Re: [bitcoin-dev] Proposal: Bitcoin Secure Multisig Setup

From: Dmitry Petukhov <dp@simplexum•com>
To: Hugo Nguyen <hugo@nunchuk•io>
Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Proposal: Bitcoin Secure Multisig Setup
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2021 18:42:31 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210212184231.22b517aa@simplexum.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAPKmR9v5jzsu7siuyAu42XOCdtXqMXmKzmiDzjEy_bVNbSPyyw@mail.gmail.com>

If HUMAN_READABLE_TITLE is the additional secret, the user would need
to enter it on the device in addition to the nonce, wouldn't it defeat
the advantage in UX that was gained by using (relatively) short nonce ?

Is 64 bit nonce not enough ?

It seems that to crack this with fixed Pwd and 64 bit nonce, the
attacker will need to be about 10^15 more powerful than 80Mhz MCU:
(2^64)/(0.3*10^15)/3600 = 17 hours. I don't know if 10^15 is realistic
scale. Average desktop cpu seems to be about 10^3 more powerful than
the mentioned MCU for this task.

Maybe for the UX it would be better to choose the number of rounds to
use in PBKDF2, instead of using variable Pwd. Number of rounds will be
easier to enter on the device (or just choose it from a set of
pre-defined values). The more money is at stake, the higher number of
rounds could the coordinator choose (taking into account the
characteristics of the participant devices)

В Fri, 12 Feb 2021 08:55:55 -0800
Hugo Nguyen <hugo@nunchuk•io> wrote:

> Thanks everyone who has provided inputs so far!
> 
> This is the new proposal for the encryption aspect of the scheme,
> based on all the feedback.
> 
> The key derivation function would be PBKDF2, with PRF = SHA512. This
> should be readily available on today's hardware already, as they are
> used for BIP39.
> 
> DK = PBKDF2(PRF, Password, Salt, c, dkLen)
> PRF = SHA512
> Pwd = HUMAN_READABLE_TITLE
> Salt = NONCE
> c = 2048
> dkLen = 256
> 
> HUMAN_READABLE_TITLE is in ASCII format, minimum length = 8, maximum
> length = 20.
> NONCE is a 64-bit number.
> 
> Reason for going with SHA512 is due to legacy support on some
> hardware. c=2048 also mimics BIP39. It takes about ~3 seconds to
> derive the encryption key on a 80Mhz MCU. We feel like this is a good
> enough tradeoff for this use case. The assumption here is that the
> secure session is only needed temporarily for a few hours, maybe up
> to one day.
> 
> The Coordinator and Signers agree and exchange these 2 secrets prior
> to the setup. The NONCE can be converted to either:
> (a) a 6-word phrase using BIP39 wordlist
> (b) a 20-digit decimal number
> (c) a QR code
> 
> Depending on the vendor. This flexibility in the data format allows
> each vendor to customize the UX based on their respective device
> capabilities.
> 
> Best,
> Hugo
> 
> On Thu, Feb 11, 2021 at 8:25 AM Dmitry Petukhov via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> 
> > В Thu, 11 Feb 2021 05:45:33 -0800
> > Hugo Nguyen via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>
> > wrote:
> >  
> > > > > ENCRYPTION_KEY = SHA256(SHA256(TOKEN))  
> > > >
> > > > This scheme might be vulnerable to rainbow table attack.
> > > >  
> > >
> > > Thank you for pointing this out! Incidentally, Dmitry Petukhov
> > > also told me the same privately.  
> >
> > My thought was that if TOKEN has the characteristics of a password
> > (short ASCII string), then it would be better to use key derivation
> > function designed for passwords, like PBKDF2.
> >
> > The counter-argument to this is that this adds another code
> > dependency for vendors, if the device firmware does not already
> > have the required key derivation function.
> >
> > Maybe this could be solved by going into opposite direction - make
> > the "token" even longer, use the mnemoic.
> >
> > The issue is that entering long data of the shared key into the
> > device manually is difficult UX-wise.
> >
> > Hww vendors that allow to enter custom keys into their device
> > already have to face this issue, and those who allow to enter
> > custom keys via mnemonic probably tackled this somehow.
> >
> > Maybe the shared key for multisig setup can be entered in the same
> > way ? (with maybe additional visual check via some fingerprint).
> >
> > Although we would then have another issue of potential confusion
> > between two procedures (entering the main key and entering the
> > shared key for multisig setup), and the measures has to be taken to
> > prevent such confusion.
> >
> > The approaches can be combined - specify a key derivation function
> > suitable for passwords; via secure channel, share a password and/or
> > the derived key. If hww supports derivation function, it can derive
> > the key from password. If hww supports only keys, the key can be
> > entered raw or via mnemonic.
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