like all other "incentive-driven honesty" proposals, it only works if the value locked in the bonds is greater than thevalue locked in the covenants. but that's a reasonable restriction for many "l2" use cases, where the purpose of l2 is to enable low-valued "vtxo's" that allow an emulated self custody of small amounts that would otherwise be too expensive to move on-chain
Esteemed Bitcoin Developers,you can find the paper here: https://rubin.io/bitcoin/2024/11/26/unfed-covenants/Sharing below an approach to implementing Bitcoin covenants without requiring native protocol changes. The approach uses covenant emulators signing servers.
Unlike approaches to date for covenant emulation, the oracle signers put up bonds to BitVM auditors subject to a BITVM style fraud proof, whereby their funds can be stolen if the emulator oracle ever signs a transaction in violation of the covenant rules.
Regards,Jeremy