If using a monetary network requires out-of-band payments, then that severely limits the actual utility of the monetary network as a medium of exchange. Imagine if the only way to make a bank transfer was to first go in-person to the bank of the recipient of the transfer to give them something that then allowed your bank to make the transfer -- it would be an unworkable monetary system. Similarly, if future Bitcoin transactions require making out-of-band payments, then it has failed as a monetary network with an endogenous unit of account. The whole system has to work without reliance upon exogenous monetary media or mechanisms. As such, the commit-and-reveal scheme fails to maintain the monetary properties of the network as a whole unless we assert reliance upon altruism to get the commitments into the blockchain, which instead breaks the incentive-based game theoretic design. Maybe it would work as a stop-gap solution in the event of the advent of a relevant quantum computer, but it is certainly not a good long-term plan as currently formulated.
On Fri, May 30, 2025 at 03:00:41PM -0700, Jonathan Voss wrote:
> As far as I can tell, the main flaw in commit/reveal protocols is in the
> commit phase: if revealing a commitment with N confirmations is required to
> spend bitcoins, then, without spending any bitcoins, how do you get the
> commitment into the blockchain in the first place? Maybe I am just
> misunderstanding this. If so, then a commit/reveal scheme may be a workable
> solution.
You can always purchase new BTC to perform the commitment.
Indeed, this problem is often seen in alt-coins where fees must be paid in a
native asset, while users are trying to send some kind of tokenized asset like
a USD token. You can have funds that you can't move because you don't have the
correct asset. While annoying, this isn't a fatal problem.
--
https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org