• The group analyzed the legal risk of operating BitTorrent Mainline DHT bootstrap nodes, concluding that even non-infringing coordination tools can trigger costly defense cases, citing the ongoing Tornado Cash prosecution as precedent.

• They dissected Kademlia-style DHT resilience: 8-fold redundancy, 30–60 min republishing, and XOR distance routing keep the network alive under massive churn, while deliberately avoiding active rebalancing to block resource-exhaustion attacks.

• Performance comparisons showed Mainline DHT achieves 3–15 s end-to-end lookups over UDP, whereas IPFS’s TCP-heavy stack is “total shit” without heavy tuning; Hyperswarm and Veilid were highlighted as newer designs that add hole-punching and IP-privacy protections.

• A technical survey of decentralized payment protocols covered Trustlines, offset, FROST/MuSig2 threshold signatures, and the open research problem of reliable timeout/clock synchronization without a trusted third party.

• Key references shared included the Mainline DHT spec (BEP-0005), libtorrent security notes, Hyperswarm documentation, the Veilid developer book, Consento’s leaderless group-consensus paper, Blockchain Commons’ CSR social-key-recovery scheme, and fiatjaf’s essays on trustlines limitations.

• Participants noted a post-Bitcoin shift in monetary experimentation from theoretical “open money” projects to adversarial, working-code approaches, while also critiquing dollar-denominated accounting and the regulatory paradox that bars thiamine fortification of alcoholic beverages.