From: Paul Sztorc <truthcoin@gmail•com>
To: s7r@sky-ip•org, bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Lightning Network's effect on miner fees
Date: Wed, 14 Oct 2015 19:55:08 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <561EEB5C.3000500@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <561ED92C.2090203@sky-ip.org>
On 10/14/2015 6:37 PM, s7r wrote:
> On 10/14/2015 6:19 PM, Paul Sztorc wrote:
> > LN transactions are a substitute good for on-chain transactions.
>
> > Therefore, demand for on-chain transactions will decrease as a
> > result of LN, meaning that fees will be lower than they would
> > otherwise be.
>
> > However, the two are also perfect compliments, as LN transactions
> > cannot take place at all without periodic on-chain transactions.
>
> > The demand for *all* Bitcoin transactions (LN and otherwise) is
> > itself a function of innumerable factors, one of which is the
> > question "Which form of money [Bitcoin or not-Bitcoin] do I think
> > my trading partners will be using?". By supporting a higher rate of
> > (higher-quality) Bitcoin transactions, the net result is highly
> > uncertain, but will probably be that LN actually increases trading
> > fees.
>
> Probably yes. But probably no. Having less hashing power is not good,
> and it's unrelated to scalability and decentralization, it's related
> to security. Of course we could argue that the hashing power is not
> super decentralized at this moment but it's unrelated to the topic.
Who are you talking to? Who said anything about any of this? If you are
talking to me, please don't imply that I don't already know these things.
>
> I'd rather have less decentralized big amount of hashing power as
> opposite to less hashing power.
>
> One theory, very close to yours, is that if Bitcoin transactions
> demand grows so high that we need the lightning network, there should
> be plenty of on chain transactions for miners to collect fees from.
For a given fee amount, LN transactions are worse than on-chain
transactions. So people would only use LN if they preferred cheaper txns.
>
> I haven't yet seen the incentives of everyone involved in lightning
> network (payment channel end points, hub operators, miners, etc.) but
> would it make sense to enforce a % of the fees collected by on payment
> hubs to be spent as miner fees, regardless if the transactions from
> that hub go on the main chain or not?
If you want fees to go up, either decrease supply (lower the blocksize
limit) or increase demand (a popular Bitcoin). There's no need to do
anything roundabout.
Regards,
Paul
prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-10-14 23:55 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-10-14 10:14 s7r
2015-10-14 15:19 ` Paul Sztorc
2015-10-14 15:37 ` Bryan Bishop
2015-10-15 3:35 ` Daniel Stadulis
2015-10-14 22:37 ` s7r
2015-10-14 23:42 ` Daniel Newton
2015-10-14 23:55 ` Paul Sztorc [this message]
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