Chun, With all due respect, there are a couple major differences between BIP34 and BIP66 on the one hand and BIP100 on the other. 1) BIP34 and BIP66 are soft forks. Miners choosing to switch to them will not seriously impact validation rules for non-mining users that do not make the switch. With BIP66, the worst that can happen to them is noncompliant transactions will no longer be accepted by the network…but even nodes that do not switch over will continue to remain synched with the network. 2) BIP100 has direct economic consequences…and particularly for miners. It lends itself to much greater corruptibility. - Eric Lombrozo > On Jun 13, 2015, at 9:55 PM, Chun Wang <1240902@gmail.com> wrote: > > To tell you the truth. It is only because most miners are not located > in the West. If Slush, Eligius and BTC Guild still on top 3, the core > developers, including brain-dead Mike Hearn, would be very happy to do > BIP100 just like they did BIP34 and BIP66. Shame on you! > > On Sun, Jun 14, 2015 at 6:20 AM, Danny Thorpe wrote: >> Please forgive my ignorance, but why should Bitcoin users have a say in >> block size limits? It's the miners and Bitcoin node operators that bear the >> burden of managing large blocks, no? >> >> Users voting on network parameters sounds like neighbors voting on how deep >> my swimming pool should be. >> >> Thanks, >> -Danny >> >> On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 11:11 AM, Peter Todd wrote: >>> >>> Jeff Garzik recently proposed that the upper blocksize limit be removed >>> entirely, with a "soft" limit being enforced via miner vote, recorded by >>> hashing power. >>> >>> This mechanism within the protocol for users to have any influence over >>> the miner vote. We can add that back by providing a way for transactions >>> themselves to set a flag determining whether or not they can be included >>> in a block casting a specific vote. >>> >>> We can simplify Garzik's vote to say that one of the nVersion bits >>> either votes for the blocksize to be increased, or decreased, by some >>> fixed ratio (e.g 2x or 1/2x) the next interval. Then we can use a >>> nVersion bit in transactions themselves, also voting for an increase or >>> decrease. Transactions may only be included in blocks with an >>> indentical vote, thus providing miners with a monetary incentive via >>> fees to vote according to user wishes. >>> >>> Of course, to cast a "don't care" vote we can either define an >>> additional bit, or sign the transaction with both versions. Equally we >>> can even have different versions with different fees, broadcast via a >>> mechanism such as replace-by-fee. >>> >>> >>> See also John Dillon's proposal for proof-of-stake blocksize voting: >>> >>> >>> https://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg02323.html >>> >>> -- >>> 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org >>> 0000000000000000127ab1d576dc851f374424f1269c4700ccaba2c42d97e778 >>> >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Bitcoin-development mailing list >>> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net >>> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development >>> >> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Bitcoin-development mailing list >> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net >> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development >> > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > _______________________________________________ > Bitcoin-development mailing list > Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development