> technically, all we need is for *miners* to consistently mine "full > rbf" There's another important point I think: technically, all we need is for *miners* to consistently mine the highest fee-rate transaction (or the one with the most incentive). Miners could probably be incentivized to mine transactions that double spend a previous transaction that isn't rbf, also. Cheers, -Yancy On 2022-11-03 14:32, Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev wrote: > actually, peter makes an important point here > > technically, all we need is for *miners* to consistently mine "full > rbf" > > as long as they do, businesses that accept 0conf will have to adjust > their risk accordingly, and the problem of misaligned incentives is > resolved > > i don't think it matters what non-mining users do nearly as much > > On Wed, Nov 2, 2022 at 3:05 PM alicexbt via bitcoin-dev > wrote: > > Hi Peter, > > tl;dr: I'm broadcasting full-RBF replacements paying extremely high > fees to reward miners that turn on full-RBF. I'm starting small, just > ~$100/block in times of congestion. Miner and pool profit margins are > pretty small, on the order of $1k/block in many cases, so I know it > doesn't take that much more money to make a difference. > I appreciate this effort and perhaps this was all that was needed in > addition to Bitcoin Core's inclusion of full rbf support. Making it > default right away or enabling preferential peering with service > flag in a bitcoin core release was unnecessary. > > If you'd like to donate to this effort, send BTC to > bc1qagmufdn6rf80kj3faw4d0pnhxyr47sevp3nj9m > Sorry, I don't trust you based on some of the things you support on > Twitter. Hopefully, others will donate and help this bounty. > > /dev/fd0 > > Sent with Proton Mail secure email. > > ------- Original Message ------- > On Wednesday, November 2nd, 2022 at 2:56 PM, Peter Todd via > bitcoin-dev wrote: > > I'm now running a full-RBf bounty program for miners. > > tl;dr: I'm broadcasting full-RBF replacements paying extremely high > fees to reward miners that turn on full-RBF. I'm starting small, just > ~$100/block in times of congestion. Miner and pool profit margins are > pretty small, on the order of $1k/block in many cases, so I know it > doesn't take that much more money to make a difference. > > Why should you do this? Full-RBF/zeroconf has been discussed to death. > But tl;dr: You'll earn more money, and help transition Bitcoin to a > more secure mempool policy based on economic incentives rather than > trust. > > If you're a miner and want to participate, the easiest way to so is to > use the mempoolfullrbf=1 option in the upcoming Bitcoin Core v24 > release (eg the 24.0rc3 tag), or use the mempoolreplacement=fee option > in Bitcoin Knots. > You can also just modify the code yourself by removing the opt-in RBF > check. For example against the v23.0 tag: > > $ git diff > diff --git a/src/validation.cpp b/src/validation.cpp > index 214112e2b..44c364623 100644 > --- a/src/validation.cpp > +++ b/src/validation.cpp > @@ -736,7 +736,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, > Workspace& ws) // check all unconfirmed ancestors; otherwise an opt-in > ancestor > // might be replaced, causing removal of this descendant. > if (!SignalsOptInRBF(*ptxConflicting)) { > - return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, > "txn-mempool-conflict"); + // return > state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, > "txn-mempool-conflict"); } > > ws.m_conflicts.insert(ptxConflicting->GetHash()); > > Once you've enabled full-RBF, you need a full-RBF peer. I'm running a > few of them: > > cup.nop.lol > mug.nop.lol > jar.nop.lol > jug.nop.lol > > These nodes run a preferential peering patch > (https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/25600) to ensure that full-RBF > nodes are interconnected to each other and replacements can easily > propagate. Also feel free to contact me if you'd like to peer with a > private node. > > If you'd like to donate to this effort, send BTC to > bc1qagmufdn6rf80kj3faw4d0pnhxyr47sevp3nj9m > > ...and yes, I'm well aware that miners could collect this bounty in > other ways, eg by raising minimum fees. Doing that also breaks > zeroconf, so I'm not too concerned. > > -- > https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org [1 [1]] > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev Links: ------ [1] http://petertodd.org _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev Links: ------ [1] http://petertodd.org