From: Luke Dashjr <luke@dashjr•org>
To: Christian Decker <decker.christian@gmail•com>
Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] [BIP] Normalized transaction IDs
Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2015 20:48:17 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <201511032048.18680.luke@dashjr.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALxbBHV4JU7TG8QutkX7m9V4n_ANgKAgWO8ZA2KxQk8jP=kF0g@mail.gmail.com>
On Tuesday, November 03, 2015 8:37:44 PM Christian Decker wrote:
> I am still very much intrigued by Luke's idea of having empty scriptsigs
> and ship the signatures in external scripts, however the proposal uses the
> on-the-fly normalization because we have no good way of relaying the
> external scripts. Since we are still in the drafting phase I am open to
> suggestions and if there is a good/working solution I can amend/withdraw
> the proposal.
Changing the network protocol is trivial in comparison to making a permanent
increase in UTXO set costs.
> As for open venues for malleability, I'm not sure we can fix them at all,
> after all the ability of a single signer to doublespend by
> appending/replacing inputs/outputs in an arbitrary fashion is not fixable
> IMHO and will cause any future transaction building on its outputs to be
> orphaned. What would the perfect properties for such a fix be?
The problem isn't changing inputs/outputs, but that such changes invalidate
later spends. In particular, note that wallets *should ideally* be actively
trying to make transfers using multiple malleated versions of the same
payment.
So the way to make an anti-malleable wallet, would be to strictly enforce the
no-address-reuse rule on payments received (note this has no effect on
other/current wallets) and rely only on the hash of that scriptPubKey+value
for the input in subsequent transactions. This way, no matter what inputs or
other outputs the transaction paying the address/invoice uses, the subsequent
transaction ignores them and remains valid. (I am not suggesting this as a
mandatory change that all wallets must adopt to receive the current semi-
malleability protection you propose - only that it be *possible* for wallets
to upgrade to or offer in the future.)
Luke
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-11-03 20:49 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-10-19 14:01 Christian Decker
2015-10-19 15:23 ` Tier Nolan
2015-10-19 19:28 ` Christian Decker
2015-10-19 22:22 ` s7r
2015-10-20 10:30 ` Christian Decker
2015-10-21 6:18 ` Luke Dashjr
2015-10-21 7:39 ` Christian Decker
2015-10-21 7:52 ` Luke Dashjr
2015-10-21 8:31 ` Christian Decker
2015-10-21 8:39 ` Luke Dashjr
2015-10-21 8:44 ` Christian Decker
2015-10-21 8:46 ` Luke Dashjr
2015-10-21 18:22 ` Danny Thorpe
2015-10-21 19:27 ` Gregory Maxwell
2015-10-21 23:20 ` Luke Dashjr
2015-10-22 8:26 ` Christian Decker
2015-10-22 8:57 ` Gregory Maxwell
2015-10-22 11:54 ` Christian Decker
2015-10-22 9:05 ` Luke Dashjr
2015-11-03 20:37 ` Christian Decker
2015-11-03 20:48 ` Luke Dashjr [this message]
2015-11-03 21:44 ` Christian Decker
2015-11-03 22:01 ` Luke Dashjr
2015-11-05 15:27 ` Jorge Timón
2015-11-05 19:36 ` Luke Dashjr
2015-11-05 20:25 ` Jorge Timón
2015-11-05 22:46 ` s7r
2015-11-05 22:29 ` Adam Back
2015-11-06 14:52 ` Christian Decker
2015-11-04 4:00 ` Peter Todd
2015-11-05 9:38 ` Christian Decker
2015-10-21 7:48 ` Gregory Maxwell
2015-10-21 8:26 ` Gregory Maxwell
2015-10-21 8:49 ` Christian Decker
2015-10-21 8:50 ` Christian Decker
2015-10-21 10:14 ` Gregory Maxwell
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