From: Peter Todd <pete@petertodd•org>
To: "Russell O'Connor" <roconnor@blockstream•io>
Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Revisiting BIP 125 RBF policy.
Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2018 13:28:03 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180309182803.GE2786@fedora-23-dvm> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAMZUoKkDnJv33H-DveHtwpnyALS5LoX-OAnabJyvPo4c1DBJRQ@mail.gmail.com>
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On Thu, Mar 08, 2018 at 03:07:43PM -0500, Russell O'Connor wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 8, 2018 at 1:34 PM, Peter Todd <pete@petertodd•org> wrote:
> > But that's not a good argument: whether or not normal users are trying to
> > attack each other has nothing to do with whether or not you're opening up
> > an
> > attack by relaxing anti-DoS protections.
> >
>
> I'm not suggesting removing the anti-DoS protections. I'm suggesting that
> replaced transaction require a fee increase of at least the min-fee-rate
> times the size of all the transactions being ejected (in addition to the
> other proposed requirements).
Fair: you're not removing them entirely, but you are weakening them compared to
the status quo.
> > Equally, how often are normal users who aren't attacking each other
> > creating
> > issues anyway? You can always have your wallet code just skip use of RBF
> >
> replacements in the event that someone does spend an unconfirmed output that
> > you sent them; how often does this actually happen in practice?
>
>
> Just ask rhavar. It happens regularly.
>
> Not many wallets let you spend unconfirmed outputs that you didn't create.
> >
>
> The problem is with institutional wallets sweeping incoming payments. It
> seems that in practice they are happy to sweep unconfirmed outputs.
Pity, that does sound like a problem. :(
> Setting all of the above aside for a moment. We need to understand that
> rational miners are going to prefer to transactions with higher package fee
> rates regardless of whatever your personal preferred RBF policy is. If we
> do not bring the RBF policy to alignment with what is economically
> rational, then miners are going to change their own policies anyways,
> probably all in slightly different ways. It behooves everyone to develop a
> reasonable standard RBF policy, that is still robust against possible DoS
> vectors, and aligns with miner incentives, so that all participants know
> what behaviour they can reasonably expect. It is simply a bonus that this
> change in RBF policy also partially mitigates the problem of pinned
> transactions.
Miners and full nodes have slightly different priorities here; it's not clear
to me why it matters that they implement slightly different policies.
Still, re-reading your initital post, I'm convinced that the weakening of the
DoS protections is probably not a huge problem, so maybe lets try this in a
release and see what happens.
Notably, if people actually use this new replacement behavior, the institutions
doing these sweeps of unconfirmed outputs might stop doing that! That's
probably a good thing, as respends of potentially conflicted unconfirmed
outputs can be dangerous in reorgs; we're better off if outputs are buried
deeply before being spent again.
--
https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-03-09 18:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-02-12 15:52 Russell O'Connor
2018-02-12 17:30 ` rhavar
2018-02-12 22:58 ` Peter Todd
2018-02-12 23:19 ` Russell O'Connor
2018-02-12 23:42 ` Peter Todd
2018-02-12 23:46 ` Russell O'Connor
2018-02-14 14:08 ` Russell O'Connor
2018-02-14 14:16 ` Greg Sanders
2018-02-27 16:25 ` Russell O'Connor
2018-03-01 15:11 ` Peter Todd
2018-03-08 15:39 ` Russell O'Connor
2018-03-08 18:34 ` Peter Todd
2018-03-08 20:07 ` Russell O'Connor
2018-03-09 18:28 ` Peter Todd [this message]
2018-03-09 18:40 ` rhavar
2018-02-12 23:23 ` rhavar
2018-02-13 18:40 ` Peter Todd
2018-02-14 2:07 ` rhavar
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