* [Bitcoin-development] Privacy-Protecting Proof of Reserves without the Moon-Math and without the backup angst
@ 2014-03-25 22:05 Peter Todd
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From: Peter Todd @ 2014-03-25 22:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Bitcoin Dev
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Introduction
------------
In the wake of the Mt. Gox debacle merkle-sum-trees for
proof-of-reserve(1) have been getting attention again. A serious
objection to using them is exchange privacy as the merkle-sum-tree
inherently reveals the sum total of all deposits held by a given
service. A second, lesser, consideration is the privacy of the users'
balances, as changes to those balances are reflected in the tree and
various levels of aggregate information can be extracted from the
solvency proofs. For instance consider how an attacker who had knowledge
of a few balance changes to a particular user's account - perhaps
because that attacker had deposited funds themselves - could then
corrolate those balance changes with changes in merkle path proofs to
determine an upper bound on the victim's total balance. With some effort
and/or luck that upper bound could be even improved to the exact account
balance by obtaining a solvency proof from an account adjacent to the
victim's account.
Real or imagined the privacy problems with merkle-sum-trees pose a
barrier to adoption. Jesse from the exchange Kraken stated recently(2)
on reddit:
This is asking a lot of an exchange, and I don't think information
is worth the price you're paying in security and privacy. Your
interests would be better served by a private auditor's report.
While there has been much discussion recently on #bitcoin-wizards and
other places about applying advanced cryptographic techniques - so
called "Moon Math" - generate zero-knowledge-proofs of blinded account
sum trees so as to not leak any information, these techniques all suffer
from implementation complexity. Fortunately private proof-of-solvency
without moon math is possible without significant increase in
complexity.
Objectives
----------
First let's look at what exactly it is that our proof-of-solvency is
supposed to achieve. For expediency we'll refer to the third-parties
proving solvency as 'banks' and start with the big picture:
0) No more banks stealing everyone's money!
Of course, since the banks have the private keys to the bitcoins in
question the best we can actually do is much weaker:
1) Prove that at some point in the past, the bank had access to a
private key that can be used to spend unspent txout(s) that still
exists now.
Note how the bank may have since lost that key! But objective #1 isn't
good enough by itself; we also need to:
2) Prove that those txout(s) have no been re-used in any other proof of
solvency or ownership.
Most discussions about merkle-sum-trees miss this critical point. To see
why it matters, consider the example of BigBank. They have a very simple
proof-of-solvency scheme where they simply allocate one address per
customer, holding at least their entire balance. To prove their solvency
to Alice they simply sign a message:
$ btc verifymessage 13pPCfupiDhWadEXTZDnqSHm5Cy2rdUDho \
ID6Wk3SDsg3os4cSWRtG13lODY84zoVYpfEC2Y4kfHqGqqZV9hy1xD5yRKCyjL0II3UwPirEVKxm5meJ3VVDW/0= \
"Hi Alice"
true
Alice checks that the txouts with that address sum up to at least as
many Bitcoins as her balance, sees that it does, and is satisfied
BigBank is solvent.
Meanwhile LittleBank is running short of funds, so they decide to
"borrow" some from BigBank. One of their customers, Bob, asks for a
proof-of-solvency for his balance, and LittleBank happily obliges:
$ btc verifymessage 13pPCfupiDhWadEXTZDnqSHm5Cy2rdUDho \
H9af7wCdJrVIPG5Z0qrSviwAsElPkGw9v5FrUBAdaBtpeEtP/G8UdwN6KxKOytqyU7ObzcQs3qa6urHceZIXDg4= \
"Hi Bob"
true
It's rather unlikely that Alice and Bob will compare notes so this
reuse-fraud goes undetected.
Solving txout reuse-fraud with per-txout commitments
----------------------------------------------------
By committing the txout to one and only one purpose we can ensure that
they can't be reused for more than one proof-of-solvency. Take the
following scriptPubKey:
H("bigbank.com") DROP <pubkey> CHECKSIG
LittleBank in our above example can't reuse that txout as it is
obviously not committed to them. The additional data is kinda ugly and
lacks privacy but can be replaced with the same math used in BIP32 HD
wallet derivation:
<pubkey + H(domain)*G> CHECKSIG
or in the multisig case:
n <pubkey_1 + H(domain)*G> ... <pubkey_m + H(domain)*G> m CHECKMULTISIG
The "domain" must be provably globally unique; the URL of the third-party
would be appropriate in most cases. A simple random UUID is *not*
sufficient as there is no good way to be sure that these UUIDs have not
been reused.
Internal reuse-fraud
--------------------
Suppose BigBank gains a second customer, Bob. After depositing some
funds he asks for a proof-of-solvency. BigBank has since added
anti-reuse-fraud to their very simple one-address-per-customer scheme:
$ btc verifymessage 1HHuBBExHYqPwfgmKiBEHAGFSaLSdVayh5 \
H6IJztw/QM4WjbtHl51WFo5L8rXn5aONZZvpQIo/8ORz7Yx0puLD68Z2WOCmAEvFQfpz0wYSX3D28RhevYBexpQ= \
"Hi Bob"
true
Bob then goes and verifies that the address 1HHuBBE was derived from the
domain "bigbank.com", and finally verifies that the funds held at that
address are sufficient to cover his balance.
Alice does the same thing:
$ btc verifymessage 1HHuBBExHYqPwfgmKiBEHAGFSaLSdVayh5 \
H5Z1LEwagAx7s1Kj21sy98/i6/DEZpyyGDfauDVfwOUE2ewsuHqSAE1txRi5VltBs5zVoMExxMw/m4JAyXBSa+s= \
"Hi Alice"
true
Note that the addresses are the same! Again, BigBank has committed
re-use fraud, this time internal to the service. In our simplistic
example of one address per customer the domain the funds are committed
to could be extended to include Alice and Bob's usernames or email
addresses. Again, most discussions of merkle-sum-trees gloss over this
important point, and assume that "somehow" the bank will publish the
merkle root publicly, e.g. at a URL.
Merkle-sum-forests for proof-of-solvency
----------------------------------------
Rather than having a single massive tree for all accounts we can instead
use a forrest of merkle-sum-trees, each committed to by a single txout.
The leaves of that tree are still the hash of a customer ID and nonce,
and a balance. However now the root of the tree and the bank domain is
committed to in a txout. To prove solvency the bank gives the customer
multiple merkle-paths that together sum up to the total balance held on
their behalf. Both internal and external reuse-fraud are impossible as
the funds are committed to the customer in question on the blockchain.
Privacy is protected for both the exchange and the customer. The former
because there is no need to reveal total holdings. The latter by
splitting up the holdings among multiple tree - in many cases a given
tree might only have one or two customers funds committed by it as well.
However the requirement to actually make a transaction to change the
balances committed to is inconvenient, potentially expensive, and makes
the so-called "cold storage" warmer.
Indirect merkle-sum-forest solvency proofs
------------------------------------------
By adding indirection we can get the privacy of the merkle-sum-forest
approach without the requirement of creating blockchain transactions on
every proof. Simply stated, if the above merkle-sum-forest is just
committing to arbitrary nonces, we can create a second, ordered,
merklized binary radix tree whose keys are those nonces, and whose
values are what customers have been assigned to the funds committed to
by the txouts associated with the nonces. Proving to the customer their
funds are backed by actual Bitcoins is then a matter of given them a
list of nonce inclusion proofs, as well as the merkle-paths proving
those nonces lead to actual blockchain funds. Since the lookup tree is
ordered each nonce may only be assigned to one specific customer.
Lets look at this in detail with BigBank as the exchange, and Alice and
Bob as the customers. For clarity we'll use OP_DROP as before. We'll say
BigBank has one txout:
<h1> DROP <pubkey1> CHECKSIG
Where h1 commits to (v1,H(n1 | 'BigBank')), (v2, H(n2 | 'BigBank')),
(v3, H(n3 | BigBank)) with v's being values and n's being nonces.
Alices's total balance is equal to v1+v2, and Bob's equal to v3, so she
creates nonce->customer radix tree mapping n1->Alice, n2->Alice, and
n3->Chalie. She publishes the root of this tree publicly and
non-repudatably.
BigBank's proof for Bob is now the two following subproofs:
Merkle path proving that n3 in nonce->customer tree
Merkle sum path proving that v3 allocated in txout
For Alice the proof is as above, except for n1,v1 and n2,v2.
Practical Considerations
------------------------
1) Customers request deposit addresses, but the exchange doesn't know in
advance how much they are going to deposit. Those addresses should
commit values and nonces for use in the solvency proof, so we need to
define a merkle-sum-tree that operates on relative amounts rather
than absolute.
2) We'd rather not have to spend a txout just to "make change" when a
customer's balance changes internally. Thus rather than, say, a
simple binary of two value decomposition in a txout, consider making
available duplicate values. Q) What's optimal here? Real world data
would help.
Deterministic nonces and backups
--------------------------------
There needs to be care taken in how nonces are generated - losing a
nonce can mean losing the ability to spend the txout. What should be
done is for the merkle-sum-trees per txout be generated deterministicly
using "sufficient" sub values to allocate change... Which leads to a
curious final conclusion: we can in reality skip the actual
merkle-sum-trees, so to speak, and derive the actual nonces committed to
in the nonce->customer tree from some deterministic splitting algorithm
and the globally unique txout, specifically H("nonce" | txid:n).
Essentially the nonce->customer mapping is actually a "part of a
txout"->customer mapping, where every txout value is split into
convenient-sized change. We still get the privacy we want, because the
customer-containing tree is not a merkle-sum tree, and we completely
prevent fraudulent reuse, and we don't risk losing coins in the event of
a backup failure as all txout scriptPubKeys can be regenerated
deterministicly from a seed.
Future work
-----------
Implement this.
References
----------
1) https://iwilcox.me.uk/2014/proving-bitcoin-reserves
2) http://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/1yk4nv/please_ask_your_favorite_exchange_to_prove_that/cflqtn0
3) Homomorphic Payment Addresses and the Pay-to-Contract Protocol,
Ilja Gerhardt, Timo Hanke, 13 Dec 2012
Copyright
---------
This document is placed in the public domain.
--
'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
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