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has quit [Ping timeout: 256 seconds] 07:11 -!- intcat [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has joined #lnd 07:18 < booyah> Alice sends to Bob through LN nodes C,D,E,F 07:18 < booyah> Alice had 100 BTC, Bob had 0 07:18 < booyah> she sends 10 BTC 07:19 < booyah> is it possible for any node to cause state where Alice has her 10 BTC frozer till channel expiration date? 07:19 < booyah> or which nodes can cause his problem? afair C can do that, being the Alice's direct partner in LN channel. can d,e,f also cause such problem? 07:26 -!- Seven_ [~Seven@c-73-162-115-183.hsd1.ca.comcast.net] has joined #lnd 07:33 -!- zsoc [~zsoc__@unaffiliated/zsoc] has quit [Read error: Connection reset by peer] 07:33 -!- zsoc [~zsoc__@unaffiliated/zsoc] has joined #lnd 07:35 -!- Shigufurido [~world_wid@unaffiliated/pril] has joined #lnd 08:02 -!- aakselrod [~aakselrod@gateway/vpn/privateinternetaccess/aakselrod] has joined #lnd 08:05 -!- intcat [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 08:06 -!- intcat [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has joined #lnd 08:07 -!- spudowiar [~spudowiar@unaffiliated/saleemrashid] has joined #lnd 08:17 < Shigufurido> the sender of a tx defines the route it will take? 08:26 < aakselrod> yes 08:28 < Shigufurido> dymurray you can choose the route yourselfe 08:30 < dymurray> aakselrod, Shigufurido so I want to make a tx to a vendor. Vendor submits txes to LN channel correct? Does the channel choose the route or me making the tx with the vendor? 08:32 < aakselrod> vendor gives you an invoice to pay which includes their node ID (public key) and a payment hash, your node chooses the path over which to send to that node 08:33 < Shigufurido> were is a good explanation of how the "handoff" works A->B->C? why cant B just keep the moneyz? 08:33 < aakselrod> https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/understanding-the-lightning-network-part-building-a-bidirectional-payment-channel-1464710791/ 08:35 < aakselrod> the second article in that series is a good explanation for why B can't keep the money 08:35 < aakselrod> but read the whole series, it's only 3 articles 08:37 -!- intcat [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 08:37 < Shigufurido> thx 08:38 -!- intcat [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has joined #lnd 08:47 -!- ThisAsYou [sid214210@gateway/web/irccloud.com/x-knepfrppkqohscyt] has joined #lnd 08:49 -!- Ylbam [uid99779@gateway/web/irccloud.com/x-walxaysmcrlzdxmo] has joined #lnd 09:04 -!- creslin_ [~textual@deposing-waterfront.volia.net] has joined #lnd 09:04 -!- creslin [~textual@deposing-waterfront.volia.net] has quit [Read error: Connection reset by peer] 09:05 -!- sovjet [~sovjet@user182.c2.sevnica.kabelnet.net] has joined #lnd 09:11 -!- intcat [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 09:12 -!- intcat [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has joined #lnd 09:13 -!- blyat_ [~blyat@cpe-71-71-200-3.carolina.res.rr.com] has joined #lnd 09:16 -!- blyat__ [~blyat@71.71.200.3] has quit [Ping timeout: 256 seconds] 09:29 -!- intcat [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 09:30 -!- intcat [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has joined #lnd 09:32 < booyah> aakselrod: do you remember (tl;dr) in handoff, the other nodes on the way in longer "chain" of channels, they can not even block the payment right? 09:34 < aakselrod> they can refuse or be unable to forward the payment, but then it gets rolled back 09:34 < aakselrod> meaning you can try again via a different path 09:36 <@molz> booyah, the worse scenario which isn't worse or bad is you connect to the other party and pay them, and who would refuse a payment 09:37 <@molz> s/connect/have-a-direct-channel/ 09:39 < booyah> aakselrod: and about time, how fast it is? 09:40 < aakselrod> pretty fast! usually under a second 09:40 < booyah> aakselrod: how long it will take before it rolls back and I can again send using the same funds (if I am sending e.g. 90% of my channel ballance), is it as slow as the channel timeout limit (which usually will be probably weeks-months) or fater somehow? 09:41 < booyah> aakselrod: oh great. so it does not need any part of the channel to reach it's expiration date (block height) right? 09:41 < aakselrod> booyah: no, it's generally as fast as a payment. the channel timeout is absolute worst case. 09:41 < booyah> neat 09:42 < booyah> aakselrod: what conditions must take place for that to happen, if rogue nodes try to "troll" me like that? 09:46 < aakselrod> they have to be willing to lose money 09:46 < aakselrod> because it'll likely cost them more in fees and/or punishment 09:47 < aakselrod> https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/ <-- the full spec 09:49 < booyah> aakselrod: can I config my node to demand e.g. 6 on-chain confirmations for everything regarding layer1 ? 09:50 < aakselrod> booyah: yes 09:50 < aakselrod> you can download lnd and play with it, see the configuration switches for confirmations, etc. 09:50 < booyah> aakselrod: last time I treid with friends, it failed to work 09:50 < booyah> wrong glibc version. on debian 9 09:51 < aakselrod> --defaultchanconfs= The default number of confirmations a channel must have before it's considered open. (1) 09:51 <@roasbeef> booyah: lnd is written in pure go 09:52 <@molz> 908 channels on testnet right now https://explorer.acinq.co/#/ 09:56 < mdrollette> I have a very different view: "num_nodes": 617, "num_channels": 1597 09:57 <@roasbeef> zombie pruning 09:57 <@roasbeef> need to add preemptive pruning 09:57 < mdrollette> ah 09:57 <@molz> one of my nodes says "num_nodes": 565, 09:57 <@molz> "num_channels": 990, 09:59 <@molz> lol my other node must be really old, it says "num_nodes": 1, 09:59 <@molz> "num_channels": 0, 10:00 < mdrollette> found him https://cl.ly/2T3B0M3z0N3k 10:03 < booyah> lol trolls on #bitcoincash again claim LND can be easily destroyed / be insecure 10:03 < booyah> "because sybil" 10:03 < booyah> someone should set up like few BTC bounty to demonstrate "attack" on bitcoin testnet 10:05 < mdrollette> What's the claimed attack? 10:06 < booyah> mdrollette: they do not have time to explain 10:06 < booyah> mdrollette: it's dymurray who claims it, he's here 10:06 < dymurray> mdrollette, fact: any p2p network topology with avg edge length of greater than 3 is vulnerable to a sybil attack. Whats the avg hop length on LN? 10:06 < dymurray> sorry... not edge lenght 10:06 < dymurray> * avg number of edge hops 10:07 -!- intcat [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 10:08 < booyah> dymurray: what the attack [you claim] does, it steals funds or what? 10:08 -!- intcat [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has joined #lnd 10:08 < dymurray> booyah, stop changing the subject. Whats the avg edge hop count on LN? 10:08 < dymurray> Because I haven't seen any LN devs come forward with the network statistics 10:09 < mdrollette> For the sake of argument, assume it's more than 3... 10:09 < mdrollette> how does your proposed attack effect the network? 10:09 -!- blaster [~blaster@unaffiliated/blaster] has joined #lnd 10:11 < dymurray> mdrollette, once a network is successfully sybil attacked a lot of different things can happen.... most commonly the reputation system is compromised because nodes are forging identities and they now have a disproportionate amount of control over the network. If they have succesfully forged the identities of enough nodes they can 100% steal funds 10:12 < mdrollette> How would that work? (I'm not playing devils advocate... I just genuinely want to understand your claim) 10:13 < mdrollette> if every peer on lightning was malicious.. how would funds get stolen? 10:13 < booyah> dymurray: you can have reputation system inside sybilable system, as web of trust 10:14 < booyah> bitcoin OTC WoT worked that way. you just consider reputation opinions given by friends of your friends, not by random strangers 10:14 < booyah> that is just btw, probably not usable anyway in attack 10:14 < dymurray> mdrollette, if you look at LNs packet fwding spec then you'll see that the only thing that prevents any hop from retrying payments multiple times is the packet construction and forwarding. If enough nodes are cooperating and forging identites this entire shared secret protocol is compromised 10:14 < booyah> also, you can stop sybil in any system by requiring work to be done, like by doing on-chain transaction (txfee cost) to establish your identity initially 10:14 < dymurray> booyah, except youre missing the most important point 10:15 < dymurray> avg hop length on L1 is <2 on avg 10:15 < dymurray> so L1 is not vulnerable to a sybil attack using the same theorem 10:16 < dymurray> I just wish that I could be pointed to a full LN simulation with a proper recording of these statistics on the network 10:16 < dymurray> I've been asking for awhile now and have never received it. I get pointed to the medium post of a 100 node simulation or something like that and it doesn't mention tx hops 10:17 < booyah> dymurray: I just told you how sybil can be reduce in any network, no matter what "edge length" is there. Lots of P2P networks use such mechanisms you know. 10:17 < dymurray> booyah, not edge length... number of edge hops 10:17 < booyah> yeah either way. 10:17 < dymurray> booyah, .... no its not "either way" its an important distinction 10:17 < booyah> any system can require some proof of work to reduce sybil (not saying it is required here, but anyway) 10:17 < dymurray> I've never seen a single LN simulation published showing these numbers 10:18 < dymurray> there were PLENTY done on BTC L1 10:18 < booyah> dymurray: again, ANY SYSTEM can reduce sybil by requirng proof of work 10:18 < dymurray> booyah, and does LN have PoW? 10:18 < booyah> incliding 100% anonymous systems that normally would have infinite sybil 10:18 < booyah> it can have if it's needed 10:18 < dymurray> booyah, haha okay but right now it DOESNT 10:18 < booyah> exchanges use captcha for it 10:18 < dymurray> youre literally talking about mining L2?? 10:18 < booyah> bitmessage uses hash cash for it 10:19 < dymurray> how is a captcha "proof of work" 10:19 < booyah> dymurray: PoW against sybil is not minining, it's just wasting time to reduce "infinite" sybil to managable level (still not saying is this at all needed for LN) 10:19 < dymurray> booyah, what is "infinite sybil" 10:19 < dymurray> that makes no sense to me whatsoever 10:20 < booyah> dymurray: in anonymous network I could create basically infinite amount of own IDs, like 100 billion of them in a day 10:20 < dymurray> True 10:20 < booyah> and even there, requirement of proof-of-burn or proof-of-work to have some resource "wasted" and tied to my ID, is a way to make it costly for me to create new ID 10:21 < dymurray> and how is it costly to create a new ID on LN? 10:21 < booyah> so IF sybil would be any issue with LN, then LN could demand nodes to publish own ID with some hash-cash proof that they spent some time creating this ID. 10:21 < booyah> easy 10:21 < booyah> if you create new ID, then you must publish: 10:21 < booyah> - the pubkey 10:21 < dymurray> booyah, No hang on 10:21 < dymurray> booyah, how does LN today make it costly to create a new ID? 10:22 < booyah> dymurray: dunno. but if it does not then it can using this method 10:22 < booyah> - a number N, such that hash( hash(pubkey) + current_date ) < T where T is the desired difficylty Target 10:22 < dymurray> booyah, just so we are clear... you're telling me that LN is not vulnerable to a sybil attack yet you have no idea what mechanisms within LN can prevent a sybil attack? 10:23 < booyah> which is simmilar to BTC PoW mining, though it does not reward any coins for it 10:23 < booyah> dymurray: no 10:23 < dymurray> booyah, you're presenting a hypothetical solution... thats not in the LN RFC 10:23 < creslin_> LND on testnet exists, isn't it easier just to code a POC attack if its so simple? 10:24 < booyah> dymurray: this solution is trivial. it can be added at any time. If it's not in RFC then it's probably because developers know it is not needed 10:24 -!- intcat [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 10:24 < booyah> creslin_: +1 10:24 < dymurray> Yes... thats what I'm told everytime I ask about this. "why don't you just simulate it yourself?" which is just insane to me that people don't expect the devs who are presenting the solution to run these sims themselves 10:24 < booyah> dymurray: what your claimed attack would be able to achieve anyway? you create 1 billion LND node pubkeys/IDs... and...? 10:25 -!- intcat [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has joined #lnd 10:25 < dymurray> booyah, whatever I want... if I also own a big group of mining hashrate then my options are actually pretty endless 10:25 < dymurray> doublespend attacks become MUCH easier 10:25 < booyah> roasbeef: should we add hash-cash to ID creation to make it more costly to troll LN nodes by reporting in as node and then not atually forwarding trades wasting everyone's time? 10:25 < dymurray> We've simulated onchain scaling... you're welcome to read those numbers 10:26 < dymurray> But... this is #lnd I respect that and I think the devs on LN are very smart 10:26 < booyah> dymurray: how would you double spend with this 100 billion IDs? 10:26 < creslin_> dymurray its not insane, if the devs position is the weakness does not exist, you are in essence demanding an atheist spend his enitre life proving god does not exist for a believers benefit 10:26 < dymurray> I just wish people wouldn't attack anyone who points out vulnerabilities 10:26 < dymurray> creslin_, no... I'm sorry. booyah came into a different channel and has been spamming LN info and summoned me here 10:26 < booyah> dymurray: creation of channel is done on L1 and therefore not sybillable, and not double-spendable. each channel is created that way. so entire path is protected that way too 10:26 < dymurray> I don't wish to change anyones opinion 10:27 < booyah> creslin_: dymurray is bcasher, and he thinks CJW is Satoshi. Usually I let special people be, but since this is the revolution that will kill BCH and VISA it's good to review all ideas :) 10:27 < booyah> CSW 10:28 < lndbot1> dymurray: do you see the harm in 0-conf at least? lul 10:28 < dymurray> Yes... because my personal opinions on who satoshi are makes all my statements irrelevant... 10:28 < booyah> dymurray: while creating 100 billion ID has no cost, there IS A COST to actually USE this id 10:28 < booyah> I think this is the part you are missing 10:28 < mdrollette> Is it just the nodeid? Aren't we talking about channels? 10:29 < booyah> to use 100 billion ID in LND I would need to do 100 billion channels = need to pay 100 billion on-chain transactions ! 10:29 < booyah> that would cost like 1000 billion USD :D 10:29 -!- Shigufurido [~world_wid@unaffiliated/pril] has quit [Ping timeout: 255 seconds] 10:30 < creslin_> what can bcash do? nobody will wait 10 minutes to buy a coffee, is just a different thing 10:30 -!- intcat [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 10:30 < dymurray> lndbot1, yeah I do see harm in 0-conf 10:31 < dymurray> creslin_, Happy to discuss that in #bitcoincash. I don't want to clog up #lnd 10:31 -!- intcat [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has joined #lnd 10:31 < mdrollette> dymurray what are you considering an "edge" in your attack? Isn't that a channel? 10:31 < creslin_> Ill give is a miss. but thanks 10:32 < dymurray> mdrollette, an "edge" only means one thing in a network. The connection between nodes 10:33 < mdrollette> which in Lightning means a channel between two nodes, right? 10:34 < booyah> dymurray: how about this solution: no use of sybil can be done in LND, since the cost of actually using ID is non-zero, it is to pay for on-chain transaction. 10:34 < lndbot1> @dymuuray: Miners wasting space on opening channels they mine just to sybil seems like a waste of money with other high fee paying txns, and for reorgs 51% attack, you can set confirmation depth for channels, good luck wasting money, 10:34 < lndbot1> dymurray: with a good chunk of malicious hashrate it seems we have bigger problems :slightly_smiling_face: 10:35 < lndbot1> on chain payments aren't safe, so much for on chain payments if we can't trust it won't be reorged or double spent? but okay 10:36 < booyah> justin in worst case, can we use whitelist with some nodes that we trust, to be sure we are not trolled with wasting money on opening channels with unrealiable partners? 10:36 < booyah> only our "direct peer" can troll us to waste our money on channels though.. so this happens on matter what the topology would be anyway 10:37 < lndbot1> @booyah one of the reasons I wanted channel opening minimums, you can set whatever policy you like, dymurray is just trolling 10:37 < booyah> dymurray: ^ so topology is not relevant here. and is not a problem due to onchain cost. if miners would use their "free txes" then still they are paying: they are not including some other's txes then and still wasting money 10:38 < booyah> justin cool 10:38 < booyah> btw justin lndbot1 is bot to where? slack? 10:38 < lndbot1> yeah lnd slack 10:39 < dymurray> lndbot1, justin I'm really not trying to troll... noones answered my question 10:41 < mdrollette> dymurray: I genuinely want to understand your point fully so I can decide if it has merit or not. My problem is I still don't understand the parameters/constraints of the proposed attack and the effects you claim it could have. I would love to see it written up with those (important) details, though. Surely if it's as important as you seem to indicate it would be worth your time. 10:45 < lndbot1> you haven't even said anything worthwhile 10:46 < mdrollette> All I can grok from this chat is "Lightning is vulnerable to an attack and everyones funds can be stolen"... but under what conditions? How might those conditions arise? How likely is it? Are there incentives/disincentives to do that? Are there existing protections against it? Are there possible (suggested) protections against it? 10:48 < AndyS2> I'm only a guy who tried to understand the lightning paper, but so far I don't understand you either, dymurray. It sounds to me like you are saying that HTTPS (or any other web tech) is attackable via sybil attack, but there's not even any influence to be gained because HTTPS servers doesn't treat participants differently, there's no reputation system to be subverted. 10:48 < AndyS2> same can be said about lightning networks. I'm not opening channels randomly, I choose the nodes I'm interacting with. 10:49 < AndyS2> (HTTPs being a random web tech example where it's equally unfitting to talk about sybil) 10:52 < dymurray> AndyS2, no... HTTPS is not a p2p network. it has nothing to do with sybil attacks 10:53 < dymurray> mdrollette, https://medium.com/@homakov/why-lightning-and-raiden-networks-will-not-work-d1880e4bc294 is a recent good writeup 10:53 < dymurray> but agree I should put something together myself 10:53 < dymurray> I didn't intend to come here and change peoples opinions... just wanted an answer to avg edge hop count 10:57 < creslin_> I don't think the avg number of hops is important - there will absolutely be some transaction with more than 3 hope that is where - if i followed correctly -- your thought is the sybil attack could present itself 10:57 < creslin_> hope/hops; 10:58 < dymurray> creslin_, that's exactly why its important... I developed a test p2p network for emergency communications and if the packet took more than 3 hops wecould falsify the packet data 10:58 < dymurray> its been mathematically proven in ALL p2p networks 11:00 <@molz> dymurray, then prove what you said about LN, just cut the crap and prove your shit 11:01 < dymurray> in my own time I may :) Happy to end this discussion 11:02 <@molz> sure, prove your point before decide to fud, i sure would love to see all the edge cases that can happen with LN too 11:03 -!- PaulCapestany [~PaulCapes@ip68-100-207-91.dc.dc.cox.net] has joined #lnd 11:05 <@roasbeef> dymurray: dude, again with this "avg length greater than 3", that's just nonsense, i've refuted that in the past, you haven't even read the source paper 11:06 <@roasbeef> you can't just state absolutes like that and not actually give the underlying rationale 11:06 <@roasbeef> again, the only way to sybil attack the network is to create channels, bitcoin is global rate limiting services, to make channels you need to pay fees 11:06 <@roasbeef> dymurray: you can't forge identities, as you can't make fake outputs on chain, everythign is authenticated 11:08 <@roasbeef> dymurray: please, actually read "On Bitcoin and Red Balloons", it's about MINER INCENTIVES TO PROPAGATE TRANSACTINOS TO THEIR COMPETITORS 11:08 <@roasbeef> you can't extract a single theorem out of context and claim it's an absolute that applies to any network 11:13 < dymurray> It doesn't matter what the parent paper is about... the theorem is describing any p2p network. What it takes to create a channel is irrelevant because someone with enough incentive will pay those fees. I'm not pulling it out of context because that theorem is not specific to a sinlge network 11:14 < dymurray> and I've read the source paper. You can't just make up stuff about me to discredit me 11:14 < booyah> dymurray: freenet is a p2p network with avg hop count 10-20 11:14 < booyah> and on freenet yet no one can falsify any data 11:14 < booyah> dymurray: what you say soind like bullshit 11:15 < booyah> no one can impersonate any other ID known by his pubkey hash, unless he owns his pubkey. 11:15 <@roasbeef> dude, think critically about this dymurray, give me a precise example 11:15 -!- intcat [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 11:15 < booyah> no matter what transport mechanism is used 11:15 <@roasbeef> how can you sybil w/o forging signatures, or just taking all of the available block space? 11:15 < dymurray> booyah, you know freenet admits that its susceptible to sybil attacks right? it even states you have to run it in Friend-to-Friend mode avoid it 11:15 < dymurray> booyah, so you're literally spreading a lie 11:15 <@roasbeef> dymurray: does free node require proofs of each nick joining in order to access the network? 11:16 <@roasbeef> nodes don't recognize othe rnodes unless they have channels 11:16 -!- intcat [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has joined #lnd 11:16 <@roasbeef> how can you sybil output creation? 11:16 <@roasbeef> oh, yeh there's this thing called POW 11:16 < booyah> dymurray: but you can not impersonate anyone's data. 11:16 <@roasbeef> ^ 11:16 < dymurray> booyah, you can forge data with a false identity which looks verifiable to other nodes 11:16 < booyah> dymurray: instead beating around the bush, just give one fucking concrete example. first of: what your attack you claim can do, steal my BTC from LND? 11:17 -!- JackH [~laptop@host-80-43-141-242.as13285.net] has joined #lnd 11:17 < booyah> dymurray: you can not do that when data is signed by public-key, no matter what method of transport is used 11:17 < booyah> in Freenet also 11:17 < booyah> you can NOT falsifie someone's USK page without owning his private key 11:17 < mdrollette> dymurray it sounds like worst case is a denial-of-service in your example? 11:17 < booyah> you can at most *censors* others from accessing it. which is something else then what you claimed, and only for that friends mode is recommended. 11:18 -!- blyat__ [~blyat@cpe-71-71-200-3.carolina.res.rr.com] has joined #lnd 11:18 < dymurray> mdrollette, denial-of-service is definitely a possibility. Biggest usecase I see is a hub performing an attack on another hub to destroy liquidity 11:18 < booyah> dymurray: it has nothing to do with "sybil", and it costs you N bitcoins to lock up my N bitcoins. 11:19 < booyah> attacker needs lots of resources to do that, plus he burns resources (txfees) even as a miner - why do it? 11:19 < mdrollette> That sounds more reasonable. But important to note nobody loses money (except the attacker) in that case 11:19 < dymurray> I won't be spreading anymore "FUD" until I can prove it myself. I never intended to anger people in this chat. booyah pulled me in here after he didn't like me talking about BCH in #bitcoincash 11:19 < booyah> anyway since it has non trivial cost, it is NOT sybil 11:20 < booyah> dymurray: no, I didn't like you saying FUD about how LN is not secure and can not work (so we need BCH) 11:20 < dymurray> booyah, thats just a blatant lie and shows your complete misunderstanding of a sybil attack 11:20 < dymurray> mdrollette, not true... the attacked hub would certainly lose money 11:20 < mdrollette> how? 11:20 < dymurray> Just in a different way 11:20 < booyah> dymurray: if sybil attack has a cost, then it's not a sybil, in meaning of p2p networks. unless you mean literal sybil as in real-life ID but ofcourse p2p is not about that 11:20 <@roasbeef> dymurray: how do you forge an output? 11:21 -!- blyat_ [~blyat@cpe-71-71-200-3.carolina.res.rr.com] has quit [Ping timeout: 248 seconds] 11:21 <@roasbeef> dymurray: in order to do that you need to generate a block with valid pow... 11:21 <@roasbeef> we're asking for specifics here 11:21 <@roasbeef> these are grand claims, which you cannot back up 11:21 < dymurray> roasbeef, yeah and if a group of miners is the attacker in this scenario? what happens? 11:21 < dymurray> Can they generate that block? 11:21 <@roasbeef> dymurray: well, if miners are double spending willy nilly there're much bigger issues than LN 11:21 <@roasbeef> ok lets continue 11:22 < dymurray> roasbeef, it gets a lot worse if they have also forged identities on L2 11:22 <@roasbeef> miners are double spending blocks, then what? 11:22 <@roasbeef> they're forgoeing fee revenue to do this, as they're mining only their transactinos 11:22 < booyah> dymurray: how can you "forge" ID that is known by hash of pubkey and all msgs are signed by privkey ???? 11:22 <@roasbeef> fee revenue is no longer insignificant 11:22 < lndbot1> dymurray: any big pool can double spend and reorg blocks on bch right now.. Not sure why you like something that is so insecure 11:22 <@roasbeef> ^ 11:23 <@roasbeef> wow: https://blockchain.info/block/000000000000000000877d93d1412ca671750152ba0862db95f073b82c04b191 11:23 <@roasbeef> insane block 11:23 < dymurray> lndbot1, Then why don't they do it justin? If any big pool can do it today why don't they? Just like booyah asked me why I don't run the LN network and prove my claims 11:23 <@roasbeef> stuff starts to break down when you send amounts that large 11:23 <@roasbeef> dymurray: exactly, why don't they??? 11:23 <@molz> lmao 11:23 < lndbot1> your a literal contradiction, just listen to yourself 11:23 < booyah> bad topology could at most lead to censorship... no way it can cause "forging" someones messages (impersonation) when msgs are signed by privkey 11:23 < dymurray> Because the second they try to you guys know what happens 11:23 <@molz> dymurray, they could kill bitcoin right now, WHY DON'T THEY???? 11:23 <@roasbeef> dymurray: uh huh...so now apply this to your attack scenario 11:23 < dymurray> look... I'm not going to talk BCh in #lnd 11:23 < dymurray> thats the fastest way to get banned 11:24 < dymurray> I've made enough enemies already 11:24 <@roasbeef> answer the questions m8 11:24 < booyah> dymurray: doing doublespending is possible on both networks, but luckily miners choose not to do it. The point is that LND or not, it's same problem 11:24 < dymurray> roasbeef, " stuff starts to break down when you send amounts that large " what stuff 11:24 <@molz> you're not going to get banned for talking about bcash, but you might get banned for spreading stupid fuds :D 11:24 < booyah> * doublespending by miner willing to reorg 11:24 <@roasbeef> incentives to continue moving the chain forward dymurray 11:24 <@roasbeef> or when fees are >>>>> than the block rewards like ppl sending 50 btc as fees 11:24 < creslin_> is that 184,000 bitcoins in that block :| 11:25 <@roasbeef> creslin_: fkn insane 11:25 <@roasbeef> !!! 11:25 < booyah> also, risk of doublespend is why merchants, exchanges, and LND nodes will require e.g. 3 or 6 confirmations (to start) which make dbl.spend realy expensive 11:25 < creslin_> Dymurray - im with you, get me that block 11:26 <@roasbeef> dymurray: can you ask your miner buddies to give us the funds sent in that block? 11:26 < dymurray> hahah let me make a phone call :) 11:26 <@roasbeef> buncha these in that block: https://www.smartbit.com.au/tx/ebed253e234b5ec1e353938efaf36f0dafbe33ee2e8c57df9b138461191a32b7 11:26 <@roasbeef> casually moving 400 btc 11:27 < mdrollette> fwiw, It's important to have rigorous discussions with facts an examples and testable hypothesis. We want more of that. We should try to help dymurray clarify their point so that we can determine if it's valid or not. Science doesn't care about FUD. 11:27 < booyah> - yes, Cral Wright Im telling them. No they are not letting it slide and are asking more questions. tallk to you later bye 11:27 < dymurray> mdrollette, completely agree. I hope you know I'm not intending to troll this chat 11:27 <@roasbeef> dymurray: yet you're not able to satisfy mdrollette's standards 11:27 < dymurray> I sincerely would like to see a LN simulations showing the statistics on avg edge hop count 11:28 <@roasbeef> dymurray: we tell you avg edge hop count is rubbish, we ask you to refute, you can't 11:28 * roasbeef reaches for the ting 11:28 < booyah> dymurray: I do not see you being able to explain how ANY "hop count" would matter here. Show how you can do something ASSUMING hop count etc is hihg. 11:28 < dymurray> roasbeef, https://arxiv.org/abs/1111.2626 11:28 < dymurray> The theorem in that paper is applicable to ALL p2p networks 11:28 < dymurray> you can't just say "that doesn't apply to LN" and avoid iut 11:29 < dymurray> Theres a reason L1 has an avg edge hop count of <3 11:29 < dymurray> because its sybilproof 11:29 < dymurray> Noone denies that L1 on BTC is sybilproof 11:30 < lndbot1> you keep repeating the same thing without providing anything new 11:30 < dymurray> Because I still haven't been told what the numbers for LN are. BTC devs published sims giving these numbers in 2011 11:30 <@roasbeef> dymurray: yeh not responding till you give some actual analysis 11:30 < dymurray> why don't we have them for LN? 11:30 <@roasbeef> dymurray: think about how trivial your statement sounds 11:31 <@roasbeef> how goes the base chain have a hop count at all? you're speaking nonsense 11:31 < dymurray> roasbeef, what? if you send a tx on BCH or L1 BTC what happens? how many hops does that tx make before its confirmed? 11:32 <@roasbeef> ooo ok, then can I spend that before it's confirmed, 50 times? 11:32 <@roasbeef> how many hops is that? 11:32 < booyah> "Noone denies that L1 on BTC is sybilproof" ... wait, what? you mean L1? or L2 11:32 < dymurray> booyah, L1. 11:32 <@roasbeef> doesn't every output have a hopcout > 3, as they were all created from a coinbase output? 11:32 <@roasbeef> tehrefore, BITCOIN IS NOT SYBIL RESISTANT 11:32 <@roasbeef> see, i can do it too 11:32 < dymurray> roasbeef, what? 11:32 <@roasbeef> dymurray: exactly. 11:32 < booyah> L1 (on-chain) on bitcoin and altcoin is sybil proof in the way that it costs money to use new IDs on it. and no one has any problem with that... 11:32 < dymurray> you're literally just making shit up 11:32 < dymurray> booyah, it has NOTHING to do with how much it costs to create a new id 11:33 < dymurray> you keep repeating that and its completely irrelevant 11:33 < booyah> dymurray: it has, the solution to sybil is to attach cost to [use of] new ID 11:33 < dymurray> you're mistaking incentive for actual mathematicks 11:33 < dymurray> you're simply talking about DISINCENTIVISING syibl 11:33 < dymurray> not preventing it 11:33 < booyah> dymurray: well if you now claim that onchain also has "sybil", then tell us 1) so what? 2) how would you solve it anyway 11:33 < dymurray> booyah, You're making up everything I am saying. I said L1 is syiblPROOF 11:33 < dymurray> it cannot be sybilled 11:34 < booyah> errr 11:34 < dymurray> booyah, if you deny that then you're severely misinformed 11:34 < booyah> "sybil with non-trivial cost" is just called pseudonymity, and is very good property to have... or do you not like that property in Bitcoin and would rather reuirere some personal ID card to be attached to each bitcoin ID ?? 11:35 < dymurray> booyah, yes... it is a good property to have. It makes a network sybil resistant NOT sybil proof 11:35 <@roasbeef> dymurray: see my coutner example above 11:35 < booyah> also are we talking bitcoin-p2p or bitcoin blockchain. bitcoin p2p resists zerocost sybil by using IP addresses 11:35 < dymurray> roasbeef, dude thats not a counterexample its literally just a bullshit statement referencing coinbase for some reason 11:35 <@roasbeef> dymurray: the coinbse *output* 11:35 < booyah> and blockchain... well.. if some Alice wants to have 10000 bitcoin addresses and use them - then go for it, it's her right. no proble,m 11:36 <@roasbeef> the outputs in your wallet were created from a coinbase 11:36 <@roasbeef> they're several "hops" away 11:36 <@roasbeef> where's the sybil? 11:36 < dymurray> roasbeef, you're mistaking tx confirmation and routing of outputs. I'm not sure what point you are trying to make it has no relevance to a sybil attack 11:36 <@roasbeef> hmmm 11:36 <@roasbeef> or is that block just super funky 11:36 <@roasbeef> the same 400 BTC being chained over and over again 11:37 -!- intcat [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 11:37 <@roasbeef> keep following the larger output (non change) 11:37 < mdrollette> Someone besides dymurray: Assume LN is Sybil-able (regardless of whether it is or not)... what effect does that have? You still can't forge signatures... what "damage" can you do? 11:38 -!- intcat [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has joined #lnd 11:38 < booyah> mdrollette: I guess you could make channels and then troll users by ignoring them and making them waste time and txfee. but that costs you txfees and frozen funds as well, so it does not make much sense. 11:39 < mdrollette> so, funds are not at risk even if it is Sybil-able? It's just a potential DoS or degradation of service across the network? 11:39 < booyah> mdrollette: afaik, yes 11:40 < booyah> I can't see ANY way in LN to lose funds in any case at all (other then waste time/txfee if we're ddosed) 11:40 < booyah> btw same problems exist in bitcoin-p2p (being trolled in p2p by cancer nodes) and it never was a serious issue 11:40 < mdrollette> ok, I would love to hear *that* refuted, dymurray. Forget proving LN is Sybil-able, for now. What damage can be done assuming it is? 11:41 < mdrollette> Then once we know the risk, try to determine if it's even possible or at what cost.. 11:42 < dymurray> mdrollette, as I said before the easiest damage I can see being done is hub-hub attacks where destroying other hubs liquidity which can give you multiple advantages that are outside of the scope of a sybil attack 11:42 < booyah> dymurray: but you need to lose equall amount of own funds too 11:43 < dymurray> destroying another hubs liquidity allows you to massively profit 11:43 < booyah> to make my hub freeze 10 BTC, you need to freeze your 10 BTC 11:43 < dymurray> booyah, why? 11:43 < booyah> well that is how channels are formed, both parties freeze N btc 11:43 < mdrollette> That sounds like a reasonable risk... what would the costs of performing that attack be at different scale? 11:43 < mdrollette> *scales 11:43 < dymurray> booyah, but I'm not talking about opening/closing the channel... I'm talking about routing payments through those hubs 11:44 <@roasbeef> dymurray: dude go write up an attack, then come back 11:44 < booyah> dymurray: it's 100% atomic. entire payment goes in through all hops, end to end, or it does not. 11:44 < dymurray> mdrollette, plenty of real life examples to work off... take wall street for example. They install fiber lines with shorter distances just to gain advantages over a neighbors liquidity 11:44 < dymurray> roasbeef, mdrollette was asking me questions... not sure why you feel the need to silence what I'm saying 11:45 < dymurray> But happy to discuss this in #bitcoincash I guess 11:45 <@roasbeef> just stop spamming and give us a concrete attack 11:45 < dymurray> see ya folks 11:45 < mdrollette> dymurray so, we're saying sybil is possible, and the risk is draining a hub of liquidity. We still need to quantify the cost to do that. 11:46 < cjd[m]> Ut oh, it's the ol' "sit in the irc channel and ask about attacks that don't really work and waste the developers time attack" ;) 11:48 < dymurray> Had no intention of doing that... Sorry if you guys feel thats the case 11:49 < cjd[m]> I'm just talking crap, don't mind me 11:49 -!- MaxSan [~user@46.19.137.116] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 12:04 -!- intcat [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 12:05 -!- intcat [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has joined #lnd 12:28 -!- intcat [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 12:29 < creslin_> part II of my deploy lnd testnet on a RaspberryPi3 is done. Already i seem to be handholding 2 strangers deploying it for their interest: http://bedtillnoon.blogspot.com/ 12:32 -!- intcat [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has joined #lnd 12:33 < creslin_> @roasbeef is the structlayout byte align fix or atomics something I can help test on my 32bit golang. I have a repeatable fail state test instance to check against. 12:34 <@roasbeef> creslin_: did you see that issue? if you can recomile, you can attempt that re-order 12:34 <@roasbeef> or I can throw up PR up in about 5 mins that you can try out 12:35 <@roasbeef> wrapping up some other stuff rn then I can get that PR up so you can test 12:37 < creslin_> I read the link, but I didn't really understand what change I would need to make to packetQueue ordered 12:37 < creslin_> I can test your PR 12:40 -!- meshcollider [uid246294@gateway/web/irccloud.com/x-pmiqrecbmxnqbpie] has joined #lnd 12:42 -!- Styil [~Styil@gateway/vpn/privateinternetaccess/styil] has joined #lnd 12:45 <@roasbeef> cool should have that up in a bit 12:47 < creslin_> Ill be diff'ing the code to learn from it. Thanks. 13:02 -!- intcat [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 13:03 -!- zshlyk [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has joined #lnd 13:08 < Veggen> so, any danger in updating and restarting node? incompatible DB, I seem to have seen... 13:09 < Veggen> nuts, my laptop node gets too many channels ;P (they'll be inactive when I turn it off for the night...) 13:13 -!- zshlyk [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 13:14 -!- zshlyk [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has joined #lnd 13:23 -!- blyat_ [~blyat@cpe-71-71-200-3.carolina.res.rr.com] has joined #lnd 13:26 -!- blyat__ [~blyat@cpe-71-71-200-3.carolina.res.rr.com] has quit [Ping timeout: 272 seconds] 13:28 -!- zshlyk [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 13:28 -!- yoctopede [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has joined #lnd 14:05 -!- yoctopede [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 14:06 -!- yoctopede [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has joined #lnd 14:12 -!- PaulCapestany [~PaulCapes@ip68-100-207-91.dc.dc.cox.net] has quit [Ping timeout: 240 seconds] 14:14 -github-lnd:#lnd- [lnd] coonce opened pull request #499: lncli: Fix "invalid handle" error (master...password-handle) https://git.io/vbP4m 14:15 -!- PaulCapestany [~PaulCapes@ip68-100-207-91.dc.dc.cox.net] has joined #lnd 14:19 -!- spudowiar [~spudowiar@unaffiliated/saleemrashid] has quit [Quit: WeeChat 1.9.1] 14:21 -!- tjader [tjader@roku.tjader.xyz] has joined #lnd 14:23 -!- sovjet [~sovjet@user182.c2.sevnica.kabelnet.net] has quit [Quit: Leaving] 14:29 -!- yoctopede [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 14:30 -!- yoctopede [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has joined #lnd 14:39 -!- StopAndDecrypt [~StopAndDe@unaffiliated/stopanddecrypt] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 14:52 -!- StopAndDecrypt [~StopAndDe@unaffiliated/stopanddecrypt] has joined #lnd 14:59 -!- StopAndDecrypt [~StopAndDe@unaffiliated/stopanddecrypt] has quit [Ping timeout: 248 seconds] 15:09 -!- yoctopede [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 15:10 -!- yoctopede [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has joined #lnd 15:15 -!- zsocw [~zsoc__@ip1.ip-149-56-182.net] has joined #lnd 15:16 -!- blyat_ [~blyat@cpe-71-71-200-3.carolina.res.rr.com] has quit [Quit: Leaving] 15:18 -!- zsoc [~zsoc__@unaffiliated/zsoc] has quit [Ping timeout: 255 seconds] 15:25 -github-lnd:#lnd- [lnd] halseth opened pull request #500: Private channel integration test (master...private-channel-integration-test) https://git.io/vbPgK 15:35 -!- zsocw [~zsoc__@ip1.ip-149-56-182.net] has quit [Ping timeout: 268 seconds] 15:49 -github-lnd:#lnd- [lnd] halseth opened pull request #501: [WIP] Failing parallel payments (master...failing-parallel-payments) https://git.io/vbPa7 16:19 -!- yoctopede [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 16:20 -!- yoctopede [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has joined #lnd 16:41 -!- yoctopede [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 16:42 -!- yoctopede [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has joined #lnd 16:55 -!- yoctopede [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 16:56 -!- yoctopede [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has joined #lnd 17:01 -!- dabura667 [~dabura667@p98110-ipngnfx01marunouchi.tokyo.ocn.ne.jp] has joined #lnd 17:02 -!- Qusai [43fbcbaa@gateway/web/freenode/ip.67.251.203.170] has joined #lnd 17:02 < Qusai> Hi is there some one here? 17:04 < booyah> Qusai: there are 111 nicks here you know 17:04 < booyah> even if everyone would be AFK now, they can read later and reply 17:14 -!- aakselrod [~aakselrod@gateway/vpn/privateinternetaccess/aakselrod] has quit [Ping timeout: 260 seconds] 17:20 -!- yoctopede [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 17:21 -!- yoctopede [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has joined #lnd 17:22 -!- yoctopede [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 17:22 -!- yoctopede [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has joined #lnd 17:31 -!- zsoc [~zsoc__@unaffiliated/zsoc] has joined #lnd 17:50 -!- aakselrod [~aakselrod@gateway/vpn/privateinternetaccess/aakselrod] has joined #lnd 18:03 -!- jigawatt [4b88a91f@gateway/web/freenode/ip.75.136.169.31] has joined #lnd 18:04 -!- noname__ [6b961c53@gateway/web/freenode/ip.107.150.28.83] has joined #lnd 18:04 -!- noname__ [6b961c53@gateway/web/freenode/ip.107.150.28.83] has quit [Client Quit] 18:05 -!- yoctopede [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 18:05 -!- yoctopede [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has joined #lnd 18:16 -!- ghost43 [~daer@gateway/tor-sasl/daer] has quit [Quit: Leaving] 18:19 -!- ghost43 [~daer@gateway/tor-sasl/daer] has joined #lnd 18:22 -!- yoctopede [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 18:23 -!- yoctopede [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has joined #lnd 18:47 -!- Qusai [43fbcbaa@gateway/web/freenode/ip.67.251.203.170] has quit [Ping timeout: 260 seconds] 19:06 -!- yoctopede [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 19:07 -!- yoctopede [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has joined #lnd 19:12 -!- Giszmo [~leo@pc-204-28-214-201.cm.vtr.net] has quit [Quit: Leaving.] 19:21 -!- JBPhoenix [~PhxN@80.73.219.166] has joined #lnd 19:24 -!- yoctopede [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 19:24 -!- yoctopede [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has joined #lnd 19:25 -!- blyat [~blyat@71.71.200.3] has joined #lnd 19:30 -!- JBPhoenix [~PhxN@80.73.219.166] has left #lnd ["Leaving"] 20:13 -!- yoctopede [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 20:17 -!- yoctopede [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has joined #lnd 20:43 -!- Mavd0g [995c91b9@gateway/web/freenode/ip.153.92.145.185] has joined #lnd 20:51 -!- sovjet [~sovjet@user182.c2.sevnica.kabelnet.net] has joined #lnd 21:00 -!- sovjet [~sovjet@user182.c2.sevnica.kabelnet.net] has quit [Quit: Leaving] 21:06 -!- Mavd0g [995c91b9@gateway/web/freenode/ip.153.92.145.185] has quit [Ping timeout: 260 seconds] 21:21 -!- yoctopede [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 21:21 -!- yoctopede [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has joined #lnd 21:24 < YungMoonHodler> some ppl on twitter were saying with LN a tx costs $100.. 21:24 < YungMoonHodler> is that true? 21:25 < lndbot1> :,'( 21:30 -!- blyat_ [~blyat@cpe-71-71-200-3.carolina.res.rr.com] has joined #lnd 21:31 < Veggen> YoungMoon: If that transaction is the only one you do on that channel and you are doing open/close at worst time, then maybe. 21:32 < Veggen> but that's not how LN is meant to work, so if that is so, you're just stupid :) 21:32 < Veggen> noone will open a LN channel to do just 1 - or even 2 - transactions. 21:34 -!- blyat [~blyat@71.71.200.3] has quit [Ping timeout: 256 seconds] 21:39 < YungMoonHodler> Veggen: i mean how much does the initial opening tx cost? 21:40 -!- meshcollider [uid246294@gateway/web/irccloud.com/x-pmiqrecbmxnqbpie] has quit [Quit: Connection closed for inactivity] 21:46 < Veggen> YoungMoonHoodler: depends on the mempool. It's a bitcoin transaction. 21:50 -!- meshcollider [uid246294@gateway/web/irccloud.com/x-jvjzqirnzhkztfmb] has joined #lnd 21:51 -!- photonclock [~photonclo@47.37.153.193] has joined #lnd 21:55 -!- yoctopede [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 21:56 -!- yoctopede [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has joined #lnd 22:03 -!- yoctopede [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 22:03 -!- yoctopede [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has joined #lnd 22:22 -!- yoctopede [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 22:22 -!- yoctopede [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has joined #lnd 22:32 -!- yoctopede [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 22:33 -!- yoctopede [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has joined #lnd 22:34 -!- sovjet [~sovjet@BSN-77-87-226.static.siol.net] has joined #lnd 23:06 -!- yoctopede [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 23:07 -!- yoctopede [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has joined #lnd 23:20 -!- yoctopede [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has quit [Ping timeout: 248 seconds] 23:23 -!- yoctopede [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has joined #lnd 23:24 -!- yoctopede [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has quit [Remote host closed the connection] 23:25 -!- yoctopede [~zshlyk@gateway/tor-sasl/intcat] has joined #lnd 23:35 -!- blyat__ [~blyat@cpe-71-71-200-3.carolina.res.rr.com] has joined #lnd 23:38 -!- blyat_ [~blyat@cpe-71-71-200-3.carolina.res.rr.com] has quit [Ping timeout: 240 seconds]