From: Tomas <tomas@tomasvdw•nl>
To: bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: Compact Client Side Filtering for Light Clients
Date: Thu, 08 Jun 2017 11:50:08 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1496915408.1583369.1002689000.641E8EAB@webmail.messagingengine.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAO3Pvs8ccTkgrecJG6KFbBW+9moHF-FTU+4qNfayeE3hM9uRrg@mail.gmail.com>
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On Thu, Jun 1, 2017, at 21:01, Olaoluwa Osuntokun via bitcoin-dev wrote:> Hi y'all,
>
> Alex Akselrod and I would like to propose a new light client BIP for
> consideration:
> * https://github.com/Roasbeef/bips/blob/master/gcs_light_client.mediawiki>
>
Very interesting.
I would like to consider how this compares to another light client type
with rather different security characteristics where each client would
receive for each transaction in each block,
* The TXID (uncompressed)
* The spent outpoints (with TXIDs compressed)
* The pubkey hash (compressed to reasonable amount of false positives)
A rough estimate would indicate this to be about 2-2.5x as big per block
as your proposal, but comes with rather different security
characteristics, and would not require download since genesis.
The client could verify the TXIDs against the merkle root with a much
stronger (PoW) guarantee compared to the guarantee based on the
assumption of peers being distinct, which your proposal seems to make.
Like your proposal this removes the privacy and processing issues from
server-side filtering, but unlike your proposal retrieval of all txids
in each block can also serve for a basis of fraud proofs and
(disprovable) fraud hints, without resorting to full block downloads.
I don't completely understand the benefit of making the outpoints and
pubkey hashes (weakly) verifiable. These only serve as notifications and
therefore do not seem to introduce an attack vector. Omitting data is
always possible, so receiving data is a prerequisite for verification,
not an assumption that can be made. How could an attacker benefit from
"hiding notifications"?
I think client-side filtering is definitely an important route to
take, but is it worth compressing away the information to verify the
merkle root?
Regards,
Tomas van der Wansem
bitcrust
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-06-08 9:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-06-01 19:01 Olaoluwa Osuntokun
2017-06-01 21:00 ` Eric Lombrozo
2017-06-01 21:33 ` Matt Corallo
2017-06-01 22:10 ` Olaoluwa Osuntokun
2017-06-02 2:15 ` Chris
2017-06-02 2:28 ` Gregory Maxwell
2017-06-02 3:35 ` Alex Akselrod
2017-06-02 16:07 ` Chris Pacia
2017-06-02 4:49 ` Olaoluwa Osuntokun
2017-06-09 3:59 ` Olaoluwa Osuntokun
2017-11-09 23:44 ` Olaoluwa Osuntokun
2017-06-02 6:00 ` Karl Johan Alm
[not found] ` <CAE0pnx+RRAP269VeWAcxKbrcS9qX4LS8_6nY_js8X5NtQ22t_A@mail.gmail.com>
[not found] ` <CAE0pnxLKYnwHnktTqW949s1AA9uK=6WnVYWmRoau8B1SszzYEg@mail.gmail.com>
[not found] ` <CAE0pnxJxHYQ4+2pt3tt=1WZ0-K0vDxGB4KBXY+R=WfktMmATwA@mail.gmail.com>
2017-06-02 17:55 ` Alex Akselrod
2017-06-05 2:06 ` Karl Johan Alm
2017-06-09 3:03 ` Olaoluwa Osuntokun
2017-06-07 21:41 ` Gregory Maxwell
2017-06-09 3:42 ` Olaoluwa Osuntokun
2017-06-09 4:47 ` Olaoluwa Osuntokun
2017-06-08 9:50 ` Tomas [this message]
2017-06-09 3:50 ` Olaoluwa Osuntokun
2017-06-09 8:26 ` Tomas
2017-06-19 11:58 ` Andreas Schildbach
2017-06-19 12:26 ` bfd
2017-06-19 15:15 ` Tom Zander
2017-06-19 15:49 ` Jonas Schnelli
2017-06-19 15:59 ` Andreas Schildbach
2017-06-19 16:22 ` Jonas Schnelli
2017-06-19 16:36 ` adiabat
2017-06-19 20:49 ` Andreas Schildbach
2017-06-20 7:03 ` Eric Voskuil
2017-06-19 16:07 ` Tom Zander
2017-06-19 16:30 ` Jonas Schnelli
2017-06-19 16:38 ` Tom Zander
2017-06-19 15:43 ` Andreas Schildbach
2017-06-19 16:10 ` Jonas Schnelli
2017-06-19 22:41 ` Gregory Maxwell
2017-06-20 9:52 ` Tom Zander
2017-06-20 13:08 ` bfd
2017-06-20 17:20 ` Adam Back
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