Re: [bitcoin-dev] Bech32 weakness and impact on bip-taproot addresses

From: Matt Corallo <lf-lists@mattcorallo•com>
To: Greg Sanders <gsanders87@gmail•com>,
	Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
	<bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Bech32 weakness and impact on bip-taproot addresses
Date: Thu, 7 Nov 2019 19:41:54 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <701F6185-EB2C-4EB1-AAAA-1133879CF541@mattcorallo.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAB3F3DsbPyqUutBNbVcHME0kGWsbTzTtb5tWV+zRERHwpibXBw@mail.gmail.com>

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Given the issue is in the address format, not the consensus/standardness layer, it does seem somewhat strange to jump to addressing it with a consensus/standardness fix. Maybe the ship has sailed, but for the sake of considering all our options, we could also redefine bech32 to not allow such addresses.

Matt

>> On Nov 7, 2019, at 17:47, Greg Sanders via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> 
> Could the softer touch of just making them non-standard apply as a future preparation for an accepted softfork? Relaxations could easily be done later if desired.
> 
>>> On Thu, Nov 7, 2019, 5:37 PM Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>> Hello all,
>> 
>> A while ago it was discovered that bech32 has a mutation weakness (see
>> https://github.com/sipa/bech32/issues/51 for details). Specifically,
>> when a bech32 string ends with a "p", inserting or erasing "q"s right
>> before that "p" does not invalidate it. While insertion/erasure
>> robustness was not an explicit goal (BCH codes in general only have
>> guarantees about substitution errors), this is very much not by
>> design, and this specific issue could have been made much less
>> impactful with a slightly different approach. I'm sorry it wasn't
>> caught earlier.
>> 
>> This has little effect on the security of P2WPKH/P2WSH addresses, as
>> those are only valid (per BIP173) for specific lengths (42 and 62
>> characters respectively). Inserting 20 consecutive "p"s in a typo
>> seems highly improbable.
>> 
>> I'm making this post because this property may unfortunately influence
>> design decisions around bip-taproot, as was brought up in the review
>> session (https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2019-October/017427.html)
>> past tuesday. In the current draft, witness v1 outputs of length other
>> than 32 remain unencumbered, which means that for now such an
>> insertion or erasure would result in an output that can be spent by
>> anyone. If that is considered unacceptable, it could be prevented by
>> for example outlawing v1 witness outputs of length 31 and 33.
>> 
>> Thoughts?
>> 
>> Cheers,
>> 
>> -- 
>> Pieter
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