The OP premise is flawed: https://github.com/libbitcoin/libbitcoin/wiki/Fee-Recovery-Fallacy as is the idea that side fees are incentive incompatible: https://github.com/libbitcoin/libbitcoin/wiki/Side-Fee-Fallacy e On 01/27/2018 11:06 AM, Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev wrote: > Not incentive compatible. Miners would prefer to include transactions > paying fees via alternative mechanisms (anyone can spend outputs, > direct pay to miner outputs, or completely out of band), if they even > paid attention to internal fees at all they would give a lot more > weight to direct payment fees. Users would accordingly pay much lower > fees if they used these alternatives instead of directly, so the > equlibrium state is almost everyone bypassing. Bypass fee mechenisms > have been supported by miners since 2011 too, so it isn't just > conjecture. > > On Sat, Jan 27, 2018 at 8:45 AM, Nathan Parker via bitcoin-dev > wrote: >> Miners can fill their blocks with transactions paying very high fees at no >> cost because they get the fees back to themselves. They can do this for >> different purposes, like trying to increase the recommended fee. Here I >> propose a backwards-compatible solution to this problem. >> >> The solution would be to reward the fees of the current block to the miner >> of the next block (or X blocks after the current one). That way, if a miner >> floods its own block with very high fee transactions, those fees are no >> longer given back to itself, but to the miner of future blocks which could >> potentially be anyone. Flooding blocks with fake txs is now discouraged. >> However, filling blocks with real transactions paying real fees is still >> encouraged because you could be the one to mine the block that would claim >> this reward. >> >> The way to implement this in a backwards-compatible fashion would be to >> enforce miners to set an anyone-can-spend output in the coinbase transaction >> of the block (by adding this as a rule for verifying new blocks). The miner >> of 100 blocks after the current one can add a secondary transaction spending >> this block's anyone-can-spend coinbase transaction (due to the coinbase >> needing 100 blocks to mature) and thus claiming the funds. This way, the >> block reward of a block X is always transferred to the miner of block X+100. >> >> Implementing this would require a soft-fork. Since that secondary >> transaction needs no signature whatsoever, the overhead caused by that extra >> transaction is negligible. >> >> Possible Downside: When the fork is activated, the miners won’t get any >> reward for mining blocks for a period of 100 blocks. They could choose to >> power off the mining equipment for maintenance or to save power over that >> period, so the hashrate could drop temporarily. However, if the hashrate >> drops too much, blocks would take much longer to mine, and miners wouldn’t >> want that either since they want to go through those 100 reward-less blocks >> as soon as possible so they can start getting rewards from mining again. >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> bitcoin-dev mailing list >> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >> > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >