The ratio of honest miners that mine the first block they see is > 0.5

Your proposed solution would reduce that ratio to 0.5

In other words your proposed change would make the attack you describe
easier not harder.

On 11/05/2013 09:26 AM, Ittay wrote:
> That sounds like selfish mining, and the magic number is 25%. That's
> the minimal pool size. 
> Today the threshold is 0% with good connectivity. 
>
> If I misunderstood your point, please elaborate. 
>
> Ittay 
>
>
>
> On Tue, Nov 5, 2013 at 12:05 PM, Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org
> <mailto:pete@petertodd.org>> wrote:
>
>     On Tue, Nov 05, 2013 at 11:56:53AM -0500, Ittay wrote:
>     > Hello,
>     >
>     > Please see below our BIP for raising the selfish mining threshold.
>     > Looking forward to your comments.
>
>     <snip>
>
>     > 2. No new vulnerabilities introduced:
>     > Currently the choice among equal-length chains is done arbitrarily,
>     > depending on network topology. This arbitrariness is a source of
>     > vulnerability. We replace it with explicit randomness, which is
>     at the
>     > control of the protocol. The change does not introduce
>     executions that were
>     > not possible with the old protocol.
>
>     Credit goes to Gregory Maxwell for pointing this out, but the random
>     choice solution does in fact introduce a vulnerability in that it
>     creates incentives for pools over a certain size to withhold blocks
>     rather than immediately broadcasting all blocks found.
>
>     The problem is that when the pool eventually choses to reveal the
>     block
>     they mined, 50% of the hashing power switches, thus splitting the
>     network. Like the original attack this can be to their benefit. For
>     pools over a certain size this strategy is profitable even without
>     investing in a low-latency network; Maxwell or someone else can
>     chime in
>     with the details for deriving that threshold.
>
>     I won't get a chance to for a few hours, but someone should do the
>     analysis on a deterministic switching scheme.
>
>     --
>     'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org <http://petertodd.org>
>     0000000000000005e25ca9b9fe62bdd6e8a2b4527ad61753dd2113c268bec707
>
>
>
>
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