• Chinese bioethicists’ response to He Jiankui was criticized for framing the benefits of human genetic enhancement as zero and the risks as infinite, highlighting a common risk-benefit imbalance in public discourse.  
• A debate ensued on whether cultural and societal maturation should precede deployment of powerful genetic technologies, with one participant arguing that “toys will kill us” if cultural sophistication lags.  
• Practical enclave malware leveraging Intel SGX was shared (arXiv 1902.03256, GitHub sgxrop/sgxrop), illustrating hardware-level security research relevant to secure bio-computation or genomic data handling.  
• Discussion of DIY vs institutional genetic engineering emphasized that engineered alleles can create phenotypes not found in nature, moving beyond simply “finding someone with the allele you want.”  
• A libertarian stance was voiced against government restrictions on self-modification or germline edits, contrasting with the “I can’t have it, so neither can you” attitude perceived in mainstream bioethics.  
• Mouse experiments were proposed to test 10×-efficiency dopamine receptors and multi-copy p53 tumor-suppressor genes as routes to cognitive or longevity enhancement.  
• An elephant genomics paper (Nature 2015) was cited to support the feasibility of extra tumor-suppressor copies as a cancer-resistance strategy for engineered humans.  
• A predictive molecular model for human intelligence development (2018 preprint linked) was circulated, underpinning aspirations to model and then engineer cognitive genomics.  
• Transcripts of technical talks (e.g., Elaine Ou on Lightning Network bootstrapping) were committed to diyhpl.us/wiki, illustrating the channel’s archival culture around cutting-edge decentralized tech.  
• Market-size skepticism was voiced: no reliable public figures exist for “transhumanism” as an industry, with only multi-thousand-dollar analyst reports behind paywalls.