From: Tamas Blummer <tamas@bitsofproof•com>
To: slush <slush@centrum•cz>
Cc: "bitcoin-development@lists•sourceforge.net"
<bitcoin-development@lists•sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] SIGHASH_WITHINPUTVALUE
Date: Fri, 23 Jan 2015 17:08:50 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <954BF4E3-8DF2-4927-9E25-C5D66127FFA5@bitsofproof.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAJna-HiXxt5E=FBiDuWMCKrK4C0dcvhHEjTAoK3LGQLafJOqtQ@mail.gmail.com>
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You mean an isolated signing device without memory right?
An isolated node would still know the transactions substantiating its coins, why would it sign them away to fees ?
Tamas Blummer
On Jan 23, 2015, at 4:47 PM, slush <slush@centrum•cz> wrote:
> Correct, plus the most likely scenario in such attack is that the malware even don't push such tx with excessive fees to the network, but send it directly to attacker's pool/miner.
>
> M.
>
> On Fri, Jan 23, 2015 at 4:42 PM, Alan Reiner <etotheipi@gmail•com> wrote:
> Unfortunately, one major attack vector is someone isolating your node, getting you to sign away your whole wallet to fee, and then selling it to a mining pool to mine it before you can figure why your transactions aren't making it to the network. In such an attack, the relay rules aren't relevant, and if the attacker can DoS you for 24 hours, it doesn't take a ton of mining power to make the attack extremely likely to succeed.
>
>
>
>
> On 01/23/2015 10:31 AM, Tamas Blummer wrote:
>> Not a fix, but would reduce the financial risk, if nodes were not relaying excessive fee transactions.
>>
>> Tamas Blummer
>>
>>
>
>
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-01-23 16:09 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-01-23 14:51 slush
2015-01-23 15:24 ` Alan Reiner
2015-01-23 15:40 ` slush
2015-01-23 16:05 ` Gregory Maxwell
2015-01-23 16:18 ` slush
2015-01-23 16:52 ` Gregory Maxwell
2015-01-23 17:40 ` slush
2015-01-23 18:51 ` Gregory Maxwell
2015-01-23 19:19 ` slush
2015-01-23 16:23 ` Alan Reiner
2015-01-23 16:27 ` Alan Reiner
2015-01-23 16:33 ` Alan Reiner
2015-01-23 16:35 ` slush
2015-01-23 17:49 ` Peter Todd
2015-01-23 15:31 ` Tamas Blummer
2015-01-23 15:42 ` Alan Reiner
2015-01-23 15:47 ` slush
2015-01-23 16:08 ` Tamas Blummer [this message]
2015-01-23 16:12 ` Adam Back
2015-01-23 16:17 ` Adam Back
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