d9:c7ff:a324:29df] has quit [Ping timeout: 248 seconds] 19:44 -!- Dazik [~Dazik@2607:fcc8:bd85:fa00:9977:2873:8a6f:97cf] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 19:49 -!- PRab [~chatzilla@2601:40a:8000:8f9b:959b:96b6:9b51:62f5] has quit [Quit: ChatZilla 0.9.91.1 [Firefox 38.0.5/20150525141253]] 19:50 -!- erasmospunk [~erasmospu@46-198-64-31.adsl.cyta.gr] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 19:54 < bramc> Aaand Gavin's proposed BIP uses nlocktime instead of block height for rollout dates. The whole subject is horribly depressing. 19:58 < Dazik> join #warez 19:58 -!- Dazik [~Dazik@2607:fcc8:bd85:fa00:9977:2873:8a6f:97cf] has left #bitcoin-wizards ["Leaving"] 20:05 -!- prodatalab [~prodatala@2602:306:ceef:a750:577:5919:1b9c:af13] has quit [Ping timeout: 248 seconds] 20:27 -!- PRab [~chatzilla@2601:40a:8000:8f9b:959b:96b6:9b51:62f5] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 20:32 -!- copumpkin [~copumpkin@unaffiliated/copumpkin] has quit [] 20:35 -!- copumpkin [~copumpkin@unaffiliated/copumpkin] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 20:35 < CodeShark> bramc: you mean block_timestamp, not nlocktime (I hope) :) 20:36 < CodeShark> although block_timestamp is almost as bad :p 20:36 < jgarzik> indeed, it is block_timestamp 20:37 < jgarzik> median time has been suggested on the list 20:37 -!- erasmosp_ [~erasmospu@104.238.169.23] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 20:38 < bramc> If you want to be more precise about future time, you can have block_timestamp be used at some point to determine an amount of extra height before things kick in 20:39 < bramc> That would be a few minutes noisy but not have weird reorg problems 20:39 < CodeShark> I don't quite get the rationale for not using block_height either - I mean, I can understand that block height doesn't accurately predict a moment in time...but the rationale given is that the block height isn't available in the block header. 20:39 < CodeShark> two things: you still need to calculate block height to validate difficulty 20:40 < CodeShark> and...if we're going to hard-fork, might as well move the block height into the header rather than using that ridiculous coinbase hack 20:41 -!- erasmospunk [~erasmospu@46-198-64-31.adsl.cyta.gr] has quit [Ping timeout: 276 seconds] 20:41 < CodeShark> and let's add an extra arbitrary 256 field to the header to allow for future extensions 20:41 < CodeShark> oh, right...that breaks miners 20:42 < CodeShark> also, if we can't hack around the coinbase data issue, we could have a way of requesting only the merkle tree for the coinbase transaction 20:45 -!- erasmosp_ [~erasmospu@104.238.169.23] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 20:45 -!- TheSeven [~quassel@rockbox/developer/TheSeven] has quit [Ping timeout: 256 seconds] 20:46 < CodeShark> still is an utterly rube-goldbergish hack...but at least it can be easily encapsulated so we never have to ever look at it in our code again 20:48 < CodeShark> I can already imagine miners creating coinbase transactions with a zillion outputs just to piss us off :p 20:50 -!- TheSeven [~quassel@rockbox/developer/TheSeven] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 20:52 < CodeShark> so someone please explain to me the use case for "not needing to know the block height when doing validation" ? 21:06 < CodeShark> it is quite depressing, bramc... 21:08 < CodeShark> ah...I see Gavin's real reason in the ML 21:09 < CodeShark> it was easier for him to hack up something that only requires the timestamp :p 21:09 < CodeShark> grabbing the block height was apparently too much work 21:09 < phantomcircuit> CodeShark, the block height is not suitable because it can be +- the network hashrate growth from the expected day 21:09 < phantomcircuit> ie you calculate the expected height in 6 months 21:09 < phantomcircuit> price goes up and the hashrate goes up 21:09 < CodeShark> it's not particularly accurate - but it's very well-defined 21:10 < CodeShark> same thing goes for block reward halving 21:10 < phantomcircuit> and the difficulty retarget lag causes that block height to be reached x% earlier 21:10 < phantomcircuit> CodeShark, using the timestamp is reasonable, the way it's being used is comically absurd 21:13 < bramc> It could be set to the first block with a timestamp greater than X plus a certain amount of height 21:14 < phantomcircuit> bramc, and we have a winner! 21:14 < CodeShark> :) 21:14 < bramc> That would be fairly easy to hack up, and not have so many headaches. 21:15 < phantomcircuit> bramc, it's really silly either way though 21:15 < phantomcircuit> if you actually have a majority consensus you merely need to switch the nodes version of reality permanently 21:15 < phantomcircuit> all the non believers be damned 21:16 < CodeShark> the question is whether the reality really switched 21:16 -!- Jaamg [jhpiloma@gateway/shell/tkk.fi/x-dhmfxcvcjxhrvrul] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 21:16 < CodeShark> if you can 21:17 < bramc> Might as well move around some utxos while you're at it. Get rid of all the really old unspent mining rewards, maybe eliminate the ones known to have been seized my mt. gox. 21:17 < CodeShark> lol 21:17 < phantomcircuit> CodeShark, that's the great joke 21:18 < phantomcircuit> what miners vote for is meaningless 21:18 < phantomcircuit> using that as the switch over criteria shows a fundamental failure to understand the matter 21:18 < CodeShark> we lack any other objective metrics besides hashing power that can't easily be games 21:18 < CodeShark> *gamed 21:18 < justanotherusr> I think the idea is to assume everyone already switched over manually.. 21:19 < CodeShark> that's the unfortunate truth 21:19 < justanotherusr> the miner vote is just to get miners to agree with each other before they risk wasting moneey 21:19 < phantomcircuit> CodeShark, the only metric that matters is user adoption 21:19 < phantomcircuit> CodeShark, which cannot be reliably measured 21:19 < phantomcircuit> there is no safe way to hard fork 21:19 < CodeShark> phantomcircuit: precisely 21:19 < phantomcircuit> tada 21:19 < bramc> phantomcircuit, Miner buy-in for compatible extensions works fine 21:20 < phantomcircuit> bramc, yes for a soft fork it's fine 21:21 < phantomcircuit> bramc, since it's essentially the miners colluding to censor transactions which violate the new rules 21:21 < bramc> phantomcircuit, That's part of it, but it's also them agreeing that they'll all understand the extensions and deciding when to start issuing them 21:23 -!- sundance30203 [6abc6be8@gateway/web/freenode/ip.106.188.107.232] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 21:23 < bramc> technically a soft fork where the miners all agreed to censor certain utxos and make them unspendable would also work 21:23 < bramc> Although that... would be a bad idea 21:24 < phantomcircuit> bramc, shh dont tell them 21:24 < CodeShark> for a hardfork, if the vast majority of users are still on the old fork it just means miners waste their hashing power securing nothing 21:24 < phantomcircuit> CodeShark, correct 21:25 < bramc> CodeShark, The result of a hardfork doesn't tend towards one side or the other winning, it tends to mining hashpower going to the two sides proportionately to what their mining rewards are trading at on exchanges 21:25 -!- mjerr [~mjerr@p578EAB34.dip0.t-ipconnect.de] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 21:25 < phantomcircuit> bramc, thus it being almost certainly a disaster unless you can achieve near universal consensus first 21:25 < bramc> Just like they're two completely unrelated altcoins, which basically they are 21:25 < CodeShark> bramc: yes, but I would think that's highly correlated with the proportion of actual users 21:26 < CodeShark> the price at exchanges, that is 21:26 < bramc> phantomcircuit, Yes exactly 21:26 < bramc> CodeShark, There aren't very many exchanges, they're the ones who have the greater say 21:26 < CodeShark> the exchanges will go with what they think is in their own economic self interest 21:27 < CodeShark> higher volume of trading would generally be seen as better for their bottom line 21:27 < CodeShark> however...I don't think this forked ledger is a stable situation :p 21:27 < CodeShark> I think the ultimate outcome is both lose 21:27 < CodeShark> either one wins overwhelmingly...or both lose 21:29 < CodeShark> and the longer the fork carries on without an overwhelming victor, the more likely they'll both lose 21:29 < phantomcircuit> CodeShark, except a bunch of them are planning to do centralized offchain transactions also 21:30 < phantomcircuit> so whose to say? 21:30 < CodeShark> I don't quite follow 21:30 < CodeShark> was that meant sarcastically? :) 21:30 < phantomcircuit> CodeShark, lots of them have -- as part of their business model -- operating trusted off chain transaction systems 21:31 < phantomcircuit> which mucks up the question about rational actors 21:31 < CodeShark> sure - that's fine for internal trades. the issue only applies to on-chain deposits and withdrawals 21:31 < CodeShark> but if it's easier for someone to get into and out of positions, they're more likely to want to trade 21:31 < jgarzik> a longstanding forked ledger is incredibly unlikely 21:32 < jgarzik> c.f. "50 BTC or die" folks :) 21:32 < phantomcircuit> jgarzik, at a 75% switch over it's practically guaranteed to happen for some period of time exceeding a week 21:33 < phantomcircuit> there's a fairly substantial amount of mining infrastructure that's entirely on autopilot 21:33 < phantomcircuit> nobody would even notice 21:34 -!- sundance30203_ [6abc6be8@gateway/web/freenode/ip.106.188.107.232] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 21:34 < phantomcircuit> hell even if 1% stays 21:34 < phantomcircuit> that's 1 block/day 21:35 < jgarzik> c.f. P2SH :) 21:35 < CodeShark> and not only do both forks lose in this scenario - any potential future cryptocoin loses as well 21:35 < jgarzik> That's perfectly OK... miners are allowed to piss money away 21:35 < CodeShark> confidence in the whole idea suffers 21:35 -!- sundance30203 [6abc6be8@gateway/web/freenode/ip.106.188.107.232] has quit [Ping timeout: 246 seconds] 21:36 < CodeShark> if a few miners are the only ones left behind I don't think anyone will shed a tear 21:37 < jgarzik> a few miners + MP 21:37 < jgarzik> ;p 21:37 < jgarzik> hmmmmm. Now I like forking even more ;p 21:37 < CodeShark> lol 21:40 < phantomcircuit> jgarzik, soft fork experience is meaningless 21:40 < CodeShark> the march 11th fork is actually a great example of user adoption did defeat hashing power adoption...but only by human intervention 21:41 < CodeShark> and willing cooperation from said miners 21:41 -!- rht__ [uid86914@gateway/web/irccloud.com/x-admfuxeqydaiinex] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 21:42 < moa> bramc: " it tends to mining hashpower going to the two sides proportionately to what their mining rewards are trading at on exchanges" 21:42 < moa> this is exactly what happened in early days of namecoin 21:42 < moa> and viiolent oscillations bettwen value and hashpower shifts 21:43 < CodeShark> are you talking about miners who mined both bitcoin and namecoin? not sure how this example fits in 21:44 < phantomcircuit> moa, and now namecoin is worthless 21:44 < phantomcircuit> so historical precedent is not good 21:44 < CodeShark> two merge-mined distinct ledgers is a whole lot better than one fork-mined ledger :p 21:44 < phantomcircuit> CodeShark, namecoin forked a bunch of times 21:45 < phantomcircuit> CodeShark, which resulted in diffent exchanges trading different forks 21:45 < CodeShark> ah 21:46 < CodeShark> that must have been a few weeks before I came into this space 21:47 < moa> CodeShark: this was before merge mining 21:48 < CodeShark> merged mining is perhaps namecoin's most significant legacy. unfortunately, namecoin's merged mining implementation is just about the worst possible way it can be done :p 21:49 < moa> depending on points in the cycle it was more profitable to mine namecoin or bitcoin, with same hashpower 21:50 < CodeShark> I missed out on all that mining fun - I never got to do any bitcoin mining 21:50 < moa> so hashpower was jumping back and forward between ... and exchange rate and difficulty oscillating wildly 21:51 < moa> which was partly the incentive to implement merge mining 21:51 < CodeShark> when I came into this space, GPU mining probably at its peak 21:51 < moa> hurredly admittably ... but hey 21:51 < moa> it works right 21:51 < CodeShark> it actually explains a bunch, moa 21:51 -!- wallet42 [~wallet42@78.179.116.60] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 21:54 < moa> lesson being you do NOT want the sha(256) hash power to split and start competing against each other 21:54 < moa> it's like a dragon eating it's own tail 21:56 < CodeShark> switching between different coins is not nearly as bad as switching between different ledgers of the same coin :p 21:57 < CodeShark> during the march 11th fork, the recommended policy for merchants and exchanges was to stop all transactions until the fork is resolved 22:00 < phantomcircuit> CodeShark, which is the only rational behavior during a hard fork 22:00 < phantomcircuit> which means there's no rational way to decide which side to goto as a user/miner 22:00 < phantomcircuit> and tada 22:00 < phantomcircuit> systemic collaprse 22:01 < CodeShark> there could be a rational reason to back one fork rather than the other if you strongly believe it will ultimately prevail 22:01 < CodeShark> as a miner, that is 22:02 < CodeShark> as a user, I think the rational thing to do is wait :) 22:02 < CodeShark> barring criminal intent, of course 22:03 < CodeShark> as a miner, the only real downside to backing one side and losing, really, is cost of electricity and a few missed blocks 22:04 < CodeShark> so one could even argue that it's more rational to mine on either fork (even without having any idea which will prevail) than not mining at all 22:07 < phantomcircuit> CodeShark, the rational decision for miners is to turn off their equipment 22:07 < phantomcircuit> fun right? 22:08 < CodeShark> so the conclusion is 75% of hashing power is an extremely poor metric to use here :p 22:08 < CodeShark> but any other metric likely requires some level of human intervention 22:10 < jgarzik> miners follow users after a hard fork 22:10 < jgarzik> except the ones on autopilot that get ignored 22:11 < CodeShark> jgarzik: that only happened on march 11th because of pressure applied on a few big pool operators 22:11 < CodeShark> had that not been done, they might not have noticed for a while :) 22:12 < CodeShark> autopilot definitely favored the minority fork in that situation 22:14 < phantomcircuit> CodeShark, i believe it is actually the worst possible 22:14 < phantomcircuit> it's high enough that the uninformed will believe it's meaningful 22:14 < phantomcircuit> will also being a useless metric 22:14 < phantomcircuit> AND basically gurantees a true network split 22:15 < CodeShark> can't we conduct a poll somehow and decide based on that? (yes, I know polls can be sybilled...but let's not be such geeks for a moment and think practically) 22:15 -!- sy5error [~sy5error@unaffiliated/sy5error] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 22:15 < phantomcircuit> jgarzik, you really have no way of knowing that, the march fork had an entirely clear course of action once it became clear what was happening 22:15 < phantomcircuit> CodeShark, no because sybil 22:15 < CodeShark> lol 22:16 < phantomcircuit> CodeShark, the polls people have put up are actually being attacked in this manner 22:16 < CodeShark> we don't just place an online questionaire up for anonymous responses - we'd have to have the process monitored by actual people...and yes, it can get political 22:19 < jgarzik> phantomcircuit, outside of hyperventilating wizards, the near unanimous majority I hear wants the network to continue to scale. If the network hard forks to 2MB in 6 months, the network will not fall over. Hard forks include big risks, but it is being blown way out of proportion -- on here & by Mike Hearn both. Mountains are being made out of molehills. 22:19 < jgarzik> As a result, when the block limit is higher and there is truly a danger to decentralization, the wizards will get ignored because they squawked too loudly, too early. 22:20 < jgarzik> On the conservative side there is a noted lack of proposals, which leads to difficulty in taking that side seriously. At least Adam has his thinking cap on. 22:20 < CodeShark> I don't think we're only talking about this block size issue, jgarzik - I think this applies generally to having any sort of hard fork process 22:21 < CodeShark> it's not about people wanting the network to scale, ultimately...that's a red herring 22:21 < jgarzik> CodeShark, perhaps - the context is unavoidable. _This_ hard fork is not going to end the world. 22:21 < CodeShark> it's about one group of developers wanting control over the network vs. another 22:21 < jgarzik> and painting is thusly is disengenuous 22:21 < CodeShark> that's really what it will come down to 22:22 < CodeShark> let's not be naive here 22:22 -!- antanst [~Adium@athedsl-341422.home.otenet.gr] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 22:22 < phantomcircuit> jgarzik, i've heard things from "what the fuck" to "i want bigger blocks without a hard fork" 22:22 < jgarzik> leave the cloister 22:22 < jgarzik> and get out into the world 22:22 < phantomcircuit> jgarzik, i've yet to speak to anybody who both wanted larger blocks and understood that they required a hard fork 22:23 < phantomcircuit> "your sample size is small and you should feel bad!" 22:24 < jgarzik> I've literally been flying all over the world taking samples ;p 22:25 < CodeShark> also, the block size increase push has a lot more to do with avoiding fee pressures than scaling 22:25 < CodeShark> let's also not be naive about that one :) 22:26 < leakypat> I couldn't find anyone at my meet up who didn't want to raise the block limit, some wanted it removed with no limit 22:26 < phantomcircuit> jgarzik, i suspect your samples are strongly biased 22:26 < jgarzik> CodeShark, yes - and they go hand in hand. To review, the _years long_ policy has been avoiding fee pressure. That is the market expectation. It is a major - and conscious - market shift to change that. 22:26 < jgarzik> That is not a judgement of good/bad, just a statement of fact. 22:26 < phantomcircuit> either way 22:26 < phantomcircuit> nobody will be happen when shit explodes 22:27 < jgarzik> Maybe you want fee pressure, maybe you don't. 22:27 < jgarzik> either way, it is a delta 22:27 < phantomcircuit> note: i personally will divest entirely before the fork date... 22:27 < jgarzik> to argue to _begin_ fee pressure is a market change 22:27 < leakypat> Most people I talk to aren't aware that fees are subsidized 22:27 < jgarzik> and an economic policy change 22:27 < moa> just a little fee pressure then? 22:27 < bramc> jgarzik, 'Leave things be' as a proposal is hard to take seriously? 22:27 < Luke-Jr> jgarzik: we have had fee pressure before 22:28 < jgarzik> bramc, No semantics will get around the fact that it is an change in economic policy to introduce consistent fee pressure. 22:28 < jgarzik> Luke-Jr, not consistently, http://hashingit.com/analysis/39-the-myth-of-the-megabyte-bitcoin-block 22:28 < bramc> jgarzik, arguably the market expectation has been that the rules which everyone has bought into by participating in the system will continue to be followed 22:29 < Luke-Jr> jgarzik: also, it's becoming more and more apparent that we will have fee pressure no matter what very soon: "stress test" spammers are going to be filling blocks as much as they can. 22:29 -!- shen_noe [~shen_noe@wired042.math.utah.edu] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 22:29 < Luke-Jr> jgarzik: I'm not sure what the link is meant to suggest. 22:29 < bramc> jgarzik, Is a balloon at the end of a mortgage schedule a sudden change in policy? 22:29 < jgarzik> bramc, If you want to argue for economic change, that's fine 22:29 < jgarzik> bramc, but be honest and admit that it is different from current policy 22:29 < Luke-Jr> jgarzik: we haven't consistently had no-fee-pressure either 22:30 -!- arubi_ [~ese168@unaffiliated/arubi] has quit [Quit: Leaving] 22:30 < jgarzik> Luke-Jr, on average yes we have. each time the situation arises, Hearn lobbies miners to increase their block size soft limit, and/or Bitcoin Core increases default miner soft limit. 22:30 < jgarzik> the history is quite clear. 22:30 < bramc> jgarzik, I am arguing for economic change, but it's also coming right on schedule, as everyone paying attention has been aware of for years 22:30 -!- GAit [~lnahum@2-230-161-158.ip202.fastwebnet.it] has quit [Read error: Connection reset by peer] 22:30 < jgarzik> the numbers are quite clear. 22:31 < jgarzik> bursts of fee pressure are inevitable and natural. the long run average is low pressure / subsidized however. 22:32 < moa> full nodes could be incentivised to pay miners for smaller blocks I suppose 22:32 < dgenr8> people keep saying that word "subsidized". i dont think it means what they think it means 22:32 < gwillen> dgenr8: transactions are secured by miners, but miners are paid by inflation right now, not by transactions. 22:32 < gwillen> So the security of transactions is subsidized. 22:33 < bramc> gwillen, Also subsidized by full nodes 22:33 -!- GAit [~lnahum@2-230-161-158.ip202.fastwebnet.it] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 22:33 < dgenr8> that makes all kinds of assumptions about the future economic value of the block reward 22:34 < moa> hearn is a good lobbyist, it has to be said ... the bitcoin foundation could have used him 22:34 < bramc> dgenr8, Some members of the ecosystem are taking on significant costs to avoid those costs hitting others. 'subsidized' is a close enough word. 22:34 < dgenr8> the exhg rate since the last halving pays for the next 3 halvings. 22:34 < bramc> the bitcoin foundation seems to be a collection of the sketchiest people you'll ever meet 22:35 < dgenr8> so lets not get too up in arms about it 22:35 -!- jmcn [~jamie@2.24.158.69] has quit [Ping timeout: 276 seconds] 22:35 < jgarzik> moa: hehehehe I dunno I think hearn isn't so great as a lobbyist, he's angering everyone with this contentious fork stuff 22:35 < bramc> dgenr8, Nobody is suggesting getting rid of the halving! 22:35 < jgarzik> maybe he is a lobbyist for keeping it at 1MB :) 22:35 -!- jmcn [~jamie@2.24.158.69] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 22:35 < dgenr8> read what i wrote again 22:35 < dgenr8> exchange rate is up 10x since 2012 halving 22:36 < dgenr8> gavin is right that this is the number miners should care about 22:36 < CodeShark> there seem to be two main interests behind the fee pressure avoidance policy: 1) bitcoin maximalists who think if we only were able to convince more people to use bitcoin the network would magically be able to suddenly support hundreds of millions of new users. 2) lazy developers who don't want to try to figure out a good solution to fee bidding 22:37 < bramc> I like fee bidding as a subject. I wish we were discussing that. 22:37 < jgarzik> CodeShark, now who's being naive ;p 22:37 < CodeShark> I said "seem" :p 22:38 < gwillen> bramc: I was interested to see that fee estimation is more widely deployed than I realized 22:38 -!- droark [~droark@209-6-53-207.c3-0.smr-ubr1.sbo-smr.ma.cable.rcn.com] has quit [Quit: ZZZzzz…] 22:38 < bramc> gwillen, Where? How? 22:38 < gwillen> that plus safe-RBF (or CPFP) sort of gives you fee bidding 22:38 < gwillen> bramc: let me see if I can find where I read that 22:39 < bramc> safe-rbf is something but it sucks. It directly reduces the potential throughput of the system as a whole, driving up prices even more 22:39 < jgarzik> CodeShark, software & market are not prepared for consistent fee pressure. c.f. economic policy change. 22:39 -!- Giszmo [~leo@pc-185-201-214-201.cm.vtr.net] has quit [Quit: Leaving.] 22:39 < jgarzik> "Let's change economic policies without preparing the ecosystem!" is not a responsible position. 22:39 < gwillen> bramc: https://gist.github.com/petertodd/8e87c782bdf342ef18fb 22:39 < jgarzik> sorry bramc 22:39 < gwillen> bramc: "As of v0.10.0 Bitcoin Core estimates fees for you based on the supply and demand observed on the network. By default it tries to pay a sufficiently large fee to get into the next block, so as demand increases it pays higher fees to compensate." 22:39 < gwillen> jgarzik: it's clearly a chicken-and-egg problem 22:40 < gwillen> jgarzik: nobody puts in engineering effort to fix problems that don't exist yet 22:40 < moa> maybe we could have full nodes into a pool for assurance contracts that pays miners automatically when they produce smaller blocks ... and run it on lighthouse? 22:40 < bramc> gwillen, *cringe* there are some control theory problems with that 22:40 < gwillen> bramc: oh sure, but it's a first attempt at least 22:40 < gwillen> it's better than _not_ doing it 22:40 < gwillen> it at least gives a better starting point for RBF than just guessing blindly 22:40 -!- pavel_ [~paveljani@79-98-72-216.sys-data.com] has quit [Quit: Leaving] 22:41 -!- paveljanik [~paveljani@79-98-72-216.sys-data.com] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 22:41 -!- paveljanik [~paveljani@79-98-72-216.sys-data.com] has quit [Changing host] 22:41 -!- paveljanik [~paveljani@unaffiliated/paveljanik] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 22:41 < gwillen> you're right that a real auction would be better economically, but I'm not even sure how you'd begin to do that 22:41 -!- ThomasV [~ThomasV@unaffiliated/thomasv] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 22:41 < CodeShark> it clearly is chicken-and-egg...we need to push the envelope...and can't expect things to always be economically smooth 22:41 < bramc> jgarzik, I very much want to discuss economic preparation, but the conversation is all getting derailed by talk about a hard fork and rbf not being supported and things which are generally sabotaging forward progress :-P 22:41 < CodeShark> we need to be faced with the problem to motivate us to find a solution - and it's arguably easier to solve it now rather than later...while blocks are still mostly subsidized by reward 22:42 < bramc> I've also talked with the lightning network guys and am trying to help with that as I can 22:42 < gwillen> jgarzik: do you follow rusty's blog at all? http://rusty.ozlabs.org/ 22:43 < gwillen> jgarzik: he has good posts recently about (1) what gets crowded out if blocks fill, and (2) what happens to latency if blocks grow. (Both simulations based on guesses, obviously.) 22:44 < bramc> gwillen, Miner algorithms for what to accept are *mostly* straightforward, it's the clients deciding on fees which is hard. 22:44 < gwillen> bramc: agree on that, yes 22:45 < bramc> Come to think of it, a lot of people not cringing about the suggested fee estimation techniques is because they don't have much experience with control theory. I have, uh, a lot more experience than I ever cared to with control theory. 22:46 < gwillen> When you talk about control theory, is the issue that you can't reason adequately about what fees are required based on the data you have? Or that a bunch of clients trying to naively do so at the same time will interact badly with each other? 22:46 < gwillen> I.e. fees will oscillate wildly or something? 22:47 < moa> bramc ... multivariate problem requiring LQR, perhaps with LQE thrown in? 22:47 < gwillen> Because I could imagine both of these being an issue although it seems like both of them _could_ be fine in practice. 22:48 -!- Mably [~Mably@unaffiliated/mably] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 22:48 < bramc> gwillen, oscillation is one example of a problem. The issue is that if you have some algorithm for setting prices, and everybody's using it, then prices will be set based on what the previous prices were... which were also set by algorithm 22:48 < gwillen> That's not inherently bad... but I agree that it could be 22:49 < bramc> moa, unfortunately each participant only does things very sporadically, so those kinds of information-heavy approaches don't even apply 22:50 < bramc> I believe that no matter what your general approach to price setting is, you always want to make an attempt to lowball early and only raise the price if it fails 22:50 < bramc> Otherwise prices have a tendency to get high and get stuck there for no particular reason 22:51 < gwillen> well, this particular problem doesn't seem too likely to get stuck there 22:52 < gwillen> depends on how the estimator works I guess, but the marginal price to get into a block is just above the minimum price of any transaction in that block 22:52 < gwillen> and if a block is literally full of transactions above a given price, it's hard to imagine the fair price being below that 22:52 < CodeShark> gwillen, miners could fake them 22:52 < gwillen> mmmmmm, true 22:53 < bramc> gwillen, Yes, but if everybody assumes that they need to offer that same amount to get into the next block then it may happen, even if it's untrue 22:53 < gwillen> bramc: if everybody is _willing_ to offer that amount to get into the next block, it can't be untrue 22:53 < CodeShark> unfortunately, without listening to the network gossip it seems very difficult to accurately assess fees... 22:53 < gwillen> the only way the true price could be lower is if people are letting the fee estimator pay money it's not actually worth to them, because they're asleep at the switch 22:54 < bramc> gwillen, maybe it looks like it's true because the miners fill up the extra space with self-payments 22:54 < CodeShark> just looking at past blocks is not enough 22:54 < gwillen> yes, miner cheating could do it 22:54 < gwillen> although you'd need a minimum hashrate fraction or a cartel, to make it profitable 22:54 < gwillen> I don't know what that fraction would be 22:54 < gwillen> otherwise you'd be bleeding fake fees to other miners 22:55 -!- spinza [~spin@197.89.24.164] has quit [Ping timeout: 252 seconds] 22:55 < gwillen> (oh, that's a lie, nevermind.... of course you only mine your fake fees into your own blocks) 22:55 < bramc> Also it could be that the fees on the next block will be dramatically lower than the last one, so maybe offering the same amount is a bad idea because you're paying too much. 22:55 < CodeShark> in principle, if miners are checked by sufficient parties, recent blocks would tend to be a fairly good guide...but I think bramc's claim of the "stuck" phenomenon is clients that aren't smart enough to figure out when miners start cheating 22:55 < gwillen> right, although that can be counteracted by looking at multiple past blocks, and looking at the mempool 22:55 < gwillen> yeah, miner cheating is the only serious issue I'm seeing here, but it's pretty serious 22:56 < bramc> Looking at the mempool can help, although it's fraught with danger 22:56 < bramc> And it requires new logic to get that info, and whoever you're talking to might lie about it if you're on spf... 22:56 < gwillen> the mempool can be full of lies but if you're smart you can't be fooled for long 22:56 < phantomcircuit> i doubt very much that there is a general solution to the problem that doesn't as it's first step assume that miners are ordering transactions on a feerate priority basis 22:57 < gwillen> phantomcircuit: that's fine, they largely do... 22:57 < bramc> phantomcircuit, Yes we all agree on that 22:57 < CodeShark> and they are more likely to do so even more if we have a real fee market 22:57 < CodeShark> assuming perfect transparency, it's the economically rational strategy 22:59 < bramc> As a general rule, there will always be some tradeoff between time for transactions to complete and fee paid 22:59 < CodeShark> of course, off-chain mining contracts might screw up even that assumption, though :) 22:59 < bramc> At the extremes there will undoubtedly be daily and weekly cycles 23:00 < bramc> So if there's a situation where, for example, there's fee pressure during peak times but none at all at other times, which will most likely happen for a while, you have to make a choice about how much you care about speed vs. fee 23:00 < phantomcircuit> gwillen, in that case it's as simple as sorting the mempool using some f(feerate, age) priority basis 23:01 < phantomcircuit> (age being a proxy for whatever other policies miners might have in place) 23:01 < CodeShark> the communication complexity (especially for thin clients) is significant for mempool stuff 23:02 < phantomcircuit> CodeShark, there's no way around that 23:02 < phantomcircuit> thin clients need to have a mempool 23:02 < bramc> CodeShark, the easy thing to do is for thin clients to simply ask the going rate. This has an obvious and horrific attack... 23:03 < phantomcircuit> although maybe it's not unreasonable to outsource fee estimation 23:03 < phantomcircuit> (on a strict fee rate basis) 23:03 < zooko> second-price auction 23:03 -!- spinza [~spin@197.89.24.164] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 23:03 < CodeShark> fee market makers :p 23:04 < bramc> phantomcircuit, There aren't many full nodes out there - it would be trivial for miners to run them just to lie to spf clients about how big the fees are 23:04 < moa> thin clients having a mempool (or sample of) is an intriguing idea 23:04 < zooko> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vickrey_auction 23:04 < phantomcircuit> bramc, i was actually thinking an authenticated trusted source 23:04 < bramc> This is all making my 'conservative' approach sound like a good idea 23:04 < phantomcircuit> the alternative is for thin clients to receive all transactions 23:04 < bramc> zooko, Yes we've all agreed to assume that the miners follow the obvious algorithm 23:05 -!- damethos [~damethos@unaffiliated/damethos] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 23:05 < moa> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dutch_auction 23:05 < bramc> zooko, In principle you could require that the fees charged to all transactions be the same but, well, that would allow miner stuffing, and Bitcoin Doesn't Work That Way 23:06 < zooko> I didn't mean that -- I meant some vague generalization/extension that maintains the Vickrey property of true preference revelation. 23:06 < zooko> Maybe when I wake up from this sleep I'll have an idea how that could actually work. Probably not. Goodnight! 23:07 < zooko> (P.S. there's a thing called Generalized Second-Price Auction, used for keyword ad sales...) 23:08 < bramc> My conservative idea, for those who haven't seen me talk about it already, is that clients don't do any of this mempool or historical lookup stuff at all. They start at a nominal fee, maybe the minimum allowed, add a random amount between 0 and 10%, and for each block where their transaction isn't accepted add another 10% compounding 23:09 < phantomcircuit> bramc, that's probably a good general solution if replace by fee is available 23:09 < phantomcircuit> (and no not the ffs version...) 23:09 < bramc> This has the advantage of being completely trustless and easy to implement. It has the disadvantages that it requires real rbf, and makes transactions take longer 23:11 < bramc> The extreme amount of noise in the capacity rate due the the stochastic nature of mining blocks doesn't help anything 23:12 < bramc> For that reason alone being willing to wait a bit longer will get you lower fees 23:12 < CodeShark> perhaps that issue will be remedied with some of the proposals out there for reducing block time variance 23:12 < CodeShark> eventually 23:13 < bramc> CodeShark, reducing block time variance comes with its own problems, like increasing the amount of orphan blocks 23:13 < CodeShark> not if you also use them for PoW 23:14 < bramc> It's probably best to assume that there will be fee/time tradeoffs as part of the new normal 23:14 < CodeShark> but obviously such a change is unlikely in the very near term on the Bitcoin network... 23:15 < leakypat> If you have a transaction in the memory pool with a high fee and then you get a number of blocks in quick succession that clear down the pool but miss your transaction , there is no way to lower your fee 23:15 < bramc> You can also do a hybrid approach, where you figure out an expected fee based on recent history or mempools or something, then lowball it and slowly raise 23:15 < CodeShark> I think the fee/time tradeoff is inherent - the only question is how to optimize this for particular use cases and automate it as much as possible 23:15 < leakypat> As miners would always mine the one with the highest fee 23:16 -!- Mably [~Mably@unaffiliated/mably] has quit [Ping timeout: 272 seconds] 23:16 < bramc> leakypat, Yes yet another reason to start low 23:16 < CodeShark> right, the "stuck" phenomenon doesn't even require cheating miners - just a bunch of dumb clients :) 23:16 < bramc> If the fees go down right after your transaction goes through then, well, you should have been wiling to raise your fee slower. 23:18 < bramc> mempool has the other problem that it could potentially get fairly washed out, so you might be looking at only a fraction of what will eventually go into the block 23:19 < CodeShark> being able to listen to the network gossip will almost certainly help you estimate more accurately more quickly 23:20 < CodeShark> so those devices that have access to this should certainly make use of that information if they can 23:21 < CodeShark> there's also the communication complexity/decentralization tradeoff 23:22 < bramc> The day/night cycle should be taken seriously. That's likely to be dominant at first 23:24 < CodeShark> I sort of like the model of fee market makers - where you can pay a fee to someone who guarantees inclusion within a certain number of blocks or you get a refund 23:24 < CodeShark> and they then work their complex algorithms using reliable broadband connections 23:25 < CodeShark> as long as there are enough of these out there 23:25 < CodeShark> if there's only one or two, it's dangerous :) 23:26 < CodeShark> it's a decentralized fee estimation model that still supports thin clients 23:27 < leakypat> Wallets could probably provide that as a service 23:27 < bramc> Another thing a wallet can do is use the last fee it successfully used as a starting point for the next one 23:28 -!- zmanian [~zmanian@c-24-5-125-31.hsd1.ca.comcast.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 23:29 < leakypat> From its pool of users (if a centralized wallet) 23:30 < leakypat> Possibly could abstract fees completely , and charge per month or something for confirmation within n blocks guaranteed 23:31 -!- antanst [~Adium@athedsl-341422.home.otenet.gr] has left #bitcoin-wizards [] 23:31 * leakypat ponders if that could be done trustless and seamlessly 23:32 -!- cdecker [~cdecker@pc-10367.ethz.ch] has quit [Ping timeout: 276 seconds] 23:33 -!- cdecker [~cdecker@pc-10367.ethz.ch] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 23:33 < leakypat> The wallet service that broadcasts the transaction can have its own pool of inputs to use for attaching inputs for fee escalation 23:34 < phantomcircuit> perhaps that issue will be remedied with some of the proposals out there for reducing block time variance 23:34 < phantomcircuit> im not aware of any such proposals 23:34 < phantomcircuit> indeed i dont believe they're possible... 23:34 < CodeShark> phantomcircuit: mostly the GHOST-like ideas 23:35 < CodeShark> amiller had such a proposal, too 23:36 < phantomcircuit> CodeShark, iirc amiller's proposal was to prevent pooling right? 23:37 < CodeShark> that's another potential benefit 23:37 < phantomcircuit> the problem there is that it... prevents pooling! 23:37 < CodeShark> well, ultimately what you want is for pooling to be incorporated into the protocol itself 23:37 < CodeShark> you can mine at lower difficulty and still have your work count towards the most difficult chain 23:38 * phantomcircuit looks around for petertodd to say treechains 23:38 < CodeShark> lol 23:38 -!- DougieBot5000 [~DougieBot@unaffiliated/dougiebot5000] has quit [Quit: Leaving] 23:39 < amiller> phantomcircuit, no the point wasn't to prevent pooling 23:39 < amiller> phantomcircuit, the point of that proposal (which predates ghost by a long time!) was to remove the block time magic setting 23:41 -!- zmanian [~zmanian@c-24-5-125-31.hsd1.ca.comcast.net] has quit [Ping timeout: 272 seconds] 23:42 < phantomcircuit> amiller, can you elaborate? 23:43 < amiller> im not sure this is the best motivation for it now, so i can tell you what i thought the point was 23:44 < amiller> the point was just to get rid of the hardcoded 10 minute block time and replace it with an automatically adjusting mechanism 23:44 < phantomcircuit> amiller, based on...? 23:44 < amiller> it should increase the target difficulty when the network is losing too much stale work 23:45 < amiller> it should lower the target difficulty as much as possible until it starts losing stale work 23:45 < amiller> the simple idea is to fix a desired 'target' for stale blocks 23:45 < amiller> the last time i asked i think it was 2%, maybe you should target 20% or 50% 23:45 -!- orperelman [~orperelma@bzq-109-67-207-175.red.bezeqint.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 23:46 < phantomcircuit> amiller, that's neat but probably fails to account for miners estimating costs 23:46 < amiller> phantomcircuit, what do you mean 23:47 < amiller> one thing i didn't pursue but now makes sense given ghost 23:47 < amiller> is whether you should give some rewards to the stale blocks or punish them 23:47 < amiller> ghost gives them some discount factor, maybe they should be given full credit i dont know 23:49 < phantomcircuit> amiller, it's currently fairly easy for a miner to calculate their revenues for the month 23:49 < phantomcircuit> it seems like it would be difficult to implement something like this without changing that 23:49 < amiller> ok this shouldn't make that any worse (i think it would be a useful idea to *prevent* large miners from doing that anyway) 23:49 < amiller> (or to put it another way, i think it would be a good idea to tempt large miners to gamble on an even bigger reward but more uncertainty) 23:50 < phantomcircuit> yeah that's probably true 23:50 -!- p15 [~p15@111.193.161.178] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 23:51 -!- priidu [~priidu@unaffiliated/priidu] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 23:52 -!- bramc [~bram@99-75-88-206.lightspeed.sntcca.sbcglobal.net] has quit [Quit: Leaving] 23:53 < amiller> but i dont have any good idea for how to set the target time 23:53 < amiller> er the target 'stale' blocks 23:53 < amiller> i dont know how to attach it to any market mechanism 23:54 < amiller> maybe there's a way to solve the lbocksize problem this way 23:54 < amiller> sdlerner wanted to decrease the block time rather than tinker with blocksize 23:55 < amiller> so i dunno maybe there's some way to let the average txes in a block or txfees determine a target stale blocks rate, and then use that to set difficulty 23:56 < CodeShark> we cannot assume that the tx fees are not the miners themselves if the model gives them any incentive to do so 23:57 < amiller> yeah 23:57 < CodeShark> also, variable block times has another potential danger...people need to understand that the security level is not proportional to the number of confirmations 23:58 < amiller> thats true but i wouldn't let such a concern about presentation to users narrow my options at this point 23:58 < CodeShark> the security level is given by how hard it is for someone to reverse the transaction - so this is what must be quantified --- Log closed Tue Jun 23 00:00:31 2015