From: vjudeu@gazeta•pl
To: Andrew Melnychuk Oseen <amo.personal@protonmail•com>,
Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
<bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>,
Giuseppe B <beppeben2030@gmail•com>,
Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
<bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Minimum fees
Date: Sun, 05 Mar 2023 22:58:51 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <179086234-135a72949cf38fda9b4e75be5889fe02@pmq1v.m5r2.onet> (raw)
> I don't know of any data of what happens at the point where the coinbase drops to below the fees on any chain. I don't think there has been one where that has happened. Perhaps there is a chain out there where it is fee's only? Perhaps that can provide insight.
I think federations like RSK or additional layers like LN can be a good example of what happens if there are no additional coins. In RSK, all coins are backed by BTC, so all you have is what users deposited, or what was Merge Mined, there are no more coins than that. In LN, there are nodes, and channels are formed only with existing coins, by default there is no mining, so all fees collected by nodes are based only on LN transaction fees (there are ways to reward small miners with LN coins, for example by enabling free LN transactions for those miners, or create channels directly by using outputs of the coinbase transaction, but it is not widely used).
Also note that when it comes to other chains, we still have testnet3, where there were more halvings than on the mainnet, because of blockstorms. So, if that network will not be resetted, then I guess we will see, how that network will behave, when there will be no other coins. For now, you can see some users complaining that it is hard to get enough test coins, and with each halving you can see, how that network is getting closer and closer to the case you want to observe. So, if we want to check, how potential solutions can solve that problem, using testnet3 will give better results than signet, simply because of more halvings. Also, as testnet3 has blockstorms, it is possible to also test extreme cases with huge reorgs, and see if taking fees from other blocks will still be profitable after introducing proposed changes.
Another important thing to note is that even if coins are worthless, then still, if there are some minimal fees (like one satoshi per virtual byte), then on-chain amounts simply represents, how many data can be sent by each user. It means that users can simply send zero satoshis (if there is a need to create any additional UTXOs), and place as many coins as they can in their change addresses, and then the whole game is about having any coins, to have the right to broadcast any transaction to the network. Because then, an interesting thing to note is that if there is no coins, then the chain is not going to be halted. It is still possible to create a coinbase transaction with zero coins, and it is still used in all block-based calculations, so mining such blocks can prevent other miners from reorging older blocks, and taking those fees. And then, if you look at the last miners that had some blocks with fees, then you notice that reaching 100 confirmations can encourage them to mine blocks with zero coinbase amount, just to spend their rewards.
On 2023-03-04 18:32:01 user Andrew Melnychuk Oseen via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
From my limited knowledge in the space, and I've taken opinions of people I respect that are far more knowledgeable than me.
I don't know of any data of what happens at the point where the coinbase drops to below the fees on any chain. I don't think there has been one where that has happened. Perhaps there is a chain out there where it is fee's only? Perhaps that can provide insight.
Opinion: I think as bitcoin's capabilities grow, demand for it will as well. There are a lot of efforts to increase the amount of transactions that can fit into a block. I think the combination of limited block space and a reduced amount of bitcoin's entering the market is the right combination for the system to self sustain. I'm looking forward to seeing the result!
Sent with Proton Mail secure email.
------- Original Message -------
On Wednesday, March 1st, 2023 at 12:18 PM, Giuseppe B via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
Hello everyone,
I'm relatively new here so what I'm proposing could have already been discussed, or may be flawed or inapplicable. I apologize for that.
I was picturing a situation where block rewards are almost zero, and the base layer is mainly used as a settlement layer for relatively few large transactions, since the majority of smaller ones goes through LN.
In such a case it may very well be that even if transaction amounts are very consistent, transaction fees end up being very small since there is enough space for everyone in a block. Users wouldn't mind paying higher fees as they know that that would increase the network security, however nobody wants to be the only one doing that. Miners would of course like being paid more. So everyone involved would prefer higher fees but they just stay low because that's the only rational individual choice.
Therefore I was imagining the introduction of a new protocol rule, min_fees, that would work like this:
- the miner that gets to mine a block appends a min_fee field to the block, specifying the minimum fees that need to be contained in the following block in order for it to be valid.
- one can also mine an empty block and reset the min_fee, to avoid the chain getting stuck.
min_fees could either represent the total fees of the following block, or the minimal fee for each single transaction, as a percentage of the value transacted. Both seem to have some merits and some potential drawbacks. Of course min_fees=0 would correspond to the current situation.
It looks to me that this could have the potential to bring the equilibrium closer to a socially optimal one (as opposed to individually optimal), and to benefit the network security in the long term. Of course it's just a rough sketch and it would deserve a much deeper analysis. I was just interested in knowing if you think that the principle has some merit or if it's not even worth discussing it for some reason that I'm not considering.
Cheers,
Giuseppe.
next reply other threads:[~2023-03-05 22:04 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-03-05 21:58 vjudeu [this message]
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2023-03-02 22:27 jk_14
2023-03-01 20:18 Giuseppe B
2023-03-02 0:39 ` Nadav Ivgi
2023-03-03 5:07 ` Giuseppe B
2023-03-03 2:45 ` WMOURA
2023-03-03 5:19 ` Giuseppe B
2023-03-04 6:21 ` Andrew Melnychuk Oseen
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