From: Tom Harding <tomh@thinlink•com>
To: Gregory Maxwell <gmaxwell@gmail•com>
Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lists•sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] First-Seen-Safe Replace-by-Fee
Date: Tue, 26 May 2015 16:00:01 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <5564FAF1.1050907@thinlink.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAAS2fgSEW9RjZ-=-XE8AkdToHjjAyzBfW6X7JjFtUbppcExbDw@mail.gmail.com>
On 5/26/2015 12:10 PM, Gregory Maxwell wrote:
> On Tue, May 26, 2015 at 5:54 PM, Tom Harding <tomh@thinlink•com> wrote:
>> It's not difficult to
>> imagine real-world consequences to not having contributed to the
>> transaction.
> I'm having a hard time. Can you help me understand a specific case
> where this makes a difference.
>
The bitcoin transaction is part of a real-world "deal" with unknown
connections to the other parts. New inputs combined with new or
increased outputs can be thought of as a second deal sharing the same
envelope. That's not the case if paying parties are kicked out of the
deal, and possibly don't learn about it right away.
A subset of parties to an Armory simulfunding transaction (an actual
multi-input use case) could replace one signer's input after they
broadcast it. Whether that's a problem depends on real-world
connections. Maybe the receiver cares where he is paid from or is
basing a subsequent decision on it. Maybe a new output is being added,
whose presence makes the transaction less likely to be confirmed
quickly, with that speed affecting the business.
With Kalle's Proof of Payment proposed standard, one payer in a
two-input transaction could decide to boot the other, and claim the
concert tickets all for himself. The fact that he pays is not the only
consideration in the real world -- what if these are the last 2 tickets?
Mempool policy shouldn't help one payer make a unilateral decision to
become the sole party to a deal after various parties have seen it
broadcast.
> The inherent malleability of signatures makes it unreliable to depend
> on the signature content of a transaction until its good and buried,
> regardless.
I'd argue that changing how an input is signed doesn't change the deal.
For example if a different 2 of 3 multisig participants sign, those 3
people gave up that level of control when they created the multisig.
Replacement is new - we have a choice what kind of warnings we need to
give to signers of multi-input transactions. IMHO we should avoid
needing a stronger warning than is already needed for 0-conf.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-05-26 23:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-05-26 5:13 Peter Todd
2015-05-26 17:54 ` Tom Harding
2015-05-26 19:10 ` Gregory Maxwell
2015-05-26 23:00 ` Tom Harding [this message]
2015-05-26 23:11 ` Gregory Maxwell
2015-05-26 23:42 ` Tom Harding
2015-05-26 21:20 ` Danny Thorpe
2015-05-26 21:27 ` Pieter Wuille
2015-05-26 22:09 ` Danny Thorpe
2015-05-26 22:18 ` Adam Back
2015-05-27 7:30 ` Peter Todd
2015-06-10 9:10 ` [Bitcoin-development] First-Seen-Safe Replace-by-Fee patch against Bitcoin Core v0.10.2 Peter Todd
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