From: Peter Todd <pete@petertodd•org>
To: Mike Hearn <mike@plan99•net>
Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lists•sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Discovery/addr packets (was: Service bits for pruned nodes)
Date: Mon, 6 May 2013 13:19:43 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20130506171943.GA22505@petertodd.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CANEZrP2WqXZVRJp6ag=RC4mSkt+a6qTYYpvE=DW_0Rdr=_BBHA@mail.gmail.com>
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On Mon, May 06, 2013 at 06:47:22PM +0200, Mike Hearn wrote:
> Iteration 1) Make it clear in the UI that if the phone is connected to
> WiFi, payments from untrusted people should not be accepted. Currently
> the Android app merely says the money won't be spendable for a few
> minutes. It needs to communicate the "may not exist" aspect more
> clearly. If you're connected via a cell tower, the existing wording is
> fine - it's very unlikely your telco is trying to scam you in a
> person-to-person transaction, traffic is encrypted and 3G+ connections
> authenticate the network so you can't be MITMd except by your telco.
> Assuming you have a good list of IPs, of course.
You mean scam you with a zero-conf transaction that hasn't actually been
broadcast?
You know how I feel about zero-conf.
> Iteration 2) Give nodes keys that appear in addr broadcasts and seed
> data (whether it be via https or otherwise), and have each node keep a
> running hash of all messages sent on a connection so far. Add a new
> protocol message that asks the node to sign the current accumulated
> hash. Not all messages really need to be signed, eg asking for
> signatures of blocks is sort of pointless at high difficulty levels
> because the structures are self proving and a simple watchdog timer
> that looks for unusually slow progress is probably enough. If the
> client keeps the same accumulated hash then when you encounter
> something you care about the accuracy of, you can ask for a signature
> over all traffic so far.
We already depend on OpenSSL, why not just use standard SSL?
Define a per-node compressed pubkey to pass around, and then do whatever
is easiest to get the actual SSL up and running. If we have to use that
pubkey to in-turn sign for a secondary RSA key or whatever due to
compatibility, no big deal.
Define a new service bit SSL and if you connect to a SSL supporting node
switch to SSL within the same TCP connection.
> Iteration 3) Do something about end to end encryption, just delegate
> everything to Tor, or find some other way to obfuscate the origin of a
> transaction (a mini onion network for example).
Obfusication probably isn't the hard part, it's SPV bloom filter privacy
that is the tough one, but probably a problem better handled by Tor.
> Last time I looked, Tor wasn't really usable in library form and
> connecting to hidden services is really slow. So it'd be an issue to
> just re-use it out of the box, I think.
For phone stuff you should work with The Guardian Project - they've
implemented Tor on Android among other things and want to find easier
ways for apps to use it.
--
'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-05-06 17:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-05-06 14:58 Mike Hearn
2013-05-06 16:12 ` Peter Todd
2013-05-06 16:20 ` Jeff Garzik
2013-05-06 16:34 ` Mike Hearn
2013-05-06 16:37 ` Peter Todd
2013-05-06 16:47 ` Mike Hearn
2013-05-06 17:19 ` Peter Todd [this message]
2013-05-06 17:25 ` Jeff Garzik
2013-05-06 17:42 ` Gregory Maxwell
2013-05-06 17:53 ` Peter Todd
2013-05-06 18:01 ` Gregory Maxwell
2013-05-06 18:19 ` Peter Todd
2013-05-06 18:32 ` Adam Back
2013-05-06 19:08 ` Peter Todd
2013-05-06 19:50 ` Adam Back
2013-05-06 20:43 ` Peter Todd
2013-05-06 23:44 ` Peter Todd
2013-05-07 9:00 ` Mike Hearn
2013-05-09 0:57 ` John Dillon
2013-05-06 18:04 ` Adam Back
2013-05-06 18:25 ` Gregory Maxwell
2013-05-06 22:51 ` [Bitcoin-development] limits of network hacking/netsplits (was: Discovery/addr packets) Adam Back
2013-05-06 23:13 ` Gregory Maxwell
2013-05-07 4:48 ` Petr Praus
2013-05-07 21:07 ` Matt Corallo
2013-05-07 9:17 ` Mike Hearn
2013-05-07 11:07 ` Adam Back
2013-05-07 12:04 ` Mike Hearn
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