From: Luke Dashjr <luke@dashjr•org>
To: Matt Corallo <lf-lists@mattcorallo•com>
Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: The Great Consensus Cleanup
Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 10:44:34 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <201903071044.34985.luke@dashjr.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <bf96c2fb-2e2e-a47f-e59f-87e56d83eca3@mattcorallo.com>
On Wednesday 06 March 2019 21:39:15 Matt Corallo wrote:
> I'd like to ask the BIP editor to assign a BIP number.
Needs a Backward Compatibility section, and should have a bips repo PR opened
after discussion on the ML.
> * The 4th change (making non-standard signature hash types invalid)
> may be worth discussing. In order to limit the number of potential
> signature hashes which could be used per-input (allowing us to cache
> them to avoid re-calculation), we can disable non-standard sighash
> types. Alternatively, however, most of the same effect could be achieved
> by caching the just-before-the-last-byte sighash midstate and hashing
> only the last byte when a checking signatures. Still, them having been
> non-standard for many years makes me doubt there is much risk involved
> in disabling them, and I don't see much potential use-case for keeping
> them around so I'd like to just remove them.
I don't understand what is being removed here.
> As for why the timewarp vulnerability should (IMO rather obviously) be
> fixed, it seems rather clear that the only potential use for exploiting
> it would be either to inflate the currency supply maliciously by miners
> or to fork in what amounts to extension blocks. As for why extension
> blocks are almost certainly not the right approach to such changes, its
> likely worth reading this old post:
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-January/013510
>.html
While I agree that extension blocks are typically a bad choice, I'm not sure
the argument really applies to forward blocks. (That being said, I find
forward blocks overcomplicated and probably not a reason to avoid this.)
> * Transactions smaller than 65 bytes when serialized without witness
> data are invalid.
Rationale should include the reason(s) why the size doesn't count the witness
here.
> ** Note that miners today only enforce increasing timestamps against the
> median-timestamp-of-last-11-blocks, so miners who do not upgrade may
> mine a block which violates this rule at the beginning of a difficulty
> window if the last block in a difficulty window has a timestamp in the
> future. Thus, it is strongly recommended that SPV clients enforce the
> new nTime rules to avoid following any potential forks which occur.
This should probably be moved outside Discussion. (Perhaps to the missing
Backward Compatibility section?)
> * There are several early-stage proposals which may affect the execution
> of scripts, including proposals such as Schnorr signatures, Taproot,
> Graftroot, and MAST. These proposals are not expected to have any
> interaction with the changes in this BIP, as they are likely to only
> apply to SegWit scripts, which are not covered by any of the new rules
> except for the sighash type byte rule. Thus, the sighash type byte rule
> defined above only applies to *current* signature-checking opcodes, as
> any new signature-checking is likely to be implemented via the
> introduction of new opcodes.
It's not clear that new opcodes will necessarily always be used. Probably
would be good to clarify the "non-Segwit or witness v0 only" rule in the
Specification section.
Luke
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-03-07 10:44 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-03-06 21:39 Matt Corallo
2019-03-07 10:44 ` Luke Dashjr [this message]
2019-03-07 19:44 ` Matt Corallo
2019-03-07 15:03 ` [bitcoin-dev] OP_CODESEPARATOR " Russell O'Connor
2019-03-07 19:50 ` Matt Corallo
2019-03-08 15:57 ` Russell O'Connor
2019-03-08 18:35 ` Matt Corallo
2019-03-09 18:29 ` Russell O'Connor
2019-03-10 3:25 ` Jacob Eliosoff
2019-03-11 17:49 ` Russell O'Connor
2019-03-12 21:08 ` Matt Corallo
2019-03-12 22:39 ` Jacob Eliosoff
2019-03-13 0:54 ` Gregory Maxwell
2019-03-13 1:34 ` Russell O'Connor
2019-03-08 19:12 ` Sjors Provoost
2019-03-08 20:14 ` Matt Corallo
2019-03-10 14:25 ` LORD HIS EXCELLENCY JAMES HRMH
2019-03-10 18:24 ` Moral Agent
2019-03-12 7:34 ` LORD HIS EXCELLENCY JAMES HRMH
2019-03-10 18:28 ` Dustin Dettmer
2019-03-11 19:15 ` Russell O'Connor
2019-03-12 2:23 ` Matt Corallo
2019-03-13 1:38 ` Russell O'Connor
2019-03-09 18:29 ` Russell O'Connor
[not found] ` <PS2P216MB0179EFBEF7BEEE1C3F251F719D4E0@PS2P216MB0179.KORP216.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM>
2019-03-10 15:22 ` Russell O'Connor
2019-03-07 15:16 ` [bitcoin-dev] Sighash Type Byte; " Russell O'Connor
2019-03-07 19:57 ` Matt Corallo
2019-03-08 15:57 ` Russell O'Connor
2019-03-13 1:34 ` Russell O'Connor
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