On Sun, Jul 25, 2021 at 12:49:38PM -0700, Billy Tetrud wrote: > find the median fee-rate for each block and store that, then calculate > the average of those stored per-block median numbers. One datapoint per block seems fine to me and it works much nicer with pruned nodes. > So the only situations where miners would gain something > from raising the fee rate is for griefing situations, which should be so > rare as to be completely insignificant to miners. I don't believe the problem scope can be reduced this way. Although we we often look at miners as separate from users, it's important to remember that every miner is also a user of Bitcoin and ever user of Bitcoin may also someday be a miner. Users may also employ miners directly via out-of-band payments. In your usecase of vaults, we can imagine Bob is attempting to store 100,000 BTC. He designs his vault to allow spending on fees up to 10x the 3,000 block median fee. Mallory steals Bob's encumbered spending key. Mallory could immediately go to a miner and offer them a 50/50 split on the 10x fees over the median (~10,000 sat?), or Mallory could take a bit more time and work with a cartel of miners to raise the median over a period of three weeks (3k blocks) to 10,000 BTC/transaction, allowing them to take all of Bob's coins in fees. > if OP_CD allowed spending the entire output as a fee then it wouldn't > be successful in constraining the destination to the listed addresses. The alternative is to never allow OP_CD to spend any of the UTXOs it encumbers to fees, requiring all fees be paid via another mechanism. Since satisfactory designs are going to provide those other mechanisms anyway, it seems to me that there's no need for OP_CD to manage fees. That said, I don't have a real strong opinion here. -Dave