From: Caleb James DeLisle <calebdelisle@lavabit•com>
To: bitcoin-development@lists•sourceforge.net
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] blind symmetric commitment for stronger byzantine voting resilience (Re: bitcoin taint & unilateral revocability)
Date: Wed, 15 May 2013 08:40:59 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <5193825B.20909@lavabit.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20130515114956.GA5863@netbook.cypherspace.org>
I can't see this working, if 51% of the mining power doesn't like your
coins, when you create the commitment they will reject it.
If the commitment is opaque at the time of inclusion in the block then
I will create multiple commitments and then after revealing the
commitment and spend to you I will reveal the earlier commitment which
commits the coins to an address I control.
On the topic of reversibility, I suspect in the long term the lack of
chargebacks will create issues as criminals learn that for the first
time in history, kidnap & ransom is effective. Suffice to say after the
first >= $10mn kidnapping-for-bitcoin heist, governments will be forced
to decide how they view the system. It will likely fall somewhere between
"arrest/question anyone identified holding tainted coins" to something
nonsensical and reactionary like "blocking" bitcoin as Iran does TOR.
Thanks,
Caleb
On 05/15/2013 07:49 AM, Adam Back wrote:
> On Wed, May 15, 2013 at 07:19:06AM -0400, Peter Todd wrote:
>> Protocols aren't set in stone - any attacker that controls enough
>> hashing power to pose a 51% attack can simply demand that you use a
>> Bitcoin client modified [to facilitate evaluation of his policy]
>
> Protocol voting is a vote per user policy preference, not a CPU vote, which
> is the point. Current bitcoin protocol is vulnerable to hard to prove
> arbitrary policies being imposable by a quorum of > 50% miners. The blind
> commitment proposal fixes that, so even an 99% quorum cant easily impose
> policies, which leaves the weaker protocol vote attack as the remaining
> avenue of attack. That is a significant qualitative improvement.
>
> The feasibility of protocol voting attacks is an open question, but you
> might want to consider the seeming unstoppability of p2p protocols for a
> hint.
>
> Adam
>
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-05-15 12:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-05-14 11:51 [Bitcoin-development] ecash and revocability Adam Back
2013-05-14 14:09 ` [Bitcoin-development] bitcoin taint & unilateral revocability (Re: ecash and revocability) Adam Back
2013-05-14 14:27 ` Simon Barber
2013-05-14 17:30 ` grarpamp
2013-05-15 10:25 ` [Bitcoin-development] blind symmetric commitment for stronger byzantine voting resilience (Re: bitcoin taint & unilateral revocability) Adam Back
2013-05-15 11:19 ` Peter Todd
2013-05-15 11:49 ` Adam Back
2013-05-15 12:40 ` Caleb James DeLisle [this message]
2013-05-15 16:21 ` Adam Back
2013-05-15 18:01 ` Caleb James DeLisle
2013-05-15 23:40 ` Adam Back
2013-05-16 1:24 ` Gavin
2013-05-16 1:39 ` Gregory Maxwell
2013-05-16 2:22 ` Mike Hearn
2013-05-16 2:45 ` Gregory Maxwell
2013-05-16 5:52 ` Caleb James DeLisle
2013-05-16 11:32 ` Adam Back
2013-05-16 14:51 ` Adam Back
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