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From: Luke Dashjr <luke@dashjr•org>
To: bitcoindev@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [bitcoindev] Trivial QC signatures with clean upgrade path
Date: Sun, 15 Dec 2024 18:54:18 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <52f3bfc0-9446-4400-bf7a-7e38e5777c56@dashjr.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <c2684826-6c93-419b-9a96-c0f0a791c9ac@mattcorallo.com>

One thing to add: the post-QC script path does not require a softfork to 
commit to, as long as it is well-defined. So wallets could begin 
implementing this fallback immediately, without waiting for _any_ 
softfork activation, as soon as the spec is final. They _would_ need to 
guard the post-QC script as if it were itself a private key, which could 
be an issue for hardware wallets - but I suspect there's probably a way 
around that too...

On 12/15/24 4:42 PM, Matt Corallo wrote:
> There's been a few rough ideas for QC robustness in the signature 
> scheme over Bitcoin transactions over the past many years, but many of 
> them have a number of fairly major drawbacks.
>
> First, some base assumptions:
>
> (a) QCs that can break EC will take a while (probably closer to a 
> decade or two than a few years). This lines up with NSA and other 
> recommendations. We have time to upgrade, but we might consider having 
> an option today for wallets to get QC security later.
> (b) Its entirely possible that fundamental scaling constraints will 
> emerge and QCs that break EC simply won't ever be reality. We might 
> not want to bet on this, but its possible.
> (c) We'll get some reasonable warning before QCs are there - QC 
> development requires immense resources, so much so that only a few 
> organizations in the world can afford to hire the talent required and 
> fund the lab. This type of development has and will likely continue to 
> lead to announcements as progress continues, and we'll have a few 
> years warning as QCs get closer and closer.
> (d) post-QC security assumptions (like Lattices and obviously 
> Supersingular Elliptic Curve Isogeny) are insufficient to secure coins 
> today, and are bad candidates for inclusion in Bitcoin's consensus due 
> to the likelihood of future cryptography research. This implies the 
> only candidates for post-QC signature security in Bitcoin's consensus 
> today are hash-based signatures (basically SPHINCS/SPHINCS+).
> (e) its not worth waiting on OP_CAT and the other more general script 
> opcode additions for this, as those seem stuck in bikeshed hell, not 
> to mention questions around MEVil and Bitcoin's future abound. 
> Further, doing this via dedicated opcode simplifies wallet adoption, 
> which is likely to struggle already given the additional workload for 
> wallet developers for no immediate user-facing features.
>
>
> Given these assumptions, it seems ill-advised for wallets today to 
> start locking funds up in a way where they need to pay the on-chain 
> footprint cost to get post-QC security for their transactions *today*, 
> but given upgrade cycles in Bitcoin it also seems ill-advised to not 
> have some option for wallets to have "emergency" paths.
>
> Luckily, taproot provides a great way to build such a scheme! Because 
> taproot script-path spends are strongly-bound (the taproot script-path 
> hash t includes the internal key in its hash), a future QC could 
> determine the associated private key and script-path merkle root, but 
> it cannot forge an alternative script-path merkle-root.
>
> This provides a compelling hook for post-QC security - with the simple 
> addition of an OP_SPHINCS (or equivalent post-QC non-one-time-use 
> (i.e. not Lamport/Winternitz) signature verification opcode, 
> functioning in much the same was OP_CHECKSIG works today), wallets 
> simply need to construct their taproot outputs to always contain a 
> script-path alternative spending condition. When QCs are becoming a 
> reality, key-path taproot spends could be disabled via soft-fork, 
> forcing spends to be done using the QC-secure path.
>
> This scheme obviously has the major drawback of non-upgraded funds 
> confiscation at the time of QC existence, but:
>
> (a) we could instead require explicit opt-in for this scheme. This has 
> the drawback of yet another on-chain fingerprint and would require a 
> new scriptPubKey format (but keeping the existing bech32m address 
> format, hopefully most wallets support that without any code changes 
> today). Of course if we do, substantial quantities of Bitcoin which 
> are unlikely to ever be spent could lead to supply shock, severely 
> damaging Bitcoin's utility in other ways,
> (b) alternatively, we could allow key-path spends for wallets which 
> prove the script-path is a NUMS point (via some new keypath+proof 
> spend variant). I doubt many wallets today bother committing to a NUMS 
> point for their taproot output pubkeys, so this would break existing 
> wallets, but it would allow for an opt-out scheme.
>
> This scheme has the incredibly nice property of not bloating existing 
> use-cases nearly at all (just one extra taproot script-path branch, 
> but that's not a huge deal generally).
>
> There's a few things to bike-shed on here, though - first of all 
> whether to require opt-in or provide an opt-out and secondly whether 
> to also fail any script-paths that hit an ECDSA signature validation 
> (probably yes?).
>
> I assume this has been written up elsewhere but I couldn't find it. 
> Most of this is due to not_nothingmuch, I'm just writing it up here 
> and taking credit for it.
>
> This doesn't address the questions around PoW in a post-QC world, of 
> course, but that likely isn't something that can be answered until we 
> see more practical limitations of QCs (eg what is the minimal latency 
> of a QC gate? If its particularly low, can we simply complexify 
> Bitcoin's PoW hash function in order to delay QC results far past when 
> traditional hardware is able to mine a block?)
>
> Matt
>

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  reply	other threads:[~2024-12-16  0:02 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-12-15 21:42 Matt Corallo
2024-12-15 23:54 ` Luke Dashjr [this message]
2024-12-16  1:30   ` Weikeng Chen
2024-12-16  1:40     ` Matt Corallo
2024-12-16 11:14 ` Anthony Towns
2024-12-16 15:57   ` Matt Corallo
2024-12-16 22:20   ` Tadge Dryja
2024-12-17  5:31     ` 'conduition' via Bitcoin Development Mailing List
2024-12-18  3:29       ` Antoine Riard

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