From: Tim Ruffing <tim.ruffing@mmci•uni-saarland.de>
To: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Taproot: Privacy preserving switchable scripting
Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2018 10:28:20 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1516786100.2567.18.camel@mmci.uni-saarland.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180124015256.GR9082@boulet.lan>
On Wed, 2018-01-24 at 01:52 +0000, Andrew Poelstra via bitcoin-dev
wrote:
>
> > They are. But I don't believe that is relevant; the attacker would
> > simply steal the coins on spend.
>
>
> Then the system would need to be hardforked to allow spending through
> a
> quantum-resistant ZKP of knowledge of the hashed public key. I expect
> that in a post-quantum world there will be demand for such a fork,
> especially if we came into such a world through surprise evidence of
> a discrete log break.
>
There are simpler ways using consensus / waiting instead of zero-
knowledge, e.g.,
1. Include H(classic_pk, tx) to blockchain, wait until confirmed.
2. Reveal classic_pk, tx
This is taken from my tweet [1] but now I realize that these are
basically Guy Fawkes "signatures" [2]. Joseph Bonneau and Andrew Miller
[3] had the idea to use this for cryptocurrency without asymmetric
cryptography.
Best,
Tim
[1] https://twitter.com/real_or_random/status/948226830166786048
[2] https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/fawkes.pdf
[3] http://www.jbonneau.com/doc/BM14-SPW-fawkescoin.pdf
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-01-24 9:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-23 0:30 Gregory Maxwell
2018-01-23 1:55 ` Chris Belcher
2018-01-23 2:51 ` Matt Corallo
2018-01-23 14:39 ` Mark Friedenbach
2018-01-23 21:23 ` Matt Corallo
2018-01-23 21:38 ` Gregory Maxwell
2018-01-23 6:44 ` Anthony Towns
2018-01-23 13:15 ` Gregory Maxwell
2018-01-23 22:22 ` Anthony Towns
2018-01-23 22:45 ` Gregory Maxwell
2018-01-24 1:52 ` Andrew Poelstra
2018-01-24 9:28 ` Tim Ruffing [this message]
2018-01-24 12:51 ` Natanael
2018-01-24 15:38 ` Tim Ruffing
2018-01-24 18:51 ` Natanael
2018-01-24 23:22 ` Tim Ruffing
2018-01-25 0:09 ` Natanael
2018-01-26 13:14 ` [bitcoin-dev] Recovery of old UTXOs in a post-quantum world Tim Ruffing
2018-01-27 17:07 ` [bitcoin-dev] Taproot: Privacy preserving switchable scripting Russell O'Connor
2018-01-27 17:23 ` Matt Corallo
2018-01-23 15:43 ` Greg Sanders
2018-01-26 21:34 ` Gregory Maxwell
2018-07-13 1:51 ` [bitcoin-dev] Generalised taproot Anthony Towns
2018-10-24 2:22 ` Pieter Wuille
2018-02-05 9:27 ` [bitcoin-dev] Taproot: Privacy preserving switchable scripting ZmnSCPxj
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