From: Luke Dashjr <luke@dashjr•org>
To: bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org,
Jonas Schnelli <dev@jonasschnelli•ch>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] p2p authentication and encryption BIPs
Date: Thu, 24 Mar 2016 02:16:55 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <201603240216.56752.luke@dashjr.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <56F2B51C.8000105@jonasschnelli.ch>
On Wednesday, March 23, 2016 3:24:12 PM Jonas Schnelli via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> I have just PRed a draft version of two BIPs I recently wrote.
> https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/pull/362
In the future, please submit BIP drafts to the mailing list for comment and
initial peer review before opening a pull request (or requesting a BIP number
assignment), per BIP 1.
> Each peer that supports p2p authentication, must provide two user editable
> databases (can be a simple record-per-line file).
As long as the format of these databases is not standardised, it seems
inappropriate to define *any* of this implementation detail in a BIP.
> A peer can send an authenticate message by wrapping the desired message into
> an <code>auth</code>-message-wrapper to the remote peer.
How does a peer know what messages the other peer requires to be
authenticated?
> 33bytes || identity-pubkey || comp.-pubkey || The identity pubkey of the
> requesting peer
Seems a waste to include this with every single [authenticated] message...
> 8bytes || auth-msg-id || int64 || up-counting auth-msg-id (0 to INT64MAX)
Is this required to persist across connections/restarts/possibly complete
reinstalls?
Can the same auth-msg-id be used for multiple peers, so a message can be
signed once and sent to all N peers?
> Responding peers must ignore (banning would lead to fingerprinting) the
> requesting peer after 5 unsuccessfully authentication tries to avoid
> resource attacks.
How does banning in this specific case enable fingerprinting as opposed to any
other banning?
> The peers should display the identity-pubkey as a identity-address to the
> users, which is a base58-check encoded ripemd160(sha256) hash.
If this is going to become a general-purpose identity system, I think more is
needed than a simple EC keypair. At the very least, it should probably use a
HD chain and use a new key for every signature (notice you already have auth-
msg-id to use with this!).
> This proposal is backward compatible. Non supporting peers will ignore the
> <code>auth</code> message.
... and not process it at all? How is that backward compatible?
> Encrypting traffic between peers is already possible with VPN, tor, stunnel,
> curveCP or any other encryption mechanism on a deeper OSI level, however,
> most mechanism are not practical for SPV or other DHCP/NAT environment and
> will require significant knowhow in how to setup a secure channel.
I don't see how Tor fails this criteria...
> The responding peer will set a session timeout time-interval. The default
> must be 1'800 seconds.
What default? Is the timeout field optional? Why not simply require it?
> This proposal is backward compatible. Non supporting peers will ignore the
> <code>enc*</code> messages.
How should the supporting peer handle the message being ignored?
Luke
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-03-24 2:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-03-23 15:24 Jonas Schnelli
2016-03-23 16:44 ` Tier Nolan
2016-03-23 20:36 ` Tom
2016-03-23 21:40 ` Eric Voskuil
2016-03-23 21:55 ` Jonas Schnelli
2016-03-25 10:36 ` Tom
2016-03-25 18:43 ` Jonas Schnelli
2016-03-25 20:42 ` Tom
2016-03-26 9:01 ` Jonas Schnelli
2016-03-26 23:23 ` James MacWhyte
2016-03-27 11:58 ` Jonas Schnelli
2016-03-27 17:04 ` James MacWhyte
2016-03-24 0:37 ` Sergio Demian Lerner
2016-03-24 2:16 ` Luke Dashjr [this message]
2016-03-24 17:20 ` Chris
2016-03-25 10:41 ` Tom
2016-03-25 7:17 ` Lee Clagett
2016-03-25 10:17 ` Jonas Schnelli
2016-04-01 21:09 ` Jonas Schnelli
2016-04-09 19:40 ` Lee Clagett
2016-05-18 8:00 ` Jonas Schnelli
2016-05-25 0:22 ` Lee Clagett
2016-05-25 9:36 ` Jonas Schnelli
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