Re: [bitcoin-dev] Concern about "Inscriptions"

From: vjudeu@gazeta•pl
To: GamedevAlice <gamedevalice256@gmail•com>,
	Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
	<bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>,
	"bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org"
	<bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Concern about "Inscriptions"
Date: Sun, 03 Sep 2023 18:01:02 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <98009035-ac19029087479e992d1f7eccdc9eb0ab@pmq6v.m5r2.onet> (raw)

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> Given the current concerns with blockchain size increases due to inscriptions, and now that the lightning network is starting to gain more traction, perhaps people are now more willing to consider a smaller blocksize in favor of pushing more activity to lightning?

People will not agree to shrink the maximum block size. However, if you want to kill inscriptions, there is another approach, that could be used to force them into second layers: it is called cut-through, and was described in this topic: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=281848.0

Then, if you have "Alice -> Bob -> ... -> Zack" transaction chain, and for example some inscriptions were created in "Alice -> Bob" transaction, then cut-through could remove those inscriptions, while leaving the payment unaffected, because the proper amount of coins will be received by Zack, as it should be.

On 2023-08-25 10:44:41 user GamedevAlice via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
As I understand it, protecting against this is exactly the reason why a blocksize limit exists. Perhaps it should never have been increased in the first place.
Given the current concerns with blockchain size increases due to inscriptions, and now that the lightning network is starting to gain more traction, perhaps people are now more willing to consider a smaller blocksize in favor of pushing more activity to lightning?

On Tue, Aug 22, 2023, 8:00 AM , <bitcoin-dev-request@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
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Today's Topics:
   1. Re: Concern about "Inscriptions" (symphonicbtc)
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Message: 1
Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2023 22:34:03 +0000
From: symphonicbtc <symphonicbtc@proton•me>
To: John Tromp <john.tromp@gmail•com>
Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
        <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Concern about "Inscriptions"
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It is important to also note that proof of secret key schemes are highly data inefficient and likely would have a higher cost for users than simply allowing arbitrary data to continue. In ECDSA, purposely re-using k values allows you to encode data in both k and the entire secret key, as both become computable. Or, one could bruteforce a k value to encode data in a sig, as is done in some compromised hardware key exfiltration attacks. Additionally, one can bruteforce keys in order to encode data in the public key.
It is very difficult and expensive to attempt to limit the storage of arbitrary data in a system where the security comes from secret keys being arbitrary data.
Symphonic
------- Original Message -------
On Monday, August 21st, 2023 at 4:28 PM, John Tromp via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> > If we ban "arbitrary data", however you want to define it, then actors will
> > simply respond by encoding their data within sets of public keys. Public
> > key data is indistinguishable from random data, and, unless we are willing
> > to pad the blockchain with proof of knowledge of secret keys, there will be
> > no way to tell a priori whether a given public key is really a public key
> > or whether it is encoding an inscription or some other data.
>
>
> Note that in the Mimblewimble protocol, range proofs already prove
> knowledge of blinding factor in Pedersen commitments, and thus no
> additional padding is needed there to prevent the encoding of spam
> into cryptographic material. This makes pure MW blockchains the most
> inscription/spam resistant [1].
>
> [1] https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5437464.msg61980991#msg61980991
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