public inbox for bitcoindev@googlegroups.com
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Mark Friedenbach <mark@friedenbach•org>
To: Nathan Wilcox <nathan@z•cash>,
	Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
	<bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Rebatable fees & incentive-safe fee markets
Date: Thu, 28 Sep 2017 20:30:27 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <53AEC8D5-EF33-434A-85C7-9CF824C1FDF2@friedenbach.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAK8perBDQDN0WvOn3bVxDHCVLjn=chg9=pVoBsVa6U67Qox8GQ@mail.gmail.com>

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2814 bytes --]

Only if your keys are online and the transaction is self-signed. It wouldn’t let you pre-sign a transaction for a third party to broadcast and have it clear at just the market rate in the future. Like a payment channel refund, for example.

> On Sep 28, 2017, at 7:17 PM, Nathan Wilcox via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
>> On Fri, Sep 29, 2017 at 11:10 AM, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>> On Fri, Sep 29, 2017 at 01:53:55AM +0000, Matt Corallo via bitcoin-dev wrote:
>> > I'm somewhat curious what the authors envisioned the real-world implications of this model to be. While blindly asking users to enter what they're willing to pay always works in theory, I'd imagine in such a world the fee selection UX would be similar to what it is today - users are provided a list of options with feerates and expected confirmation times from which to select. Indeed, in a world where users pay a lower fee if they paid more than necessary fee estimation could be more willing to overshoot and the UX around RBF and CPFP could be simplified greatly, but I'm not actually convinced that it would result in higher overall mining revenue.
>> 
>> Note too that the fee users are willing to pay often changes over time.
>> 
>> My OpenTimestamps service is a perfect example: getting a timestamp confirmed
>> within 10 minutes of the previous one has little value to me, but if the
>> previous completed timestamp was 24 hours ago I'm willing to pay significantly
>> more money because the time delay is getting significant enough to affect the
>> trustworthyness of the entire service. So the fee selection mechanism is
>> nothing more than a RBF-using loop that bumps the fee every time a block gets
>> mined w/o confirming my latest transaction.
>> 
>> This kind of time sensitivity is probably true of a majority of Bitcoin
>> use-cases, with the caveat that often the slope will be negative eventually:
>> after a point in time completing the transaction has no value.
>> 
> 
> Wouldn't this RBF loop behave pretty much the same in the Monopolistic Price Mechanism? (I haven't grokked RSOP yet.)
> 
> In fact, so long as RBF works, isn't it possible to raise Pay-Your-Bid fees and Monopolistic Price fees over time to express the time curve preference?
> 
>  
>> --
>> https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
>> 
>> _______________________________________________
>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev

[-- Attachment #2: Type: text/html, Size: 4256 bytes --]

  reply	other threads:[~2017-09-29  3:30 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-09-29  1:06 Mark Friedenbach
2017-09-29  1:53 ` Matt Corallo
2017-09-29  2:09   ` Nathan Wilcox
2017-09-29  2:10   ` Peter Todd
2017-09-29  2:17     ` Nathan Wilcox
2017-09-29  3:30       ` Mark Friedenbach [this message]
2017-09-29  2:02 ` Peter Todd
2017-09-29  2:45   ` Mark Friedenbach
2017-09-29  3:02     ` Peter Todd
2017-09-29  4:45 ` Anthony Towns
     [not found] <CAEgR2PGCZ=F85yjAbZgC6NtzhpdgBL3n4M2jowN12wJ7x-Ai1A@mail.gmail.com>
     [not found] ` <CAEgR2PGrxDQE0k8WX4XXz9GN-RAL6JB51ST9Hdz=ba36gRCa6A@mail.gmail.com>
     [not found]   ` <CAEgR2PFjt=ihzRBhNXbHTAJz1R+3vz8o-zRZkDA3iBo39x9cTQ@mail.gmail.com>
     [not found]     ` <CAEgR2PFfSjJjkTYq+DAmTzmkHPxqhn6fUDoXTzrRebz+OoUgqw@mail.gmail.com>
     [not found]       ` <CAEgR2PG5ZueHKDXbsPDEjQG7xAYBa_JAtPZo9n1V2=STC1srpA@mail.gmail.com>
     [not found]         ` <CAEgR2PGPQ1e9SmoWOS3V+N9v+OWiM4g3nPN3d9urc+DfkWEJ7A@mail.gmail.com>
     [not found]           ` <CAEgR2PEKkHH6+Sh8cQGF83-s1tpwQZgd0fiuNz_xyWu0mUPfCA@mail.gmail.com>
     [not found]             ` <CAEgR2PEyWFO1RFohVEpcb-M7aM-8xjCFvDPeJPD4zF4yTCyZ0A@mail.gmail.com>
2017-09-29 10:43               ` Daniele Pinna
2017-09-29 12:50                 ` Alex Morcos
2017-09-29 15:22                 ` Mark Friedenbach
2017-09-30  3:53                   ` Jorge Timón
2017-09-30  3:55                     ` Jorge Timón
2017-09-30  8:54                       ` Gregory Maxwell
2017-09-30  0:47                 ` Gregory Maxwell

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=53AEC8D5-EF33-434A-85C7-9CF824C1FDF2@friedenbach.org \
    --to=mark@friedenbach$(echo .)org \
    --cc=bitcoin-dev@lists$(echo .)linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=nathan@z$(echo .)cash \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox