From: Alan Reiner <etotheipi@gmail•com>
To: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lists•sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Preparing for the Cryptopocalypse
Date: Mon, 05 Aug 2013 01:37:53 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <51FF3A31.5050209@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAPaL=UXqxS_p-cLt_Jvh2dzq-dr5nt1RQu1ojEnBxmSN+EuD7A@mail.gmail.com>
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Whoops, I didn't mean to run us down the Quantum Computing debate path.
I was simply using my experience with QCs as a basis for questioning the
conclusion that ECDLP is so much more robust than RSA/factoring
problems. It's possible we would simply be jumping from one burning
bridge to another burning bridge by rushing to convert everything to ECC
in the event of a factoring breakthrough.
From the perspective of quantum computers, it seems those two problems
are essentially the same. As I said, I remember that one of the
problems is solved by using the solution/circuit for the other. But I
don't know if this relationship holds outside the realm of QCs. The
guy who did this presentation said he's not a mathematician and/or
cryptographer, yet he still strongly asserts the superiority of ECDLP.
I'm not convinced.
On 08/05/2013 01:29 AM, John Dillon wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 5, 2013 at 3:30 AM, Peter Vessenes <peter@coinlab•com> wrote:
> > I studied with Jeffrey Hoffstein at Brown, one of the creators of
NTRU. He
> > told me recently NTRU, which is lattice based, is one of the few (only?)
> > NIST-recommended QC-resistant algorithms.
>
> > We talked over layering on NTRU to Bitcoin last year when I was out that
> > way; I think such a thing could be done relatively easily from a crypto
> > standpoint. Of course, there are many, many more questions beyond
just the
> > crypto.
>
> Is NTRU still an option? My understanding is that NTRUsign, the
algorithm to
> produce signatures as opposed to encryption, was broken last year:
>
http://www.di.ens.fr/~ducas/NTRUSign_Cryptanalysis/DucasNguyen_Learning.pdf
>
> Having said that my understanding is also that the break requires a few
> thousand signatures, so perhaps for Bitcoin it would still be
acceptable given
> that we can, and should, never create more than one signature for any
given key
> anyway. You would be betting that improving the attack from a few thousand
> signatures to one is not possible however.
>
> In any case, worst comes to worst there are always lamport signatures.
If they
> are broken hash functions are broken and Bitcoin is fundementally broken
> anyway, though it would be nice to have alternatives that are similar
is pubkey
> and signature size to ECC.
>
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-08-05 5:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-08-04 17:13 Melvin Carvalho
2013-08-04 18:06 ` Alan Reiner
2013-08-05 3:30 ` Peter Vessenes
2013-08-05 5:29 ` John Dillon
2013-08-05 5:37 ` Alan Reiner [this message]
2013-08-05 6:41 ` Gregory Maxwell
2013-08-05 15:37 ` Peter Vessenes
2013-08-06 11:09 ` Mike Hearn
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