From: Amir Taaki <zgenjix@yahoo•com>
To: "bitcoin-development@lists•sourceforge.net"
<bitcoin-development@lists•sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Protocol extensions
Date: Sun, 18 Dec 2011 10:47:54 -0800 (PST) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1324234074.548.YahooMailNeo@web121006.mail.ne1.yahoo.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <4EEE2B91.1050908@gmail.com>
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Has anyone considered 'snapshot' frames (blocks).
Message to node:
getsnapshot: hash
Node responds with a 'block' message.
Then the hash for that particular snapshot is hardcoded into the sourcecode. It would replace the checkpoints and use the last hash in that list.
Validating blocks is pretty fast right up until block 135k, which is where time taken balloons and starts become exponentially slower. As blockchain grows linearly, resources needed grows exponentially if you think about it.
________________________________
From: Alan Reiner <etotheipi@gmail•com>
To: bitcoin-development@lists•sourceforge.net
Sent: Sunday, December 18, 2011 6:06 PM
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Protocol extensions
The whole point of having headers built at a constant size and generation rate is to minimize the amount of data needed to "understand" of the blockchain while simultaneously maximizing integrity/security in the presence of untrusted nodes. Barring the 50%-attack, you only need a couple honest nodes out of 50 to stay safe (as long as you're waiting for your 6 confirmations). In fact, I would argue that a full node (Satoshi client), has the same level of security as a headers-only client... because they both base all their verification decisions on computations that end with comparing hashes to the longest-chain headers.
In the case that an attacker figures out how to isolate your node
entirely and start feeing you poisoned blocks, then you are
vulnerable with any kind of node, full or lightweight. I don't see
where the reduced security is.
The only issue I see is that a truly light-weight, headers-only node
will be having to download an entire block to get one transaction it
needs. This would be significantly alleviated if nodes can start
requesting merkle-trees directly, even without
merkle-branch-pruning. If a node can ask for a tx and the
tx-hash-list of the block that incorporated that tx, he can easily
verify his tx against his no-need-to-trust-anyone headers, and
doesn't have to download MBs for every one.
As for blockchain pruning... I think it's absolutely critical to
find a way to do this, for all nodes. I am swayed by Dan Kaminsky's scalability warnings, and my instinct tells me that leaving full verification to a select few deep-pockets nodes in the future opens up all sorts of centralization/power-corporation issues that is contrary to the Bitcoin concept. It is in everyone's best interest to make it as easy as possible for anyone to act as a full node (if possible). As such, I believe that the current system of minimizing TxOut size is the right one. TxIns take up 0 bytes space in the long-run when taking into account any blockchain pruning/snapshot idea (except for nLocktime/seq transactions where the TxIn might have to be saved).
-Alan
On 12/18/2011 12:09 PM, theymos wrote:
On Sat, Dec 17, 2011, at 05:27 PM, Jordan Mack wrote:
>I don't like the idea of a header only client, unless this is just an
interim action until the full block chain is downloaded in the
background. Development of these types of clients is probably
inevitable, but I believe that this breaks the most fundamental
aspects of Bitcoin's security model. If a client has only headers, it
cannot do full verification, and it is trusting the data from random
anonymous peers.
>A headers-only client is much better than trusting anyone, since an
attacker needs >50% of the network's computational power to trick
such clients. For everyone to keep being a full node, hardware costs would need to
constantly go down enough for all nodes to be able to handle enough
transactions to meet demand. If hardware doesn't become cheap enough
quickly enough, either some people would be unable to handle being full
nodes, or the max block size wouldn't rise enough to meet demand and
transaction fees would become noncompetitive. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Microsoft is holding a special Learn Windows Azure training event for
developers. It will provide a great way to learn Windows Azure and what it
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Learn more at http://p.sf.net/sfu/ms-windowsazure
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2011-12-18 18:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2011-12-17 7:41 Eric Lombrozo
2011-12-17 13:13 ` Michael Grønager
2011-12-17 13:37 ` Christian Decker
[not found] ` <CABsx9T0puk3CWH1cfNHMSVEoCPaLJJWNJ+H5ObCERZrzMbrTyA@mail.gmail.com>
2011-12-17 19:06 ` Gavin Andresen
2011-12-17 21:49 ` theymos
2011-12-18 0:44 ` Jordan Mack
2011-12-18 1:07 ` Jeff Garzik
2011-12-18 1:27 ` Jordan Mack
2011-12-18 14:16 ` Andy Parkins
2011-12-18 17:09 ` theymos
2011-12-18 18:06 ` Alan Reiner
2011-12-18 18:47 ` Amir Taaki [this message]
2011-12-18 19:37 ` Jorge Timón
2011-12-17 19:28 ` Gregory Maxwell
2011-12-17 20:34 ` Christian Decker
2011-12-18 21:19 ` Stefan Thomas
2011-12-19 21:43 ` Jordan Mack
2011-12-20 9:10 ` Wladimir
2011-12-20 10:44 ` Nicolas Fischer
2011-12-21 0:47 ` Kyle Henderson
2011-12-21 8:50 ` Michael Grønager
2011-12-21 11:42 ` Eric Lombrozo
2011-12-21 12:41 ` Michael Grønager
2011-12-21 16:10 ` Christian Decker
2011-12-22 9:18 ` Michael Grønager
2011-12-22 10:12 ` Andy Parkins
2011-12-22 10:27 ` Michael Grønager
2011-12-22 11:52 ` Andy Parkins
2011-12-22 12:14 ` Joel Joonatan Kaartinen
2011-12-22 12:26 ` Christian Decker
2011-12-22 12:42 ` Michael Grønager
2011-12-22 14:46 ` Andy Parkins
2011-12-25 2:55 ` Zell Faze
2011-12-21 17:17 ` Jordan Mack
2011-12-22 9:19 ` Michael Grønager
2011-12-21 6:19 Eric Lombrozo
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