From: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp•com.au>
To: Anthony Towns <aj@erisian•com.au>, bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
Cc: lightning-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Lightning-dev] More thoughts on NOINPUT safety
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 14:03:55 +1030 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87woku9q3g.fsf@rustcorp.com.au> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87k1gubdjm.fsf@rustcorp.com.au>
Sorry AJ, my prior email was not constructive :(
I consider the "my software reused my keys" the most reasonable attack
scenario, though still small compared to other lightning attack surfaces.
But I understand the general wariness of third-parties reusing
SIGHASH_NOINPUT signatures.
Since "must have a non-SIGHASH_NOINPUT" rule addresses the first reuse
scenario (as well as the second), I'd be content with that proposal.
Future segwit versions may choose to relax it.[1]
Cheers,
Rusty.
[1] Must be consensus, not standardness; my prev suggestion was bogus.
Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp•com.au> writes:
> Anthony Towns <aj@erisian•com.au> writes:
>> If you publish to the blockchain:
> ...
>> 4 can be dropped, state 5 and finish can be altered). Since the CSV delay
>> is chosen by the participants, the above is still a possible scenario
>> in eltoo, though, and it means there's some risk for someone accepting
>> bitcoins that result from a non-cooperative close of an eltoo channel.
>
> AJ, this was a meandering random walk which shed very little light.
>
> I don't find the differentiation between malicious and non-malicious
> double-spends convincing. Even if you trust A, you already have to
> worry about person-who-sent-the-coins-to-A. This expands that set to be
> "miner who mined coins sent-to-A", but it's very hard to see what
> difference that makes to how you'd handle coins from A.
>
>> Beyond that, I think NOINPUT has two fundamental ways to cause problems
>> for the people doing NOINPUT sigs:
>>
>> 1) your signature gets applied to a unexpectedly different
>> script, perhaps making it look like you've being dealing
>> with some blacklisted entity. OP_MASK and similar solves
>> this.
>
> ... followed by two paragraphs describing how it's not a "fundamental
> way to cause problems" that you (or I) can see.
>
>> For the second case, that seems a little more concerning. The nightmare
>> scenario is maybe something like:
>>
>> * naive users do silly things with NOINPUT signatures, and end up
>> losing funds due to replays like the above
>
> As we've never seen with SIGHASH_NONE?
>
>> * initial source of funds was some major exchange, who decide it's
>> cheaper to refund the lost funds than deal with the customer complaints
>>
>> * the lost funds end up costing enough that major exchanges just outright
>> ban sending funds to any address capable of NOINPUT, which also bans
>> all taproot/schnorr addresses
>
> I don't find this remotely credible.
>
>> FWIW, I don't have a strong opinion here yet, but:
>>
>> - I'm still inclined to err on the side of putting more safety
>> measures in for NOINPUT, rather than fewer
>
> In theory, sure. But not feel-good and complex "safety measures" which
> don't actually help in practical failure scenarios.
>
>> - the "must have a sig that commits to the input tx" seems like it
>> should be pretty safe, not too expensive, and keeps taproot's privacy
>> benefits in the cases where you end up needing to use NOINPUT
>
> If this is considered necessary, can it be a standardness rule rather
> than consensus?
>
> Thanks,
> Rusty.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-03-20 3:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-03-13 1:41 [bitcoin-dev] " Anthony Towns
2019-03-13 6:41 ` [bitcoin-dev] [Lightning-dev] " ZmnSCPxj
2019-03-13 11:10 ` Anthony Towns
2019-03-14 5:22 ` ZmnSCPxj
2019-03-14 7:24 ` Anthony Towns
2019-03-14 7:55 ` ZmnSCPxj
2019-03-14 12:00 ` Christian Decker
2019-03-20 0:22 ` Rusty Russell
2019-03-20 3:33 ` Rusty Russell [this message]
2019-03-20 7:38 ` ZmnSCPxj
2019-03-20 8:07 ` ZmnSCPxj
2019-03-21 8:37 ` Johnson Lau
2019-03-21 9:06 ` Anthony Towns
2019-03-21 10:05 ` ZmnSCPxj
2019-03-21 11:55 ` Anthony Towns
2019-03-22 1:59 ` ZmnSCPxj
2019-03-22 2:58 ` Anthony Towns
2019-03-22 7:46 ` ZmnSCPxj
2019-03-22 4:23 ` Johnson Lau
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