Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Lightning-dev] CPFP Carve-Out for Fee-Prediction Issues in Contracting Applications (eg Lightning)

From: Matt Corallo <lf-lists@mattcorallo•com>
To: "Johan Torås Halseth" <johanth@gmail•com>,
	"Rusty Russell" <rusty@rustcorp•com.au>
Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
	<bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>,
	lightning-dev <lightning-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Lightning-dev] CPFP Carve-Out for Fee-Prediction Issues in Contracting Applications (eg Lightning)
Date: Thu, 24 Oct 2019 21:25:14 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <83915e8a-f49a-8233-0389-934c189f770c@mattcorallo.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAD3i26AjhQ9VkCo_5y8aqZ_8YvSqKP2MCkdRv8YunjAhmmXz=Q@mail.gmail.com>

I may be missing something, but I'm not sure how this changes anything?

If you have a commitment transaction, you always need at least, and
exactly, one non-CSV output per party. The fact that there is a size
limitation on the transaction that spends for carve-out purposes only
effects how many other inputs/outputs you can add, but somehow I doubt
its ever going to be a large enough number to matter.

Matt

On 10/24/19 1:49 PM, Johan Torås Halseth wrote:
> Reviving this old thread now that the recently released RC for bitcoind
> 0.19 includes the above mentioned carve-out rule.
> 
> In an attempt to pave the way for more robust CPFP of on-chain contracts
> (Lightning commitment transactions), the carve-out rule was added in
> https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/15681. However, having worked on
> an implementation of a new commitment format for utilizing the Bring
> Your Own Fees strategy using CPFP, I’m wondering if the special case
> rule should have been relaxed a bit, to avoid the need for adding a 1
> CSV to all outputs (in case of Lightning this means HTLC scripts would
> need to be changed to add the CSV delay).
> 
> Instead, what about letting the rule be
> 
> The last transaction which is added to a package of dependent
> transactions in the mempool must:
>   * Have no more than one unconfirmed parent.
> 
> This would of course allow adding a large transaction to each output of
> the unconfirmed parent, which in effect would allow an attacker to
> exceed the MAX_PACKAGE_VIRTUAL_SIZE limit in some cases. However, is
> this a problem with the current mempool acceptance code in bitcoind? I
> would imagine evicting transactions based on feerate when the max
> mempool size is met handles this, but I’m asking since it seems like
> there has been several changes to the acceptance code and eviction
> policy since the limit was first introduced.
> 
> - Johan
> 
> 
> On Wed, Feb 13, 2019 at 6:57 AM Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp•com.au
> <mailto:rusty@rustcorp•com.au>> wrote:
> 
>     Matt Corallo <lf-lists@mattcorallo•com
>     <mailto:lf-lists@mattcorallo•com>> writes:
>     >>> Thus, even if you imagine a steady-state mempool growth, unless the
>     >>> "near the top of the mempool" criteria is "near the top of the next
>     >>> block" (which is obviously *not* incentive-compatible)
>     >>
>     >> I was defining "top of mempool" as "in the first 4 MSipa", ie. next
>     >> block, and assumed you'd only allow RBF if the old package wasn't
>     in the
>     >> top and the replacement would be.  That seems incentive
>     compatible; more
>     >> than the current scheme?
>     >
>     > My point was, because of block time variance, even that criteria
>     doesn't hold up. If you assume a steady flow of new transactions and
>     one or two blocks come in "late", suddenly "top 4MWeight" isn't
>     likely to get confirmed until a few blocks come in "early". Given
>     block variance within a 12 block window, this is a relatively likely
>     scenario.
> 
>     [ Digging through old mail. ]
> 
>     Doesn't really matter.  Lightning close algorithm would be:
> 
>     1.  Give bitcoind unileratal close.
>     2.  Ask bitcoind what current expidited fee is (or survey your mempool).
>     3.  Give bitcoind child "push" tx at that total feerate.
>     4.  If next block doesn't contain unilateral close tx, goto 2.
> 
>     In this case, if you allow a simpified RBF where 'you can replace if
>     1. feerate is higher, 2. new tx is in first 4Msipa of mempool, 3.
>     old tx isnt',
>     it works.
> 
>     It allows someone 100k of free tx spam, sure.  But it's simple.
> 
>     We could further restrict it by marking the unilateral close somehow to
>     say "gonna be pushed" and further limiting the child tx weight (say,
>     5kSipa?) in that case.
> 
>     Cheers,
>     Rusty.
>     _______________________________________________
>     Lightning-dev mailing list
>     Lightning-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
>     <mailto:Lightning-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>
>     https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/lightning-dev
> 