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-!- maaku [~quassel@50-0-37-37.dsl.static.fusionbroadband.com] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 06:13 -!- maaku is now known as Guest93019 06:13 < frankenmint> https://www.coursera.org/course/crypto 06:13 < frankenmint> worth every penny 06:14 < stonecoldpat> Crypto II has been released for october 06:15 < frankenmint> that's how I found out about course 1 06:15 < stonecoldpat> https://www.coursera.org/course/crypto2 06:15 < stonecoldpat> ah ok 06:16 -!- adam3us [~Adium@172.56.18.57] has quit [Client Quit] 06:21 -!- LeMiner2 [LeMiner@5ED1AFBF.cm-7-2c.dynamic.ziggo.nl] has quit [Read error: Connection reset by peer] 06:23 < jouke> There is a crypto2 :o 06:23 -!- MrHodl [~fuc@185.22.183.194] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 06:28 < wumpus> jouke: ja, staat op de site, maar schijnt vaker vals aangekondigd te zijn hoorde ik, https://twitter.com/orionwl/status/639061669365317632 06:28 -!- MrHodl [~fuc@185.22.183.194] has quit [Ping timeout: 246 seconds] 06:28 < wumpus> ... maar wie weet. 06:28 -!- fuc [~fuc@46.166.190.187] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 06:28 -!- fuc is now known as MrHodl 06:29 < frankenmint> thanks for sharing that today 06:29 < fluffypony> ek kan ook Duits praat! 06:29 < kinlo> fluffypony: it's not "duits" 06:29 < fluffypony> kinlo: it is in Afrikaans 06:29 < kinlo> and bad bad wumpus, talk english :) 06:30 -!- AaronvanW [~ewout@unaffiliated/aaronvanw] has quit [Ping timeout: 246 seconds] 06:33 -!- MrHodl [~fuc@46.166.190.187] has quit [Ping timeout: 265 seconds] 06:34 -!- ThomasV [~ThomasV@unaffiliated/thomasv] has quit [Ping timeout: 244 seconds] 06:35 < frankenmint> this is a dumb question, but can primecoine hashes be used to reverse engineer bitcoin private keys? Watching this movie says that public key crytography systems are built on combining the product of prime numbers and that the computation of factorization of these products to determine the prime number bases is what makes it very difficult to crack cryptography? Wouldn't using a huge swath of known prime numbe 06:35 < frankenmint> rs and hashed prime number results in a sort of 'rainbow table' be sufficient to break sha2? 06:36 -!- dEBRUYNE [~dEBRUYNE@56-197-ftth.onsbrabantnet.nl] has quit [Read error: Connection reset by peer] 06:37 -!- dEBRUYNE [~dEBRUYNE@56-197-ftth.onsbrabantnet.nl] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 06:37 < frankenmint> the 'bend' would be in easing the rate of factorization 06:40 < helo> frankenmint: well, ECDSA doesn't use prime numbers... that's RSA. 06:42 -!- LeMiner [LeMiner@unaffiliated/leminer] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 06:42 -!- ASTP001 [~ASTP001@c-76-99-32-112.hsd1.pa.comcast.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 06:45 -!- [d__d] [~d__d]@ec2-54-85-45-223.compute-1.amazonaws.com] has quit [Read error: Connection reset by peer] 06:46 < helo> frankenmint: offtopic, but the crux of RSA is that it's pretty easy to find a lot of very large prime numbers. there are too many to build a table of. 06:48 -!- [d__d] [~d__d]@ec2-54-85-45-223.compute-1.amazonaws.com] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 06:48 < wumpus> eh sorry, thought this was -nl 06:49 -!- Guyver2 [~Guyver2@guyver2.xs4all.nl] has quit [Quit: :)] 06:51 -!- realcr [~real@bzq-79-178-30-92.red.bezeqint.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 06:59 -!- MrHodl [~fuc@185.22.183.199] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 07:02 -!- ASTP001 [~ASTP001@c-76-99-32-112.hsd1.pa.comcast.net] has quit [Ping timeout: 260 seconds] 07:05 -!- ASTP001 [~ASTP001@c-76-99-32-112.hsd1.pa.comcast.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 07:07 < andytoshi> frankenmint: (a) no, because bitcoin does not use RSA, and (b) no, because you can't make a rainbow table of thousand-bit primes :) 07:10 -!- eudoxia [~eudoxia@r167-57-31-183.dialup.adsl.anteldata.net.uy] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 07:11 < frankenmint> is that basically a MB per data column? 07:11 < frankenmint> 1MB ^ 256-1? 07:12 < frankenmint> *2 to denominate a 2nd column for UUID 07:24 -!- dgenr8 [~dgenr8@unaffiliated/dgenr8] has quit [Quit: Leaving] 07:25 -!- dgenr8 [~dgenr8@unaffiliated/dgenr8] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 07:25 -!- ASTP001 [~ASTP001@c-76-99-32-112.hsd1.pa.comcast.net] has quit [Ping timeout: 256 seconds] 07:29 -!- DougieBot5000 [~DougieBot@unaffiliated/dougiebot5000] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 07:32 -!- GGuyZ [~GGuyZ@dhcp-18-189-114-219.dyn.mit.edu] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 07:33 < instagibbs> frankenmint: You should watch the Crypto1 lectures :) does RSA and Crypto2 will cover ECC(if it actually happens) 07:33 < frankenmint> im on lecture 3 right now 07:34 < instagibbs> I actually went through the lectures, and repeated as necessary to really understand. Great stuff. 07:36 -!- AaronvanW [~ewout@91.206.81.13] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 07:36 -!- AaronvanW [~ewout@91.206.81.13] has quit [Changing host] 07:36 -!- AaronvanW [~ewout@unaffiliated/aaronvanw] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 07:38 < MRL-Relay> [tacotime] helo: ECDSA uses prime numbers, e.g. prime field moduli etc. just in a totally different way than RSA. :) 07:39 < gmaxwell> tacotime: all math uses prime number if you want to be abstract enough about it, as every number has a prime decomposition! :) 07:39 < MRL-Relay> [tacotime] gmaxwell: hah, true enough 07:39 -!- GGuyZ [~GGuyZ@dhcp-18-189-114-219.dyn.mit.edu] has quit [Quit: GGuyZ] 07:40 < gmaxwell> gah well all number theory, at least; shouldn't have said all math. :P though the notion of primeness probably translates into every other context somehow. :) 07:45 -!- PaulCapestany [~PaulCapes@204.28.124.82] has quit [Ping timeout: 244 seconds] 07:45 < Apocalyptic> gmaxwell, find me a related notion to primeness in general topology :) 07:46 < andytoshi> Apocalyptic: terminal objects in category theory are analogues to primes 07:46 < andytoshi> or is it initial objects? 07:47 < Apocalyptic> andytoshi, I thought category theory was not part of topology 07:47 < andytoshi> Apocalyptic: category theory encompasses everything 07:47 < gmaxwell> Apocalyptic: would you count! https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Furstenberg's_proof_of_the_infinitude_of_primes (not really fair, I think) 07:47 -!- damethos [~damethos@unaffiliated/damethos] has quit [Quit: Bye] 07:47 < Apocalyptic> Apocalyptic: category theory encompasses everything // precisely 07:48 < Apocalyptic> not the other way around 07:48 < Apocalyptic> i.e it's not a subfield of topology 07:48 < andytoshi> Apocalyptic: you can still learn a lot about topology from categories; algebraic topology is almost entirely category theory 07:48 -!- _whitelogger [whitelogge@fehu.whitequark.org] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 07:49 < Apocalyptic> gmaxwell, it's a nice proof though, i'll always remember it as it was one of my first exercices when I was introduced to topology 07:50 -!- _whitelogger [whitelogge@fehu.whitequark.org] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 07:50 < Apocalyptic> andytoshi, no argument there 07:51 < andytoshi> oh, good :) because that's the limit of what i actually know about topology\ 07:55 < frankenmint> how do i unignore someone? 07:56 < fluffypony> /ignore -r nickname 07:56 < frankenmint> aha, okay cool 08:01 -!- blackwraith [~priidu@unaffiliated/priidu] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 08:02 -!- priidu [~priidu@unaffiliated/priidu] has quit [Ping timeout: 260 seconds] 08:05 -!- mkarrer [~mkarrer@103.Red-88-23-167.staticIP.rima-tde.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 08:05 -!- ufoinc__ [~ufoinc@31.154.92.14] has quit [Ping timeout: 250 seconds] 08:07 -!- nwilcox [~nwilcox@74-95-207-205-SFBA.hfc.comcastbusiness.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 08:07 -!- mkarrer_ [~mkarrer@231.Red-83-58-147.dynamicIP.rima-tde.net] has quit [Ping timeout: 264 seconds] 08:12 -!- mjerr [~mjerr@p578EB313.dip0.t-ipconnect.de] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 08:19 -!- Emcy [~MC@unaffiliated/mc1984] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 08:22 -!- spinza [~spin@197.89.23.249] has quit [Excess Flood] 08:23 -!- PaulCapestany [~PaulCapes@204.28.124.82] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 08:24 < MRL-Relay> [shen] gmaxwell - you are talking about UFD's (rings where every element factors uniquely into primes) 08:24 -!- nullbyte [NSA@gateway/vpn/mullvad/x-aprqdfjpgdvjhibh] has quit [Ping timeout: 246 seconds] 08:25 -!- ThomasV [~ThomasV@unaffiliated/thomasv] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 08:26 -!- nullbyte [~NSA@193.138.219.233] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 08:27 -!- spinza [~spin@197.89.23.249] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 08:27 -!- Dizzle [~Dizzle@104-6-36-162.lightspeed.austtx.sbcglobal.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 08:31 -!- PaulCapestany [~PaulCapes@204.28.124.82] has quit [Quit: .] 08:35 -!- c-cex-yuriy [uid76808@gateway/web/irccloud.com/x-ganlrfwmdapjexyl] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 08:35 -!- PaulCapestany [~PaulCapes@204.28.124.82] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 08:40 -!- GGuyZ [~GGuyZ@dhcp-18-189-114-219.dyn.mit.edu] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 08:41 -!- GGuyZ [~GGuyZ@dhcp-18-189-114-219.dyn.mit.edu] has quit [Client Quit] 08:41 < frankenmint> ah i see that's something like relay transmitting users comms between here and slack 08:49 -!- kang_ [67efe80a@gateway/web/freenode/ip.103.239.232.10] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 08:49 < fluffypony> frankenmint: between here and the Monero Research Lab 08:49 < fluffypony> but yes, the person talking is the person in [ ] brackets :) 08:49 < frankenmint> nice cool alright 08:51 < kanzure> i would still like to find a general solution to the problem of "even if you have good fraud proofs for all possible fraud, a single supernode might require so many resources as to make it impossible to setup an alternative supernode, due supernode costliness". 08:51 < kanzure> on a related note, there may be no guarantees that fees could ever be sufficient for scaling towards a system that accepts 1e9 to 1e15 transactions/sec, even in a centralization regime 08:55 -!- Guyver2 [~Guyver2@guyver2.xs4all.nl] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 08:56 < frankenmint> 1 cent times 15 quadrillion? 08:56 < kanzure> that was number of transactions not number of cents 08:56 < frankenmint> at that level would a much greater portion of mining power be needed? 08:56 < frankenmint> but what would the propsed global transaction fee be? 08:57 < frankenmint> .001 cents perhaps? 08:57 -!- Newyorkadam [~Newyorkad@wikipedia/Newyorkadam] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 08:57 < kanzure> i think 10k-member m-of-m at-least-1-honest-signer signing pool running as a supernode might always have no way for the network to recover consensus in the event of supernode fraud. what are you going to do, accept lots of reorgs while "0.1% capacity nodes" try to run things and compete to become the new supernode? bah 08:57 < kanzure> frankenmint: i don't know what you mean by global transaction fee 08:59 < kanzure> frankenmint: mining hashrate is unrelated to number of transactions/sec 08:59 < frankenmint> what is a supernode specifically? 08:59 < frankenmint> a huge pool processsing 1e9+ trx? 08:59 < kanzure> supernode is a vague and generic concept that refers to the idea of a certain type of node, sometimes only one, in a p2p network that has asymmetrically more resources or computing power than all of the other p2p nodes. 09:00 < frankenmint> essentially centralization 09:00 -!- kmels [~kmels@186.64.110.122] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 09:00 < kanzure> yes, very much so 09:01 < frankenmint> my contrapoint was that this occurs because people are trying to squeeze more value out of the network 09:01 < kanzure> in the scenario i described i placed various limiters on the supernode- like it's either trustless or there's fraud proofs flying around- but yeah it's centralization 09:01 -!- AaronvanW [~ewout@unaffiliated/aaronvanw] has quit [Ping timeout: 246 seconds] 09:01 < frankenmint> so yes very much so there will be some sort of global agreed upon rate in the future should btc become the main vehicle for transacting value in tail end of the next comming decades 09:02 < kanzure> "this occurs because people are trying to squeeze more value" what is "this"? 09:04 < frankenmint> this == phenomenon of centralization people == big mining warehouses who have real voting power at this moment, squeeze more value == control the shaping block size and inferred fee market 09:04 < frankenmint> that was my train of thought as I was typing anyhow 09:04 < kanzure> "voting power"? 09:04 -!- GGuyZ [~GGuyZ@dhcp-18-189-28-106.dyn.mit.edu] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 09:05 < kanzure> also i'm not sure why you think i proposed a transaction fee...? 09:05 < frankenmint> I didn't say you did, I'm saying it's the underlying reason why the phenomenon of centralization is occuring 09:05 < frankenmint> in addition to the obvious reaping of the block reward subsidy 09:06 < kanzure> er, the reason why centralization happens is because costliness, not because fees 09:06 < frankenmint> I think its also because the incentives have now become that much greater 09:06 < frankenmint> ie the price exploded 09:07 < frankenmint> perhaps if we see a great pricing depression we can see a firesale and exodus of mining rigs to more end-users and proliferate decentralization, but I believe that due to human nature, ultmately we're always doomed to lean towards centralization as the incentives increase (value) 09:08 < kanzure> you are very difficult to talk with 09:08 -!- GGuyZ [~GGuyZ@dhcp-18-189-28-106.dyn.mit.edu] has quit [Client Quit] 09:09 -!- paveljanik [~paveljani@unaffiliated/paveljanik] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 09:09 < frankenmint> I don't know I gave different reasons for my assertions then you did, I'm sorry you feel I'm difficult to talk with? 09:09 < frankenmint> than 09:10 < kanzure> and why did you make those assertions? i'm not understanding this. 09:12 < kanzure> the whole point of pow is to make it prohibitively costly to create a fork; my scenario that i outlined was one where in the event of a consensus failure (such as a fraudulent single supernode running the "consensus") you need the costliness to go down because nobody else has been running such a large supernode anyway. 09:13 < kanzure> i suppose you could just mandate to only use "oblivious"-style systems where supernodes are incapable of committing fraud... but i am not as well-versed about that type of solution. 09:14 < kanzure> (as for "errors of omission" or "fraud by omission" you could probably fix that with increased privacy so that the supernode has no idea the actual details of the transactions it is processing, so it should in theory be possible to make it incapable to do selective censorship, in addition to the usual fraud proofs that are recommended- like proofs about double spending or proofs about inflation) 09:15 < frankenmint> let's rewind here: 09:15 < frankenmint> kanzure: i would still like to find a general solution to the problem of "even if you have good fraud proofs for all possible fraud, a single supernode might require so many resources as to make it impossible to setup an alternative supernode, due supernode costliness". 09:15 < frankenmint> 08:55 kanzure: on a related note, there may be no guarantees that fees could ever be sufficient for scaling towards a system that accepts 1e9 to 1e15 transactions/sec, even in a centralization regime 09:15 -!- dEBRUYNE [~dEBRUYNE@56-197-ftth.onsbrabantnet.nl] has quit [Ping timeout: 244 seconds] 09:16 < frankenmint> i think 10k-member m-of-m at-least-1-honest-signer signing pool running as a supernode might always have no way for the network to recover consensus in the event of supernode fraud. what are you going to do, accept lots of reorgs while "0.1% capacity nodes" try to run things and compete to become the new supernode? bah 09:16 -!- ttttemp_ [~ttttemp@pc-5305.ethz.ch] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 09:16 < kanzure> yes, having billions of dollars in fees doesn't mean that those fees are going to be useful for constructing trillion transaction per second systems. just like they obviously wont help accepting 2^^^^^^4 transactions per second. 09:18 < frankenmint> how on earth would there be 20M trx per second without centralization? 09:18 < frankenmint> its just not possible 09:18 < kanzure> invoking centralization doesn't necessarily solve that type of problem, and my point is that invoking fees doesn't necessarily either :-) 09:20 < frankenmint> I'm not really seeing a limiting factor, except the fact that high difficulty proofs of work are required, but that's because the network is extremely efficient. The other side of this is that scalability is desired but not yet required. I'm with you that btc software is in for some serious growing pains if we are to ever see 20MM trx per second, but at the same time lets analyze the existing demand across all 09:20 < frankenmint> monetary systems currently 09:21 < frankenmint> and factor in gradual population growth over time 09:22 -!- GGuyZ [~GGuyZ@dhcp-18-189-114-219.dyn.MIT.EDU] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 09:23 < kanzure> i wonder if "trusted setup"'s costliness is the right type of costliness in the same sense that pow is costly and thus useful. 09:23 -!- ttttemp [~ttttemp@nb-10350.ethz.ch] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 09:26 -!- drwin [~drwin@out-nat-33.jes.cz] has quit [Read error: Connection reset by peer] 09:26 -!- drwin [~drwin@out-nat-33.jes.cz] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 09:29 < frankenmint> so far I can find 500K as a record trx per second 09:30 < kanzure> well as wumpus says, the demand for transaction inclusion is probably infinite, but you're looking at world records for some reason 09:30 < kanzure> when you are designing a system you have to consider the transactions that should be included versus the ones that shouldn't (the invalid ones) 09:30 < kanzure> not just the ones that happened to get into previous systems 09:38 -!- kmels [~kmels@186.64.110.122] has quit [Ping timeout: 240 seconds] 09:41 -!- Tiraspol [~Tiraspol3@unaffiliated/tiraspol] has quit [Ping timeout: 256 seconds] 09:44 -!- GGuyZ [~GGuyZ@dhcp-18-189-114-219.dyn.MIT.EDU] has quit [Quit: GGuyZ] 09:47 -!- afk11 [~afk11@unaffiliated/afk11] has quit [Read error: Connection reset by peer] 09:51 -!- polyclef [~polyclef@208.90.213.198] has quit [Read error: Connection reset by peer] 09:52 -!- Tiraspol [~Tiraspol3@unaffiliated/tiraspol] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 09:53 -!- kmels [~kmels@186.64.110.122] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 09:58 -!- blackwraith [~priidu@unaffiliated/priidu] has quit [Ping timeout: 264 seconds] 10:00 -!- spinza [~spin@197.89.23.249] has quit [Ping timeout: 264 seconds] 10:01 -!- spinza [~spin@197.89.46.121] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 10:09 -!- polyclef [~polyclef@208.90.213.198] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 10:11 -!- LeMiner [LeMiner@unaffiliated/leminer] has quit [Read error: Connection reset by peer] 10:13 -!- kang_ [67efe80a@gateway/web/freenode/ip.103.239.232.10] has quit [Ping timeout: 246 seconds] 10:15 -!- Guyver2 [~Guyver2@guyver2.xs4all.nl] has quit [Ping timeout: 264 seconds] 10:18 -!- Guyver2 [~Guyver2@guyver2.xs4all.nl] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 10:27 < nwilcox> frankenmint: My current belief is that centralization occurs because lower cost operations outcompete others, and economies of scale help lower marginal cost. 10:27 < nwilcox> So if the exchange price drops, I expect this would lead to *more* centralization of miners, because the smaller miners tend to be less efficient and will drop out earlier. 10:28 < nwilcox> Notice several assumptions there. 10:29 < nwilcox> Maybe a smaller miner can lower costs more efficiently (eg: they aren't paying rent on a giant warehouse). 10:30 -!- jojva [~dev@shattrath.sceen.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 10:31 -!- LeMiner [LeMiner@unaffiliated/leminer] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 10:32 -!- smk [9e557647@gateway/web/freenode/ip.158.85.118.71] has quit [Ping timeout: 246 seconds] 10:35 -!- nwilcox [~nwilcox@74-95-207-205-SFBA.hfc.comcastbusiness.net] has quit [Quit: leaving] 10:37 -!- bedeho [~bedeho@50-202-37-133-static.hfc.comcastbusiness.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 10:39 -!- ThomasV [~ThomasV@unaffiliated/thomasv] has quit [Ping timeout: 250 seconds] 10:45 -!- alferz [~alferz@unaffiliated/alfer] has quit [Ping timeout: 244 seconds] 10:47 -!- CohibAA [~CohibAA@unaffiliated/cohibaa] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 10:48 -!- CodeShark [~CodeShark@cpe-76-167-237-202.san.res.rr.com] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 10:49 -!- dEBRUYNE [~dEBRUYNE@56-197-ftth.onsbrabantnet.nl] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 10:50 -!- binaryFate [~jeremie@joule.ulb.ac.be] has quit [Quit: Konversation terminated!] 10:50 -!- alferz [~alferz@unaffiliated/alfer] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 11:05 -!- alferz [~alferz@unaffiliated/alfer] has quit [Ping timeout: 244 seconds] 11:06 -!- user7779078 [~user77790@2604:2000:c525:200:f1b9:67ef:cb02:7648] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 11:09 -!- rubensayshi [~ruben@91.206.81.13] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 11:14 -!- paveljanik [~paveljani@unaffiliated/paveljanik] has quit [Quit: Leaving] 11:14 < ryan-c> https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/3jd5qe/05_btc_bounty_at_brainwalletio_the_passphrase_is/ < *sigh* 11:14 -!- paveljanik [~paveljani@79-98-72-216.sys-data.com] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 11:14 -!- paveljanik [~paveljani@79-98-72-216.sys-data.com] has quit [Changing host] 11:14 -!- paveljanik [~paveljani@unaffiliated/paveljanik] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 11:20 -!- user7779_ [~user77790@2001:1af8:4010:a08c:1::6e] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 11:20 -!- Oizopower [uid19103@gateway/web/irccloud.com/x-mrdewyjtbantkdtq] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 11:20 -!- mengine [~mengine@251.92-221-142.customer.lyse.net] has quit [Ping timeout: 256 seconds] 11:22 -!- user7779078 [~user77790@2604:2000:c525:200:f1b9:67ef:cb02:7648] has quit [Ping timeout: 244 seconds] 11:24 < fluffypony> ryan-c: but it has a password AND a memorisable salt, so it must be doubly secure! 11:29 -!- zooko [~user@c-73-14-172-248.hsd1.co.comcast.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 11:33 < ryan-c> fluffypony: he posted the passphrase 11:33 < fluffypony> and he said he memorised the salt, which is lol 11:34 < frankenmint> you guys know if that painting w/ the puzzle ever got solved? 11:36 < ryan-c> fluffypony: well, the annoying thing is that he'll "win" this rigged game and claim it means things are secure. 11:36 < fluffypony> yeah 11:36 < fluffypony> and then he'll promptly go on to submit a PR to Ethereum :-P 11:39 -!- user7779078 [~user77790@2604:2000:c525:200:f1b9:67ef:cb02:7648] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 11:42 -!- user7779_ [~user77790@2001:1af8:4010:a08c:1::6e] has 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[~nwilcox@24.130.26.146] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 13:10 -!- ProfMannaro [~httpwww@93-42-173-105.ip87.fastwebnet.it] has quit [] 13:10 < frankenmint> hey guys, you're the wizards, not me. So, someone who isnt me, had some funds that they tried to send. They sent them at first with too low of a fee...and they were super impatient. So now, those funds never confirmed, and being impatient, the person used a tool to erase the transaction off their wallet and tried to resend it, now with the proper fee. A few blocks have passed and now neither transactions sho 13:10 < frankenmint> w as confimed but they both appear like double spend attempts. The poor guy just wants to send his money, what does he have to do? 13:15 -!- trippysalmon [rob@2001:984:6466:0:acb0:1d6:1cb1:2149] has quit [Ping timeout: 250 seconds] 13:15 -!- ThomasV [~ThomasV@x5ce3da3b.dyn.telefonica.de] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 13:15 -!- ThomasV [~ThomasV@x5ce3da3b.dyn.telefonica.de] has quit [Changing host] 13:15 -!- ThomasV [~ThomasV@unaffiliated/thomasv] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 13:15 -!- moa [~kiwigb@opentransactions/dev/moa] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 13:16 -!- arubi [~ese168@unaffiliated/arubi] has quit [Quit: Leaving] 13:22 < nwilcox> frankenmint: When you say "they boath appear like double spend attempts" I'm not sure what tool you are using which calls them double spends. 13:22 < frankenmint> different block explorers 13:22 -!- GAit [~GAit@2-230-161-158.ip202.fastwebnet.it] has quit [Quit: Leaving.] 13:22 -!- Guest99747 is now known as starsoccer 13:23 -!- King_Rex [~King_Rex@70.193.100.226] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 13:23 < frankenmint> they both say double spend attempts on the two different transactions 13:23 -!- King_Rex [~King_Rex@226.sub-70-193-100.myvzw.com] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 13:24 < nwilcox> frankenmint: Even though it seems obvious that miners would prefer the transaction with a higher fee, I'm not certain the status quo is to accept them. 13:24 < frankenmint> http://puu.sh/jXM2l/c7aa4ea11e.png 13:24 < nwilcox> Last I checked, ~6 mo ago, "replace by fee" wasn't a feature in the reference bitcoin-core node, although I am not familiar with actual miner behavior. 13:25 < frankenmint> that's exactly what I thought 13:25 < c0rw1n> are you sure it spent the exact same outputs? 13:26 < frankenmint> I doubt it 13:26 -!- LeMiner [LeMiner@unaffiliated/leminer] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 13:26 < frankenmint> I think it emptied his wallet and sent the change to an exchange - this 2nd transaction he sent less to the exchange to account for the fee i think 13:26 < nwilcox> I would expect any scary double spend badge means at least one TxOut appears in both transactions. 13:26 < midnightmagic> frankenmint: see pm? 13:27 < frankenmint> yea hold on 13:27 < midnightmagic> k 13:34 -!- digitalmagus [~digitalma@unaffiliated/digitalmagus] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 13:49 -!- Burrito [~Burrito@unaffiliated/burrito] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 13:50 -!- GGuyZ [~GGuyZ@216-15-123-91.c3-0.sbo-ubr1.sbo.ma.cable.rcn.com] has quit [Quit: GGuyZ] 13:50 -!- mkarrer [~mkarrer@103.Red-88-23-167.staticIP.rima-tde.net] has quit [] 13:54 -!- davec [~davec@cpe-24-243-251-52.hot.res.rr.com] has quit [Quit: leaving] 13:54 -!- davec [~davec@cpe-24-243-251-52.hot.res.rr.com] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 13:55 -!- mkarrer [~mkarrer@226.Red-83-35-140.dynamicIP.rima-tde.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 13:59 -!- ThomasV [~ThomasV@unaffiliated/thomasv] has quit [Ping timeout: 268 seconds] 14:01 -!- ASTP001 [~ASTP001@c-76-99-32-112.hsd1.pa.comcast.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 14:09 -!- drwin [~drwin@out-nat-33.jes.cz] has quit [Read error: Connection reset by peer] 14:13 -!- Quanttek [~quassel@2a02:8108:73f:f6e4:e23f:49ff:fe47:9364] has quit [Ping timeout: 250 seconds] 14:16 -!- drwin [~drwin@out-nat-33.jes.cz] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 14:16 -!- ASTP001 [~ASTP001@c-76-99-32-112.hsd1.pa.comcast.net] has quit [Quit: My Mac has gone to sleep. 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(sorry for the FAQ) 17:00 -!- smk [9e557647@gateway/web/freenode/ip.158.85.118.71] has quit [Quit: Page closed] 17:01 < jgarzik> kanzure, and, , did you see https://github.com/jgarzik/auctionpunk :) Bitcoin-specific auction, where only one bid is valid, bidders must provably commit funds to an auction, and more. 17:01 < jgarzik> *only one-of-N bids is valid, from the blockchain perspective 17:03 < kanzure> jgarzik: there's no particular link yet for the information, but i could be guilted into making some 17:03 < jgarzik> kanzure, another idea developed in IRC a bit is a "IM chain" -- freeze funds using CLTV, to obtain N bytes worth of posting rights to a chain that operates with a 14-day moving window (meaning all data after 14 days is pruned network-wide) 17:03 < jgarzik> a better-bitmessage 17:04 < jgarzik> kanzure, amiller and I also sketched a design for a DHT which required funds in order to store resources 17:05 < jgarzik> kanzure, I did a bit of code writing for "data coin", a chain focused on data storage 17:06 -!- ThomasV [~ThomasV@unaffiliated/thomasv] has quit [Ping timeout: 246 seconds] 17:07 < jgarzik> kanzure, http://impulse.is/impulse.pdf describes an interesting idea -- have a wallet with N open payment channels; the process of sending funds involves treating "payment channels as UTXO" -- to spend you must gather one or more open payment channels, sufficient to cover the value being spent. This results in added traffic on the blockchain, but instant secure payments. 17:07 < jgarzik> All the best material though is found trolling through ancient bitcointalk.org threads, and looking at old posts of key authors like Tier Nolan 17:08 -!- priidu [~priidu@unaffiliated/priidu] has quit [Ping timeout: 256 seconds] 17:10 < kanzure> jgarzik: i have read all bitcointalk.org threads from the technical discussion forum as of yesterday 17:10 < kanzure> and condensed it down to about ~400 tagged concepts 17:11 < kanzure> i am curious if your data coin was the same thing as the dht pay-for-storage amiller concept? 17:11 < jgarzik> kanzure, no, datacoin was a chain 17:11 < jgarzik> kanzure, the DHT thing was separate 17:12 < jgarzik> kanzure, it followed on an IRC theme of designed bitcoin-bound side chains (unrelated to Blockstream Side Chains(tm)) 17:12 -!- alexwaters [~alexwater@unaffiliated/matth1a3] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 17:12 < jgarzik> *designing 17:13 < kanzure> i found when reading the forums that there have been many "side-chains" and we collectively don't know how to name different ideas 17:13 < jgarzik> I'm using "side chains", little "s" little "c" 17:13 < kanzure> perhaps gmaxwell should just assign numbers to ideas :-) 17:13 < jgarzik> as inclusive of merged-mined chains, Side Chains(tm), any chain with bitcoin-anchored tokens and/or security 17:14 < kanzure> there was also "sub-chains"... like https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=244682.0 and https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1083345.0 17:14 < jgarzik> e.g. some chains might use bitcoin's token value as security, some might use the timestamping directly as security 17:14 < kanzure> that last one had a proposal for a new opcode OP_SIDECHAINVERIFY or something 17:14 < jgarzik> that's a reasonable term too 17:14 -!- Newyorkadam [~Newyorkad@wikipedia/Newyorkadam] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 17:14 < kanzure> (update: impulse stuff was thoroughly documented in my system about 8 months ago) 17:14 < jgarzik> kanzure, more for the idea pile: "active addresses" - on-chain entities a la Ethereum that can hold balances, and execute scripts when new funds come in 17:15 -!- nwilcox [~nwilcox@107-217-190-93.lightspeed.sntcca.sbcglobal.net] has quit [Ping timeout: 264 seconds] 17:16 -!- kinoshitajona [~sid28@tor-exit.echelon.nsa.network] has quit [Ping timeout: 256 seconds] 17:17 -!- kinoshitajona [~sid28@tor-exit.echelon.nsa.network] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 17:17 -!- sundance [~sid16@tor-exit.echelon.nsa.network] has quit [Ping timeout: 256 seconds] 17:18 -!- sundance [~sid16@tor-exit.echelon.nsa.network] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 17:18 < kanzure> jgarzik: what about "crazy things i should expect to find hidden in logs if i am looking closely enough, that might be undocumented elsewhere"? 17:18 < kanzure> er, hidden in irc logs 17:22 < jgarzik> yep 17:23 < jgarzik> kanzure, there are autonomous agent threads to follow. StorJ http://garzikrants.blogspot.com/2013/01/storj-and-bitcoin-autonomous-agents.html and me working on part of that problem moxiebox, https://github.com/jgarzik/moxiebox 17:23 -!- GGuyZ [~GGuyZ@216-15-123-91.c3-0.sbo-ubr1.sbo.ma.cable.rcn.com] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 17:24 < jgarzik> kanzure, and then there's the decentralized market stack: DC currency + DC market + DC identity & reputation & attestation/auditing/qualificaiton 17:25 < jgarzik> A lot of ideas with bitcoin at their core 17:27 -!- ThomasV [~ThomasV@unaffiliated/thomasv] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 17:27 -!- GGuyZ [~GGuyZ@216-15-123-91.c3-0.sbo-ubr1.sbo.ma.cable.rcn.com] has quit [Client Quit] 17:30 -!- Ylbam [uid99779@gateway/web/irccloud.com/x-rnijrsgowdbxgvjl] has quit [Quit: Connection closed for inactivity] 17:34 -!- alexwaters [~alexwater@unaffiliated/matth1a3] has quit [Quit: Leaving.] 17:35 -!- Oizopower [uid19103@gateway/web/irccloud.com/x-mrdewyjtbantkdtq] has quit [Quit: Connection closed for inactivity] 17:38 < jgarzik> kanzure, I view collecting all these ideas as one of the biggest contributions somebody could make to the ecosystem 17:38 < jgarzik> kanzure, there is a wealth of material just lying around, waiting to be picked up 17:38 < jgarzik> there is also duplication, and people claiming 2015-era inventions that were first described independently by someone else in 2010 or 2011 17:42 < kanzure> yes i am also hoping to fix the "irc trap" where ideas go to die 17:43 < kanzure> there are strange gaps on the mailing list and forum; like nothing about OP_MOXIE, a lack of announcements about libsnark; far less content on treechains than i anticipated.. 17:44 -!- rusty [~rusty@pdpc/supporter/bronze/rusty] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 17:44 < kanzure> the forum suffered (or continues to suffer) from an extreme focus on bootstrapping costs of downloading all the data. pruning is nice but there's a transactions/sec mining bottleneck... 17:44 < jgarzik> tree chains are mainly a rhetorical device petertodd employs when he doesn't like a random idea ;p 17:45 < jgarzik> kanzure, to be expected - that was a big sore point in the initial experience of early users 17:45 < jgarzik> kanzure, you want the first impression to not-suck 17:46 < jgarzik> kanzure, nobody was projecting into the future 17:46 < jgarzik> (That's not a criticism, just an observation; there is great value in not roadmapping far ahead) 17:47 < kanzure> well i mean that, yes it's an awful problem to have, but i bet a bunch of brainpower was wasted on that rather than other scalability issues :-) 17:47 < kanzure> re: not roadmapping, that's also true 17:48 -!- user7779078 [~user77790@2001:1af8:4010:a027:21::4e] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 17:48 -!- user7779078 [user777907@gateway/vpn/mullvad/x-twbzhizpthtcsabo] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 17:49 < jgarzik> heh, google finds a grand total of three hits for OP_MOXIE 17:49 < kanzure> they are probably all me screaming about it once i heard it 17:50 < jgarzik> kanzure, ah yes, "mailboxes" mentioned on same page, https://botbot.me/freenode/bitcoin-wizards/2015-04-12/?page=5 17:50 < kanzure> i believe it was mentioned during http://diyhpl.us/wiki/transcripts/bitcoin-sidechains-unchained-epicenter-adam3us-gmaxwell/ 17:50 < jgarzik> tiny bits of on-chain storage, associated with some funds. storage goes away when funds go away. 17:50 < kanzure> and http://gnusha.org/bitcoin-wizards/2015-04-12.log 17:51 -!- snthsnth [~snthsnth@c-98-207-208-241.hsd1.ca.comcast.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 17:51 < kanzure> actually you were the one that wrote the OP_MOXIE message in that log >:( 17:51 < kanzure> hah 17:51 -!- kmels [~kmels@186.64.110.122] has quit [Ping timeout: 252 seconds] 17:53 < kanzure> "... each extension block could be implemented in moxiebox script. The definition of an extension block would be the sha256 hash of the bytecode that represents the compiled version of its validation, then you could have quite good assurance in a sidechain-like way. [...] you could introduce a new extension block and all you need is the interpreter of the moxiebox bytestring and the longest chain rules and then you could move coins ... 17:54 < kanzure> ... between them via the Core or directly." 18:00 < kanzure> jgarzik: thank you for the dump 18:02 < gmaxwell> Thats really a concept that I'd proposed in #bitcoin-dev a while back (even before we knew about moxie-- I found moxie while looking for preexisting sutable VMs with compiler support). 18:02 < jgarzik> kanzure, I expect to be paid back with a voluminous link that can be shared publicly :) 18:03 < gmaxwell> Adam runs, I think, a little too far with the idea (basically ignoring the resource requirements issues that arise), but its interesting. 18:03 -!- mjerr [~mjerr@p578EB313.dip0.t-ipconnect.de] has quit [Ping timeout: 264 seconds] 18:04 < jgarzik> I'd need to think about it. The farthest I've gone is OP_MOXIE, and adding the interpreter to Bitcoin Core 18:04 < jgarzik> and adding a cost model for that 18:04 < ryan-c> jgarzik: that auction thing looks cool, do you have a writeup of the design? 18:04 < jgarzik> ryan-c, alas no 18:04 -!- mjerr [~mjerr@p5B209723.dip0.t-ipconnect.de] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 18:05 < jgarzik> ryan-c, if you want to do a write up, I'll give you a sketch & answer questions ;p 18:06 * jgarzik found moxie via gmaxwell 18:06 < jgarzik> my initial thought was NACL (i.e. OP_X86) 18:07 < ryan-c> jgarzik: I'm wondering if it's feasible to combine with a mostly-noninteractive atomic trading thing I half-built for namecoin. 18:08 < jgarzik> ryan-c, the auction still needs a server (or quorum of agents) to collect bids and perform a few management tasks; it reduces some risks on both the auctioneer and auction bidder sides, but not completely. 18:09 < jgarzik> long term goal is rapid allocation, execution, and de-allocation of whole markets. 18:10 < jgarzik> auctions, trade order matching and other tasks grouped within a decentralized administrative domain 18:14 < ryan-c> jgarzik: https://github.com/ryancdotorg/nametrade - uses partial transactions with SIGHASH_SINGLE|ANYONECANPAY 18:14 -!- alexwaters [~alexwater@unaffiliated/matth1a3] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 18:16 < jgarzik> kanzure, (ideas pile) One of my thoughts is that scaling bitcoin will indeed involve side chains. chains will fork off the main chain, and merge/settle back into the main chain. lightning does this, yes, but it can be done more simply and effectively with a side chain. 18:17 < jgarzik> similar to git fork and git merge 18:17 < jgarzik> a cluster of users will achieve short term consensus to fork a chain 18:19 < jgarzik> (semantic note: "fork" here is _not_ a hard fork or soft fork; it refers to a departure from the main chain) 18:20 < jgarzik> later, when that decentralized cluster (a decentralized market?) de-allocates, settlement (merge) with main chain occurs. 18:20 < jgarzik> One hyper scaling future fills the main chain with nothing but side chain activity 18:21 < kanzure> jgarzik: yesterday in here i outlined a plan for using lightning network and bip70-style wallet-to-wallet online negotiation for finding cross-chain lightning hubs that will settle to where your merchant prefers to receive utxos. thoughts? 18:21 < kanzure> and then chain preference is probably caused by various fee pressures etc. 18:21 < kanzure> but not sure if cross-chain lightning hubs can work with same trustlessness properties 18:21 < jgarzik> kanzure, In general I'm a fan of lightning 18:22 < jgarzik> kanzure, Trying to reason out whether or not it is simpler for a future end user [wallet] to simply use "the local San Francisco side chain for low value payments" versus a lot of lightning network routing 18:22 -!- alexwaters [~alexwater@unaffiliated/matth1a3] has quit [Read error: Connection reset by peer] 18:22 < jgarzik> there is routing in either case 18:23 < rusty> kanzure: oh, I missed that. Atomic-swap-to-X seems like something we'll want to ddo. 18:23 -!- alexwaters [~alexwater@unaffiliated/matth1a3] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 18:23 < kanzure> as long as it's the same bitcoin currency underneath i'm not sure anyone really cares, as long as the chain is not experiencing lots of reorgs 18:23 < kanzure> rusty: search for "cross-chain" here http://gnusha.org/bitcoin-wizards/2015-09-01.log to see my rantdump 18:23 < jgarzik> moving from main chain to bitcoin-linked side chain, for a wallet, is conceptually a simple "refill my payment account" action 18:24 < jgarzik> kanzure, sorry, I should have been clear - Side Chain with 2way peg, in last few statements 18:24 < GreenIsMyPepper> kanzure: yes i think it can work, the nice thing is you don't need to trust the source chain if you're the recipient 18:24 < jgarzik> Side Chain not side chain :) 18:24 < kanzure> hubs sitting on two chains would be interesting if they can keep their guarantees... it means insta chain hopping and scale on the main chain doesn't matter as long as you're okay with settling for utxos on other chains. 18:24 < GreenIsMyPepper> nor do you need to trust the consensus schemes of the destination if you're the source 18:24 < jgarzik> kanzure, agreed 18:25 < kanzure> were there any particular scale problems with things like treechains or "merge mine a billion different sidechains"? 18:25 < kanzure> er, 2-way-peg sidechains 18:25 < GreenIsMyPepper> it's probably going to be one of the primary uses in the future for computation on different chains/sub-chains IMO and is one of the intended applications, didn't really discuss it much since it's a bit unusual today... 18:25 < jgarzik> tree chains are over hyped and under studied ;p 18:26 < kanzure> well it's just a merge mining circus; so at minimum the merge mining scaling limit question is still in play 18:26 < jgarzik> merge mining a bunch of chains implies collecting all that stuff, and paying miners for each. doable but adds a brand new layer of complexity, economics and attacks. 18:26 -!- Burrito [~Burrito@unaffiliated/burrito] has quit [Quit: Leaving] 18:27 < jgarzik> i.e. miners wind up joining a network that helps them decide which chains to merge mine at which moments. 18:28 < kanzure> oh each miner must merge mine all of them? 18:28 < jgarzik> usefully, 2way pegged chains can at least provide a clear compensation route 18:28 < jgarzik> kanzure, well who decides what goes into the individual miner's merkle root? (rhetorical q) 18:29 < kanzure> also, i would be okay with federated sidechains for some of those usecases- depending on whether i'm a member of that federated consensus signature or not, heh. but if a hub is on that chain sure i'd be okay with receiving outputs there. 18:30 < jgarzik> The end user Holy Grail is instant, secure payments. Lightning or Impulse seems closest to providing that. 18:30 < jgarzik> Side Chains(tm) seem slightly better for scalability than Lightning. 18:30 < kanzure> well there's still various scaling issues with just lots of payment channels. but cross-chain hubs seems to solve that, to me.. depending on which chains you're okay with.. 18:30 -!- chmod755 [~chmod755@unaffiliated/chmod755] has quit [Quit: Ex-Chat] 18:31 < jgarzik> Impulse is quite gratuitous with its protocol, possibly generating many payment channel transactions for a single payment 18:31 < jgarzik> (since it operates in the "lots of open payment channels" model) 18:32 < gmaxwell> jgarzik: The "Side Chains(tm)" thing is affiliating you with disreputable sock accounts on reddit, perhaps you'd prefer to not send that signal. I'd really like to see an elevated level of professionalism for you. There is, obviously, no trademark there; and actual sidechains systems we've done have their own names, e.g. Elements alpha. 18:32 < kanzure> one other issue i have been pondering about here is that if you have a federated consensus based on a handful of supernodes for a sidechain, and you have a strong fraud proof system in place, what exactly do the non-supernode users do when they notice that fraud has been committed? they don't have a supernode for themselves! so... i think the answer is going to be something like "have graceful consensus degradation" but i have no idea ... 18:32 < kanzure> ... what that looks like.... 18:32 < kanzure> jgarzik: btw there is also amiko pay which has been doing some payment channel hub stuff 18:33 < kanzure> see https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1036208.0 and https://github.com/cornwarecjp/amiko-pay although i found the repo indecipherable 18:33 < jgarzik> gmaxwell, it's my method of disambiguating between 2way pegged Side Chains (capitalized) and a larger set of "side chains", which refers to any sub-chain tied to the bitcoin main chain security somehow 18:33 < jgarzik> gmaxwell, I think it's a positive term :) 18:33 -!- frankenmint [~frankenmi@71-222-57-192.ptld.qwest.net] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 18:33 < gmaxwell> OK 18:33 < kanzure> yeah there's lots of ambiguous "side-chain" "sidechain" "sub-chain" proposals from bitcointalk; it's crazy out there in the chain zoo.... 18:33 -!- frankenmint [~frankenmi@71-222-57-192.ptld.qwest.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 18:34 < CodeShark> I'm not entirely sure that people are applying the sidechain concept in the way it was originally intended at all :p 18:34 -!- Dr-G [~Dr-G@unaffiliated/dr-g] has quit [Disconnected by services] 18:34 -!- Dr-G2 [~Dr-G@xd9bf75a4.dyn.telefonica.de] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 18:35 < CodeShark> doesn't seem like sidechains are a scalability solution at all, really - more like a way to create a new ledger and protocol without having to create a new currency 18:35 < kanzure> "other side" can have arbitrary implementation- how does that not solve scalability? 18:35 < gmaxwell> As far as scalablity goes, dunno depends on what you mean by "sidechains" If you're talking about global broadcast blockchain consensus, the result has the same scalablity contour as Bitcoin. It has quasi-quadratic scaling with usage. Vs micropayment channel networks which normally keep transaction data exclusively between participants instead of being globally broadcast is a real scalablity imp 18:36 < gmaxwell> rovement over anything that must broadcast everything to all participants. When you get into sidechains that have different security models, then perhaps you can also drop the globalness and then there is a scaling benefit. 18:36 < jgarzik> CodeShark: the original selling point of Side Chains with two-way pegging as I understood it was "Bitcoin Beta" - test new features before rolling them out on the main chain, with a real money test 18:36 < kanzure> yes i often mean "arbitrarily different security models" 18:36 < gmaxwell> kanzure: Well thats a little like saying bitcoin scalablity is solved because the scientific method is known to mankind. :) 18:36 < kanzure> it is often not known to mankind :-( 18:36 < gmaxwell> besides the point. 18:37 < gmaxwell> And yea, sure to the extent that a 2wp sidechain lets some new snazzy stuff get easily deployed, then it can help provide scalablity improvements. But in that example it's just the pre-req the scaling improvement is something you added later. 18:37 < CodeShark> my understanding is that sidechains are an experimentation mechanism that allows the creation of a new blockchain that can accept value from another existing blockchain without forking any ledgers 18:37 < kanzure> users that want 1 trillion transactions/second might be willing to go with federated signing-pool consensus techniques 18:37 < kanzure> seeing as how that's the only way we know how to do that 18:37 < jgarzik> CodeShark: However based on my own reasoning and analysis, a two-way pegged side chain can certain perform useful transaction-aggregation functions if combined with some of the aforementioned decentralized market software 18:37 < kanzure> CodeShark: the other side does not necessarily require a blockchain 18:38 < jgarzik> In the Bitcoin Rules The World scenario you might even see main chain + side chain + lightning 18:38 -!- Newyorkadam [~Newyorkad@wikipedia/Newyorkadam] has quit [Quit: Newyorkadam] 18:38 < jgarzik> all using bitcoin-the-token 18:38 < gmaxwell> There is a really really mild example of this in elements alpha, say-- The seperated witness stuff means that you can create a new kind of intermediate security node that doesn't transfer historical signatures but checks everything else. Using only 1/3rd the bandwidth (or something like 1/10th the bandwidth in the case of elements alpha due to CT). 18:39 < kanzure> for some reason i am substantially less worried about non-miner scalability; i think it's because fraud proofs can be constructed by things approximating spv clients in most circumstances? 18:39 < CodeShark> right, you could aggregate stuff on a sidechain but it seems like it's better to aggregate stuff BEFORE committing globally 18:40 < jgarzik> CodeShark: real time transactions happen in... real time. there might not be a 'before' :) 18:40 < gmaxwell> kanzure: they can't efficienty be done in bitcoin today but we know it can be done; though it's moot if the software isn't written. 18:41 < kanzure> (i suppose you could also argue that a flooding network has no incentive to actually transfer fraud proofs, because the cost of ruckus is possibly greater than the temporary loss due to whatever inflation was evidenced...... ouch) 18:41 < CodeShark> jgarzik: point is the contract negotiation and aggregation can take place outside a flood network 18:41 < kanzure> of course. 18:41 < CodeShark> flood networks aren't particularly scalable :p 18:41 < gmaxwell> Case in point, bitcoinj checks basically nothing it could check, even without any more data transfered; I haven't checked for a month, but electrum's chain selection was wrong and would take a chain with more blocks even with less work, etc. The pratical concern of people will just not implement security is a major one, especially when its security against fringe risks and it's 70% of the low le 18:41 < gmaxwell> vel software complexity. 18:42 < kanzure> well that just sounds like an argument for handwaving reference implementations into existence... :-) 18:43 < jgarzik> yeah software sucks 18:43 < gmaxwell> and them people go reimplement for varrious reasons (some good some bad) 18:44 < gmaxwell> Thats why e.g. there was time spent thinking about awful contrivances like requring every block to commit to a bad block too. Though I think there is an architecture that makes implementing fraud proofs correctly easier and more likely. 18:44 < kanzure> are we missing basic toy fraud proof example implementations? 18:44 < gmaxwell> E.g. basically set up things so that all data is fraud proofs, and a normal block is really just a compressed on the wire representation of the fraud proofs for every update it would make to the system state. (Is that concrete enough for you?) 18:44 < kanzure> i did not see one in my recent forum review.. 18:44 < CodeShark> yes, if anyone can provide examples that would be very useful - I'm compiling this info into a talk 18:45 < kanzure> same, 'cept i am doing review of all scaling proposals ever mentioned. (my eyes aren't bleeding yet which is pretty interesting to me...) 18:46 < gmaxwell> e.g. you can instead look at a block as a bag of utxo updates and the associated data to show the update was permitted. And you can write code that busts apart a block into a bunch of freestanding updates+proofs, or compresses a collection of proofs into a block (ditching all the redundant information). 18:46 < kanzure> but what to do when your supernode is committing fraud? 18:47 < jgarzik> Tragically the stupid social media hubbub prevents Blockstream from agreeing with my obviously correct opinion that Side Chains(tm) are a scalability solution (because then sock puppets dive in with conspiracies about block size) 18:47 < kanzure> yes there have been some good explanations of how to do authenticated data structures + fraud proofs for each update type. 18:47 < CodeShark> gmaxwell: if you have any materials on this topic I can use it would be tremendously appreciated 18:48 < gmaxwell> jgarzik: hah, hey, I was saying they weren't before the noise! :) But I agree that if I did agree I sure as hell couldn't say it now without more (electronic at least) rocks through my window. 18:48 < gmaxwell> jgarzik: probably a definitional issue. 18:48 < kanzure> re: fraud proof toy example, if nobody in this community has one then we should pester amiller maybe to pick a good paper to work from 18:48 < gmaxwell> kanzure: no. not beyond my bitcoin wiki page. Though I mentioned here a completely general approach. 18:49 < gmaxwell> which uh I'd have to find. 18:49 < kanzure> yeah i am having trouble organizing a strategy for reading all -dev and -wizards logs... it's much much more data at way higher density. 18:49 < kanzure> i mean i can read all of it, it will just take me much longer 18:50 < kanzure> (see near 18:12 here for my ideas on an approach for whittling down the logs some http://gnusha.org/logs/2015-09-01.log ) 18:50 -!- belcher [~user@unaffiliated/belcher] has quit [Quit: Leaving] 18:51 -!- King_Rex [~King_Rex@226.sub-70-193-100.myvzw.com] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 18:51 -!- kmels [~kmels@184.62.151.186.static.intelnet.net.gt] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 18:52 < gmaxwell> jgarzik: by defintions I mean, I don't consider something that (1) gets you a small constant scale to be a scalablity solution, (2) is just a way to deploy some other actual scalablity solution, or (3) only gets you scale if you also take a major security tradeoff. Things that do 1/2/3 can all be super useful-- and are all things I know how to do with 2WP concepts, but I wouldn't call them scalab 18:53 < gmaxwell> lity. 18:53 < kanzure> one of the okay overviews of types of fraud proofs for authenticated data structures (merkle tree stuff) was https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=586832.msg6478781#msg6478781 (tier nolan) 18:53 < kanzure> oops wait wrong link 18:56 < CodeShark> gmaxwell: could you do utxo commitments without requiring trusting miners to validate? 18:56 < kanzure> welp this is hard to find 18:58 < kanzure> ah it was at least here https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1103281.msg11743498#msg11743498 18:58 < CodeShark> I should probably rephrase that 18:58 < kanzure> which was an enumeration of all required fraud proofs 18:58 < aj> gmaxwell: re: clients not checking fringe cases for potential fraud; wouldn't that be something you could do on the testnet, ie have constant streams of full blocks, reorgs, double spends, longer-but-weaker chains, etc? 18:59 < kanzure> aj: clients are not required to be on testnet 19:00 < aj> kanzure: client software, i mean. "check your program doesn't break on testnet before releasing it" 19:00 < kanzure> testing? hahaha 19:01 -!- GGuyZ [~GGuyZ@216-15-123-91.c3-0.sbo-ubr1.sbo.ma.cable.rcn.com] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 19:01 < kanzure> oh you mean "regtest local testing framework that throws your client lots of weird data, and then plz integrate this api for the tests to check your wallet's status to see if it handled everything correctly". well that's doable i guess if someone bothered to make such a sandbox environment. 19:01 < gmaxwell> aj: yes. though there have been bitcoin reimplementations used in criticial applications handling huge amounts of other people's funds, which instantly fell over on testnet... 19:01 < gmaxwell> So it's clearly not sufficient. 19:02 < gmaxwell> It's been basically impossible to get most bitcoin using businesses to setup test copies of their stack against testnet. 19:02 < aj> gmaxwell: well if you're only handling /other/ people's funds, security's not a problem :) 19:02 < aj> gmaxwell: wow, that's pretty terrible 19:02 < jgarzik> gmaxwell, yeah sad - I've been pushing on "run a testnet version of your website" for years 19:03 < CodeShark> could we use a formal proof management system? 19:03 < jgarzik> though cynically I'm also waiting for the first botnet C&C to be found running through testnet 19:03 < kanzure> amiller: if someone was going to write a toy demo for fraud proofs, which research paper should they shamelessly copy from? 19:03 < gmaxwell> There are some actually good arguments against it, e.g. it's usually not ideal but okay if you have a service that responds to a big reorg by shutting down and waiting for human intervention. But if you do that on testnet you might get a bunch of time wasted on it. 19:04 < kanzure> testnet might be unnecessary if you have a sufficiently wide coverage of events to plug into your regtest system (but you'll be sourcing edgecases from testnet anyway.... so...) 19:04 < gmaxwell> not the best of arguments, since you're going to screw up the manual intervention if it's not 99% automated and it's not something you do. 19:05 < kanzure> (because it's not just blockchain content that matters, but also network status and network behavior that you need to test with, which testnet does not provide synced to your internal testing schedules) 19:05 < gmaxwell> Testnet though has other business benefits. There have been services that I'd be much more likely to try if I could try them out with play money. 19:05 -!- sparetire_ [~sparetire@unaffiliated/sparetire] has quit [Quit: sparetire_] 19:05 < kanzure> sure, yes. 19:05 < CodeShark> testnets are useful if you manufacture edge cases 19:05 < kanzure> "has testnet" is one of the contractual requirements that i always demand, so.. yeah. 19:05 < kanzure> CodeShark: no we mean testnet itself; regtest is the manufactured one. 19:06 < gmaxwell> CodeShark: yes, the public testnet is full of constructed edge cases... and anyone can add to it. 19:06 < gmaxwell> it's like a collaborative regtest. :) 19:06 < CodeShark> right 19:07 < gmaxwell> also for those who prefer to report issues by setting your stuff on fire, testnet provides a safer way to do it than actually setting your production stuff on fire. 19:07 < jgarzik> heh 19:08 < kanzure> fraud proofs are not enough to convince me that supernode fraud can be tolerated, especially when there's only one supernode on the whole network. it's similar to a mining cartel problem. 19:09 < CodeShark> that's where incentives come in 19:09 < CodeShark> if you could buy fraud proofs we might be onto something 19:16 -!- NewLiberty [~NewLibert@76-255-129-88.lightspeed.irvnca.sbcglobal.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 19:17 -!- ThomasV_ [~ThomasV@x4db3b151.dyn.telefonica.de] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 19:17 < gmaxwell> yea, it's ... uh. a tool. Not a silver bullet. 19:20 < kanzure> oh right, the mining cartel thing had an attack that andytoshi identified about a single miner not colluding gaining disproportionate advantage... actually that was a private conversation between him and vitalik that he was summarizing. 19:21 -!- ThomasV [~ThomasV@unaffiliated/thomasv] has quit [Ping timeout: 268 seconds] 19:25 -!- ThomasV_ [~ThomasV@x4db3b151.dyn.telefonica.de] has quit [Ping timeout: 264 seconds] 19:29 -!- nwilcox [~nwilcox@73.202.109.21] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 19:30 -!- alexwaters [~alexwater@unaffiliated/matth1a3] has quit [Read error: Connection reset by peer] 19:30 -!- alexwaters [~alexwater@unaffiliated/matth1a3] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 19:37 -!- Giszmo [~leo@pc-185-201-214-201.cm.vtr.net] has quit [Quit: Leaving.] 19:37 < amiller> kanzure, which fraud proof 19:37 < amiller> that enumeration of kinds from tiernolan seems pretty good 19:38 -!- drwin [~drwin@out-nat-33.jes.cz] has quit [Read error: Connection reset by peer] 19:39 -!- drwin [~drwin@out-nat-33.jes.cz] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 19:39 -!- nwilcox [~nwilcox@73.202.109.21] has quit [Ping timeout: 272 seconds] 19:41 < kanzure> amiller: basically any of those i guess. 19:41 < kanzure> amiller: i don't know, chef's pick? 19:41 < kanzure> it is sort of embarassing that we do not have a toy demo for fraud proofs at all 19:42 < amiller> petertodd has a library for this sort of thing but i think it's unwieldy, i don't have anything better though 19:42 < kanzure> merbinnertree? 19:42 -!- jgarzik [~jgarzik@unaffiliated/jgarzik] has quit [Quit: Leaving] 19:42 < amiller> i think i could hack my ocaml hack into doing thing right thing but i'd need to add custom serialization 19:42 < amiller> and hash 19:42 < amiller> to be compatible with existing bitcoin data structures 19:43 < amiller> https://github.com/proofchains/python-proofchains 19:43 < kanzure> wonderful readme 19:44 < kanzure> https://github.com/proofchains/python-proofchains/blob/1e90fdcbd98f71f1732509f0fc873548aef03838/proofchains/test/core/uniquebits/test_singleuseseal.py 19:44 < CodeShark> I reimplemented peter todd's MMR trees in C++ 19:45 < CodeShark> but I'm not sure what else Peter Todd was doing 19:45 < amiller> CodeShark, i'd be curious to see what that C++ looks like 19:45 < amiller> especially if it uses any kind of generic thing where you have to write the 'traversal' only once 19:45 < amiller> and the prover / verifier are just different 'modes' using the same code 19:46 < amiller> in ocaml i do that by having two compilers, in petertodd's he does it with a pruning flag, in my python-merkle toy it had some kind of mixin class thing 19:48 < kanzure> when you say python-merkle do you mean https://github.com/amiller/redblackmerkle 19:48 < amiller> yeah i meant that thanks kanzure 19:48 -!- hazirafel [~ufoinc@31.154.92.14] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 19:49 -!- alexwaters [~alexwater@unaffiliated/matth1a3] has quit [Quit: Leaving.] 19:53 < kanzure> so i wonder how many out of that enumeration that proofchains can cover 19:54 < kanzure> "It would be necessary to go through the entire set of consensus rules and create a fraud proof for every check that is performed. It is also necessary to create a check of anything that is used for checking. If UTXO commitments are added, then fraud proofs are needed for the UTXO set commitment tree. Ideally, there would be a guarantee that the maximum size of a fraud proof has a finite limit. Some of the elements of the fraud proof ... 19:54 < kanzure> ... scale with O(log(N)) so it can't be guaranteed entirely, but it should be possible to guarantee in practice. Fraud proof don't protect against miners withholding some info. You can't prove a block is invalid if you only have 99% of the transactions in the block." 19:56 < kanzure> "You need to break down blocks into small pieces that can be verified individually. I think 1MB is a reasonable chunk of data. A block would consist of sub-blocks. Each sub-block would have the UTXO commitments and any additional information required for proving. This UTXO commitment would include the hash of the scriptPubKey and the value. This keeps everything self-contained." 19:57 < CodeShark> what I had done was mostly experimental - it was not quite yet production-level code...but https://github.com/CodeShark/CryptoLedger/blob/master/src/HashTrie.h 19:58 < CodeShark> it uses a pretty inefficient serialization 19:58 -!- rusty [~rusty@pdpc/supporter/bronze/rusty] has quit [Ping timeout: 264 seconds] 20:13 -!- zooko [~user@2601:281:8301:e87f:6d31:cf24:4e53:4f5] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 20:15 < kanzure> Luke-Jr: "collusion-determined limit" heh 20:15 -!- [7] [~quassel@rockbox/developer/TheSeven] has quit [Disconnected by services] 20:15 < Luke-Jr> kanzure: hey, might as well be explicit about it? :P 20:15 -!- TheSeven [~quassel@rockbox/developer/TheSeven] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 20:19 < CodeShark> rather than using red-black trees isn't it better to use radix trees if you want quasi-self balancing? 20:19 < CodeShark> since the keys are essentially uniformly distributed 20:21 -!- GGuyZ [~GGuyZ@216-15-123-91.c3-0.sbo-ubr1.sbo.ma.cable.rcn.com] has quit [Quit: GGuyZ] 20:23 -!- GGuyZ [~GGuyZ@216-15-123-91.c3-0.sbo-ubr1.sbo.ma.cable.rcn.com] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 20:24 -!- snthsnth [~snthsnth@c-98-207-208-241.hsd1.ca.comcast.net] has quit [Ping timeout: 272 seconds] 20:32 -!- rusty [~rusty@pdpc/supporter/bronze/rusty] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 20:34 < Taek> CodeShark: you'd want to be careful about radix trees because they aren't guaranteed to balance (iirc). Attackers could potentially be abusive. 20:34 < CodeShark> I suppose attackers could "mine" specific prefixes 20:34 < CodeShark> but it's costly to do it too many levels deep 20:35 < phantomcircuit> Taek, it's easy to add a tweak value 20:35 < phantomcircuit> ie 20:35 < phantomcircuit> k,v -> H(k|t), v 20:36 -!- jgarzik [~jgarzik@unaffiliated/jgarzik] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 20:36 < Taek> where 't' is determined by the block id? That would probably be sufficient. 20:37 < phantomcircuit> Taek, t can just be a random value that's published alongside the radix tree hash 20:37 < phantomcircuit> it increases (doubles?) the size of the commitment, but trivially prevents that issue 20:38 < CodeShark> who selects the t? 20:40 < CodeShark> if the t can be chosen by the committer arbitrarily it's still possible to brute-force prefixes 20:41 -!- Emcy [~MC@unaffiliated/mc1984] has quit [Ping timeout: 250 seconds] 20:42 < CodeShark> and it would probably be better to use HMAC so that each new t requires a complete recalculation 20:42 < phantomcircuit> CodeShark, the entity generating the radix tree hash ie the commitment can select a t value that makes the tree not balanced 20:43 -!- c0rw1n is now known as c0rw|zZz 20:43 < phantomcircuit> that's better than someone else being able to do it though 20:43 < CodeShark> I kinda like the idea of using the block hash as the t 20:43 < phantomcircuit> CodeShark, you'd have to use the previous block hash as t 20:43 < phantomcircuit> and it's still vulnerable to grinding 20:44 < phantomcircuit> but probably nobody cares enough to actually do it 20:44 < CodeShark> yes, but at least there's a limited time window here 20:44 < CodeShark> you can't just mine keys for months and then suddenly attack 20:45 -!- GGuyZ [~GGuyZ@216-15-123-91.c3-0.sbo-ubr1.sbo.ma.cable.rcn.com] has quit [Quit: GGuyZ] 20:46 < CodeShark> in any case, it is possible to construct a scheme to generate a unique t value that cannot be predicted by anyone with very much anticipation, cannot be influenced much by anyone, and can be verified by anyone 20:47 < CodeShark> the last "and" should be a "but" 20:49 -!- user7779078 [user777907@gateway/vpn/mullvad/x-twbzhizpthtcsabo] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 20:50 -!- user7779078 [~user77790@2001:1af8:4010:a027:21::4e] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 20:50 < CodeShark> the supposed advantage of using peter todd's MMR idea was that more recent insertions usually have short branches 20:51 < CodeShark> but I'm not entirely convinced of the benefits - you'd need a separate index to find paths to arbitrary nodes 20:52 < CodeShark> and as you approach powers of 2 the tree approaches a perfectly balanced binary tree 20:53 -!- Newyorkadam [~Newyorkad@wikipedia/Newyorkadam] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 20:53 < CodeShark> a problem with using the scriptPubKey as an index is that it requires an extra nonce to make it unique 21:00 < CodeShark> also, the main idea here wasn't so much fraud proofs...but shifting the burden of validity proofs over to the sender 21:03 -!- kmels [~kmels@184.62.151.186.static.intelnet.net.gt] has quit [Ping timeout: 250 seconds] 21:04 -!- bildramer [~bildramer@p5DC8ABAD.dip0.t-ipconnect.de] has quit [Ping timeout: 246 seconds] 21:09 -!- p15 [~p15@114.244.151.135] has quit [Ping timeout: 272 seconds] 21:10 -!- bildramer [~bildramer@p5DC8ABAD.dip0.t-ipconnect.de] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 21:20 -!- Newyorkadam [~Newyorkad@wikipedia/Newyorkadam] has quit [Quit: Newyorkadam] 21:22 -!- c-cex-yuriy [uid76808@gateway/web/irccloud.com/x-ganlrfwmdapjexyl] has quit [Quit: Connection closed for inactivity] 21:22 -!- NewLiberty [~NewLibert@76-255-129-88.lightspeed.irvnca.sbcglobal.net] has quit [Ping timeout: 246 seconds] 21:23 -!- zooko [~user@2601:281:8301:e87f:6d31:cf24:4e53:4f5] has quit [Ping timeout: 244 seconds] 21:24 -!- bildramer [~bildramer@p5DC8ABAD.dip0.t-ipconnect.de] has quit [Ping timeout: 255 seconds] 21:24 -!- bildramer [~bildramer@p5DC8ABAD.dip0.t-ipconnect.de] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 21:36 -!- CodeShark [~CodeShark@cpe-76-167-237-202.san.res.rr.com] has quit [Ping timeout: 250 seconds] 21:37 -!- CodeShark [~CodeShark@cpe-76-167-237-202.san.res.rr.com] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 21:53 -!- user7779078 [~user77790@2001:1af8:4010:a027:21::4e] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 21:54 -!- snthsnth [~snthsnth@c-98-207-208-241.hsd1.ca.comcast.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 22:06 -!- mengine [~mengine@251.92-221-142.customer.lyse.net] has quit [Ping timeout: 250 seconds] 22:18 -!- paveljanik [~paveljani@unaffiliated/paveljanik] has quit [Quit: Leaving] 22:21 -!- mengine [~mengine@251.92-221-142.customer.lyse.net] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 22:23 -!- snthsnth [~snthsnth@c-98-207-208-241.hsd1.ca.comcast.net] has quit [Ping timeout: 265 seconds] 22:33 -!- ThomasV [~ThomasV@unaffiliated/thomasv] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 22:45 -!- DougieBot5000 [~DougieBot@unaffiliated/dougiebot5000] has quit [Quit: Leaving] 23:02 -!- priidu [~priidu@unaffiliated/priidu] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 23:14 -!- drwin [~drwin@out-nat-33.jes.cz] has quit [Read error: No route to host] 23:15 -!- drwin [~drwin@out-nat-33.jes.cz] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 23:30 -!- gielbier [~giel@a149043.upc-a.chello.nl] has quit [Read error: Connection reset by peer] 23:33 -!- Ylbam [uid99779@gateway/web/irccloud.com/x-sprdvklpyeoqujtl] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 23:35 -!- Meeh [~meeeeeeh@meeh.sigterm.no] has quit [Read error: Connection reset by peer] 23:36 -!- Meeh [~meeeeeeh@meeh.sigterm.no] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 23:41 -!- drwin [~drwin@out-nat-33.jes.cz] has quit [Read error: Connection reset by peer] 23:42 -!- drwin [~drwin@out-nat-33.jes.cz] has joined #bitcoin-wizards 23:43 -!- veleiro [~veleiro@fsf/member/veleiro] has quit [Ping timeout: 264 seconds] 23:56 -!- ThomasV [~ThomasV@unaffiliated/thomasv] has quit [Ping timeout: 268 seconds] --- Log closed Thu Sep 03 00:00:59 2015