From: Peter Todd <pete@petertodd•org>
To: Mike Hearn <mike@plan99•net>
Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lists•sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Fee drop
Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2014 12:13:34 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20140225171334.GA30819@savin> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CANEZrP0pDjHr3v2w_zKnME+6GjVdvV5HYjrLH7xthbNdBniK4g@mail.gmail.com>
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On Tue, Feb 25, 2014 at 10:25:58PM +0530, Mike Hearn wrote:
Well, I've done my responsible disclosure, and I've got better things to
do than argue with wishful thinking.
> There are two possibilities.
>
> One is that the value of transactions with the new lower fee is outweighed
> by increased orphan costs and miners refuse to include them en-masse.
> Wallet authors lose the staring match and go back to setting higher fees
> until such a time as block propagation is optimised and the orphan costs go
> down. Nodes that are encountering memory pressure can increase their min
> relay fee locally until their usage fits inside their resources. It's
> annoying to do this by hand but by no means infeasible.
>
> The other is that the total value of transactions even with the lower fee
> is not outweighed by orphan costs. The value of a transaction is higher
> than its simple monetary value - the fact that Bitcoin is useful, growing
> and considered cheap also has a value which is impossible to calculate, but
> we know it's there (because Bitcoin does not exist in a vacuum and has
> competitors). In this case miners stop including lots of useful
> transactions that represent desired economic activity and are put under
> pressure by the community to change their policies. If all miners do this
> and making small blocks is considered errant behaviour, then we're back to
> the same situation we're in today.
>
> The possibility you're worried about - that someone does a DoS attack by
> flooding the network with small transactions - is only an issue in the
> first situation, and it is by no means the easiest or cheapest way to DoS
> Bitcoin. We all want to see more DoS resistance but basically any change to
> Bitcoin can be objected to on anti-DoS grounds at the moment, and this will
> remain the case until someone steps up to spend significant time on
> resource scheduling and code audits.
--
'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-02-25 17:13 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-02-25 4:41 Peter Todd
2014-02-25 7:34 ` naman naman
2014-02-25 12:40 ` Odinn Cyberguerrilla
2014-02-25 12:55 ` Mike Hearn
2014-02-25 14:49 ` Peter Todd
2014-02-25 16:55 ` Mike Hearn
2014-02-25 17:13 ` Peter Todd [this message]
2014-02-25 18:09 ` Jeremy Spilman
2014-02-28 11:18 ` Peter Todd
2014-02-25 22:43 ` Odinn Cyberguerrilla
2014-02-26 22:51 ` Jeff Garzik
2014-02-28 4:50 ` Troy Benjegerdes
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