We already have a wonderful system for secure updating - gitian-downloader. We just neither use it not bother making actual gitian releases so anyone can use it to verify signatures of downloads. Jeremy Spilman wrote: >I didn't know about the dedicated server meltdown, it wasn't any of my > >infra. Anyway, my previous offer still stands. > >One less 'security theater' approach would be if we could provide >forward-validation of updates using the blockchain. It's always going >to >be up to the user the first time they install the wallet to verify the > >provenance of the binaries/source. From that point forward, we could >make >it easier if the wallet could detect updates and prove they were valid. > >This could be as simple as hard-coding a public key into the client and > >checking a signature on the new binaries. But it could also be more >interesting... > >For example, a well known address on the blockchain corresponds to >multi-sig with keys controlled by developers (or whatever key policy >the >release team wants to impose). A spend from that address announces a >new >release, and includes the expected hash of the file. > >You would probably need some way to handle the different release >targets. >A more rigorous approach could identify all the various releases in >terms >of a BIP32 xpubkey whose branches would correspond to the different >release trains and platform builds. Spends from a node announce the >release and the expected hash. > >This provides zero benefit if the wallet software is already >compromised, >but I think this would allow trusted automatic update notification, and >a >trusted way to deliver the expected hashes. It also might resolve some >of >the consternation around when a release is truly "released", if that's > >really a problem. > >I'm not sure how far along the slope you would want to go; 1) >announcing >updates in the UI, 2) providing a button the user could click to verify >a >binary matches its expected hash, 3) click to download and verify the >upgrade matches the expected hash, 4) click to upgrade > >Formalizing the release process around a set of privkeys (or split >shares >of keys) may raise its own set of questions. > >For the download itself, I've heard the advocates of announcing >availability on the blockchain leading to a BitTorrent magnet link, but >I >also understand objections to adding an entire BitTorrent stack into a > >wallet. > >On Tue, 31 Dec 2013 06:23:55 -0800, Mike Hearn wrote: > >>> The site was actually moved onto a dedicated server temporarily and >it >>> melted down under the load. I wouldn't call that no progress. >> >> Oh, it did? When was that? I must have missed this excitement :) >>Any idea how much load it had? >> >>> Perhaps I wasn't clear on the point I was making Drak's threat model >>> is not improved in the slightest by SSL. It would be improved by >>> increasing the use of signature checking, e.g. by making it easier. >> >> Well, that depends. If you watch Applebaums talk he is pushing TLS >> pretty hard, and saying that based on the access to the source docs >some >> of >their MITM attacks can't beat TLS. It appears that they have the > >> capability to do bulk MITM and rewrite of downloads as Drak says but > >> *not* when >TLS is present, that would force more targeted attacks. >So >> to me that implies that TLS does raise the bar and is worth doing. >> >> However if we can't find a server that won't melt under the load, >then >> that'd be an issue. We could consider hosting downloads on AppEngine >or >> >something else that can handle both high load and TLS. > >------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >------------------------------------------------------------------------------ >Rapidly troubleshoot problems before they affect your business. Most IT > >organizations don't have a clear picture of how application performance > >affects their revenue. With AppDynamics, you get 100% visibility into >your >Java,.NET, & PHP application. Start your 15-day FREE TRIAL of >AppDynamics Pro! >http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=84349831&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk > >------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >_______________________________________________ >Bitcoin-development mailing list >Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net >https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development