* [Bitcoin-development] On the optimal block size and why transaction fees are 8 times too low (or transactions 8 times too big) @ 2013-11-07 14:11 Michael Gronager 2013-11-07 15:00 ` Pieter Wuille 2013-11-07 20:31 ` Peter Todd 0 siblings, 2 replies; 8+ messages in thread From: Michael Gronager @ 2013-11-07 14:11 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Bitcoin Dev Following the discussion on the recent mining sybil trick, I reread the article on block propagation by Decker et al.* and decided to use it for doing a proper estimate of transaction fee size and optimal block size. The propagation of a block depends on and is roughly proportional to its size. Further, the slower a block propagates the higher the risk of a fork, so as a miner you are basically juggling the risk of a fork (meaning you loose your bounty) vs the opportunity for including more transactions and hence also get those fees. This alone will dictate the minimal transaction fee as well as the optimal block size! Lets try to put it into equations. For the purpose of this initial study lets simplify the work by Decker et al. Roughly, we can say that the average propagation time for a block is t_propagate, and the average time between blocks is t_blocks. Those are roughly 10sec and 600sec respectively. The risk of someone else mining a block before your block propagates is roughly**: P_fork = t_propagate/t_blocks (~1/60) Also note that propagation time is a function of block size, S: t_propagate = t_0 + alpha*S where Decker et al have determined alpha to 80ms/kb. We also define the fee size pr kilobyte, f, so E_fee = f*S Given these equations the expected average earning is: E = P_hashrate*(1 - P_fork)*(E_bounty + E_fees) And inserting: E = P_hashrate*[1 - (t_0 + alpha*S)/t_block]*(E_bounty + f*S) We would like to choose the fee so the more transactions we include the more we earn. I.e. dE/dS > 0: dE/dS = P_hashrate*{[(t_block - t_0)*f - alpha*E_bounty]/t_block - 2*alpha*f/t_block*S} Which gives: f > alpha*E_bounty/(t_block-t_0) ~ alpha*E_bounty/t_block or f > 80*25/600000 = 0.0033 or assuming a standard transaction size of 0.227kb: f_tx > 0.00076. Note that this number is 8 times higher than the current transaction fee! So the current optimal block size is an empty block i.e. without other transactions than the coinbase! (miners don't listen now...) Lets see what you loose by e.g. including 1000 transactions: E(1000) = P_hashrate*24.34XBT Which is a loss of 2.6% compared to not including transactions at all! So there are two ways forward from here. 1) raise the minimum fee, and 2) make transactions smaller. We cannot make transactions much smaller, but we can utilize that most of them have already been broadcasted verified and validated and then just include their hash in the block***. This changes the relevant size for a transaction from 0.227kb to 0.032kb. Which makes f_tx = 0.00011. We are almost there! Now assume that we implement this change and raise the minimum fee to 0.00015, what is then the optimal block size (dE/dS = 0) ? S = 1/2 * (t_block/alpha - E_bounty/f) Which gives 1083kb for a bounty of 25 and 2417kb for a bounty of 12.5. Optimal size in case of no bounty or an infinite fee is 3750MB. Final conclusions is that the fee currently is too small and that there is no need to keep a maximum block size, the fork probability will automatically provide an incentive to not let block grows into infinity. *) http://www.tik.ee.ethz.ch/file/49318d3f56c1d525aabf7fda78b23fc0/P2P2013_041.pdf **) The calculations should be done using the proper integrals and simulations, but I will leave that for academia ;) ***) A nice side effect from switching to broadcasting transactions in blocks as only their hash is that it decouples fee size from transaction size! ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* Re: [Bitcoin-development] On the optimal block size and why transaction fees are 8 times too low (or transactions 8 times too big) 2013-11-07 14:11 [Bitcoin-development] On the optimal block size and why transaction fees are 8 times too low (or transactions 8 times too big) Michael Gronager @ 2013-11-07 15:00 ` Pieter Wuille 2013-11-07 15:19 ` Pieter Wuille 2013-11-07 20:31 ` Peter Todd 1 sibling, 1 reply; 8+ messages in thread From: Pieter Wuille @ 2013-11-07 15:00 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Michael Gronager; +Cc: Bitcoin Dev Hi, (I didn't have time to read your e-mail entirely yet, I'll do so later) I believe that C. Decker's paper used measurements for propagation delays for blocks 180000-190000, which happened between may and juli 2012. The latest bitcoind/bitcoin-qt release at the time was 0.6.3. I'm sure the general patterns are valid, but if you're relying on actual speed numbers, I believe they may be very different now. I don't have numbers of course, but at least the changes 0.8 should impact propagation significantly. Some changes merged in git head (to become 0.9) could improve things further. If we're talking about long-term scalability, we should base decisions on the best technology available, at least. -- Pieter On Thu, Nov 7, 2013 at 3:11 PM, Michael Gronager <gronager@ceptacle•com> wrote: > Following the discussion on the recent mining sybil trick, I reread the > article on block propagation by Decker et al.* and decided to use it for > doing a proper estimate of transaction fee size and optimal block size. > > The propagation of a block depends on and is roughly proportional to its > size. Further, the slower a block propagates the higher the risk of a > fork, so as a miner you are basically juggling the risk of a fork > (meaning you loose your bounty) vs the opportunity for including more > transactions and hence also get those fees. > > This alone will dictate the minimal transaction fee as well as the > optimal block size! > > Lets try to put it into equations. For the purpose of this initial study > lets simplify the work by Decker et al. Roughly, we can say that the > average propagation time for a block is t_propagate, and the average > time between blocks is t_blocks. Those are roughly 10sec and 600sec > respectively. The risk of someone else mining a block before your block > propagates is roughly**: > > P_fork = t_propagate/t_blocks (~1/60) > > Also note that propagation time is a function of block size, S: > > t_propagate = t_0 + alpha*S > > where Decker et al have determined alpha to 80ms/kb. We also define the > fee size pr kilobyte, f, so > > E_fee = f*S > > Given these equations the expected average earning is: > > E = P_hashrate*(1 - P_fork)*(E_bounty + E_fees) > > And inserting: > > E = P_hashrate*[1 - (t_0 + alpha*S)/t_block]*(E_bounty + f*S) > > We would like to choose the fee so the more transactions we include the > more we earn. I.e. dE/dS > 0: > > dE/dS = P_hashrate*{[(t_block - t_0)*f - alpha*E_bounty]/t_block - > 2*alpha*f/t_block*S} > > Which gives: > > f > alpha*E_bounty/(t_block-t_0) ~ alpha*E_bounty/t_block > > or f > 80*25/600000 = 0.0033 or assuming a standard transaction size of > 0.227kb: > > f_tx > 0.00076. > > Note that this number is 8 times higher than the current transaction > fee! So the current optimal block size is an empty block i.e. without > other transactions than the coinbase! (miners don't listen now...) > > Lets see what you loose by e.g. including 1000 transactions: > > E(1000) = P_hashrate*24.34XBT > > Which is a loss of 2.6% compared to not including transactions at all! > > So there are two ways forward from here. 1) raise the minimum fee, and > 2) make transactions smaller. We cannot make transactions much smaller, > but we can utilize that most of them have already been broadcasted > verified and validated and then just include their hash in the block***. > This changes the relevant size for a transaction from 0.227kb to > 0.032kb. Which makes f_tx = 0.00011. We are almost there! > > Now assume that we implement this change and raise the minimum fee to > 0.00015, what is then the optimal block size (dE/dS = 0) ? > > S = 1/2 * (t_block/alpha - E_bounty/f) > > Which gives 1083kb for a bounty of 25 and 2417kb for a bounty of 12.5. > Optimal size in case of no bounty or an infinite fee is 3750MB. > > Final conclusions is that the fee currently is too small and that there > is no need to keep a maximum block size, the fork probability will > automatically provide an incentive to not let block grows into infinity. > > *) > http://www.tik.ee.ethz.ch/file/49318d3f56c1d525aabf7fda78b23fc0/P2P2013_041.pdf > **) The calculations should be done using the proper integrals and > simulations, but I will leave that for academia ;) > ***) A nice side effect from switching to broadcasting transactions in > blocks as only their hash is that it decouples fee size from transaction > size! > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > November Webinars for C, C++, Fortran Developers > Accelerate application performance with scalable programming models. Explore > techniques for threading, error checking, porting, and tuning. Get the most > from the latest Intel processors and coprocessors. See abstracts and register > http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=60136231&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk > _______________________________________________ > Bitcoin-development mailing list > Bitcoin-development@lists•sourceforge.net > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* Re: [Bitcoin-development] On the optimal block size and why transaction fees are 8 times too low (or transactions 8 times too big) 2013-11-07 15:00 ` Pieter Wuille @ 2013-11-07 15:19 ` Pieter Wuille 2013-11-07 15:22 ` Mike Hearn 0 siblings, 1 reply; 8+ messages in thread From: Pieter Wuille @ 2013-11-07 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Michael Gronager; +Cc: Bitcoin Dev Correcting myself: On Thu, Nov 7, 2013 at 4:00 PM, Pieter Wuille <pieter.wuille@gmail•com> wrote: > I believe that C. Decker's paper used measurements for propagation > delays for blocks 180000-190000, which happened between may and juli > 2012. The latest bitcoind/bitcoin-qt release at the time was 0.6.3. They did use data from blocks 20000-210000, september-november 2012. That was still before the 0.8 release, however. -- Pieter ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* Re: [Bitcoin-development] On the optimal block size and why transaction fees are 8 times too low (or transactions 8 times too big) 2013-11-07 15:19 ` Pieter Wuille @ 2013-11-07 15:22 ` Mike Hearn 2013-11-07 15:53 ` Michael Gronager 0 siblings, 1 reply; 8+ messages in thread From: Mike Hearn @ 2013-11-07 15:22 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Pieter Wuille; +Cc: Bitcoin Dev, Michael Gronager [-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1499 bytes --] I think trying to help miners figure out the propagation/fees tradeoff at the moment is a non-starter until we understand it better ourselves. A server that tracks and records block propagation times, how many fees per passed up per block, orphan stats per size bucket etc would be tremendously helpful. On Thu, Nov 7, 2013 at 4:19 PM, Pieter Wuille <pieter.wuille@gmail•com>wrote: > Correcting myself: > > On Thu, Nov 7, 2013 at 4:00 PM, Pieter Wuille <pieter.wuille@gmail•com> > wrote: > > I believe that C. Decker's paper used measurements for propagation > > delays for blocks 180000-190000, which happened between may and juli > > 2012. The latest bitcoind/bitcoin-qt release at the time was 0.6.3. > > They did use data from blocks 20000-210000, september-november 2012. > That was still before the 0.8 release, however. > > -- > Pieter > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > November Webinars for C, C++, Fortran Developers > Accelerate application performance with scalable programming models. > Explore > techniques for threading, error checking, porting, and tuning. Get the most > from the latest Intel processors and coprocessors. See abstracts and > register > http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=60136231&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk > _______________________________________________ > Bitcoin-development mailing list > Bitcoin-development@lists•sourceforge.net > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development > [-- Attachment #2: Type: text/html, Size: 2331 bytes --] ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* Re: [Bitcoin-development] On the optimal block size and why transaction fees are 8 times too low (or transactions 8 times too big) 2013-11-07 15:22 ` Mike Hearn @ 2013-11-07 15:53 ` Michael Gronager 0 siblings, 0 replies; 8+ messages in thread From: Michael Gronager @ 2013-11-07 15:53 UTC (permalink / raw) To: bitcoin-development Mike, Pieter, My writeup outlines a framework for good approximation to a minimal fee as well as the optimal block size. The model has basically just one parameter, the propagation time - if that goes down, so can the fee. (Well there is another parameter too, the time btw blocks, which currently with the current hash acceleration is more like 400 than 600). Also seconding Mike, that, yes, it would be tremendously useful to track propagation times and other things on the network to help us all decide the proper settings. Finally, it would be great if someone from academia would grab the ball and do the full probabilistic analysis based on my outline. Michael On 7/11/13, 16:22 , Mike Hearn wrote: > I think trying to help miners figure out the propagation/fees tradeoff > at the moment is a non-starter until we understand it better ourselves. > A server that tracks and records block propagation times, how many fees > per passed up per block, orphan stats per size bucket etc would be > tremendously helpful. > > > On Thu, Nov 7, 2013 at 4:19 PM, Pieter Wuille <pieter.wuille@gmail•com > <mailto:pieter.wuille@gmail•com>> wrote: > > Correcting myself: > > On Thu, Nov 7, 2013 at 4:00 PM, Pieter Wuille > <pieter.wuille@gmail•com <mailto:pieter.wuille@gmail•com>> wrote: > > I believe that C. Decker's paper used measurements for propagation > > delays for blocks 180000-190000, which happened between may and juli > > 2012. The latest bitcoind/bitcoin-qt release at the time was 0.6.3. > > They did use data from blocks 20000-210000, september-november 2012. > That was still before the 0.8 release, however. > > -- > Pieter > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > November Webinars for C, C++, Fortran Developers > Accelerate application performance with scalable programming models. > Explore > techniques for threading, error checking, porting, and tuning. Get > the most > from the latest Intel processors and coprocessors. See abstracts and > register > http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=60136231&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk > _______________________________________________ > Bitcoin-development mailing list > Bitcoin-development@lists•sourceforge.net > <mailto:Bitcoin-development@lists•sourceforge.net> > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > November Webinars for C, C++, Fortran Developers > Accelerate application performance with scalable programming models. Explore > techniques for threading, error checking, porting, and tuning. Get the most > from the latest Intel processors and coprocessors. See abstracts and register > http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=60136231&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk > > > > _______________________________________________ > Bitcoin-development mailing list > Bitcoin-development@lists•sourceforge.net > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development > ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* Re: [Bitcoin-development] On the optimal block size and why transaction fees are 8 times too low (or transactions 8 times too big) 2013-11-07 14:11 [Bitcoin-development] On the optimal block size and why transaction fees are 8 times too low (or transactions 8 times too big) Michael Gronager 2013-11-07 15:00 ` Pieter Wuille @ 2013-11-07 20:31 ` Peter Todd 2013-11-07 21:58 ` Michael Gronager 1 sibling, 1 reply; 8+ messages in thread From: Peter Todd @ 2013-11-07 20:31 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Michael Gronager; +Cc: Bitcoin Dev [-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 5410 bytes --] > Final conclusions is that the fee currently is too small and that there > is no need to keep a maximum block size, the fork probability will > automatically provide an incentive to not let block grows into infinity. Your definition of P_fork is inaccurate for a miner with non-negligable hashing power - a miner will never fork themselves. Taking that into account we have three outcomes: 1) The block propagates without any other miner finding a block. 2) During propagation another miner finds a block. (tie) 2.1) You win the tie by finding another block. 2.2) You lose the tie because someone else finds a block. We will define t_prop as the time it takes for a block to propagate from you to 100% of the hashing power, and as a simplifying assumption we will assume that until t_prop has elapsed, 0% of the hashing power has the block, and immedately after, 100% has the block. We will also define t_int, the average interval between blocks. (600 seconds for Bitcoin) Finally, we will define Q as the probability that you will find the next block. The probabilities of the various outcomes: 1) 1 - (t_prop/t_int * (1-Q)) 2) t_prop/t_int * (1-Q) 2.1) Q 2.2) 1-Q Note that to simplify the equations we have not taking into account propagation in our calculations for outcomes 2.1 or 2.2 Thus we can define P_fork taking into account Q: P_fork(Q) = (t_prop/t_int * (1-Q))(1-Q) = t_pop/t_int * (1-Q)^2 Over the range 0 < Q < 0.5 the probability of a fork decreases approximately linearly as your hashing power increases: d/dq P_fork(Q) = 2(Q-1) Q=0 -> d/dq P_fork(Q) = -2 Q=1/2 -> d/dq P_fork(Q) = -1 With our new, more accurate, P_fork(Q) function lets re-calculate the break-even fee/KB using your original approach: t_prop = t_0 + \alpha*S E_fee = f*S E(Q) = Q*(1 - P_fork(Q))*(E_bounty + E_fee) E(Q) = Q*[1 - (t_0 + k*S)/t_int * (1-Q)^2]*(E_B + f*S) d/dS E(Q) = Q*[ -2fSk/t_int*(1-Q)^2 - f*t_0/t_int*(1-Q)^2 + f - E_b*k/t_int*(1-Q)^2 ] Again, we want to choose the fee so that the more transactions we include the more we earn, dE/dS > 0 We find the minimum fee to include a transaction at all by setting S=0, thus we get: d/dS E(Q, S=0) = Q*[ f - f*t_0/t_int*(1-Q)^2 - E_b*k/t_int*(1-Q)^2 ] > 0 f(1 - t_0/t_int*(1-Q)^2) > E_b*k/t_int*(1-Q)^2 f > [E_b*k/t_int(1-Q)^2] / [1 - t_0/t_int*(1-Q)^2] f > [E_b*k*(1-Q)^2] / [t_int - t_0*(1-Q)^2] With Q=0: f > E_b*k / (t_int - t_0) ~ E_b*k/t_int This is the same result you derived. However lets look at Q != 0: df/dQ = 2*E_b*k * [t_int*(q-1)] / [t_int - t_0(q-1)^2]^2 With negligible latency we get: df/dQ, t_0=0 = 2*E_b*k*(q-1)/t_int So what does that mean? Well in the region 0 < q < 1/2, df/dQ is always negative. In other words, as you get more hashing power, the fee/KB you can charge and still break even decreases linearly because you will never orphan yourself. Lets trythe same assumptions as your first analysis, based on the work by Decker et al Based on the work by Decker et al, lets try to calculate break-even fee/KB for negligible, 10%, 25% and 40% hashing power: t_0 = 10s t_int = 600s k = 80ms/kB E_b = 25BTC Q=0 -> f = 0.0033 BTC/kB Q=0.1 -> f = 0.0027 BTC/kB Q=0.25 -> f = 0.0018 BTC/kB Q=0.40 -> f = 0.0012 BTC/kB Let's assume every miner is directly peered with every other miner, each of those connections is 1MB/s, and somehow there's no latency at all: k = 1mS/kB Q=0 -> f = 0.000042 BTC/kB Q=0.1 -> f = 0.000034 BTC/kB Q=0.25 -> f = 0.000023 BTC/kB Q=0.40 -> f = 0.000015 BTC/kB Regardless of how you play around with the parameters, being a larger miner has a significant advantage because you can charge lower fees for your transactions and therefor earn more money. But it gets even more ugly when you take into account that maybe a guy with 0.1% hashing power can't afford the high bandwidth, low-latency, internet connection that the larger pool has: k = 10mS/kB, t_0=5s, Q=0.01 -> 0.000411 BTC/KB k = 1mS/kB, t_0=1s, Q=0.15 -> 0.000030 BTC/KB So the 1% pool has an internet connection capable of 100kB/s to each peer, taking 5s to reach all the hashing power. The 15% pool can do 1MB/s to each peer, taking 1s to reach all the hashing power. This small different means that the 1% pool needs to charge 13.7x more per KB for their transactions to break even! It's a disaster for decentralization. Businesses live and die on percentage points, let alone orders of magnitude differences in cost, and I haven't even taken into account second-order effects like the perverse incentives to publish your blocks to only a minority of hashing power.(1) This problem is inherent to the fundemental design of Bitcoin: regardless of what the blocksize is, or how fast the network is, the current Bitcoin consensus protocol rewards larger mining pools with lower costs per KB to include transactions. It's a fundemental issue. An unlimited blocksize will make the problem even worse by increasing fixed costs, but keeping the blocksize at 1MB forever doesn't solve the underlying problem either as the inflation subsidy becomes less important and fees more important. 1) http://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg03200.html -- 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org 00000000000000054eeccf3ac454892457bf4919d78efb275efd2ddd1a920c99 [-- Attachment #2: Digital signature --] [-- Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 490 bytes --] ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* Re: [Bitcoin-development] On the optimal block size and why transaction fees are 8 times too low (or transactions 8 times too big) 2013-11-07 20:31 ` Peter Todd @ 2013-11-07 21:58 ` Michael Gronager 2013-11-15 10:52 ` Peter Todd 0 siblings, 1 reply; 8+ messages in thread From: Michael Gronager @ 2013-11-07 21:58 UTC (permalink / raw) To: bitcoin-development -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 7/11/13, 21:31 , Peter Todd wrote: >> Final conclusions is that the fee currently is too small and that >> there is no need to keep a maximum block size, the fork >> probability will automatically provide an incentive to not let >> block grows into infinity. > Great additions! - I was about to do a second iteration of the calculations including the pool size, but you beat me to it - thanks! Still the picture remains the same - you can half the fee if you are a large pool > Q=0 -> f = 0.0033 BTC/kB Q=0.1 -> f = 0.0027 BTC/kB Q=0.25 -> f > = 0.0018 BTC/kB Q=0.40 -> f = 0.0012 BTC/kB You second list of numbers is an unlikely extreme: > k = 1mS/kB The propagation latency in the network is more due to the block verification than due to its network (fiber) propagation time, bringing down the number of hops helps tremendously, so I agree that we can probably bring down k by a factor of ~10 (k=8-12) if we consider only pools directly connected. This should bring us close to break even with the current fee size, but we should really get some empirical data for interconnected large pools. However - important note - if you are a 1% miner - don't include transactions! > > Q=0 -> f = 0.000042 BTC/kB Q=0.1 -> f = 0.000034 BTC/kB Q=0.25 > -> f = 0.000023 BTC/kB Q=0.40 -> f = 0.000015 BTC/kB > > > This problem is inherent to the fundemental design of Bitcoin: > regardless of what the blocksize is, or how fast the network is, > the current Bitcoin consensus protocol rewards larger mining pools > with lower costs per KB to include transactions. I don't see a problem of rewarding economy of scale, as long as the effect is not too grave (raising the min fee would actually make it more profitable for smaller miners). Michael > 1) > http://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg03200.html > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > November Webinars for C, C++, Fortran Developers > Accelerate application performance with scalable programming > models. Explore techniques for threading, error checking, porting, > and tuning. Get the most from the latest Intel processors and > coprocessors. See abstracts and register > http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=60136231&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk > > > > > _______________________________________________ Bitcoin-development > mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists•sourceforge.net > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.22 (Darwin) Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJSfA0SAAoJEKpww0VFxdGRSEUIALFws8/nNDGPDFWKX2N19jWA YecC7ZdMgN+1xmf+z2TNjaREvUqI1BLbYO3qQj9AsvTgkMZDwo8c5hMfJL7//V+z vLiygTbEcorEbyM54w8yTuDVBqdNEg22Cn2T35DIEmqxGP5OSqw+vEBp2B4Y7asv GG+JgYTVNJf6kZ1GV8cXYnXVBgfccZfXllBYOIPjyk2tdz7HMJN10WKUePbSJtg+ zcvly05JY70d1quERj/fXxVsHpPP6BrH5sH+h4WPxM27+i6R3N90JLAWbB9D4h2s oYK9MMlH3UC3HR4AR7po4xxuOpxOK3Exa6d9ACQGPGtLRNVWmHiBFT2SViKViK4= =gALT -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* Re: [Bitcoin-development] On the optimal block size and why transaction fees are 8 times too low (or transactions 8 times too big) 2013-11-07 21:58 ` Michael Gronager @ 2013-11-15 10:52 ` Peter Todd 0 siblings, 0 replies; 8+ messages in thread From: Peter Todd @ 2013-11-15 10:52 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Michael Gronager; +Cc: bitcoin-development [-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2269 bytes --] On Thu, Nov 07, 2013 at 10:58:42PM +0100, Michael Gronager wrote: > > Q=0 -> f = 0.0033 BTC/kB Q=0.1 -> f = 0.0027 BTC/kB Q=0.25 -> f > > = 0.0018 BTC/kB Q=0.40 -> f = 0.0012 BTC/kB > > You second list of numbers is an unlikely extreme: > > > k = 1mS/kB > > The propagation latency in the network is more due to the block > verification than due to its network (fiber) propagation time, > bringing down the number of hops helps tremendously, so I agree that > we can probably bring down k by a factor of ~10 (k=8-12) if we > consider only pools directly connected. This should bring us close to > break even with the current fee size, but we should really get some > empirical data for interconnected large pools. Well if large pools wanted it would be trivial for all of them to just connect to each other... but my 25kB/s average data rate sure indicates that they either aren't bothering, or aren't bothering to do that correctly. > However - important > note - if you are a 1% miner - don't include transactions! Which is an awful solution, although probably a correct one.... After all, if you don't include transactions, you can start mining blocks earlier too based on just the header. > > Q=0 -> f = 0.000042 BTC/kB Q=0.1 -> f = 0.000034 BTC/kB Q=0.25 > > -> f = 0.000023 BTC/kB Q=0.40 -> f = 0.000015 BTC/kB > > > > > > > This problem is inherent to the fundemental design of Bitcoin: > > regardless of what the blocksize is, or how fast the network is, > > the current Bitcoin consensus protocol rewards larger mining pools > > with lower costs per KB to include transactions. > > I don't see a problem of rewarding economy of scale, as long as the > effect is not too grave (raising the min fee would actually make it > more profitable for smaller miners). That's a fundemental misunderstanding; there's no such thing as a min fee. As for economies of scale, the "product" we're paying miners for is decentralization and resistance to 51% attack. If instead only get 51% attack resistance, we're getting a bum deal. If that's all we're getting, we don't actually have 51% resistance... -- 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org 00000000000000075ed91531e07d2045b5823da050fe373bde7bb363965e44ae [-- Attachment #2: Digital signature --] [-- Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 685 bytes --] ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2013-11-15 10:53 UTC | newest] Thread overview: 8+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed) -- links below jump to the message on this page -- 2013-11-07 14:11 [Bitcoin-development] On the optimal block size and why transaction fees are 8 times too low (or transactions 8 times too big) Michael Gronager 2013-11-07 15:00 ` Pieter Wuille 2013-11-07 15:19 ` Pieter Wuille 2013-11-07 15:22 ` Mike Hearn 2013-11-07 15:53 ` Michael Gronager 2013-11-07 20:31 ` Peter Todd 2013-11-07 21:58 ` Michael Gronager 2013-11-15 10:52 ` Peter Todd
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