From: Brian Erdelyi <brian.erdelyi@gmail•com>
To: Eric Voskuil <eric@voskuil•org>
Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lists•sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Proposal to address Bitcoin malware
Date: Mon, 2 Feb 2015 15:58:11 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4B53C1B0-A677-4460-8A69-C45506424D7F@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <F4C9E954-6A29-4A31-B09B-7F0B62270EF8@voskuil.org>
> Confusing or not, the reliance on multiple signatures as offering greater security than single relies on the independence of multiple secrets. If the secrets cannot be shown to retain independence in the envisioned threat scenario (e.g. a user's compromised operating system) then the benefit reduces to making the exploit more difficult to write, which, once written, reduces to no benefit. Yet the user still suffers the reduced utility arising from greater complexity, while being led to believe in a false promise.
Just trying to make sure I understand what you’re saying. Are you eluding to that if two of the three private keys get compromised there is no gain in security? Although the likelihood of this occurring is lower, it is possible.
As more malware targets bitcoins I think the utility is evident. Given how final Bitcoin transactions are, I think it’s worth trying to find methods to help verify those transactions (if a user deems it to be high-risk enough) before the transaction is completed. The balance is trying to devise something that users do not find too burdensome.
Brian Erdelyi
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-02-02 19:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-01-31 22:15 Brian Erdelyi
2015-01-31 22:38 ` Natanael
2015-01-31 23:04 ` Brian Erdelyi
2015-01-31 23:37 ` Natanael
2015-01-31 23:41 ` Natanael
2015-02-01 12:49 ` Brian Erdelyi
2015-02-01 13:31 ` Martin Habovštiak
2015-02-01 13:46 ` Mike Hearn
2015-02-01 13:54 ` Brian Erdelyi
2015-02-01 13:48 ` Mike Hearn
2015-02-01 14:28 ` mbde
2015-02-02 17:40 ` Brian Erdelyi
2015-02-02 17:54 ` Martin Habovštiak
2015-02-02 17:59 ` Mike Hearn
2015-02-02 18:02 ` Martin Habovštiak
2015-02-02 18:25 ` Mike Hearn
2015-02-02 18:35 ` Brian Erdelyi
2015-02-02 18:45 ` Eric Voskuil
2015-02-02 19:58 ` Brian Erdelyi [this message]
2015-02-02 20:57 ` Joel Joonatan Kaartinen
2015-02-02 21:03 ` Brian Erdelyi
2015-02-02 21:09 ` Pedro Worcel
2015-02-02 21:30 ` devrandom
2015-02-02 21:49 ` Brian Erdelyi
2015-02-02 21:42 ` Brian Erdelyi
2015-02-02 21:02 ` Pedro Worcel
2015-02-03 7:38 ` Eric Voskuil
2015-02-02 18:10 ` Brian Erdelyi
2015-02-02 18:07 ` Brian Erdelyi
2015-02-02 18:05 ` Eric Voskuil
2015-02-02 18:53 ` Mike Hearn
2015-02-02 22:54 ` Eric Voskuil
2015-02-03 0:41 ` Eric Voskuil
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