--- Log opened Fri Jan 17 00:00:09 2020 00:05 -!- dopplergange [~dop@196.244.191.166] has joined #joinmarket 01:05 -!- jcoe [seru@gateway/vpn/protonvpn/joncoe] has joined #joinmarket 01:52 -!- Zenton [~user@unaffiliated/vicenteh] has joined #joinmarket 01:59 -!- slivera_ [slivera@gateway/vpn/privateinternetaccess/slivera] has joined #joinmarket 02:14 -!- robbo093485 [677a2d86@103.122.45.134] has joined #joinmarket 02:14 < robbo093485> Hi guys, I'm using JM on Raspiblitz - if I change it to run behind Tor, will JM continue to work or do I have to make adjustments? 02:18 < k3tan> is this what you're looking for? https://github.com/openoms/bitcoin-tutorials/blob/master/joinmarket/joinmarket_desktop_to_blitz.md 02:26 < robbo093485> ah, looks like it ... so basically a few small adjustments in joinmarket.cfg, that seems to be it :-) thanks! 02:35 < waxwing> seeing only 28 in pit on darkscience. 02:36 < waxwing> 98 on cgan 02:48 -!- belcher [~belcher@unaffiliated/belcher] has joined #joinmarket 03:06 -!- Doug46Goodwin [~Doug46Goo@ns334669.ip-5-196-64.eu] has joined #joinmarket 03:27 < AgoraRelay> [agora-irc/AlexCato1] robbo093485: yeah, you should adjust the IRC server addresses in your joinmarket.cfg config file to use the TOR onion addresses and ports 03:27 < AgoraRelay> [agora-irc/AlexCato1] other than that, no changes needed 03:55 -!- slivera_ [slivera@gateway/vpn/privateinternetaccess/slivera] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 04:11 < robbo093485> thanks, AgoraRelay! 04:14 -!- Doug46Goodwin [~Doug46Goo@ns334669.ip-5-196-64.eu] has quit [Ping timeout: 265 seconds] 04:14 -!- robbo093485 [677a2d86@103.122.45.134] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 04:47 -!- rottensox [~rottensox@unaffiliated/rottensox] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 04:49 -!- rottensox [~rottensox@unaffiliated/rottensox] has joined #joinmarket 05:20 -!- zndtoshi [1fda0683@31.218.6.131] has joined #joinmarket 05:24 < zndtoshi> Chris Belcher and Adam do you agree with the idea of a mobile app for Joinmarket? There can be a multisig bounty program for this and have android devs work on it. I guess would be a branch of the Joinmarket github page and I'd like to know if you are ok with the idea or not. https://twitter.com/zndtoshi/status/1218108044858527744?s=20 06:00 -!- vrana [~mvranic@gateway/tor-sasl/vrana] has quit [Ping timeout: 240 seconds] 06:03 < dave_uy> How does JoinMarket try to stop sybil attacks? Does it not try? I considered opening multiple yield generators to gain more returns. 06:07 -!- vrana [~mvranic@gateway/tor-sasl/vrana] has joined #joinmarket 06:09 < belcher> zndtoshi yes i agree with the idea in principle, it would more than just android deving because it probably requires client-side block filtering too, also in the past we've had bad experiences with bounties for individual features because it ended up with a dev coming along doing a hack job and adding technical debt and whining until someone reviewed their code, but if those concerns can be solved it would be a great thing to do 06:09 < belcher> highlighting waxwing 06:10 < belcher> dave_uy you wouldnt be the first, joinmarket doesnt have sybil protection implemented right now, however there is an idea of using time-locked bitcoins for sybil protection which you can read about here https://gist.github.com/chris-belcher/18ea0e6acdb885a2bfbdee43dcd6b5af/ 06:10 < belcher> actually working on implementing that is my current project right now 06:14 < waxwing> there is sybil protection against spying on makers though 06:19 < belcher> an alternative idea to the SPV joinmarket android app is the android app which talks to joinmarket running in your home https://twitter.com/fiatjaf/status/1218148987083075589 06:23 < waxwing> belcher, i made a few comments here, not that you need to read it of course :) https://x0f.org/web/statuses/103498357461148970 06:23 < waxwing> my main point is that, yeah, there are several different things you could do that vaguely fit the description "joinmarket on mobile" 07:17 -!- MaxSan [~four@193.148.16.211] has quit [Quit: Leaving.] 07:21 < dave_uy> belcher: very interesting sybil attack article. In a way, running multiple generators by honest actors is an improvement to privacy. I'm not sure that the fidelity bond helps sibyl attacks. Isn't running multiple generators essentially achieving the same goal on increasing the cost for everyone else? 07:21 < belcher> running multiple generators by the same person is a degradation of privacy 07:22 < belcher> say the taker has paid coinjoin fees for 6 makers expecting that 6 different people need to collude to unmix the coinjoin, but then it turns out those 6 makers are actually run by 2 people so only those 2 need to collude now 07:23 < belcher> the fidelity bond solution works by pricing the bonds as V^2, which gives a strong incentive to run just one bot instead of many 07:26 < dave_uy> I see. Wouldn't fidelity bonds also decrease the amount of makers too? My point is, I would rather an honest maker run multiple generators if they never planned on using the data to unmix coins. 07:26 < waxwing> zndtoshi, apologies didn't see you in the backscroll, but same comments apply as per my mastodon comment. i think it's cool to try to do something like that. i would just try not to be too ambitious to start with. also good comment about client side filters from belcher - that's in our TODO.md and is something one of us should actively take up shortly, really (though not sure who, and when). 07:27 < belcher> dave_uy they would decrease the number of makers probably, because today's makers are artificially inflated as individual people run multiple makers 07:27 < dave_uy> Of course, I would rather all generators be run by unique individuals. 07:27 < belcher> we'd also rather not rely on makers having to be honest, if we're willing to rely on honest people we could use centralized mixers instead 07:27 < waxwing> well that's not the same thing, eh 07:28 < dave_uy> I was a little confused about signing the IRC nick. Doesn't the IRC nick change on each restart? Would it need to be signed each time restarting? 07:28 < waxwing> dave_uy, the purpose is to prevent people taking your nick on another irc server while you're running 07:28 < belcher> under the proposal yield generators would have a long-lived IRC nick 07:28 < waxwing> if we only used one messaging server such signing would have no value. 07:29 < dave_uy> I don't trust anyone but myself when it comes to bitcoin. But that is at least ONE person I trust. :) 07:29 < waxwing> sorry confusing, you are questioning belcher's idea while i'm explaining why we have signing now 07:30 < belcher> yeah theres two kinds of signing under discussion, the IRC nick signing of messages today which is there because of multiple servers, and the proposed signing of IRC nicks using the fidelity bond pubkeys which would be required for the sybil resistance idea 07:32 < dave_uy> Right. That's all the questions I have for now. I really appreciate the hard work. Thank you! 07:32 < belcher> np 07:34 < dave_uy> I will be curious to see how many "burn" their coins for coinjoin privileges. That would be a hard sell for me. 07:34 < belcher> i imagined that the people are hodlers who do this have their coins sitting in cold storage and doing nothing else anyway 07:35 < belcher> if you use time locked addresses you get your original bitcoins back after the timelock expires of course 07:35 < waxwing> they're not burned. burn has a very specific meaning in this context. 07:36 < belcher> yep, aside from time-locked addresses there are also burner addresses which literally destroy the bitcoins, and they can also be used as fidelity bonds (although id guess far fewer people will do this) 07:37 < dave_uy> OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY I would do, but OP_RETURN I would need to know I would make that bitcoin back eventually. 07:37 < belcher> OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY is most appropriate for you then 07:37 < belcher> id say the biggest unknown is whether takers will agree and adopt this idea 07:38 < dave_uy> Very interesting. Maybe for a small amount it would make a lot of sense. 07:38 < belcher> because the idea depends on coinjoin fees going up a bit to incentivize the locking of bitcoins, takers are the one paying for it (and in return they get better privacy, but is it enough? i hope so but its unknown) 07:39 < belcher> yes people would start small for sure 07:39 < belcher> as with anything 07:39 < waxwing> oh sorry dave_uy i had forgotten that op_return was proposed in that article as well as cltv. i had always only consider cltv. but yeah one could make an argument for both, in some economic sense they're both ~equivalent (time value of money) 07:40 < dave_uy> I think I would still be incentivized to burn multiple small amounts and run multiple generators though. I could be wrong, depending on how difficult the process it. 07:40 < waxwing> here's one thought i had about this topic when we were dealing with the other sybil attack (from taker side, for snooping): attackers *really* don't like leaving traces on chain. 07:41 < belcher> dave_uy the value of a fidelity bond is calculated as V^2, so the square of the value sacrificed, that means that if you run multiple yieldgenerators you would be losing money 07:41 < waxwing> if you force them to create tons of utxos there's a very good chance they won't do it. 07:41 < belcher> yep 07:42 < waxwing> yeah superlinear is a good idea in this context. that was a nice touch. 07:42 < belcher> a concrete example of the V^2 thing: if you had 10btc you wanted to lock up, if it was just in one ygen the bond would be worth 10^2 = 100, but if it was split across two bonds then together they would be worth 2*(10/2)^2 = 50, and 50 is less than 100 07:43 < dave_uy> I see. Thank you for pointing out the math. 07:43 < belcher> dave_uy is right to point out that without the V^2 superlinearity the fidelity bond scheme doesnt actually provide much privacy 07:43 < belcher> because attacks would earn the same amount as defenders 07:43 -!- rottensox_ [~rottensox@unaffiliated/rottensox] has joined #joinmarket 07:44 < waxwing> hmm .. but isn't "attack" in this context specifically the behaviour of splitting liquidity? 07:44 -!- rottensox [~rottensox@unaffiliated/rottensox] has quit [Read error: Connection reset by peer] 07:44 < dave_uy> You have convinced me. The fidelity system is better for privacy. 07:44 < belcher> waxwing yep 07:45 < waxwing> so attack is less profitable than honest right 07:45 < belcher> yep 07:54 < belcher> one possible problem is actually that superlinearity, it gives an incentive for multiple people to lump together their coins into one bot 07:54 < belcher> which is not too privacy-damaging, because the privacy-relevant information is still only with the single operator of the bot, but its not ideal nonetheless 07:55 < waxwing> that would apply to literally any privacy technique, even say zkps, because if one person knows X they can always tell anyone they like about X. 07:55 < belcher> lumping together requires possibly introducing custodial risk though (i.e. you could send your money to some guy who will make money running a joinmarket yield-gen, and then that guy just steals your money instead) 07:56 < belcher> also we can do things like code takers the only accept a single timelocked UTXO as a fidelity bond, because if you allowed multiple UTXOs they could be owned by multiple people 07:57 < belcher> in the worst case the superlinearity power could be reduced down to 1.5 maybe, changing that parameter changes the tradeoff between disincentivizing sybils and disincentivizing lumping 08:17 -!- rottensox_ is now known as rottensox 08:21 -!- krvopije [~krvopije@2001:4bb8:180:fa0:3c43:be9b:78bb:13ae] has joined #joinmarket 08:29 -!- zndtoshi [1fda0683@31.218.6.131] has quit [Ping timeout: 260 seconds] 08:39 -!- rottensox [~rottensox@unaffiliated/rottensox] has quit [Ping timeout: 252 seconds] 08:40 -!- rottensox [~rottensox@unaffiliated/rottensox] has joined #joinmarket 09:13 -!- Zenton [~user@unaffiliated/vicenteh] has quit [Ping timeout: 260 seconds] 09:56 -!- krvopije [~krvopije@2001:4bb8:180:fa0:3c43:be9b:78bb:13ae] has left #joinmarket ["Leaving"] 09:57 -!- krvopije [~krvopije@2001:4bb8:180:fa0:3c43:be9b:78bb:13ae] has joined #joinmarket 10:04 -!- vrana [~mvranic@gateway/tor-sasl/vrana] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 10:10 -!- vrana [~mvranic@gateway/tor-sasl/vrana] has joined #joinmarket 10:15 -!- ghost43_ is now known as ghost43 10:38 -!- krvopije [~krvopije@2001:4bb8:180:fa0:3c43:be9b:78bb:13ae] has quit [Quit: Leaving] 10:52 -!- krvopije [~krvopije@2001:4bb8:180:fa0:3c43:be9b:78bb:13ae] has joined #joinmarket 10:52 -!- krvopije [~krvopije@2001:4bb8:180:fa0:3c43:be9b:78bb:13ae] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 11:15 -!- krvopije [~krvopije@2001:4bb8:180:fa0:3c43:be9b:78bb:13ae] has joined #joinmarket 11:27 -!- krvopije [~krvopije@2001:4bb8:180:fa0:3c43:be9b:78bb:13ae] has quit [Quit: Leaving] 11:41 -!- rottensox [~rottensox@unaffiliated/rottensox] has quit [Read error: Connection reset by peer] 11:41 -!- rottensox [~rottensox@unaffiliated/rottensox] has joined #joinmarket 12:03 -!- CgRelayBot [~CgRelayBo@p54866377.dip0.t-ipconnect.de] has quit [Ping timeout: 260 seconds] 12:10 -!- Zenton [~user@unaffiliated/vicenteh] has joined #joinmarket 12:18 -!- CgRelayBot [~CgRelayBo@p54866377.dip0.t-ipconnect.de] has joined #joinmarket 12:23 -!- krvopije [~krvopije@2001:4bb8:180:fa0:3c43:be9b:78bb:13ae] has joined #joinmarket 12:41 -!- slivera [slivera@gateway/vpn/privateinternetaccess/slivera] has joined #joinmarket 12:49 -!- technonerd [~techno@gateway/tor-sasl/technonerd] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 12:49 -!- technonerd [~techno@gateway/tor-sasl/technonerd] has joined #joinmarket 13:12 -!- luke-jr [~luke-jr@unaffiliated/luke-jr] has quit [Ping timeout: 265 seconds] 13:25 -!- jcoe [seru@gateway/vpn/protonvpn/joncoe] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 13:25 -!- jcoe [seru@gateway/vpn/protonvpn/joncoe] has joined #joinmarket 14:03 -!- jcoe [seru@gateway/vpn/protonvpn/joncoe] has quit [Read error: Connection reset by peer] 14:04 -!- jcoe [seru@gateway/vpn/protonvpn/joncoe] has joined #joinmarket 14:07 -!- krvopije [~krvopije@2001:4bb8:180:fa0:3c43:be9b:78bb:13ae] has quit [Quit: Leaving] 15:14 -!- krvopije [~krvopije@2001:4bb8:180:fa0:3c43:be9b:78bb:13ae] has joined #joinmarket 16:10 -!- luke-jr [~luke-jr@unaffiliated/luke-jr] has joined #joinmarket 16:18 -!- krvopije [~krvopije@2001:4bb8:180:fa0:3c43:be9b:78bb:13ae] has quit [Quit: Leaving] 16:56 -!- jcoe [seru@gateway/vpn/protonvpn/joncoe] has quit [Ping timeout: 240 seconds] 17:05 -!- belcher [~belcher@unaffiliated/belcher] has quit [Quit: Leaving] 17:19 -!- AgoraRelay [~jmrelayfn@p54866377.dip0.t-ipconnect.de] has quit [Ping timeout: 260 seconds] 17:20 -!- CgRelayBot [~CgRelayBo@p54866377.dip0.t-ipconnect.de] has quit [Ping timeout: 268 seconds] 17:27 -!- CgRelayBot [~CgRelayBo@p5486669A.dip0.t-ipconnect.de] has joined #joinmarket 17:31 -!- AgoraRelay [~jmrelayfn@p5486669A.dip0.t-ipconnect.de] has joined #joinmarket 19:41 < zfk> How could Binance SG know that bc1 address was a Wasabi Wallet address? 20:31 -!- krvopije [~krvopije@185.106.109.144] has joined #joinmarket 20:31 -!- krvopije [~krvopije@185.106.109.144] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 22:04 -!- MaxSan [~four@193.148.16.211] has joined #joinmarket --- Log closed Sat Jan 18 00:00:10 2020